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ABSTRACT
The purpose or the present study Is two fold (I) To examine the essential
components or leadership In general end charismatic leadership In particular, and
(II) to construct a generalized model pertaining to the emergence, consolidation
and termination of charismatic leadership. In otherwords, It is an attempt to
analyze and explain the various theories on political leadership and scrutinize the
Weberlan concept of charisma. Above that, the basic objective of the thesis is the
application of political theory and the conceptual framework of charisma to the
case of Gamal Abdel Nasser, ruler of Egypt from 1952 until his premature death
In 1970. Special focus Is made in the aftermath of the 1967 War and the
reinstatement of Nasser as Egypt's leader by popular mandate, following his
decision to resign.
The thesis Is divided into three sections: The first section, Framework of Analysis
and Theoretical Perspective, locks at (I) the definitions, functions and
approaches of Political Leadership, and; (Ii) The study, formulation and critique
of Weberian Charisma. The second section, the role dynamics, politics, and
Impact of Gamal Abdel Nasser, constructs (I) a Political Biography of
Nasser( 1918-1970) and, (II) Nasser's cognitive perceptions and the politics of
Arab Nationalism. The third section looks at Nasser's leadership impact on the
Arabs with specific reference to the 1967 June War. Also Included In this
section, Is a generalized model of charismatic political leadership.
As conceptualized by Weber, charisma (the gift of Grace) referred to 'a certain
quality of an Individual personally by virtue of which he Is set apart from
ordinary man and treated as enclosed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least
specifically exceptional powers or qualities.' The present thesis has attempted to
apply the theory of political leadership and the conceptual tool of charisma to the
case study of Nasser's Egypt (1952-1970). In view of Nasser's unique and
pervasive role In Egyptian politics, the primary focus of inquiry is the leader
himself as he Interacted with the political environment of his time. In the course
of one's Investigation, several elements of Weber's formulation of charismatic
authority have been revised. Thus, a number of exceptions to Weber's
formulation are brought Into context. Following this, a generalized model of
charismatic political leadership Is drawn from this case study.
In memory of 6ma1 Abdel Nasser,
e man of exceptional ability.
energy end compassion.
II
Political action Is not undertaken by angels
but by human beings. Political leadership Is
not a ruthless end sharp sword but rather a
process of balance...between various
possibilities and, In many cases, between
obvious risks.
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An unidentified philosopher once said that there ore at least three subjects (and
probably a dozen more) on which no wise man should ever attempt to write: Love.
genius. end leadership. Of the three, the lest Is the most mysterious, the most
capricious, and the most unpredictable. No amount of training, no sedulous
nurturing by the family or the social group, no long line of ancestry pously
dedicated to the eventual flowering of a leader ties ever proved a sure means of
developing leaders.
History, which affords us a comfortable Insight Into the mistakes of others, may
explain actions long after the event, but the decisions through which same become
leaders while others are crushed In defeat cannot, In most cases, be anticipated.
Wherever one turns today, the cry Is for more end better leadership. The
pervasiveness of this demand, however, Is hardly Indicative of Its underlying
causes. Nor does this pervasiveness explain just what It Is that people expect of
leaders. People face a general sense of a vital n 	 for leadership.
Before the lest echoes of the thunderous shouting, Nasser, Nasseri have faded
altogether from our memories, It Is well to pause to Inqulre into the nature of
men's quest for leadership. As long as man has lived in society, whether in
primitive families or in complex twentieth-century national communities, he has
sought end found leaders. Some of his leaders have been good, others - 'bad'.
Some have led to progress while others have disappointed their people end led
them to ruin. But always, there have been leaders.
Recognizing its grave Importance to him, man has struggled with the problem of
leadership for centuries. He ties studied the problem, speculated about it, end
proposed many solutions to It but these have not proved to be universally
1
ep p11 cable.
Throughout the centuries of civilization, leadership not only In the abstract but
also In the concrete experience of everybody living has been one of the most
controversial subjects. Partially answered questions have been asked concerning
the philosophical end the biological aspects of the phenomenon of leadership.
Definitions have been formulated. but most of them have created undefinable
feelings of Incompleteness. It Is Indeed a most puzzling question to try to explain
objectively why some members of a group move definitely to the top, while others
remain relatively stationery or move upward only short distances.
Nevertheless, students of political leadership hove produced numerous reports
which list the so-celled 'traits of leadership'. 1 Such lists, of which there are
a multitude, are either posed with complete generality or are presented for 'good'
end 'bed leadership. Recent research has produced such lists which distinguish
democratic s , outocratic, sbossist_, charismatic, etc., from each other.
Most of these lists may be discounted on the grounds that any experienced layman
could sit down and make up ually good lists. Furthermore, the lists usually
allow abundant exceptions: many leaders lack many characteristics; many non-
leaders exhibit most of the traits; and the leader In one situation may not be the
leader In another.
Leadership involves social interaction. To the extent that one Identifies a pattern
of leadership, It would be safe to assume that this pattern has a functional
relationship to the structure of the group or the society within which the pattern
has emerged. It follows that a change In the leadership pattern cannot easily take
place without simultaneously affecting the structure and also, that a change in the
structure cannot but affect the prevailing pattern of leadership. in others words,
1 W. H. Cowley. Thre. Distinctions In the Study of Le.ders, JOURNAL OF
ABNORMAL SOCIAL PSYCHOI.06Y. XXIII. June. 1928. pp .144-157. For a thorough
critique of the trait approach, see Alvin W. Gouldner, STUDIES IN LEADERSHIP. New
York : Harper and Brothers. 1950. pp . 2 12-25.
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even though revolutions may be exportable', as some militant leaders proclaim
today, leadership cannot - es a rule - be importable.
The structure of any given society at a certain time In its history Is determined
by its historical, social, cultural, economic, and geographic aspects, as well as
by Its unique character which Is a mysterious blend of those factors. Therefore,
leadership In different societies must be perceived, treated, and studied as
separate entities. On this umption, any attempt to study comparative
leadership must be preceded by an extensive study of the above stated affecting
factors.
Another way to study comparative leadership Is to observe the behaviour of the
leaders of the societies Involved. Leadership can be seen as a relationship between
en Individual and a group built around some common interest and behaving in a
manner directed or determined by the leader. Creative leadership emerges when
an Individual becomes Identified with a value or complex of values. This type of
leadership Is different from the ordinary representative leadership because It
attempts to bring In Innovations - an undertaking which cannot be restricted to
one society or group of analogous societies. Endeavours to Innovate may be
traceable to Indigenous sources as well as to social influences. Fantastic
ambitions and Irrational motivations as such are not Incompatible with creative
leadership. In all societies, Including democracies, these two factors may even be
a necessary Ingredient for a leader to appeal to the society and Its leadership
demands. These factors have been most obvious In the figure of the charismatic
leader.
The central theme of this thesis Is concerned with the Idea of charismatic
leadership. The current emphasis on behaviorism in the study of charismatic
leadership stimulates students of political leadership to Investigate case studies
without particularly focusing on the cultural heritage, the social structure or the
economic aspects of the societies Involved In such a project.
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The main weapon of the charismatic leader Is personal magnetism. His charm
conveys not only his magical power but also his delicate need for support end
reinforcement. The charismatic leader needs his followers as much as the ector
needs his audience. In this Interdependence the charismatic leader maintains the
cohesion of the group or society largely by Identifying himself with myth.
The charismatic leader becomes able to communicate to his followers a sense of
continuity between himself and his mission end their legendary heroes and their
missions. And since a myth remains the same as long as It Is felt as such, he and
his claims are legitimated by his ability to clothe himself with the mantle of
myth.
In 'developed' societies, charismatic leadership at the present time appears to be
of minor Importance simply because the faith in a charismatic leader is not
sufficiently strong or general to provide en adequate basis for legitimizing
radical institutional changes. In 'underdeveloped', or 'developing counties', as
they are sometimes called, the political institutions do not seem to be so rigidly
established as their counterparts In developed nations. Also, the socialization
processes seem to be still In the process of expanding to Include a larger number
of institutions than In the pest. It has been argued that charismatic leadership In
traditional societies Is probably the most appreciated, the most welcomed, and the
most effective type of leadership to effect social or political change.
This thesis will have two major objectives: a general one which will be discussed
In the first part of this study; and a specific one which will be analyzed In the
next two parts of the work.
The first objective Is to peruse carefully the literature on political leadership to
determine how the phenomenon of leadership has been defined, analyzed,
conceptualized, end categorized. This objective win be attained through a two
stage process. First, the author will discuss the general problem fIng students
4
of political leadership in obtaining an adequate definition of political leadership.
This will Include analysing the works of some recent scholars who have been
concerned with political leadership, Identifying Its functions and the different
pproeches of studying the subject. Secondly, the concept of political charisma as
first presented by Max Weber Is formulated end critiqued. It Is felt that since
the leadership case in question calls In charisma to assist In our analysis, the
concept of charisma Itself has to be looked at thoroughly. The essentially
ambiguous Weberian formulation, which does not emphasize the social milieu
from which charisma emerges, has led to confusion, misunderstanding, and
dissent among scholars. One major contribution of this thesis lies In the effort to
clarify the concept of charismatic political leadership, to rid It of possible
inconsistencies, end, most Important, to construct and apply a model to It. While
the model draws its inspiration from the great German thinker, It was necessary
to go beyond him. It is Indeed curious that while the notion of charisma has been
used extensively - even abused - only a few have seen fit to modify and/or expand
It.
Clearly, then, the current literature regarding the subject of political charisma
varies widely between those who consider It a useful analytical tool, and those
who dismiss it as too nebulous or amorphous. In this situation, one Is faced with
the problem of choice. If one Is determined to be open minded, the only
alternative Is to plunge Into the thickets of Intellectual discourse end try to steer
through the complicated and tortuous mazes In order to attain the clarity of
understanding. This has been the essential ethos underlying Chapters One and
Two, entitled Political Leadership and Weberlan Char Isma.
The second objective of this thesis Is to present, analyze, and study a case of
charismatic leadership: President Gamel Abdel-Nasser (1918-1970) of the
United Arab Republic (Egypt). The study will apply the suggested concept of
charismatizatlon to the leadership of Nasser in order to analyse and conceptualize
the phenomena associated with the emergence, maintenance, and consolidation of
5
charismatic leadership.
In the application of the charismatic leadership model to the case of Egypt, one
emphasizes that Nasser's charismatic authority was restricted, up to 1952-
1953, to a small circle of colleagues. Thereafter, end especially after the
national Izetion of the Suez Canal in 1956. he emerged as a charismatic leader not
only In Egypt but also throughout the Arab world. With the formation of the
United Arab Republic In 1958, Nasser's charisma reached its zenith. However,
Syria's secession from the UAR in 1961 marked the beginning of the process of
erosion of charisma. With the stalemate In the Yemeni Civil War - despite
substantial Egyptian support, end particularly with the stunning defeat in the
1967 1June War, Nasser's charisma was thought by many to have reached its
nadir. His presumed extraordinary powers began to be doubted as his appeal
dwindled. Consistent with the model, his charisma was undermined by repeated
failures. Given that Chapter Five makes a case study of Nasser's resignation and
subsequent return to power following the 1967 War, en exception to Webers rule
will be brought into context.
Nasser symbolized a distinctive brand of charismatic leadership. Utilizing his
charisma, he succeeded in communicating to his people a great sense of identity,
pride, and honour. As a Pan-Arab leader, he became a legendary hero among his
followers. His person, attitude, and ideology was turned by his followers into
solid bodies of myth which have remained for decades in the Arab world. The
espousal by Nasser of the idea and practice of 'aggressive presidency end 'massist
politics' enhanced the reputation of his brand of leadership and indeed made it
worthy of fresh studies by modern students of political leadership.
From the initial stages of research, it became transparent that the concepts of
political leadership and Weberlan Charisma lacked theoretical rigour and clarity,
especially when applied to the proposed empirical study of Nasser's Egypt. Thus,
6
It became clear that one had to devise a means by which to fashion charismatic
leadership with a more rigorous base. This Is the aim of Chapter Four which
utilize linguistic analysis to establish Nassers terminology as the 'vehlcles or
charisma.
To conclude, the writer would like to emphasize that this thesis Is concerned with
the study of leadership patterns. It highlights the leadership Images that Oamel
Abdel Nasser sought to project to his followers. The study neither attempts to
present a detailed biography of Nasser nor claims to offer a complete picture of
all the dimensions of his life. Such associated questions pertaining to the
economic, social, political, or educational aspects, while not ignored or by-
passed, are not presented In minute detail as they would be in a historical
coverage.
With these guidelines, let us proceed to designate and explain the unethlogy and
the assumptions concerning the subject of political leadership.
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PART ONE
FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
CHAPTER ONE
THE CONCEPT OF LEADERSHIP : A OENERAL DEFINITION
AND ThEORY
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this Chapter Is to develop en understanding of the nature.
function, end scope of politicel leedership. Its aim Is to provide a general
definition for polItical leadership, en essentially contestable concept, 1 and
encompass a more general theoretical reach by providing a synthesis of a
multitude of theoretical perspectives. While one may desire to narrow down on
only political aspects, the need to borrow Important theoretical perspectives
from Interrelated fields will prove necessary. And, In pursuing this task,
various lines of elaboration will be merged with the aim of adding new
conceptualizations and theoretical Insights. in addition, the search for an all
encompassing perspective of political leadership Is considered desirable since it
Is felt that instead of modifying the environmenr to suit our analytic model, one
should change frameworks to fit the envlronment. However, such en
undertaking is understandably without difficulties. As Edinger has observed:
The variety In scope, theory, method, and data
presented...in....studies of political leadership may
cause one to wonder whether a comprehensive
approach can ever be achieved. The answer, as one
social psychologist recently suggested, depends largely
upon one's aspirations. The editor of this symposium
shares the belief that the task of integration may be
difficult but not Impossible, provided one's approach
'One has labeled PoIit.ical Leadership, an essenUally contestable concept, since,
as Edinger has so profoundly put It: As social scientists have learned to probe beneath
the manifest aspects or leadership and have correspondingly more sensitive to the
relevance or numerous and complex latent facts, they have found it. more difflcult to
agree on what leadership is and does. See Lewis Edinger (ed) POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
IN INDUSTRIALISED SOCIETIES. New York : John Willey & Sons, 1967. p.13. For a
discussion on the inevitability of essentially contestable concepts in social science see
William E. Connolly, TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE, Oxford : Martin Robertson,
1983. pp.10-44.
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Is broad enough to encampass research by all the
social sciences on many societies end political
systems.2
A general perspective used to construct a comprehensive perspective on political
leadership can run the risk of being so abstract that It would have little value.
Keeping this In mind, one Is to be continuously reminded of Kaplans warning that
...great generality Is achieved at the cost of trivializing the generallzation.3
However, as pollticel leedershlp is an analytic construct thetis developed to
separate, Identity end clarity variables that form a "whole, 4 only an
implicit deflnition can be provided from a specific theory, from which a
general meaning can be Inferred.5 Such a definition Is provided by Paige who
states that:
Political leedership Is the behavior of persons In
positions of authority, their competitors, end these
both In Interaction with either members of society as
manifested In the past, present, end probable future
throughout the world. This means not only the
behavior of persons In positions of highest authority
but also those at Intermediate and lower levels: not
only monarchs, presidents, and premiers, but.
governors, provincial cheirmans, and mayors, as well
as village chiefs, headmen, and leaders of party cells.
It means not only single personalities but also the
collective leedershlp of aggregate bodies, and those
both not In Isolation but In interaction with
•followers. It means leadership not only In one type
of institution (e.g. party, legislation, or bureaucracy
or process e.g. policy decision, election or revolution)
but across them all. It means not only men but
women; not only Incumbents but competitors end
revolutionaries; not only those who rule by moral
suaslon and reasoned agreement but those who gain
compliance by fear and force; not only the admirable
but the despicable, not only the successful but those
who feir.6
2Edlnger. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN iNDUSTRIALiSED SOCIETIES. op.cit.. p.25.
3Abraham Kaplan, THE CONDUCT OF IN(XJIRY: Methodology (or Behavioral Science. San
Francisco : Chandler Press. 1964. p.108.
4A simfilar problem Is •ncountrid when attempting to d.flne what is meant by
ideology.
5Kaplan, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY. op.cIt.. p.73.
6See 6lenn D. Paige. THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. London The
Free Press, 1977. pp.1-2.
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rIerly put, political leadersMp, focuses on what Easton has called the
'authoritative allocation of values' In a community and Involves both the attempt
to exercise and the actual exercise of power to make policy - choices between
alternative courses of action effecting this allocation. 1 The analysis of the
Interaction between the decision-makers and those who are subject to the
decisions, as well as those groups or Individuals vying to Influence certain
decisions that will in turn realize their values end Interests, comprises the
study of political leadership. Almond and Coleman put political leadership to
Include not only leader-follower relationships but, also the Interaction between
different leaders, between the leaders of one political group and the members of
another, between potential leaders and political followers, and between actual end
aspiring leaders.8 Lastly, In terms of role analysis, political lership is
the placement or an actor or group of actors within a collectivity In the
pursuance of values and Interests that are desired by a community.9
1.2 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
The following pages will attempt to examine and review the various definition and
approaches of leadership as they exist in social and political literature. The
first section of this Chapter, will examine the multitude of factors present In
trying to formulate a definition of leadership. The section concludes with a
general i.e. functional definition of leadership that utilizes an
Interdisciplinary approach end seeks to show It as a relationship and process
between a person exerting Influence and those that are influenced.
The second section of the Chapter seeks to Identify the functions of leadership and
review the theoretical approaches to the study of political leadership. These
lSee David Easton, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, New York : Knopr Publishers Co., 1953.
p.13.
8See 6abrlel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds), THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPING
AREAS. Princeton : Princeton University Press. 1960. pp.5-58.
9See W. Olmstead, SOCIAL 6ROUPS. ROLES. AND LEADERSHIP. Michigan : Michigan
State UniversIty. 1961. pp.83-87.
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approaches may be identified as: The situational approach, the genetic approach,
the personality approach, the psychoanalytic approach, the psychohistorical
approach, the prophetic-caliphal approach and the charismatic approach.
1.3 THE NEED FOR DEFINITION
Historically the concept of leadership has been most difficult to define.
Inevitably one becomes bogged down In such Interminable questions as to what
constitutes leadership. Is leadership a function of personality, society or fate?
What is the degree of Interdependence between the leader and follower?
Considering these questions from the point of view of empirical studies only,
leadership Is an omnibus term indiscriminately applied to such varied activities
as playground leader, committee chairman, club president, business executive,
state politician or chief of staff.
However, It has been widely noted that In attempting to give clarity and precision
to a term, one has had to furnish a definition for It.'° A definition involves
purpose and method. The purpose of a definition Is what it is trying to do; and the
method Is the means which it adopts to achieve its purpose. In linking these two
together, one has to explain the formal properties of definitions and the meaning
and use of stipulative definitions in terms of the words 'leadership' 1 1 and
10The word definition Is represented here as a search for a certain kind of
conventionai statement that explains all the properties of a particular matter. For a
discussion on the attributes of definitions see Richard Robinson, DEFINITION. Oxford :
Clarendon Press, 1954. p.163.
1 1 1he word leadership itself can be traced at least as far back as early 6reek and
Latin, and It Is derived from the verb to act. Hannah Arendt shows that the two 6reek
verbs archein to begin, to lead, and finally La act and gerers t pass through, to
achieve, to furnish correspond to the latin verbs_caere Lo set Into motion, to lead
and gerere (the original meaning of which was Lo bean. It was believed that each
action i divided Into two parLs: the beginning, made by a single person, and the
achievement, performed by others, who, by beanlng and finishing the enterprise,
see it through. See Hannah Arendt ThE HUMAN CONDITiON. Chicago : University of
Chicago Press, 1958. pp .188-189. Thus, the two words distinguishing the verb lo
act in both Greek and Latin are closely related. The beginner or leader depends upon
others for help; the followers are dependent upon him for an occasion to act. In time,
ii
'leader'.
Formal properties of deflnitlons have been identified as [ 1 I..en abstraction of
particular identifying attributes from a potentially Infinite number of attributes
possessed by a phenomenon; [2]..nelther right nor wrong but only more or less
useful; [3]...an analytic statement; it says nothing about the reel world, but only
about the use of words. 12 In other words, a definition Is a rule for mutual
transformation of words in the same language.
Of the various types of definitions that have been formulated, stipulation has been
noted to embrace most of the major concept usages in social science. What is
meant by a stipulative definition, is the explicit end self conscious setting up of
the meaning-relation between some word and some object, the act of assigning en
object to a name (or a name to an object), not the act of recording an already
existing assignment. in short, stipulation is the special meaning given to a word
for a particular purpose. When one stipulates that a certain thing is to be the
meaning of a certain word, the word may or may not have previously existed as a
name for something else.
A stipulative definition stipulates that, whatever the word may mean In other
communications, it is best for the rest of this communication to be taken as
having no moaning whatever except the one now stipulated. In this respect, the
essential and constant element Is the deliberate, arbitrary, seliconscious choice
of a name for a certain thing, or of a thing for a certain name. Whether this
suggests Ar.ndt, the original interdependence of action between the leader and the
follower becomes split into two dirrerent funcUons - the funcUon of giving commands,
which becomes the prerogative of the leader, and the function or executing them, which
becomes the duty of his followers. Contrary to what many social scientists believe,
leadership as far back as early Greece and Rome did not necessarily mean that
followers were completely dependent upon leaders. There was - as is the case today -
a range or interdependence within which leaders and followers interacted. A
successful leader may hay, claimed for himself what actually was th. achievement or
many, and perhaps through this claim the leader monopolized the strength of his
followers without whose help he would not have achieved anything. It Is probable that
In this way the delusion of extraordinary strength arose and with it the phenomenon of
the great man' who Is powerful because he is alone.
12Robinson, DEFINITION, op.cit.. p.169.
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Individual choice agrees with or differs from the common usage of the word
defined, end whether there Is any common usage of It or not, Is Irrelevant to the
essence of stipulation. Stipulations often consist merely In ptlng one of the
many common meanings of a common word end discarding the rest, that is.
announcIng which of the established meanings one Is going to use.
Why has one chosen to stipulate in the use of the terms 'leadership' and 'leader'?
In other words, what are the ulterior purposes of stipulative definitions? By
stipulation, one hopes to gain the removal of an ambiguity and an avoidance of the
Inconvenience caused by the ambiguity. The case of 'leadership' is obvious.
The concept of leadership, like that of ideology, has largely lost Its value for the
social sciences, although It remains Indispensable to general discourse. There
are a great variety of ways in which one Individual stands out from others In
social situations and in which the one may be said, therefore to be 'leading' the
others. So diverse are these ways that any one concept attempting to encompass
them all, as 'leadership' does, loses the specificity and precision that Is
necessary to scientific thinking. Stipulation is thus a means of ensuring that one
Is talking about the same thing when one uses the same word.
Stipulation of the above kind may Involve no new rule of meaning; It is merely the
choice of one established rule and the rejection of others. In this, the Immediate
benefit would be the Improvement of concepts, the creation of new concepts and.
approaching the subject under study with a new set of conceptions. When one
doubts and disagrees whether a given behaviour can be labelled 'leadership' and
that someone with some 'unique' qualities qualifies to be called a 'leader' then,
one needs to clarifies the application of these terms.
13
Bearing this In mind, the writer of this thesis will discuss leadership as a
process by which one Individual consistently exerts more Impact then others on
the nature end direction of group activity. While a leader is one "who makes
things happen that would not happen otherwise" 13 we can also make a distinction
between leadership as defined by position, or, heedship and leadership as defined
by the relationship between leaders and followers, or leadership. Heedship Is
associated with the "rights and duties of an office or status in a hierarchical
structure, whether In a formal organization or en Informally stratified
collectivity." 14 Headshlp Is identified with superior position, and followership
with subordinate ones. It Is maintained through en organized system, end It
Implies a considerable distance between the group members end the heed.
Leadership, too, Is associated with the one who shapes the actions of others. But
the focus here Is not on role, or position, but on the special nature of the
relationship between leader end followers. Leaders, In contrast to heeds, are
accorded their authority spontaneously by group members who, It turn, follow
because they went to rather than because they must.
Can political leadership be distinguished from other forms of leadership? One Is
of the opinion that, to a certain degree, It can. Ordinarily, political leadership
refers to control over public policy decisions. Political leaders derive their
authority from the fact that they occupy a high office In a legally sanctioned
government which, by virtue of Its legitimacy, has the power and authority to
choose between alternative goals and courses of action. In other words, the
'political' of political leadership "establishes the general organizational context.
Explicitly or Implicitly, political Is taken to refer to the state and to
governmental processes." (5
13Andraw McFarland, POWER AND LEADERSHIP IN PLURALIST SYSTEMS, Stanford
Stanford University Press. 1981. p.10.
14LewIs J. Edinger. "The Comparative Analysis of Political Leadership,
COMPARATIVE POLITICS. Ii. January. 1975. p.255.
151b1d.. P.257.
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In line with the above mentioned distinction between hoadship, leadership, heads
end leaders, the next question seems obvious: Who are the political leaders?
Political leaders can be identified in two ways: [1] they occupy formal offices or
are members of official ruling groups or decision making bodies; or [21 It can be
demonstrated that whet happened did so because leaders made It happen. We can
prove leadership only when It can be shown that those said to be followers would
otherwise have behaved differently. 16
A general definition of leadership must thus start from the effect that leaders
have or may have on their society. This Is the cornerstone of the Inquiry. The
aim Is to see whether this Impact Is due to some characteristics of leaders -
personal characteristics, for Instance - or to certain powers, normally
Institutional, that they hold. It Is the Impact, as a dependent variable, that
Justifies our examination of what the Independent variables - for example,
personality and institutional Instruments - constitute. Thus, It is fair to state
that the general framework pursued Is provided by the goal of the analysis - the
analysis of the Impact of leaders on society.
A serious - and legitimate - warning, however must be made at the onset: this
work attempts to show that leadership Is a behavioural concept: the definition of
leadership must be therefore behavioural. If this Is so, 'what leaders are' has to
be determined. One can easily discover positional leaders, but the determination
of behavioural leaders Is not so simple. Prin,a Ixie, leadership appears related
to power: a leader (In the behavioural sense) Is a person who Is able to modify
the course of events. But the operetionalizatlon of power Is elusive, as Is well
known. The operatlonalization of behavioural leadership Is consequently equally
difficult to achieve. In this respect, one attempts to define leadership within the
context of organized groups.
161b1d., p.259.
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SECTION ONE : THE THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LEADERSHIP:
DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS
1.4 INTRODUCTION
The Issue of language, or more precisely political vocabulary, has not managed to
keep up with the dynamic changes visible In our time of transition. This
statement could effectively be related to political leadership as well as to other
political dimensions that have become by necessity full of misnomers. Motivated
by this conviction and the need for some systematic frame of reference however
rough, one Is obliged to formulate a general but useful definition of political
leadership. A quick review of the literature on leadership will indicate various
attempts to study leadership as an interaction of characteristic traits and a status
position relative to other individuals who are not too clearly related to him/her.
Little effort has gone into discovering what leadership stands for, resulting In an
unsatisfactory conceptualization. James MacOregor Burns In his analysis of
leadership literature reflected on this when he stated that:
...PolitIcal leadership Is one of the widely noted and
reported and least understood phenomena in modern
politics. If you doubt this, glance at the indexes of any
seven hundred works that deal with political leaders
but have little concept of, or reference to the role of
political leadership which must, In my view be part of
a more general theory of social or historical
causation. Hence the student of political leadership
must deal with the most refractory questions of
political power and social change. Brilliant work has
been done on countless aspects of political leadership.
But we lack a general theory.
Because we lack a general theory of political
leadership, we may be tempted to resort to the
opposite strategy - the hypothesizing of a limitless
assortment of psychological, social, and political
variables In the shaping of political leadership and the
making of history. This strategy would be the safest
and the least rewarding... 1 7
16
Jenkins comes to a similar conclusion when Investigating literature on the
selection of leaders:
...The situation does not appear to be a particularly
happy one with regard to the deriving of general
principles or of setting up a systematic theory of
leadership from the available Information. A few
statements may be set forth, however, that appear to
hold for the findings of a number of the investigations
reviewed; the list should be thought of as a series of
hypotheses for further Investigation.18
As a result of these theoretical and conceptual difficulties, definitional problems
arise. However, various definitions have been given to leadership and, general
consensus has revolved round the proposition that what characterizes leadership
Is the varying degree of ability that Influences the behaviour of others In a social
relationship. 19 A social relationship, viewed from a structural - functionalist
perspective Involves the notions of purpose, function, structure,
Interdependence, and equilibrium; each of which must be open to critical and
interpretative reappraisal. 2° Purpose Is generally taken to mean the utility
of specifying goals for each relationship or structure.21 Function deals
ultimately with objective consequences, but they may be perceived as objectives1
processes, or results from various points of view and for various purposes.22
Structure can be taken to mean the working parts of a social system that either
turn resources Into services or boosts the potential of system service.23
17See James Plac6regor Burns. Wellsprings of PollUcal L.adership, AMERICAN
POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW. Vol. LXXI. March, 1977. p.266.
16See WiUlam 0. JenkIns. A Review .f Leadership Studies with Particular Reference
t. Military Problems, PSYCHOLO6ICAL BULLETIN. 1947. Vol. 49, No.1.. p.75.
19,, Bernard ti. Bass, LEADERSHIP. PSYCHOLO6Y. AND OR6ANISATIONAL
BEHAVIOUR. New York : Harper. 1960. pp.65-69.
20TaIcot.t Parsons. STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN MODERN SOCIETIES. 6lencoe. Illinois
: Th. Fr.. Press. 1960. pp.149-150.
21 See Chalmers Johnson, REVOLUTIONARY CHAN6E. Boston : Little. Brown, 1966,
p.49.
Young, SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Englewood Cliffs : Prentice Hill.
1966. p.27.
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interdependenco Is a consequence of the Insufficiency of a single structure in
performing the overall tasks of social systems. 24 Equllibrium Is a state
where ...mechenisms constrain end secure a chain of mutual adjustment among
the variobles... 25 are present in a social relationship.
Another analytic difficulty present in the literature Is encountered when trying
to establish and clarify a conceptual demarcation between leaders end followers,
mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the leader - follower distinction is one of
degree, and not kind. Secondly, Individuals may be leaders in one situation and
followers in another. 26 The dividing line between these two roles is neither
clear cut nor stationary. One has the impression that Bogardus sought to draw a
distinction between 'Individuality', which refers to those distinguishing traits
that set one person off from another, and 'sociality', which Is composed of those
traits that Identify one person with another. Bogardus' notion indicates that the
Individuality of a person Interacts with the sociability of the group and produces
tailored patterns of leadership. 27 At the same time, a difficulty arises when
attributes of a small group are applied to larger political communities and
organizations.28
The problem of coming to some general agreement about the precise meaning of
leadership is especially acute when one's objective is to construct a framework
23See Niel Smelsor, THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR New York : The Free Press.
1963. p.15.
6abriel Almond and S. Bingham Powell Jr.. COMPARATIVE POLITICS 	 A
Development Approach, Boston : Little, Brown, 1966. pp.58-61.
25Robert Plerton, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE, 6lencoe, Illinois : The
Free Press, 1957. pp.72-73.
265ee Thomas S. Cohn. THE STUDY OF LEADERSHIP. Danville : Interstate Publishers.
1958. pp.74-75.
27Emory S. Bogardus. LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP. New York : Appleton - Century.
Inc., 1934. p.4.
28For a good example of this, see William A. Gamson, Reputation and Resources in
Community PoliUcs In ThE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY. Vol.72. No.2..
September. 1966. pp.87-99.
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from which many different types of leaders and varying leader - follower
situations con be viewed. Hence, for simple heuristic purposes, one can use three
major definitional categories in order to clarity the various leadership
concepts.29 They will be discussed In the following order:
1. The Positional - Ascriptive Definition.
2. The Behavioural - Descriptive Definition.
3. The Cognitive - Attitudinal Definition.
1.5 THE POSITIONAL - ASCRIPTIVE DEFINITION
This category deals with a range of Institutional definitions which frame
leadership within the context of status, duties, or obligations that arise from
Individuals holding office or any positions that are objectively identified and
linked with formal or Informal authority. The analysis Involved in this
definitional classification mostly comprises of a circular description between
those holding office and their worklng environment.
1.6 THE BEHAVIOURAL - DESCRIPTIVE DEFINITION
The emphasis of this category Is on how well one carries out one's leadership in
terms of influence and induction of compliance or commitment. Here, leadership
Is seen as ...the process by which an agent induces a subordinate to behave In a
desired monner. 3° Central to this sort of definition classification Is the
relationship between the leadership and the group I.e. the to-and-fro, stimulus-
response or push-pull relationship. According to 6erth and Mills:
Leadership, most broadly conceived, Is a relation
29These classlflcatlons are derived from Lewis J. Edinger (ed). POLITICAL
LEADERSHIP IN INDUSTRIALISED SOCIETIES. New York John Wifley & Sons, 1967.
pp.56-68.
30W.6. Bemas, LeadershIp Theory and Administrative Behaviour : The Problems •r
Authority. ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY. 1959. 4 pp.259-260.
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between leader and led in which the leader influences
more than he is influenced, because or the leeder,
those who are led act or feel differently than they
otherwise would. As a power relation, leadership may
be known to both leader and led, or unknown to either
or both...31
Under the Behavioural-Descriptive definition, leadership, the act of leadlng
leads to the establishment of four basic factors In the relationship. The first
factor, the leader, deals with the ability and personal end material potential to
goal accomplishment. 32 The second factor, the followers, who possess the
relevant abilities and personal characteristics. 33 The third factor Is the
settlng where ...leadership takes place In, Is conditioned by, effects, and is
affected try its environment. 34 The last factor, the task, is taken be a problem
to be solved, an occasion for decision, or a discrepancy between actual and
desirable state of affairs. Tasks are viewed both as perceived by the leadership
and as objectively given. 35 The leader-follower aspect in this category
regards leadership not only In terms of personal qualities but, as an Integral part
of the group structure and those indlvlduals, the led. Also, of equal importance
are the reasons why the leader Is followed by the led, why the leader is
admired, respected or feared; whether leadership can offer rewards and
punishment; or whether the leadership authority In relation to the led is
legitimized by habit, charisma, tradition, or on a legal-rational basis.36
31 Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, CHARACTER AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE : The
Psychology .f Social lnstituUons, London : Routledge & kegan Paul, Ltd. 1970, p.405.
32E.P. Hollander, Emergent Leadership and Social Influence, In Luigi Petruilo and
Bernard 11. Bass (eds.), LEADERSHIP AND INTERPERSONAL, New York : Hoit Publication,
1961, pp.68-69.
33T.E. Stephenson, The Leader-Follower Relationship, SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW. 1959,
7, pp.179-195.
34Paige, reflecting on political leadership labels this variable the settlng and
asserts that It 'is $ major challenge facing political studies t. determine which
partial aspects of an environment or which total configurations of environmental
characteristics are casually related to political leadership behaviour' in Glenn D.
Paige. ThE SCIENTIFIC STUDY Of POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. London: The Free Press,
1977. p.124.
355ee Fred F. Fiedler in teadership', GENERAL LEARNING CORPORATION MODULE.
Plornst.own: 6eneral Learning Press, 1971. p.12.
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1.7 THE OONITIYE - ATTITUDiNAL DEFINITION
This definitional category deals with leadership in terms of the subjective
perception of en Individual where regardless of the settlngs or tosks, on
individual holds the subjective notion that he hose mandate either to lead or be
led37
1.8 LEADERSHIP AND POWER
It follows from the above that leadership evaluation will be determined by both
the researcher's definition and the behaviour model one chooses to apply. And,
developing definitions can serve Important purposes: Firstly, It can Identify the
object to be observed. Secondly. It can satisfy or avoid a particular value
orientation or prectical implication. Thirdly, and most vItal, ft can provide the
development of a theory with a basis. Fourthly, It can identify a form of practice.
A definition of leadership can be one of group presses and movement, or one of
an art of Inducing compliance, or It can be one of that treats this factor In terms
of power differentials, I nitiatlon of structure and role differentiation. 38 In
attempting to define leadership a complex set of variables and concepts must be
brought Into play. Among the many variables on leadership, six have been
Identified as the most vital ones: personality,39 role,4° organization,41
Webers pure types ot legitimate authority: Rational. Traditional or Charisma
In MAX WEBER : 04 CHARISMA AND INSTITUTION BUILDING, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt.
Chicago : The University of Chicago Press. 1968. p.46.
37See Eric Hotter, THE TRUE BELIEVER. New York : Mentor Books, 1951, for an
elaboration on the nature of revolutionary actors and followers.
38For a review of different definitions and conceptions of leadership refer to B.M.
Bass, LEADERSHIP, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOR. New York :
Harper, 1950.
39The term 'personslity has been observed to lack uniform meaning. Within
psychology, a commonly accepted definition of personailty' cannot be reached. Gordon
Mlport in his PERSONALITY lists no less than flfty types of definitions (New York :
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task,42 values,43 end setting.44 Among the various concepts, leadership
may Involve the following: personality in action, induction of compliance,
Influence, Influence relation, power differential, modes 01 tendency, status
position end effect of Interaction. Thus, by taking Into account these purposes,
variables end concepts, a definition of leadership should not only identify leaders
end reflect on the means by which thay secured their leadership but, also account
for the maintenance and continuance of leadership. 45 Thus, from an observer's
Halt, 1937, pp. 24-54). However, the term's referent. is to an interred entity, a
construct that accounts for and regulates an IndMduals behaviour as It responds to
stimulus, rather than a directly observed phenomenon. Furthermore, to political
scientists, different connotations are interred from the term. Here, the usage of
personality excludes political atutudes and refers to Inner conflict and
manifestations of ego defences.
40 Role, one of the most complex concepts In social science, has a range of
definitions. A role, according to L.svinson. can be defined in three alternative ways:
(a) the structurally given demands (norms, expectations, taboos, responsibilities.
and th. like) associated with a given social position; (b) th. members orientation or
conception of the part he is to play In the organization; (c) the ways in which members
of a position act (with or without conscious intenLion) in accord with or In violation if
a given set of organizational norms in D.J. Levinson. Role, Personality, and Social
Structure In the Organisational Setting. JOURNAL OF ABNORflAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLO6Y.
1959. 56, pp.170-160.
41 8y organisatlon, what is meant in the broad sense I, social interaction among
dyads. small groups, formal organizations, institutions, ad hoc collectives, horizontal
social strata, vertical societal segments, and whole political communities.
42The term task s has often been intertwined with that of role'. However, there Is a
difference. 'Task Is taken to mean an assigned position where goals, procedures, and
function are clearly specified to and by group members. it has been observed that one
of the leadership roles is on task allocation and task motivation, shortly referred to as
role task. Refer to Walter A. Hill and D. Hughes. teader Behavior as a Function of
Task Type in ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE. London :
University Press. 1974. pp. 63-96.
43 Values are taken to be standards that influence choices and commiLments to end
states of existence and modes of conduct'. The importance of values is echoed by
Meyer who states: •Ali potential action demands choice, which is based on a system of
values. See Alfred 6. Meyer, LENINISM. New York : Praeger. 1957, p.287.
44GIven that. leadership takes place In an environment and Is conditioned by. affects
and is affected by It, leadership behaviour will be determined by partial or total
configurations of the environmental characteristics. Thus, the term 'setting' is
employed as a symbol .f the environment. The idea of 'setting links leadership with
those relevant aspects of such fields as geography, technology, economics,
demography and cultural anthropology. For a striking example of this. see Jomo
kenyatta. SUFFERING WITHOUT BITTERNESS, London : Sacker & Warburg. 1967, and
FACING MOUNT KENYA. London : Sacker & Warburg. 1966.
45For an Interdisciplinary paradigm for leadership analysis refer to the model set
out by Richard T. Morris and Melvin Seeman, The Problem of Leadership : An
Interdisciplinary Approach, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY. 1950. Vol. LVIX.
pp.149-155. where they examine group and individual variables In terms of
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view, the definitions of leadership are as many as the persons who have attempted
to define It. 46 Nevertheless, as Fiedler points out,47 similarities between the
multitude of definitions allow for a functional sociological classification scheme,
which can be formulated as such:48
1. Leadership as a differentiated role.
2. Leadership as structural Initiation.
3. Leadership as personality and Its effects.
4. Leadership as a process of achievement of objectives.
5. Leadership as a form of persuasion.
6. Leadership asan act.
7. LeadershIp as a process of Influencing activities.
8. Leadership as polarisatlon of group process.
9. LeadershIp as an art of inducing commitment and compliance.
1 0. LeadershIp as a power relation.
conditioners, concommlLants. determiners and behaviour In terms of maintenance and
continuance.
46Paige in his SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. •p .clt., has suggested
that a sampting of how leaders themselves view what it is they do may help to
understand political leadership: leadership as Decision and Persuasion: leadership is
the ability to decide what is to be done, and then to get others to want to do it. (D.D.
Eisenhower). Leadership as Influence by Example: The essence Is to be more
revolutionary and set the •xample (Che Guevara). Leadership as Creative Brutality
Based upon Hostilties against Out group Enemies: ..The leader of genius must have the
ability to make different opponents appear as If they belonged in the same category..
(Adolf Hitler). Leadership as Satisfaction of Follower Needs: Serve the people (llao
Tse Tung). Leadership as Task Performance: The essence of leadership Is the
successful resolution of problems and the successful attaining of objectives. (Paul H.
Nitze). Leadership as Slave or Master of Circumstance: 'if we do not win, we will
blame neither heaven nor earth but only ourseives (Mao Tee Tung). Taken as a whole
these concepts suggest that political leadership comprises decisional initiative, pacific
and coercive persuasion, the exacerbation or reduction of conflict, follower need
satisfaction as related to task accomplishment, and action within an influencing but
partly influonclable situational context...' pp.65-66.
47F.E. Fi.dl.r, 'A Contingency Model .f L.adership Effectiveness' in I.. Berkowitz
Cod), ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. 1., London : Academic
Press. 1964.
48 Thts typology is adopted from Ralph M. Stogdlll. THE HANDBOOK OF LEADERSHIP : A
Survey of Theory of Research. New York : Free Press. 1974. pp.7-15. It has been
stated in many other works in one form or the other. For another set of typologles see,
Barbara Kellerman, leadership as a PolILIca Act' in LEADERSHIP : Multidisciplinary
Perspectives edited by Barbara Kellerman, New Jersey : Prentice Hall, Inc., 1984..
pp.63-89.
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Leadership con be defined as a form of relationship between persons where one or
several persons act In conformance with the request of another. 49 This
flnitlon emphasizes leadership as a differential power relationship among
members of a group. Leadership, as a power relation, can be conceptualized as a
resultant of the maximum force which A con Induce on B minus the maximum
resisting force which B can mobilize In the opposite dlrectlon. 50 As a form of
Influence relationship, leadership power, In DaM's terms, refers to subsets of
relations among secial units such that the behavior of one or more units to the
responsive units, depend In some circumstances on the behavior of other units
(the controlling, units). 51 From this stimulus-response conceptualization,
one can derive two essential factors which Warriner puts as:
...(a) a communication requesting someone to do
something, en lndicatlon' followed by (b) en action,
performed by the person to whom the request was
directed, which Is carried out and Is consistent with
the 'Indication'. The latter element may be termed
the response, for simplicity of expression.52
In their common usage, power and Influence cannot be used Interchangeably since
power Is the ability to exert a degree of control over persons, things and events
while Influence is used more to suggest the exercise of persuasion rather than
control53.
49Charles 1. Warriner. Leadership in the Small 6roup. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
SOCIOLO6Y, 1950. 60. pp.361-369.
50J.R.P. French & D. Raven, lb. Bases .f Social Power In 0. Cartwright, STUDIES
IN SOCIAL POWER. Ann Arbor : University of Pllchigan, 1959, p.84.
51 Robert A. Dahl, Power	 In THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE. New York : Macmillan and Free Press, 1968, Vol.12, p.407.
52Warriner, Lesdershlp in Ui. Small 6r.up, .p.clt., p.367.
53The conceptual confusion surrounding power' and lnfluence (the warp and woof in
the dynamics of social organization) has given rise to a debate since they are
impossIble to define in a satisfactory way. In a number or definitions, power and
influence are introduced as the capacity to determine the actions of others in
accordance with the will or the purposes of the holder of power or influence. See Max
Weber in his WIRSCHAFT UND 6ESELLSCHAFT. Berlin : koln, 1964. p.38.
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Oier5tcdt uffcr3 a claicol di5tincUon between Influence end power when he saId:
Influence does not require power, end power may
dispose with Influence.	 Influence can convert a
friend, but power coerces friend end foe alike.54
Nevertheless, while power and Influence constitute different processes, they are
Intertwined since the leadership may have to use both when Involved In certain
circumstances end with particular followers. Even elected or appointed
leadership must rely on Influence, i.e. the sense of persuasion, and complement it
with power. And, In order to ovoid resistance end negative feelings among
followers, leadership, elected or appointed, may have to use persuasion In many
more Instances rather than to employ the power that Is supposedly at their
disposal.
in practice, leadership as a power relation has two features: the ability to exert
power, in the sense of controlling others and events, and the capacity to defend
against power. 55 As Weber in his theory of power wrote: Power Is the
probability that one actor within a social relationship will be In a position to
carry out his own will despite resistance." 56 Several bases of power as
exercised by leadership have been Identified. 57 Legitimate power is akin to the
concept of leadership authority in as far as leadership acceptability Is concerned.
Within this context, Jonde has defined leadership 03:
...a particular type of power relationship
characterized by a group member's perception that
54R. BiersL.dt. •An Analysis of Social Power, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW.
1950. Vol.15., pp.730-738. p.73 1.
55S.. D. Cartwrlght (ad). STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER. Ann Arbor : Research Canter
for 6roup Dynamics. University of Michigan. 1959. for an .lsboraUon on counter
pow.r.
56Max W.bsr. THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOIIIC ORGANIZATION. (Translated and
•dlted by T. Parsons and Au. Henderson). New York : Oxford University Press. 1947,
p.152.
57French and Raven. "The Bases of Social Power. op.clt.. p.85.
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another group member has the right to prescribe
behavior patterns for the former regarding his
activity as a member of a particular group...58
Reward or coercive power deals with the gains or the losses that will accrue to
group members for compliance or non - compliance. The degree by which group
members will Identify with the leadership represent referent power I.e.
'likeeblllty'.59 Lastly, expert power arises when group members value the
leadership's specialized knowledge or distinctive competence In satisfying group
needs or in accomplishing goals. tiore so, when dealing with group needs and
goals:
Leedorshlp...Is a relation between leader and led in
which the leader Influences more than he Is
influenced: because of the leader, those who are led act
or feel differently than they otherwise would. As a
power relation, leadership may be known to both
leader and led, or unknown to either or both; It may be
close up or long distance; it may occur at a single
cross road In the lives of the both, or only In the life
of the follower, after the leader is long dead, It may
affect only a momentary decision, or It may dominate
the life of the led.6°
So far the above discussion has centered on the essential stimulus response nature
of the leadership concept as a power relation. However, leadership In this
respect can also be equated with control of the interaction process. Thus, as Bess
has put It. ...when the goals of one member. A. Is that of changing another. B, or
when B's change in behavior will reward A or reinforce A's behavior, A's effort to
58K.F. Janda, Towards the Explication .t the Concept .f Leadership In Terms of the
Concept of Power, HUMAN RELATIONS. 1960. 13, PP.345-363. p.348. Janda defines
power as the ability to cause other persons to adjust their behavior In conformance
with communicated behavior patterns. For a discussion on two different perspectives
of power In relationship to leadership see Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, The
Two Faces of Power. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 56. 1962. pp.947-52.
595ee Ru. StogdiH, Personal Factors Associated with Leadership : A Survey of the
Llterature. JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLO6Y, Vol. 25. 1948, p p .35-71, for a survey on the
determination of the traits and characteristics of leaders.
606erth and Mills, CHARACTER AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE. o p .cit., p.405.
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obtain the goals Is leadership. 61 Adding to this, Homans points to an essential
criteria In defining leadership as a power relation In the Interaction process:
The leader Is at the center of the web of Interaction;
much Interaction flows towards him and away from
him. But It Is Impossible to define the leader merely
by saying that he Is the person who must often
originate the Interaction for the other members of the
group. He must also know the content of his orders
and the degree to which they are obeyed. A member of
the group may make a suggestion to the rest, and they
would greet It with scornful laughter. He has
originated Interaction to which the others have
responded, but the response Is not the one he wished
and he Is obviously not a leader. The high social rank
of the leader and the respect that Is accorded to him
are determined by the fact that he originates
Interaction for the group, by giving orders that are In
fact obeyed.62
While a member with ability can successfully persuade others to follow him, a
member with power can coerce others to follow. His power may derive from his
personality or his position. A powerful person can directly reinforce the
behaviour of others by granting or denying rewards or punishments to the others,
depending on their behaviour. A person has power over others If be controls what
the others want. If the other members are not motivated to gain these goals, the
control does not yield power. The stronger the motivation, the greater the
resulting power.
Coercion occurs when members publicly but not privately comply with the
suggestions or direction of another member. But the Inhibition of their own
preferences results In dissatisfaction and frustration, which In turn may lead to
a variety of attempts to reduce the frustration. Coercion may produce hostility
among the coerced. Or the less powerful members may withdraw from the
situation. Or they may over-react, resulting In a loss In task effectiveness. Or
61 B11. Bass, LEADERSHIP. PSYCHOLOGY. AND OR6ANISATION BEHAVIOR. New York :
Harper. 1960. p.261.
626eorge C. Homans, THE HUMAN GROUP. New York : HarcourL, Brace. 1950. p.48.
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they may compensate by forming a new Informal organization to counter the
frustrating effects of being coerced.63
Power provides successful coercive leadership but It Is not as likely to be
effective as far as the coerced members are concerned. To lead successfully and
permissively, a member must have the power to impose restrictions on what
other members are permitted to do, and he must have the ability to know when
such restrictions are necessary and when he would do better to avoid such
impositions. While power used to coerce will produce hostility, withdrawal,
apathy, 'forced' behaviour toward irrelevant goals, the same power, coupled with
ability, can be used permissively. Permissiveness is less likely to result In
hostility end withdrawal since the goals selected by those led permissively are
likely to be relevant to them.64
Thus, essentially, to understand the nature of leadership requires understanding
the essence of power, for leadership is a special form of power. The two
essentials of power are motivation and resources. The two are interrelated.
Lacking motive, resource diminishes; lacking resource, motive lies Idle. Lacking
either one, power collapses. Because both resources and motive are needed, and
because both may be In short supply, power Is an elusive and limited thing.
Central to a concept of power Is the role of purpose. Power has been defined as
the production of Intended effects, but the crux of the matter lies In the
dimensions of 'Intent'. The relationship between the nature, Intensity,
persistence and scope of purpose defines the exercise of power In leadership as a
collective act. This approach carries on the assumption that power Is first of all
63R. White and Ri. Llppitt, ieadership Behavior and Member Reaction in Three
Social CIImates in D. Cartwright and A. Zander (eds). 6ROUP DYNAMICS. New York
Row, Peterson, 1956. pp.79-82.
64 PeIz, teadershl p Within a Hierarchical Organlzation, JOURNAL OF SOCIAL
ISSUES, Vol.VlI, 1951, pp.98-99.
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a relationship end not merely an entity to be passed around like an Item; that it
Involves the Intention or purpose of both power holder and power recipient; and
hence It Is collective, not merely the behaviour of one person. On these
assumptions, the power process Is viewed as one In which power holders,
possessing certain motives end goals, have the capacity to secure changes in the
behaviour of a respondent, by utilizing resources In their power base, Including
factors of skill, relative to the targets of their power-wielding and necessary to
secure such changes. This view of power deals with three elements In the
process: the motives and resources of power holders; the motives end resources
of power recipients; and the relationship among all these.65 To define power
not as a property or entity or possession but as a relationship In which two or
wore persons tap motivational bases in one another end bring varying resources
to beer in the process is to perceive power as drawing a vast range of human
behaviour Into Its orbit. The arena of power is no longer the exclusive preserve
of a power elite or en establishment or persons with legitimacy. 66 Power Is
ubiquitous and permeates human relationships. It exists whether or not it Is
quested for.
Given that power can take multifarious, ubiquitous, and subtle forms and is
650ne feels that we are so accustomed to observing persons with power drives or
complexes, so sensitive to leaders with the •will to power, so exposed to studies
finding the source of the power urge In early deprivation, that we tend to assume the
power motive to be exclusively that of seeking I.e dominate the behaviour of others.
To this, David MacClelland asks: ...must all experiences of power have as their
ultimate goal the exercise of power over others? See David C. PicCieliand. POWER
The inner Experience, New York : Irvington 1975. p.17; see also D.6. Winter, THE
POWER MOTIVE. New York : Free Press, 1973. p.34.
66The existence of power and leadership in the form of a stream of multiple direct
and Indirect forces operating over time is often seen as part of the sequences of
events of history that are beyond the control .r identifiable persons capable of
foreseeing developments and powerful enough to influence them and hence to be held
accountable for them. From this, one can reject the gee whiz approach to power that.
often takes the rorm of the automatic presumption or elIte control of communities.
groups, institutions, entire nations. Elitism is often used as a concept that
presupposes the exIstence of the very degree and kind of power that Is to be estimated
and analyzed. Such elite theories commit the gross error of equating power and
leadership with the assumed power bases of preconceived leaders and power holders.
without considering the crucial role of motivations of leaders and foiiowers.
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reflected In en infinite number of combinations end particularities In specific
contexts, It can still be broken down Into certain attributes. DaM's breakdown of
the reach and magnitude of power reveals three dimensions: distribution, scope
end domain. Distribution Is the concentration end dispersion of power among
persons of diverse influence In various political, social, and economic locations
such as geographical areas, castes end classes, status positions, skill groups.
communication centers, end the like. Scope is the extent to which power Is
generalized over a wide range or Is specialized. Persons who are relatively
powerful in relation to one kind of activity may be relatively weak In other power
relationships. Lastly, domain Is the number end nature of power respondents
influenced by power wielders compared to those who are not. 61 But, whatever
the dimensions or context, the fundamental process remains the same: power
wielders draw from their power bases resources relevant to their own motives
and the motives and resources of others upon whom they exercise power. Power
shows many feces and takes many forms; It may exist as en overwhelming
presence or as a potential that can be drawn at will. But all this has to have
something In common: It must be relevant to the motivations of the power
recipients.
Leadership Is en aspect of power, but It is also a separate and vital process In
Itself. We have noted that power' over other persons is exercised when potential
power wielders, motivated to achieve certain goals of their own, marshal in their
power base resources (economic, military, Institutional, or skill) that enable
them to Influence the behaviour of respondents to those goals. This is done in
order to realize the purpose of the power wielders, whether or not these are also
the goals of the respondents. Power wielders also exercise Influence by
mobilizing their own power base In such a way as to establish direct physical
67DahI, Power, op.clt., p.4O8.
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control over other's behaviour.
Leadership Is exercised when persons with certain motives end purposes
mobilize, perhaps In competition or conflict with others, institutional, political,
psychological, end other resources so as to arouse, engage end satisfy the motives
of followers. This is done to realize goals mutually held by both leaders and
followers. Not only must motivation be relevant, as In power generally, but its
purposes must be realized and satisfied. Leadership is exercised In a condition of
conflict or competition In which leaders contend in appealing to the motive bases
of potential followers. Naked power, on the other hand, admits of no competition
or conflict.
Leaders are a particular kind of power holders. Like power, leadership is
relational, collective, and purposeful. Leadership shares with power the central
function of achieving purpose. But the reach end domain of leadership are, in the
short range at least, more limited than power. Leaders do not obliterate
followers' motives though they may arouse certain motives and Ignore others.
They lead creatures and not things. To control things - money, energy, toals,
mineral resources - Is an act of power, not leadership, for things have no
motives. Power wielders may treat people as things. 68 Leaders may not. Along
this line of thought, one con assert that all leaders are actual or potential power
holders, but not all power holders are leaders.69
68See Richard Hughes, ThE FOX IN THE ATTIC. New York : Harper & Row. 1962.
p.266. in regards to Hitler seeing the universe as containing no persons other than
himself, only 1.hings.
691t need not be emphasized that the leader is a very special, very circumscribed,
but potentially the most. effective or power holders, Judged by the degree or Intended
real change finally achieved. The crucial variable is, again, the purpose. Leadership
has been defined as leaders making followers do what followers would not otherwise
do. or as leaders making followers do what the leaders want them to do. Leadership
can also be defined as leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals that
represent the values and the motivations - the wants and needs, the aspIration and
expectations - of both leaders and followers. And the genius of leadership lies in the
manner in which leaders see and act on their own and their followers values and
motivations.
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Leadership, unlike naked power wielding, Is thus Inseparable from followers'
needs and goals. The essence of the leader - follower relation Is the Interaction of
persons with different levels of motivations end of power potential, Including
skill. In pursuit of a common or at least Joint purpose. That Interaction,
however, takes two fundamentally different forms. The first form Is where
leadership occurs when one person takes the Initiative In making contact with
others for the purpose of an exchange of valued things. The exchange could be
economic, political or psychological. Each party to the bargain Is conscious of the
power resources and attitudes of the other. Their purposes are related, at least
to the extend that the purposes stand within the bargaining process and can be
advanced by maintaining that process. But beyond this the relationship does not
go. The bargainers have no enduring purpose that holds them together; hence they
may go their separate ways. A leadership act took place, but It was not one that
binds leader and follower together In a mutual and continuing pursuit of a higher
purpose.1°
The other form of Interaction occurs when one or more purposes engage with
others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels
of motivation. Their purposes might have started out as separate but related and
become fused. Power bases are linked not as counterweights but as mutual
support for common purpose. This sort of interaction ultimately becomes 'morel'
In that it raises the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader
and led, and it thus has a transforming effect on both. A striking example of this
Is Gandhi, who aroused and elevated the hopes and demands of millions of Indians
and whose life and personality was enhanced In the process. This 'transcending
leadership' Is dynamic leadership In that the leaders throw themselves Into a
relationship with followers who will feel 'elevated' by It and often become more
active themselves, thereby creating new cadres of leaders. Waked power wielding
10This torm of leadership Is sometimes referred to as transactional leadership.
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can neither be transactional, transcending or transforming; only leadership can
be.
Leaders end followers may be Inseparable In function, but they are not the same.
The leader takes the Initiative In making the leader-led connection; It Is the
leader who creates the links that allow communication end exchange to take place.
The leader Is more skillful In evaluating followers' motives, anticipating their
responses to en Initiative, end estimating their power bases, than the reverse.
Leaders continue to take the major part In maintaining end effectuating the
relationship with followers end will have the major role in ultimately carrying
out the combined purpose of leaders and followers. Finally, end most Important
by far, leaders address themselves to followers' wants, needs end other
motivations, as well as to their own, and thus they serve as an independent force
In changing the makeup of the followers' motive base through gratifying their
motives.
Certain forms of power and certain forms of leadership are near to the extremes
of the power/coercion continuum. One is the kind of absolute power that, Lord
Acton felt, 'corrupts absolutely' which In the opinion of many, also coerces
absolutely. 7 ' The essence of this kind of power Is the capacity of power
wielders, given the necessary motivation, to override the motive end power bases
of their targets.12 At the other extreme Is leadership so sensitive to the
71 For an elaboration on this see R.M. Emerson, Power-Dependence Relations,
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW. 1962, 27. PP.31-41. Included within this dimension,
are the single minded power wielders who fit the classical Images of Machiavelli or
Hobbes or Nietzsche, or at least the portraits of modern power theorists. These
consciously exploit their external resources (economic, social, psychological, and
Institutional) and their eff.ctance' their training, skill, and competence, to make
persons and things do what they want done. The key factor here Is what they want
done'.
72Conslder the testimony of one Soviet linguist and dissident who spoke of the
ordinary citizen's attitude to the government: With us, it. Is there, like the wind, lit.
a wall, like the sky. It is something permanent, unchangeable. So the individual
acquiesces, does not dream of changing it - except a few, rew people... In Hendrick
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motives of potential followers that the roles of leader and follower becomes
virtually Interdependent. 13 	Whether the leadership relationship Is
transactional or transforming, In It the motives, values, and goals of leader and
led have merged.
Smith. THE RUSSIANS. New York : Ballantine. 1976. p.339.
73The power resources and the motivations of leaders are measured by the extent to
which their promises and programmes are carried out. Note that the variables are the
double ones of intent (a function or motivation) and of capacity (a function or power
base), but the Lest of the extent and quality of power and leadership Is the degree of
actual accomplishment of the promised changes. For a discussion on the dimensionality
of power refer to Steven Lukes, POWER : A Radical Approach. London : The Macmillan
Press. 1974. pp.26-34.
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SECTION TWO: THE FUNCTIONS OF AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES
TO LEADERSHIP.
The concept of leadership as en established social role seeks to account for and
understand the activities and relationships between the leadership and followers
in terms of their characteristic and unique Interaction. 14 In order to develop a
specific framework from which one can examine the functions of leadership, one
has to reiterate the established premise that any group member occupies the
position of leadership when he successfully Initiates group action end, thus
affects the coordination of group behaviour. 75 Consequently, one must be aware
of the ends that are being served by the leadership end their contribution to
'effective' performance.76 William F. Whyte In his STREET '?NER SX/ETY
has used the concept of 'origination of action' as the defining criteria for
leadership function. This concept, apparently, is dependent upon Interaction end
the procedures for defining the end-point In an Interectional unit. 77 Thus, 'the
origination of actions' or, what Chapple and Coon call 'the first action In a
sequence' can be described as:
The observation of the order In which people act In a
simple operation, end will be found very useful In
describing the relations of Individuals In groups. Its
Importance lies in the fact that once two individuals
have been conditioned to maintain an order In which
one of them habitually originates action to the other,
we are dealing with the rudiments of leadership.18
The function of leadership within the conception of Interaction will be an
14R.P1. StogdHl. INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR AND GROUP ACHIEVEIIENT, New York : Oxford
University Press 1 1959. p.112.
75JK. Hemphill, Why People Attempt to Lead In Lulgi PeLrullo and Bernard 11. Bass,
eds, LEADERSHIP AND INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR, New York : Holt,, Rinehart & Winston,
1961. pp.201-204.
76EffectIve performance Is used here to refer to group syntality and synergy as
being satisfied by group leadership.
77Wflhiam F. Whyte, STREET CORNER SOCIETY : The Social Structure of an Italian
Slum. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1943. pp.257-63.
78E.D. Chapple and C.S. Coon, PRINCIPLES OF ANTHROPOLOGY, New York : Henry Halt
& Co.. 1942. p.705.
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aggregate of roles in a formal end highly differentiated structure that Is to, a
greater extent due to environment necessities. The stable composition of the
group end the lack of social assurance on the part of the members vls-a-vis the
environment often contributes toward producing a very high rate of social
Interaction within the group. The group structure Is a product of these
Interactions. Out of these Interactions arises a system of mutual obligations
which is fundamental to group cohesion. As Whyte points out:
...the code of the street corner boy requires him to
help his friends when he can and to refrain from doing
anything to harm hlm...The leader Is the focal point
for the organization of his group. In this absence the
members of the gang are divided into a number of
small groups; there is no common activity or general
conversation. When the leader appears, the situation
changes strikingly. The smaller units form into one
large group. The conversation becomes general and
unified action frequently follows. The leader becomes
the central point in the discussion. When the leader
leaves the group, unity gives way to division which
existed before his appearance.79
The concept of 'function' deals ultimately with processes, results, or objective
consequences. On the other hand, role Is the differentiated manifestation of the
function of leaders in contributing to the social systems' coordination. In this
view, the functional emphasis of leadership will reflect on the most frequently
played roles with the accompanying leadership style to indicate its organizational
mode.
As leadership functions deals with the relationship between the • leeder' and the
followers of a group, a stimulus-response relationship, the concept of function
will include among many other (actors, that of communication. Thus leadership
becomes:
A behavioural process consisting of stimulating
79WliIlam Foote Whyte, leader-Follower Relations In Street-Corner Society. in
Harol Proshanaky and Bernard Seldenberg, BASIC S11JDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, New
York : HelL, Rinehart and Winston, 1965. p.5 19.
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persons, called 'followers' to act integratively toward
the achievement of group goals. It Is primarily a
function of the situation within which It occurs,
through significantly Influenced by personal traits
end status role.8°
Thus, one of the functions of leadership (apart from being the totality of
Influencing relationships emanating from a particular Individual that serves as a
guiding force) Is the coordination of efforts essential to a system of cooperation
which requires an organized system of communication. Centers or points of
Interconnections In such a communication system can only operate through the
centers of leadership. One of the functions of leadership can be said to be one of
communication facilitation as far as communication Is to be coordinated through
'central positions'. It follows from then that the vitality, maintenance and
endurance of the group will depend on the functions of leadership. 8 ' Thorton
Roby in his work on the executive functions In small groups, made a general
inference In terms of the leadership function and group behaviour. In effect, this
conceptualization,
...Is intended to cover the entire process by means of
which group actions are selected from a pool of
potential actions. This process entails the direction
or reception of information; storage of this
information; transmission of Information;
calculations; refinements and extrapolations based on
Information; and the final processes that are casually
classed as judgemental or decision making...82
The essential functions of group leadership are, firstly, to provide the system of
communication; secondly, to promote the securing of essential efforts, and thirdly
to formulate and define purpose. Since the elements of group organization are
80See N.P. TilImans definition it leadershlp In ThE DICTIONARY Of POLITICAL
SCIENCE. Edited by Joseph Dunam New York : The Philosophical Library, 1964. p.396.
81 5ee C. Shannon and W. Weaver. THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION.
Urbana : University of Illinois, 1949, for an elaboration on the Importance of group
'centers or leaders in the control and distribution of communication among a
collectivity.
82Thorton R. Roby, The Executive Function in Small Groups, In LEADERSHIP AND
INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR by Lulgi Petrutlo and Bernard M. Bass, eds, New York : Halt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961, pp.82-83.
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Interrelated end Interdependent, the leadership functions follow this course. This
point Is explained within the Interaction process by Chapple and Arensberg who
state that:
Given two Individuals, we observe that one of the two
manifests the first unit of actions which I then
followed by a unit of action manifested by the second
Individual. The first unit Is regarded as the stimulus
end the second unit the response. The distinction
between the two Is that the first action Is not
preceded by en action of the other Individual In the
second pair.83
And, more explicitly:
...when we state that Interaction Is taking place, we
base this statement upon our observation that one of
our Individuals changes his motor pattern and that
change is followed by a change In the pattern of the
other. In other words, we see that after one Individual
changes his previous motor pattern and adapts to a new
one and the other Individual still Is maintaining his
previous condition, if then the second Individual
manifests a change pattern Immediately following the
change In the first Individual, we have what we have
previously defined as Interaction...84
Within this Interaction process, the need of a definite system of communication
creates the first role of the leader and signifies the Immediate start of the
leadership function. Given that group organization will Initially be conceived In
the mind of the leadership establishing the means of communication will have to
call In a selection of 'lieutenants', I.e. creation of positions, that In turn will
create a system of communication. And, the very first task of that system of
communication will most likely be the selection of a leadership. 85 In this
theme, the leadership function Is a relationship between those exerting Influence
83EIiot D. Chapple and Conrad ti. Arensberg, •Measuring Human Relations : An
Introduction to the Study or the Interaction •r Indlviduals, GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY
MONOGRAPHS. XXII. 1940. p.56.
84Chapple and Arensberg, tieasuring Human RelaUon.... op.cit.. p.26.
85E. Katz, The Two-Step Flow ot Communication : An Up-to-date report on a
Hypothesls, PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY. 1957. 21. pp.61-78.
38
end those who are Influenced, end Is best seen within the framework of group
processes. Therefore, the establishment end maintenance of a communication
system, is the primary task of the leadership. This process involves the
selection of lieutenants, the offering of Incentives, the securing of an Informal
organization where the lieutenants share the property of compatibility. This
property, In turn, has the chief function of expending the communication
accompanied with the reduction of formal decisions; minimizing undesirable
Influence end promotion of desirable Influences that are In harmony with the
scheme of formal responsibilities.86
The second leadership function Is to secure essential personal services from
group members. This process encompasses, firstly, the 'recruitment' of
personnel with the aim of establishing cooperative relationships. And, secondly.
the eliciting of such persons' who are 'pulled' to the 'tangible character of
membership'. 87 It follows from this that the effort to recruit persons who by
the general appeal are brought into contact with en organization, becomes the
most regular and routine work of securing contributors. Here, the eliciting of
the quantity and quality of efforts from group adherents will determine the actual
outputs of efficiency and Influence, which are the real materials of the group's
organization.88
The third leadership function Is that of formulating and defining purposes,
objectives, ends of the group. It has already been stated that purpose Is the
aggregate of action that Is a produce of the decisions relative to purpose and
86Daniel Katz and Paul Lazerfeld, PERSONAL INFLUENCE. New York : Free Press.
1956.
87For an elaboration on this, consider the testimony of one Hitler's olIowers; quoted
In Theodore Abots WHY HITLER CAME TO POWER, New York : Prentice Hall, 1938.
p.146. it states: 1 was attracted to the National Socialist Party because it did not
Indulge in the high promises other parties made in their campaign literature. On the
contrary, we were told that we must suffer and sacrifice; that the end of our striving
must be a greater 6ermany rather than personal aggrandizement.
88See Fay D. Havron and D. 600dacre, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SMALL MILITARY UNITS,
Washington, D.0 : Institute for Research in Human Relations, 1951. For an Illustration
on the maintenance of morale, scheme of inducements, the maintenance of schemes or
deterrents, supervision and control, inspection, education and training.
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environment and result In the achievement of concrete acts. 69 Purpose must
also be something that Is accepted by all the contributors to the system of efforts.
Purpose can be broken down into specific objectives that can be ordered in the
time as well as specializations. It becomes more apparent that leadership
functions will Include, formulations. redefinitions, break Into detail, end decide
on the Innumerable simultaneous end progressive actions thot constitute the
synthesis of purpose 90
Hence a core aspect of the leadership function Is the assignment of responsiblity
- the delegation of objective authority. The potential aspect of authority would be
In, as discussed above, structuring the system of communication. The other
aspect of authority would Include the actual decision and conduct which makes a
working system out of the group. Hence, the organization for work specification,
I.e. the definition of purpose, will mould the activity, the responsibility, and the
specification of those who make the last contributions to attain the final concrete
objectives. What binds this authority, responsibility and Individual capability
together in a meaningful whole Is the Indispensable coordination that requires a
pyramiding of roles and that to-and- fro, up-and-down-the-line coordination of
purposeful decisions to maintain the vitality of action, concrete Interaction,
mutual adjustment, and ultimately, the fulfillment of purpose and objectives.91
Of the various assertions one has made of leadership functions, one of the
necessities for Integrated behaviour has to do with the compatibility of goals and
values of group members to the potential values of various responses that it may
get. One function of leadership may be to emphasize the existing congruence of
89Douglas tic6regor. Conditlons of Effective Leadership In the Industrial
Organlz.tion irs the JOURNAL OF CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY, 1944, VIII, pp.55-63.
90See Chapter 3 of E.P. Hollander, LEADERS. GROUPS AND INFLUENCE • New York
Oxford University Press. 1964. where the experience of the organizational leader as
related to the group., pp.30-4 1.
91 See Alex Baveias, teadership : Man and Function, ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE
QUARTERLY. Vol.4, 4. March 1960. pp.491-496.
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goals and to achieve these goals. 92 Given that the Intelligent choice of response
Is essential to effective group action, one of the leadership functions would be to
ensure that a balance exists between the processing of Information relevant to the
group end Its potential to respond. This can be done by the recruitment of
specialized personnel to deal with one or the other functions so as to ensure that
balance.93 The decision making function of the leadership calls upon for the
provision of a structure that Incorporates the relationships between Information
end action. 94 Another function would be to Insure that the leadership structure
executes Its functions as It Is supposed to. What this means Is, taking the
example of Information processing, that basically If a certain piece of
Information Is required then the leadership must guarantee the availability.
accuracy and timing of the material In order to make a selection that constitutes
an 'optimal response' to a stimulus (via an available option) and then proceed to
Interpret feedback.95
So far, one has dealt with functions of organization leadership. However,
leadership functions on a group level can be enumerated under two sets which
have been Identified as: 'task functions', I.e. functions undertaken In order to
rationally select end achieve goals; 'maintenance' I.e. functions connected with
those emotional 'Intangible' areas required In group development, maintenance
end viability.96
These functional dimensions as recognized by Interested observers In group
92Rlchard E. Andrews, LEADERSHIP AND SUPERVISION. Washington D.C. : U.S. Civil
Service CommissIon. No.9, 1955. p.23.
93J. Marschak. Towards an Economic Theory of Organization and lnformatlon In
P.M. Thrafl, C.H. Coombs, and P.1. Davis (eds.). DECISION PROCESSES. New York
Wiley, 1954, pp.46-47.
94See Thorton P. Roby, •The Mechanics of Environmental Adjustsnent, BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE. 1959. 4, pp.107-119.
95Roby, The Mechanics of ....,op.cit., p.110.
96These two sets of runcuons have been used widely by Davis, Mooney, ReIley, Katz
and Kahn. Parsons and Bales have developed these two sets and labelled them
instrumental and expresstve as discussed below in the text. See Talcott Parsons,
Robert F. Bales and Edward A. Shils in WORKING PAPERS IN THE THEORY OF ACTION.
New York : The Free Press, 1953, p.64.
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conditions have been given a wider classification under the labels, the
'Instrumental' and 'expressive' as coined by Parsons and Bales. 97 By the
'Instrumental function' one Is referring to the control of a functional social
system in terms of performing tasks that are goal oriented I.e. those actions that
contribute to the maintenance and effectiveness of the organization. By the
•expresslve l'unctlon one rerers to the reactions in the social - emotional areas
that prevail between the leadership and the led. Amital Etzioni in his Dual
Leadership in Complex Organizetlons, elaborated on this, claiming:
The distinction between expressive and instrumental
orientations is not limited to a classification of
leadership. All acts can be classified as expressive or
instrumental. Roles can be classified according to the
prevalence of one kind of act over the other.
Moreover, the same analytical distinction can be
applied to the functional needs of social systems.
Here, instrumental refers to the need to acquire
resources, or means, and to allocate them among the
various role - clusters in the system, and expressive,
to the need to maintain the integration of various
parts of the system with each other as well as with its
normative system.	 Role clusters can then be
classified as devoted primarily to the service of one or
another functional need...98
Hence, If the leadership contribution to the co-ordination of social systems Is to
be a function of the role It ploys, is. en indicator of its organizational mode (be
it Instrumental or expressive), then situational facets have to be borne In mind.
This is felt so due to the reason that roles will be chosen when responding to the
group's environmental problems, which includes the follower's bearing on the
role and the styles of leadership. 99 It follows from then, that in order to
97See Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales In Ibid. •The Dimensions of Actlon-Space,
where they state: .the essenUal approach was La think of the small group as a
functioning social system. it was held that such a system would have four main
lunctional problems which are described, respectively, as those of so'opt,lioa, to
conditions of the external situation, of Insfrumentsi control over parts of the
situation in the performance of goal oriented tasks, of the m.nagemenl and
expression of sentiments and tensions of the members and of preserving the social
integration of members with each other as a solidarity coliectivity.. (p.64).
96AmltaI Et,zionl,	 Dual Leadership in Complex Organlzations, AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 30. October, 1965, p.689.
99A well known formulation on this issue comes from 6reensteln who stated that the
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maximize the organizational effectiveness of the group, a 'harmonization' between
the instrumental end expressive modes of leadership Is essential. When this
harmonization Is ensured, the organization's effectiveness will be enhanced by
making the expressive mode leadership serve the organization's instrumental
needs. These modes of leadership come Into conflict when the Instrumental
preferences of an organization bear down on the expressive preferences and thus a
balance is required for 'normal' functionIng.'
The instrumental and expressive orientations of leadership will affect task
leadership in a group as It attempts to set the structure of goal achievement,
work performance, making decisions, initiating and directing action while
performing professional and technical speciality. 101 On the other hand, social
leadership will attempt to maintain group morale and harmony by 'knowing'
subordinate and showing consideration for them, keeping channels of
communication open, training the group to work as a team and accepting personal
responsibility and setting an example. 102 	Along this line of thought, the
solutions to organizational problems will be provided by the leadership assuming
both of these orientations. As 6usfleld In his lunctional Areas of Leadership
points Out:
Occupying an office of leadership, the leader Is
subject to two sets of role demands and to dual
functions. As an articulator of the movement In the
total society, he must learn the limits and possibility
of actions In the light of the power end Ideologies of
Influential persons and organizations outside of the
movement. He must attempt to sway these to the uses
likelihood of personal impact varies (1) the degree to which the actions take place in
an environment which admits of restructuring, (2) the location of the actor in the
environment, and (3) the act.ors peculiar strengths or weaknesses. in Fred I.
Greenstein, PERSONALITY AND POLITICS : Problems of Evidence. Inference, and
Conceptualization, Chicago : Markham Publishing Company. 1971. pp.42-45.
100Et.zioni. Dual Leadership in Complex Organizations. op.cit.. p.696.
1011 . Carter, leadership and Social 6roup Behavior in P1. Sherlf and P1.0. Wilson
(eds.), 6ROIJP RELATIONS AT ThE CROSSROADS. New York : Harper. 1953. PP.257-
284.
lO2j.. Jenkins, Nomlnating Technique as a Method of Evaluating Air Lroup Morale,
JOURNAL OF AVIATION MEDICINE. 19. pp.12-19.
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of the movement as best as may be done. However, as
the mobilizer of commitment to the movement, he Is
expected to express the sharp disjunction between the
values of the society end those of the movement.
Janus-like, the leader stands In one place, facing two
different ways. In one direction he Is the head of the
movement - the major embodiment of commitment to
the valuee end program. Here he feces inward, toward
the goals and ideals of the adherents. In the other
directions he functions as a negotiator and
communicator between the external environment and
the Internal one. In one function, that of
mobilization, he breathes the fire end brimstone of
enthusiastic mission. In the other function, that of
articulation, he pours the oil of bargaining,
compromise, end the common culture.103
Deducing from this, one may consider the primary mode in complex organization
to be the Instrumental one. However, during periods of rapid change, the
expressive mode can assume Increasing importance within the group structure.
6iven that expressive leadership is capable of moulding and maintaining the
emotional bonds between leader and led, Integration can be restored once the
Instruments' responses have failed to maintain social control and order. It Is also
quite clear that a single leader can shift between the modes of leadership,
maintaining an Instrumental capacity while at the same time, maintaining
followers' loyalty through expressive behaviour. 104 Furthermore 1 the overall
performance of an organization can be enhanced by the creation of strong social
ties - a contribution that can arise from the expressive mode of leadership.'05
103Joseph R. 6usfield, Functional Areas of Leadership In Social tlovements, ThE
SOCIOLO61CAI. QUARTERLY. 7, Spring, 1966. pp.140-14 1.
104For an outstanding example bearing on this point consult Allan Bullocks HITLER : A
Study in Tyranny, Book 1. Chapter II. The Years of Struggle 1919-24, p.113. New
York : Bantam Books. 1958.
105For an elaboration on this facet refer to Havron and 600dacre, ThE EFFECTIVENESS
OF SMALL MILITARY UNITS. op.cit.. Also, a more specialized study by Edward A. Sbus
and Moris Janowltz reflects on this point in Cohesion and Disintegration in the
Wehrmacht in World War 1I in THE PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, Summer. 1946.
where a basic hypothesis is provided: it appears that a soldiers ability to resist is a
function of the capacity of his immediate primary group (his squad or section) to avoid
social disintegration. When the individuals immediate group, and its supporting
formations, not his basic organic needs, offered him affection and esteem from both
officers and comrades, supplied him with a sense of power and adequately regulated his
relations with authority. The element of self-concern In battle, which would lead to
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In these terms one comes close to the notion of leadership not only as an
organizational function but, one of personal quality. Under this concept, one may
ask the question, 'How Is the leader identified?' From the preceding discussion,
It becomes evident that leadership means 'different things to different
people'. 106 However, Shartle and Morris offer four criteria frequently used to
Identify leaders. A leader can be Identified as:
1. An Individual who exercises positive Influence upon
others.
2. An individual who exercises the most Influence in the goal
setting or goal hievement of the group or the organization.
3. An Individual who Is elected by the group as leader.
4. An Individual who Is given office or position of apparently
high Influence potential.'°7
Morris' listing of leadership criteria Includes the previous four postulates and
also adds five others concerning leadership behaviour, which Includes:
1. Any positive Influence act.
2. Behaviour of any individual that makes a difference In the
behaviour or the characteristics of the group.
3. Behaviour of an individual when he is directing the
disruption of the effective funcUoning of his primary group 1 was mlnimlzed. (p.281)
'°6'When one considers Cattels conception of leadership as involving a group members
effect upon group syniality (in Raymond B. Cattel. New Concepts for Measuring
Leadership In Terms of Group Syntality. HUMAN RELATIONS. IV, 1951. pp.161-184.)
and Stogdills definition of leadership as the process of influencing the activities of
an organized group in Its effort toward goal setting and goal achievement (Ralph 11.
Stogdill. Personal Factors Associated with Leadership : A Survey of the Literature,
JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. XXV. Jan 1948. pp .35-71) It Is clear that each conception
of leadership has a fairly explicit meaning, and bears different implications for
research and theory.
'°7See Carroll Shartle, Studies In Naval Leadershlp in Harold 6uetzkow. GROUPS.
LEADERSHIP AND MEN. Pittsburgh : Carnegie Press. 1951. pp .119-133. and Richard
Morris. The Problem of Leadership : An interdisciplinary Approach, AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY. LVIX I September, 1950.
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activities of a group.
4. All the behaviour of en Individual selected as leader.
5. Behaviour Involved In the execution of a given
position.108
it con be suggested that from a review of the literature on leadership, these
criteria have been utilized to identify leaders but, as stated in the beginning of
this chapter, there exists a dilemma In the study of leadership. 109 Dean
attempts to explain this dilemma by providing four useful overviews on
leadership. As he stated:1 10
1. LIttle comparability exists among leadership
studies in the aggregate, for those studies, guided by
widely different notions of the phenomenon called
leadership, have not concerned themselves with
common phenomena.
2. Much of the research on leadership has been
influenced by a conception which, upon Inspection,
blurs into another more fundamental concept employed
In the study of group processes.
3. The study of leadership has suffered under a
dubious distinction between 'leadership' and 'headshlp
which has adversely conditioned much of the
conceptualization of leadershIp. 11
4. The study of leadership has emerged as a separate
field in the study of group processes and has been
conducted as If leadership were a totally unique
' °8Ilorrls, The Problem of Leadershlp..., op.clt., pp.149-155.
'°9See John B. Miner. The UncerLain Future of the Leadership Concept : Revisions and
Clariflcation In THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE. Volume 18, Number
3, pp.293-307, where he offers a Behavioral treatment of the limitations of
leadership. As he staLes: The leadership paradigm was developed out of the study of
small groups and group dynamics, the Initial focus was on emergent leadership. To the
extent that we are concerned with the functioning of organizations, not isolated work
groups (and, Increasingly, organizations are the focus of our theoretical and repeated
attempts attention), the small group models have proved Inadequate. Repeated
attempts to extrapolate from the work group level have not resulted In viable macro
theorles... pp.293-294.
1 i °Dwight Dean, DYNAMIC SOCIAL PSYCFIOLO6Y. New York : Random House, 1969.
pp.458-461.
11 'An attempt to differentiate between leadership and headshlp has been made by
Charles R. Hotlowman, L.sdership and Headshlp There Is a Difterence, in
PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION, 31. 4, July-August. 1968, pp.38-44.
phenomenon, although virtually all the existing
conceptions of leadership can be explicated In terms of
more basic concepts of social psychology.
Although these reservations on the field of leadership echoed by Dean end
reflected In other forms by many authors, Including Burns and Jenkins, lead one
to evaluate the many difficulties In differentiating between different
conceptualizations, the tracing of common notions provides one with some
approaches by which one can discuss and analyze leadership. These approaches
may be discussed in the following order:
1. The situational approach,
2. The genetic approach,
3. The personality approach,
4. The psychoanalytic approach,
5. The psychohistorical approach,
6. The prophetic-caliphal approach, and,
7. The charismatic approach.
(1) The Situational Acoroach
The situational approach suggests that leaders must have situations or moments
that will bring their genius to the fore, and without these situations, many men
go down In history unknown.1 12 William James suggested that great events often
occur by a proper marriage between the personality of the leader and the nature
of the situation, and that leadership Is not simply a personal quality, although the
line between the personality and the situation Is not clear. James' argument
reconciles an older analysis presented by Hegel and Fichte. They Introduced the
time spirit' (Zeitgelst) theory which emphasized that situations call upon
personalities to play required roles In the fulfillment of destIny.1 13 Hegel
1 ' 2WIIliam James, The Dilemma of Determinism from his ThE WILL TO BELIEVE. New
York : Dover Publications, 1956. p.26.
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thought he saw in Germany the spirit or culture which would serve as the basis
for unity If a German hero appeared end accepted the role of leadership. in this
sense, the great man becomes the Instrument of historic forces, lie Is great In the
sense that he understands the invincible logic of events and cooperates with
history. The situational approach emphasizes that occasion makes the 'great man'
rather than the other way round. There are probably, according to this approach.
very limited choices for man, and even fewer opportunities to reach self-chosen
ends.
The situotionalists might not view Hitler as personally powerful, although he may
have hod an exceptionally strong personality. Hitler, they assume, generated his
power through the skillful exploitation of a 'ripe situation'. Nasser's famous
statement concerning the situation In Egypt before the 1952 revolution
Illustrates this point very vividly: A role In search of an actor.1 14 Nasser
often used his role as an Illustration of human instrument of the revolution
which was the only way out." 15 British imperialism, the corrupt monarchy,
feudal overlords and the disparities In the social structure constituted the
climate which triggered popular dissatisfaction end thus offered a stage for the
'actor'.
Another example always forwarded by the situationalists Is that of Theodore
Roosevelt. The situation of the United States then was that of a nation which held
In Its hands the fate of other nations for the coming years. He sew that the people
enjoyed exceptional advantages, but were menaced by certain lurking dangers.
With this picture in mind, he settled to the conclusion that here is the task, and
I havegottodolt.116
1131I.S. Jennings, THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN NATJJRE. New York W.W. Nort.on
& Co.. Inc., 1930, p.9.
1 14Gamal Abdut Nasser, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION. Cairo : Maslahiat a)
istriamat Press, 1966. p.52.
I l5Nasser, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION, op.cit. p.53.
lI6jbId., p.92.
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Thus, the conclusion the situationalists would come to Is that situation, and not
the individual, Is the foremost end determining factor.
(2) The Genetic ADoroach
It was not tee long ego that many persons considered that lineage determined one's
fate. Francis Oalton, Will Durant, Herbert E. Walter and Havelock Ellis were
among the various Intellectuals of their day who applied their biological
knowledge and openly declared that, despite obstacles and unlavourable
circumstances, genius Is hereditary and Is bound to assert Itself.' 7 They
claimed that superior achievement required the Inheritance of superior Inherited
traits while, at the same time, differentiating between superior, normal and
defective genes. 'Integration' occurs when a couple mate and the offspring may be
either superior or inferior to either parent. However, the rules that govern a
set of integration are not known.' 18
The question that Is often raised on this approach Is: Can the crossing of genes be
comprehended and thus controlled to produce superior offspring? The Influence
of environment on the gene Is widely acknowledged by many biologists. The
genetic result, in terms of a personality trait, depends on the surroundings of the
germ Itself, and on the cells and hormones In contact with the germ cell.
Hereditary studies seem to have supported the biologist's environmental gene
theory. Jennings provides evidence that points out heredity In the study of
monozygotic twins was affected by the process of their gene development.1 19
Whatever the geneticists have to say about their genetic calculations, it seems
that they admit the environmental nature In the making of leaders.
lllFrancis GalLon. HEREDITARY GENIUS. London : MacMillan & Co., Ltd.. 1892. Will
Durant. ADVENTURES IN GENIUS. New York : Simon and Schuster. 1931. Navelock Ellis.
A STUDY IN BRITISH GENIUS. London : Hurst and Blackett, Ltd.. 1904. and Herbert E.
Walter. GENETICS, New York : The Macmillan Company. 1930.
l2OjennIogs, THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN NATURE. op.cIt., p.384.
119 Ibid., p.145.
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'What is the formula of Interaction between the environment end the genes?'
would be the second question in this connection. The answer, as provided by
Jennings, may be that personalities end leadership traits are products of
development, end development Is always through the Interaction of the materials
of Inheritance (the genes) and other things (environmental effects)" 120 The
genetic theory, which does not provide clear guidelines en Its rules end
methodology, cautions eugenists on predictions that can become dangerous and
most unwise. This caution on the biology of leadership, while stating the
'common mistakes':
1. It is fallacious 'to sum up heredity In the maxim that like produces like'.
6eniuses do not always produce geniuses. Perhaps they do, rarely. However,
Inferior parents may produce superior offspring.
2. It Is fallacious to assume that, although all human 'characteristics' are
inherited, heredity is all Important In human affairs. Heredity has to be taken
into consideration, but It need not be worshipped.
3. It Is fallacious to claim that 'characteristics' are not alterable by
environment. If the process of adaptation Is often obscure, it need not therefore
be denied.
4. It is also fallacious to assert that biological dogma, widely proclaimed and
believed by many in social, economic and political circles, requires en
aristocratic constitution of society. If genes, special ability, and hence,
leadership, may come from apparently Inferior patterns, a democratic
organization of society Is wise. The offspring of the Interior must not be
condemned to inferior social roles by autocratic overlords.121
Finally, in conclusion, given that the validity of the genetic approach is highly





By far the most elaborate body of leadership material is based on the theory that
leadership Is a result of the personal traits end characteristics of the leader. In
this perspective, leadership has a relationship to individual virtue where a
person is able to perform In ways different from end superior to his fellows and
thus he qualifies for leadership. 122 One point worth mentioning is that a greet
deal of Individuality may not produce superiority end thus may not result In
leadership. Superior Individuality as demonstrated by any leader must be
expressed In such a way that It would be appreciated by the social group or its
possessor will not be a leader.
This approach emphasizes the role of personality where the leader may ascend
through the combination of a strong personality with a vigorous assertive ego and
a steady determination to accomplish certain goals end objectives he perceives as
Important. Steady determination and a strong personality In a leader on many
occasions earned him the label 'born leader'. Proponents of the personality
approach tend to make a distinction between the egoistic model and the genetic
model. The examples of De Oaulle 123 Nasser and Sukarno' 24 were probably self
evident. None of these were born to superior parents; however, they apparently
were dominant egoists who showed early characteristics of leadership.
Ordway Teed In his analysis of this personality type described the egoistic leader:
They Impose themselves; their will to power Is
Inordinate and insatiable. They strive on the passion
for authority and the thirst for obedience....They are
forces to reckon with, for people come to be convinced
that In submission for them they are caught up Into a
larger whole and come to desire, somewhat
l22Emory S. Bogardus, LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP. New York : Appleton-Century, Inc..
i g3. p.4.
1235ee Monique Clague, Conceptlons ot Leadership : Charles de 6aulle and Max
w.ber. POLITICAL THEORY. Vol.3. No.4, Norvember,1975. pp.423-439.
l24See Paul R. Dettman, Leaders and Structures in Third World' Politics
Contrasting Approaches to Legitimacy, COMPARATIVE POLITICS. 1974, January,
Vol.6, No.2, pp.245-269.
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hypnotically, despairingly or mistakenly, what the
leader desires.125
James Martin, elaborating further on the structure of personality into three
major components: habits, attitudes, end traits; analysing them in two different
approaches - the static and the dynamic.l26 The combination of these three
elements of personality form a pattern ci characteristics peculiar to the
Individual making him Identifiable as a unique person. A person may share many
of the cultural end group characteristics but the combination, intensity end
degree of these characteristics will represent a unique 'whole'. Oiven that no one
personality can be perfectly Integrated, psychologists believe a functional
Interrelationship among the personality characteristics of any individual will be
present. It is equally possible to expect that some persons will have a sufficient
number of similar characteristics to Justify a cautious usage of the term
'personality type'. The effect of culture on personality may be such that certain
personality 'types' are more or less identifiable.127
Thus, if one was to make a valid conclusion on how egoistic Individuals become
leaders, then it would be that a realization of this personality 'type' must be so
challenging, stimulating and provoking as to drive their leadership capabilities
Into existence. The Implication of this statement goes against the earlier
situational approach and leaves the person responsible for the creation of the
situation rather than vice versa.
The personality model can be divided Into three common subtypes : the bassist,
the paternalistic and the autocratic. The 'bassist' subtype, originated by Munro
In his PERSON4LITY/NPOL/T/C.5, Is found more common In local government than
In state or national government. The 'boss' Is an outgoing person, perhaps
I25Ordway Toad, ThE ART OF LEADERSHIP. New York : Whittlesey House, 1935, p.26.
l26james Martin, THE TOLERANT PERSONALITY. Detroit : Wayne SLate University
Prep" 1964., p.34.
121iIoward Wriggins, THE RULERS IMPERATIVE : Strategies rot Survival In Asia and
Afri Ca , New York : Columbia University Press, 1970, P.90.
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extroverted, a 'dubious Individual', a shrewd master who plays upon human
feelings. He ranges from the coarse, crude foreman In a factory, to the smooth
and sophisticated politician who displays direct, partisan and autocratic
behavior.' 28 Usually calling himself the 'realist', with knowledge of the inside
moves of the game, he denounces the writers of politics end governments as mere
'theorists'. Knowing his business well, the boss will grab whatever useful
tangibles come his way, retain as much as he can, and may divide the rest with his
associates. 129 Always having to demonstrate superior Individuality and skill, he
ascends to leadership status by manipulating a combination of Industrial
abilities, good Judgment, perseverance, brute force, end good fortune and has
nobody to thank for it but himself.'3°
The 'boss' Is not a man of military training, but It Is astonishing how well he
applies. in his own sphere, the axioms of military science. Having informants,
spies and a miniature 'fifth column In the enemy's camp, he has access to
information that is in most cases accurate. He creates a spoils system, dependent
on his cunning, which provides the boss with his power base. A spoils system
brings the 'bass' to power and it is this spoils system that In the main
contributes to keep him In power.'31
Autocratic leadership emphasizes a state of affairs where persons are ruled
without consulting them. It wields an Iron club and leads In terms of its own
wishes, wants, desires; It shapes the action of others in terms of Its plans and
Justifies Its doings In terms of Its superiority. The autocratic leader is not only
objective, overt and positive but proceeds aggressively and obtrusively. He
commands and organizes; sometimes moving with precision and sometimes not.
Autocratic leadership restricts the freedom of others but exercises great freedom
i28WIIIIam Bennett Munro, PERSONALITY IN POLITICS, New York : The MacMillan
ComP$ flY. 1925. p.67.
l29Harold Zink. CITY BOSSES IN THE UNITED STATES. Durham. N.C. : Duke University
Pr55. 1930. p.53.
l3OCIay Feiker. THE POWER GAME. New York : Simon and Shuster, 1968. p.73.
l3ltlunro, PERSONALITY IN POLITICS. op.cit., pp. 69-70.
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end embodies the law according to its own designs. In the extreme, this
leadership can instill dark fear in the hearts end minds of Its subjects and makes
ruthlessness the standard operating procedure.132
Paternalistic leadership Is probably the most commonly found. Here, leaders act
fatherlike end consider the welfare and purpose of their followers. They may
dominate the group attitudes, goals end objectives if these seem ill-advised. In
case of errors and mistakes made by the group, the paternalistic leadership
assumes accountability. Thus, the leadership safeguards against errors by
undertaking to make the decisive decisions.133
The main weakness of the autocratic and paternalistic leadership is that when the
leadership Is lost, the group is left helpless. Under both models, the members
become dependent on the leadership since they do not have the opportunity to
acquire experience of leadership for themselves. The main fault of these two
models Is that they do not provide for the development of members' Initiatives for
leadership.
(4) The Psychoanalytic Anoroech
This approach constitutes the foundation of some influential contemporary studies
of leadership. Pioneered by Freud, ft assumes that since Irrationality and
emotionality characterizes group behaviour, the key to understanding a collective
phenomena is leadership. As he writes:
...a group Is...es Intolerant as it is obedient to
authority. It respects force and can only be slightly
Influenced by kindness, which It regards merely as a
form of weakness. What It demands of Its heroes Is
strength, or even violence. It wants to be ruled and
oppressed and to fear Its masters. 134
l32Tead, THE ART OF LEADERSHIP. op.ciL. p.20.
1331b1d.. p.23.
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Freud believed that the cohesIon 01 group members is based upon their common
libidinal/emotional Identification with the leader. The followers' emotional bond
to the leader stems, specifically, from their Individual inner dynamics which, In
eternal tension, seek to resolve the conflict between the ego -rationality
principle on the one hand, and the Id - Instinctual forces, end superego -
social/moral Imperatives. Since the followers are Incapable ci measuring up to
their ego ideal (as reflected by the super ego), the leader Is substituted for the
ego Ideal. The leader, on his part, stands In sharp psychological contrast to the
members of the group. ..He may be of a masterful nature, absolutely
narcissistic, self-confident end Independent."135
The basis of Freud's leadership approach is the controversial 'primal horde'
theory, where at the start of human society, rebellious sons kill their tyrannical
father, initiate a fraternal society which later experiences the need for strong
leadership that in turn leads to religion, totemism end deity. All this represents
the reincarnation of the murdered father. ..The leader of the group Is still the
dreaded primal father...the primal father Is the group ideal, which governs the
ego in place of the ego ideal..,"'36
Building on the influential nature of Freud's work, Harold D. Lasswell focused
directly upon the inner (psychological) dynamics of the political man, whose
relentless pursuit of power enables the person to compensate for feelings of
inadequacy and low self esteem. In other words, political personality is seen as
the power centered personality that maintains its personal 'Integrity' only
through the pursuit and exercise of power. Postulating on several political
personality types,' 31 Lesswell Identifies three major ones: the agitator, the
1345ee Sigmund Freud, 6ROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO. New York
Bantam Books, 1921, p.'4.
l35frsud, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND ThE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO, op.cit.. p.7 1.
I36gbid.. p.76.
l3lTo speak of type Is to say that each personality Is. or course different in fine
deta l '. but nevertheless Important similarities can be extracted. These similarities
allo w ror the claim that two or more leaders are of the same type.
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administrator end the theorist:
The essential mark of the agitator Is the high value
which he places on the emotional response of the
public...The agitator has come by his name honestly,
for he Is enough agitated about public policy to
communicate his excitement to those about him.138
IThe administrator Is tied] to the members of his own
environment, whose relations he seeks to coordinate.
The administrator Is a co-ordinator of effort In
continuing activity.139
Marx, Ithe theorist], wanted to Impress himself upon
mankind, certainly...But more: Marx wanted
unreserved admiration for the products of his mind.
He toiled through years of Isolation end poverty to
make his assertions Impregnable. 	 It was more
Important to gain theoretical completeness than to
modify his technique of social Intercourse)40
Lasswoll concluded that although three different types of Individual responses are
mode to particular situations, a general formula that explains why they all
became 'political men' can be constructed: p ) d } r = P. where p equals
private motives; d equals displacement onto a public object; r equals
rationalization In terms of public Interest; P equals the political man, and }
equals transformed Into. 41 This broad conceptualization known as 'the
displacement hypothesis' serves as a theoretical justification to see persons that
get involved In social movements end revolutions as displacing private motives
upon public objects.
Positing a particular type of political man - the revolutionarY leader - E. Victor
Wolfenstein's in THE REVOL UT/OMRY pERxw4L11Y 142 offers en essentially
Freudian Interpretation of Lenin, Trotsky end Gandhi, end employing Eriksons
1 36H.rold Lasswefl, PSYCHOPAThOLOGY




AND POLITICS, Chicago 	 University or
l42f. Victor Woltenstein, THE REVOLUTIONARY PERSONALITY, Princeton1 N.J.
Princeton University Press, 1971.
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eight stages of personality development - oral, anal, genital, latency,
adolescence, young manhood, adulthood, maturity - focused on the Oedipus complex
in locating the motivational dynamics that drive men towards revolutionary
action:
Turning then to adolescence, we found the following
situation to be common to all three men. Each hod an
unusually ambivalent relationship with his
father....When the nature of the youths relation to
paternal authority, Is very much at issue, it is
extremely likely that the Individual will be
responsive to occupations, of which revolutionary
activity is one, which allow him to work through his
conflicts and hopefully resolve them...The
revolutionary Is one who escapes from the burdens of
Oedipal guilt and ambivalence by carrying his conflict
with authority into the political realm)43
In this manner the revolutionist dichotomises his
world, and with it the emotional complex of his
ambivalent feelings toward his father. As a
consequence his feelings of guilt are substantially
reduced, so that in all three cases we saw men turning
from introspection and inaction to vigorous pursuance
of their revolutionary vocations. 144
Stimulating as this may be, 145 the psychoanalytic approach to leadership Is faced
with difficulties of validity. These studies, many authorities have observed, are
highly speculative and do not lend themselves to scientific criteria - especially
verification and replication. Providing at best a parochial explanation to
leadership, they are applicable to numbered individuals and leave out historical
and socioeconomic variables that play a vital part in emergent leadership. Also,




145For more Information on typologies of political leaders refer to James David
Barber. ThE PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER. Englewood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1977.
1460ne can only imagine the formidable task a psychoanalyst may face trying to
uncover the necessary psychological data concerning leaders from secondary sources.
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(5) The Psvchohlstorlcal ADDrOaCh
Unlike the psychoanalytic perspective that deals solely with the inner dynamics
of personality, the psychohistorical approach attempts to place personality
dynamics in the context of society and history. Pioneered by Ink H. Enlkson,
this approach represents a fusion of psychology end history evolving around
personal crisis, historical drama, adolescence and adulthood. The eight distinct
end successive developmental stages, noted earlier, evolve In a sociohistorical
setting end each contributes towards the progressive differentiation of the
personality. A 'turning point' or 'crisis' marks each of these stages leading to the
growth of a psychosocial personality. In organizing his study, Enlkson uses the
pivotal 'Event' around which he constructs a 'scenario' of Identity crisis and
personality dynamics)47
Erlkson's work on Martin Luther emphasizes the central concern of 'Identity
crisis' that deals with personal wholeness, Integrity and continuity. The 'Event'
Is en account where Luther, most probably In his early twenties, has what
appeared as a fit In his monastery's choir. Erikson regards this Incident as the
Illustration for Luther's 'Identity crisis' that Is located In his childhood and home
life.' 48 By advocating his reformist attitude, Erlkson claims, Luther was among
the chosen Individuals called upon...to lift his individual patienthood to the level
of a universal one and try to solve for all what he could not solve for
hlmself)49
l47See Erik H. Erlkson's. The Nature .f Clinical Evidence In INSIGHT AND
RESPONSIBILITY. New York : W.W. Norton. 1964.
148Refer to Ink H. Enikson. YOUNG PlAN LUTHER, New York : W.W. Norton. 1958.
where his parents and tutors are said to be strict disciplinanians and Luther Is
portrayed as rebellious, violent, moody, bad tem pered and hating. At university level
be studies under radical theologians who question the teachings of the Catholic Church
and thus influence young Luther. Becoming a monk In an austere monastry and ordained
as a priest, Luther used his priesthood training to formulate tutheranism (mostly
contained In the ninety five theses emphasizing the priesthood of all believers and
condemning the Church hierarchy) as a legitimate weapon in his attack on the Catholic
Church. By doing this he spoke on behalf of the thousands who shared the same
Judgements but had neither the resources nor the capacity to challenge the existing
order,
' 49 Ibid., p.67
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Another of the cases Erlkson has undertaken is that of discovering the
psychohistorical evidence of Mahatma Gandhi. In this case, the focus Is
'generativity crisis' that I, whether or not one develops the capacity to establish
and guide the next generation - either In terms of actual fatherhood or
symbolically In terms of accomplishments or 'works'. The 'Event' around which
Erlkson constructs his study of Gandhi Is the textile strike of 1918 at Ahmedabad.
which Is viewed, at least by Erlkson, to be the starting point of the Indian labour
union movement, Important In this 'Event' Is the Impact It had on Gandhi's life,
especially In terms of engineering non-violence as a transformative technique
based on the ritual belief of political fasting. It was from then that Gandhi leads
the mess movement of national civil disobedience)50
According to Erlkson's analysis, In responding to a crisis of generativity
characteristic of his adulthood, Gandhi expounded and practised non-violence to a
process of nation building as well as self-creation. Thus, In transforming the
negative Inferiority identity of the Indians In their relations with the British,
Gandhi was able to transform his own negative self Image Into one that was more
satisfying to his Inner needs. 151 In this, one witnesses the coalescence of
historical Imperative end personal drama 'prodding' a great leader to adopt a
historical setting to his personal needs.
Bruce Mazllsh's THE REVOLUT/OA(4RY ASCETIC provides a specialized
psychohistorical study of revolutionary leaders. Relying upon the work of Freud
and Weber and using a cluster of traits, he delineates the revolutionary ascetic
that consists of two components: narcissism and self denial, control and sacrifice.
Along with Freud's Indications of the leader having few libidinal ties to others
(I.e. incapable of feelings and emotions) Mazllsh applies the notion of 'displaced
libido' (I.e. displacing libidinal ties Into an abstraction) to Cromwell.
Robesplerre, Lenin, end Ilea. Each of these leaders exhibited the same
I5OSee Erik H. Erlkson 6ANDHIS TRUTH. New York : W.W. Norton, 1969. p.34.
l 5l Erik H. Erlkson. 0n the Nature of Psycho-HisLorical Evidence: In Search of
Gandhi, DAEDALUS. 97, 1968. pp.695-730.
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behavioural pattern, differing only In their sociohistoricel context; making them
glorlfy:...the Revolution, the People, Humanity, or Virtue...152
On the second component of escetism, Mazlish borrows from Weber the idea of
transforming a roliglous oonocpt end Its placement ...under the banner of
revolutionary activlty...' 53 making ...the traits of displaced libido and
esceticlsm...hlghly functional in the reel world of revolution... 54 The
followers, perceiving the leader's ascetic qualities as 'superhuman' and 'godlike',
are bound together by the identification they have for the leader who by offering
victory as well as salvation acquires a hypnotic hold over them.
The main weakness of the soclohistorical approach Is that, even when overcoming
some of the limitations of the psychoanalytic perspective, it is still embedded In
some of the latter's Intuitive and non-scientific aspects. Questions of scientific
rigour, the operetionalization of the many psychological categories and of locating
the necessary psychohistorical data are ever present. Similarly, this
perspective is limited to very few individuals)55
(6) The ProDhetic-Caliohel Aoorooch
This approach arises from the traditional Moslem philosophy of leadership that Is
based upon the belief that rulership Is a gift bestowed and pre-destined by 6od,
and the ruler will be accountable for It before 6od on the Day of Judgment. The
implication here Is that the ruler theoretically does not own his power end
accordingly Is not accountable for It to his fellowmen. Various verses from the




155For another example of this, refer to E.H. Erlkson, 6andhrs Autobiography : The
Leader as a Child. THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR. Autumn. 1966.
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Holy Koran are Interpreted to confirm that theory. The ruler, be he a C8l1Dfl a
Sultan, or a Well, 156 or one appointed by them, is 'God's shadow on earth" and
the dlvine shadow is here assimilated to the divine effulgence. 57 Other men
must therefore love and obey the ruler who, for his part, must rule them Justly.
The ruler's accountability to God for his conduct is stated on the authority of a
saying ascribed to the Prophet Mohammed that unjust rule does not last
long')58
The qualifications for the Moslem leader were physical and moral. The physical
are: adulthood, sanity, liberty (non slave), male sex and sound sight and
hearing. 159 The moral are: military prowess, administrative competence, piety
and knowledge. Obviously, the qualifications of the 'Moslem leader' are very
similar to those pertinent to the Western-leader type which are basically,
justice, courage, knowledge, good health and competence. The process of reaching
leadership was where God nominated the leader, the electoral college was the
ulema) 60 and the leader pleased the Almighty by guiding the followers who were
In most cases passive, except when the leader forfeited the qualifications for
justice and morality. in these terms the political process was the Caliph's
responsibility and any theory of democracy was absent.
From the above analysis, It becomes obvious that leadership was perceived in
terms of mysterious and religious obligations. The leader-follower relations
were to a great extent not accounted for and the leaderships' 'operational codes'
' 56The three terms_Calloh. Sultan, and_Wall are Arabic titles meaning respectively:
successor of the Prophet charged with sacred as well as secular leadership',
'possessor of power', usually appointed by a Caliph, and 'governor of a provinCe',
usually appointed by the Sultan. See Ceasar E. Farah, ISLAM : Beliefs and
Observances. New York : Barrons Educational SerIes. 1968. for a detailed account on
Islamic political thought.
157 e Abduhamld Al 6hszali, ADVICE FOR KIN6S. Translated from Persian by F.R.C.
Bagley. London : Oxford University Press, 1915. pp. xI-xli.
1585ee E.I.J. Rosenthal, POLITICAL ThOUGHT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM. Cambridge
University Press, 1958. pp. 113-114.
159*1 6hazall, ADVICE FOR KIN6S, op.cit., p.V.
l6OUJama. an Arabic word, means a council of religious elders.
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seem to have been non - existent.
An attempt has been made to operatlonalize some aspects of the dynamics of Arab
leadership based on Moslem political thought. This abstraction consists of four
elements end two submodels, The four elements are porsonelism. Individuelism.
lack of institutionalization 1 end importance of the 'great man'. The two submodels
are the prophetic model and the caliphal model. A comprehensive dynamic system
of leadership relationship co-ordinates these four elements and the two sub-
models.'6'
Personalism refers to a subjective. personalistic and highly emotional
relationship between a person and other people and things. Objectivlty' If
anything at all can be called so, is present only to a small degree. On the other
hand, Individualism represents a tendency to make decisions regardless of group
opinion, or In spite of It. These two elements are viewed as complementing and
reinforcing each other and whose combined effect Is the lack of
Institutionalization. Lack of InstitutionalizatIon denotes that the means for
solving leadership problems are ineffective or even absent. Given this the
prophetic-caliphal model undermines Institutions and the combined effect of
personalism, Individualism and lack of Institutionalization creates a vacuum.
This vacuum so created, as a result of the weak binding effect of Institutions La.
ways and means of doing things, the lack of an overriding Ideology or a dominant
group, can be filled by the quality of a leader. The Interaction of personalism,
Individualism and the lack of Institutionalization maintain a strong predisposition
for the arrival of the great man who, as though completing a set, accepts his role
as the fourth element.1 62
The followers' perceptions of the leader and their attitudes to him become the
defining criterion In differentiating between a great man and an ordinary one.
l6IThis typology Is adopted from Bashir Khadras THE PROPHETIC—CALIPHAL MODEL A
Theor y of the Arab Concept of Leadership, Amman : Cobary Press, 1962.
ló2See PhIlip Hitti. HISTORY OF ThE ARABS. New York : MacMillan, 1951, pp. 27-28.
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The 'prophetic' leader or the 'great man' will only be accepted by the followers If
he performs a 'miracle' or something 'extraordinary' end will most likely
exercise a leadership that manifests free will, solidarity, drive end unity of
action. On the other hand, the 'celiphol' leader, the ordinary, possessing neither
superior qualities nor extraordinary capabilities will be termed by the others as
the 'average' and will exercise authority: maintaining himself mostly by coercion
end authoritarian devices. However, the distinction between the caliphatic and
prophetic models, like that of authority and leadership, Is a matter of degree and
not kind. At best, they can be viewed as a spectrum where leadership variations
occur but, nevertheless, display en anti-establishment mode of leadership.
Issues of succession, accession end other leadership problems take different
directions In the two submodels. In the caliphal sub-model, force, coercion end
lack of confidence result in the lack of Institutionalization. While in the
prophetic model, the lack of Institutionalization arises from the belief and trust
In the leader.163
It should be noted that this leadership approach involves three participants: the
leaders, the potential contestants, and the followers. To operational ize any of the
elements of the prophetical-caliphal model, an analysis of the Interaction of the
three participants is to be considered.
The primary significance of this model Is that it points out the prominence of the
'great man' in a system's development, continuity and progress. However, its
most visible weakness is that dependence on the great Individual Increases risks
and uncertainties In the development process which Is compounded by the factors
of chance and unpredictability of the emergence of the 'great leader'. It may be of
some validity to assert that a period of stability, development and identification
exists when the 'great man' Is available, but political development requires more
certainty, popular participation, continuity of leadership, a minimum of conflict
and more unifying agents, like ideology end Institutions. 6iven this, it is felt
1635ee Khadra, THE PROPHE11C-CALIPHAL MODEL, op. cIL, p.13.
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that the monistic and absolutist tendencies that arise from the anti-Institutional
prophetic-caliphal model can only be suppressed or modified If an emphasis is
made on Ideology and the fostering of political organizations accompanied by an
institutionalized groupist spirit.
(7) The Cherismatic Aparoach
Perhaps the most prominent approach to leadership revolves around the concept
of charisma. The charismatic leader Is distinguished from other leaders by his
capacity to inspire loyalty toward himself as the source of authority, 164 apart
from an established status. 165 The main weapon of the charismatic leader Is
personal magnetism and charm that conveys not only his magical power but also
his delicate need for support and reinforcement. The charismatic leader needs his
followers as much as the actor needs his audience. In this interdependence the
charismatic leader maintains the cohesion of the group or society largely by
identifying himself with myth. The charismatic leader Is able to communicate to
his followers a sense of continuity between himself end his mission and their
iMOne can identify charismatic authority only in terms of the extent Lo which it. is
acknowledged by the followers and the only proor of a leaders charismatic
Inspiration is Its recogniLion as genuine by the followers. IL is not so much what the
leader is but how he is regarded by those subject to his authority that is decisive for
the validity of charisma. Charisma is a state of mind which resides in the perceptions
of the followers. As Weber tells us, What is alone important Is how the individual Is
actually regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, by his ioliowers or
disclples. In Max Weber. ThE ThEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OR6ANIZATION.
(Translated by H.R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons) London : William Hodge and Co..
Ltd.. 1947. p.331.
' 65According l.a Max Weber the link between the charismatic hero and his followers Is
direct; it is not mediated by established institutions. The charismatic hero occupies no
office within established religions or military organizations. See Max Weber.
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, edited by 6uenther Roth and Claus Wittich. 3 Vols. New York
Bedminister Press. 1968. I. pp.241-242. Elsewhere. Weber claims: The charismatic
hero does not deduce his authority from codes and statutes, as Is the case with the
jurisdiction of office; nor does he deduce his authority from traditional custom or
feudal vows of faith, as is the case of patrimonial power... The charismatic leader
gains and maintains authority solely by proving his strength in life. If he wants to be
a prophet, he must perform miracles; if he wants to be a war lord, he must perform
heroic deeds. See Max Weber. The Sociology of Charismatic Authority in FROM
MAX WEBER : Essays in Sociology, edited and translated by Hans 6erth and C. Wright
Mills, New York : Oxford University Press. 1946, pp.248-249.
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legendary heroes end their missions. And since a myth remains the same as long
as It Is felt such, he and his claims are legitimated by his ability to clothe
himself with the mantle of myth. 1 66
The term 'charismatic leader' has recently attained widespread and almost debased
currency. 167 In the past. It was occasionally applied to Lenin, Roosevelt and
Hitler. It was noted that nearly every leader with marked popular appeal,
especially those of new states, Is Indiscriminately tagged as charismatic. In the
absence of clear cut specifications of traits of personality or behaviour shared
those many leaders' 68 to whom charisma has been attributed and of any
Inventory of the common characteristics of the publics who have been susceptible
to charismatic appeal, it Is not surprising that scholars should question the
meaning end utility of the concept of charisma.
Max Weber's 'charisma', a creative and compelling Ideal - typical conceptual
tool, was adapted from the vocabularly of the church historian Rudolf Sohm, who
associated it with the world of religion and divinely inspired leaders, claiming
that ...the charisma Is from Ood...and the service to which the charisma calls Is a
service Imposed from God, and an office in the service of the church, end not of
any local community...' 169 Weber's secularization of 'charismatic authority'110
' 66 The notion of charismatic response and 'epic myth' is taken from the work of A.R.
Whiner and D. Whiner's work on charisma. Refer to The Rise and Role of Charismatic
Leaders, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE,
358. March. 1965. pp . 77-88. and ThE SPEILBINDERS : Charismatic Political
Leadership . New Haven : Yale University Press, 1984.
l6lse K.J. Rat.nam. Charisma and Political Leadership', POlITICAL STUDIES, XXI.
No.3. September, 1964, pp.341-354 (or a critique of the contemporary uses of the
concept.
1686en 6urion, Churchill, Di Gaulls, Penn, Sukarno, Nasser, Tours, Lumumba. N.hru,
Jomo Kenyatta and Kennedy are just a few of the noted charismatic political leaders in
history. A contemporary example of a religious leader (notably with a political
mandate) that has been called charismatic is the Ayatollah Rohollab Khomeini. Refer to
Micheal S. Kimmel and Rahmat Tavakol, Against Satan : Charisma and Tradition in
Iran. In Ronald M. 6lassman and William H. Swatos, Jr. In SOCIETY. CHARISMA AND
SOCIAL CHANGE • New York : Wiley. 1984. pp.101-112.
l69QuoLed rrom Arthur Shweitzer, THE AGE OF CHARISMA, Chicago : Nelson Hall,
1984. pp.151-152. Karl Lowensteln In his MAX WEBERS POLITICAL IDEAS IPI THE
PERSPECTIVE OF OUR TIME. (Amherst : University of Massachusetts Press. 1966.
p.79) also observes that: iundamentaliy.... the locus of charisma is the world of
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served to create a theoretical yardstick by means of which to denote one of his
three classical 'ideal types' of authority on the basis of legitimacy claims. He
distinguished among firstly, 'traditional authority' whose claim is based on an
established belief In the sanctity of Immemorial trodltions; secondly, 'rational
or legal authority' grounded on the belief in the legality of rules and in the right
of those holding authoritative positions by virtue of those rules to Issue
commands, and, thirdly, 'charismatic or personal authority', that rests on
devotlon to the specific sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an
Individual person 1 and of the normative pattern or order revealed by him.111
Charismatic authority, according to Weber. differs from the other two In being
unstable,' 72 even if recurrent, and tends to be 'routinized' Into one of the other
two types.173
One point that seems to recur In the literature on charismatic leadership is that
the term 'charisma' cannot be properly applied to leaders whose 'call' neither
comes from 6od nor can be considered divinely Inspired In the specifically
rellgion; Or in the case of Wolfgang Mommsen ...charisma ...is a rorm of spiritual
energy oriented to other - wordly ideals which are in more or less sharp contrast to
the facts of daily life. In Wolfgang Mommsen, Max Webers Political Sociology and
his Philosophy of World History. INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL. 17.
pp.23-45, p. 33. However, in the case of modern charismatic leaders, the religious
element is nearly absent . An exception to this is the case of the Ayatollah Rohollah
Khomeini as discussed above.
170The term charisma, writes Weber, ....wIIl be applied t. a certain quality of an
IndIvidual by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed
with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or
qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are
regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual
concerned is treated as a leader... In THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION. op.clt., pp. 328-29. See also H.H. 6.rth and C. Wright Mills (eds)
FROM MAX WEBER : Essays in Sociology. New York : Oxford University Press, 1946.
pp.78-79.
171 Weber, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION. op.cit., p.328.
' 72Much of Weber's Theory of revolution is drawn from his discussion of charisma.
which he terms the specifically creative revolutionary force of history and denotes
an anti-order attrlbute. Quoted in William H. Swatos. Jr.. The Disenchantment of
Charisma On Revolution in a Rationalized World. in Glassman and Swatos (eds),
SOCIETY. CHARISMA AND SOCIAL CHANGE. op.ciL.. p.129.
173Th1s notion of 'rout.inizatlon' has led to the charge that Weber used the concept of
charisma ambiguously, that is, on the one hand, characterizing certain classes of
people in particular situations and, on the other hand, as a more general quality that
can be institutionalized.
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religious sense. On the grounds that the works of 'Luther' and 'Hitler' should not
be classified together, Webers extension of an originally Christian concept to
include lenders who advocate a darkly secular fervor Is deplored.' 14 The lack of
realism of this notion lends one to recognize that the empirical manifestation of
charismatic leadership Is one and the same thing whether In the service of the
'good' or the 'bad'.
Therefore, the term 'charisma' Is redefined, without departing from Weber's
premise; that is, the leader's capacity to elicit from his followers a combination
of acquiescence, allegiance. end reverence In establishing his base of authority.
Any leader who has this effect on his group Is endowed with charisma.
The 'charismatic process' Is one of interaction between the lender and his
followers. In the course of this Interaction the lender transmits, and the
followers accept, his presentation of himself as their pre-destined leader, his
definitions of their world as it is and as it ought to be, and his conviction of his
mission and their duty to shape it. In actuality, the process is more complicated
because it involves several groups of followers and several stages of validation.
There is the small group of the 'elect' or 'disciples', the Initial group whom the
leader first Inspires as a beach-heed into the society. There Is, also, the public
at large which, In turn, can be divided Into those of modern orientation toward
order. In the societies with which this research is concerned, further divisions
may exist along ethnic, tribal, religious, regional, and national lines. The
nationally significant charismatic leader must command the loyalty of all or most
of these sectors.
To understand how a charismatic leader functions, It seems advisable to
distinguish two levels on which his appeal Is communicated end responded to: the
first level is that of grievances and special Interests of each group; significance
174For an example of this refer to Carl J. Friedrlch, PoliticaI Leadership and the
Problem of Charismatic Power, THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS. XXIII. February, 1961.
pp.3-24.
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of these grievances end Interests is probably greatest during the stage In which
the charismatic leader mobilizes the population In opposition to a prevailing
order and in assertion of the possibility of a new order. In developing notions or
areas In transition from colonial rule to Independence, this stage is naturally
that of opposition to the rule of a colonial power. In developed notions, this stage
Is seen In terms of determining the reforms of the adverse party (such as the
situation in the United States or the United Kingdom) or attacking previous cult
worshipping systems (as happened in the Soviet Union under Krushchev).
While the attraction exercised by the charismatic loader can. In pert, be
attributed to his ability to focus and channel diverse grievances end interests In a
common appeal, this explanation Is insufficient to account for the acceptance of a
given leader. Nor does charismatic attraction show how a leader maintains
charisma In the conditions of uncertainty end fractionalization which follow the
attainment of the common goals. Ironically enough, this attraction exercised by
charismatic leaders could not explain why the followers maintain their support
(or augment It) to these leaders when they were defeated or humiliated by foreign
or internal forces.
Ann Ruth Wiflner suggests that the charisma of a leader Is bound up with, end may
even depend upon, his assimilation In the thoughts end feelings of a populance, and
his assimilation in the peoples sacred figures, divine beings, or heroes.115
Their actions, states Wiflner, and the context of these actions encountered in
myths, express the fundamental values of a culture, Including Its basic categories
for organizing experience and trying to resolve basic cultural end human
dilemmas.
Of the overlapping and conflicting theories of myth to be found In anthropological
literature, all seem to regard myths as tales referring to events that took place
In the past, usually a legendary pest. Levi-Strauss points out that what gives
ll5An Ruth WHiner CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. Research Monograph.
No.32, PrInceton, N.J. : Center of International Studies, 1968. pp.84-85.
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myth en operational value is that the specific pattern is timeless; it explains the
present end the pest as the future."' 76 A prime example of Strauss' explanation
was given by the late French President Pompldou when he expressed to the French
people, after the death of President Dc 6aulle, that This spirit will always lead
France and the French people....France Is now a widow." 177 Strauss contends that
recent events in a people's politics, particularly those marking a major
transition or extraordinary occurrence in public life, n become endowed with
the quality of myth If they fit In or can be fitted Into a pattern of a traditional
myth or a body of myths. In these terms, the charismatic leader communicates to
his followers a sense of continuity between himself and their missions.' 18 How a
particular leader does this was described by Winner as a 'cultural management'.
In a similar way. Miles Copeland, In his 694ME OF MT/ON$. called the same
phenomena a 'strategy' which is played by charismatic leaders in part consciously
end in pert unconsciously and intuitIvely.
The particular 'strategy' of Individual charismatic leaders could be subjected to
Investigation. Elements of such strategies might be broken Into categories:
rhetoric employed In speeches, simile, metaphor, and allusions used In myths end
history; gestures and movements used In actions; and modes used In handling
crises. While this list con be refined end extended, It suggests some of the
categories In terms of which the charismatic appeal of leadership con be
ennlyzei.180
It should be stressed that the elements of the behavioural patterns of each leader
vary from culture to culture and from society to society. However, specific to
the charismatic leader In all cultures Is the role of the myth in the validation of
i76Claude Levi-Strauss. "The Structural Study at Myth. THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN
FOLKLORE .LXVIII. September, 1955. p.430.
177tHE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE. November 11, 1970. p.1.
170W,Ilner, CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. op.cit.. p.63.
179MiIes Copeland, THE 6AME OF NATIONS. New York : Simon and Shuster, 1969.
p.121
18OAn illustration at specific details of even a single leader would require an
01.t'oratlofl at the myths and values or his culture and lack at space.
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his authority. His appeal can best be understood and accepted by reference to the
body of myth prevalent in his culture.1 8 1 The charismatic leader is charismatic
because, In the breakdown of other means of legitimizing authority, he Is able to
evoke and associate with himself the sacred symbols of the culture. It follows
that the charismatic appeal of a leader Is, by definition, limited to those who
share the traditions of a given culture, that Is, to those who understand and
respond to the symbols expressed In the myths a charismatic leader evokes.
Nasser In the mid-sixties was a charismatic to the Egyptian people as he was to
the Syrians, Libyans, and Sudanese. The change here is definitely related to the
modifications in the Arab myths and traditions (In addition to other factors, i.e.,
communication systems and propaganda techniques) which Nasser evoked In the
Arab peoples as one nation.182
This argument should not suggest that charismatic leaders achieve power or
retain It by charisma alone. Charismatic appeal provides the source end
legitimization of authority In a certain society for e certain period of time.
Other supports may be needed (sometimes re quired) to maintain power,
especially when charismatic appeal begins to decline) 83
The basic mission of a charismatic leader In any SOC 1 ety can be broadly stated as:
(1) to destroy the older order, completely or partially (political, social,
economic or all of them together); and (2) to build a new end a more adequate
(often termed better) order. 184 A valid question which Is often raised with
161 Bronisiau Malinowski. 'Myth In Primitive Psychology' In his MAGIC. SCIENCE AND
RELI6ION. Boston : Beacon Press, 1948, pp.96-108.
152 At this juncture, the dicotomy that Is inherent. In the study of charismatic leaders
should be established. We are accustomed to thinking of charismatic leaders as those
who are bent on bringing about sweeping changes. However, some charismatic
movements hive as their focus the preservation of tradition. Still, others aspire to
bring about some changes while maintaining some traditions. This dicot.omy is
discussed in greater detail In Chapter SIx.
i83DiyId Apter. GHANA IN TRANSITION. New York : Atheneum Publishers. 1963,
pp.326 329. Apter argues that charisma can decline in favour of a secular authority
or, s he found In Ghana, as a result of conflict with traditional authority.
l84Willner, CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. op.cIL p.86.
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regard to the second point, adequate to whom? To the new members of the society
or to the leaders of the new regime? Or both? Another question, of course, Is
what happens when the Interests of the people conflict with the Interests of the
regime? The answers to these questions probably can be obtained only if new
concepts of 'political Integration' and •polltical participation' are applied, as
presented by David Easton, Gabriel Almond, Sidney Yerbo, David Apter, end
others. 185 Naturally, the new order (system) cannot be Initiated against the
proclaimed or Implied wishes of the populace unless It Is propagated with vigour.
Also it becomes strategically hazardous to the new system lilt fails to capture the
public appeal especially in the early stages of Its emergence. It, therefore,
becomes Imperative for political leaders to structure a soclo-economic and a
political system which attracts maximum popular appeal and, at the same time,
minimizes the leadership risks the regime has to encounter.
in developing nations, as well as In rich nations, political, economic, social and
ecological problems often spring to the fore when development projects are
introduced to the populace. The end products of these dilemmas are often seen in
terms of national unity or disunity (with regard to major development issues).
Disunity might develop in a grave manner so as to threaten the cohesion,
sovereignty or independence of the nation. The Civil War In the United States was
a prime example; the situation In the Congo In 1961 or in Jordan In 1970 are
also excellent examples. In these situations, the charismatic leader (Lincoln,
tiobutu, and King Hussein, respectively) may be single symbols of unity
surmounting the diversity end the primary means of creating consensus on
objectives. Nasser faced several situations of disunity during his rule. However,
he floated high above the complexities of the issues and became the only visible
embodiment of the nation as a whole.
165For detailed information on the theories or political Integration and political
participation, see the following references: 6abriel Almond, STUDY OF COMPARATIVE
POLITICS. Boston : Little, Brown, 1966; Karl Deutsch, NERVES OF GOVERNMENT New
York : Free Press. 1963; Lucian Pye. POLITICS. PERSONALITY AND NATION BUILDING
New Haven : Yale University Press. 1962.; Robert Dahi, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS
Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall. 1970; David EasLon. A FRAMEWORK OF
POLITICAL ANALYSIS, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall, 1965.
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The charismatic leader can be seen as a double visogell Janus projecting himself1
on the one hand, as the omniscient himself, and, on the other hand, as the new man
of the people, who leads them and shares with the trials of revolutionary renewal.
The charismatic leader In developing nations often seeks to conserve his charisma
end subdue factionalism under the umbrella of the single party regime which
ocryc, a double function. 186 Joint participation in regime sponsored
organizational activities, even if partially or originally coerced, often creates a
sense of solidarity among the people, a sense of Identification with the regime's
goals, and a sense of accomplishment that gives some meaning to nationalism.
Of major significance to the charismatic leader is the creation of a national
identity on the International scene. His speeches, remarks, and gestures become
Ideological Indications which must be contended with in the International
community. The presence and prominence of charismatic leaders In distant
capitals and their exertion of obvious influence on international conferences give
their peoples a sense of national Identity and pride. 6reat examples in
contemporary history are Churchill, Kennedy, Nehru, Nasser, and Khrushchev.
While charismatic leadership may contribute in many ways to the consolidation of
the state, Its exercise has often Indicated the delay of Institutionalism and
political continuity needed for concrete tasks of development A charismatic
leader may become trapped by his own symbols and substitute symbolic action as
ends Instead of means. Viewing himself as the Indispensable father of the country
end the only one who holds Its destiny, he may convert It - consciously,
subconsciously or unconsciously - to an arbitrary state. Charismatic leadership,
as a rule, does not provide for orderly succession, though In several cases it did
under uncommon conditions.181
l86WIIIner, CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. op.cIt., p.87.
i8lPresldent Nasser, some months before he died on September 28. 1970. hastily
made provisions for, Anwar al Sadats succession to the rulership of the United Arab
Republic In case he (Nasser) become unable to preside. The reason ror this hasty and
arbitrary decision was explained by AL AHRAtI. (October 17. 1970) as a response by
Nasser when he discovered about an assassination attempt plotted against his life in a
forthcoming trip.
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Finally, it is noteworthy to Indicate that there appears to be no correlation
between charismatic leadership end recognized systems. It exists - end might
exist - In democracies, theocracies or autocracies. It existed -and might exist-
under capitalist systems, as well as under communists systems. It was common -
end Is common - In traditional societies end In developed societies. The
charismatic leader might be a Christian, a Jew or Moslem, as well as a pagan or
atheist. The charismatic approach focuses on the leader's ability end performance
rather than on the constitutional technicalities of legitimacy and political
philosophies. Charismatic leadership is hard to define, but 1t is there, go and
use 1t, to quote Thomas Edison when he described electricity. Charismatic
leadership, In this respect, might either turn a nation on, or it might keep the
populace, as well as the leader, in political darkness. Charismatic leaders are
hard to find and are harder to depose; It is the people who help charismatic
leadership emerge, and ironically it is these same people who stimulate Its fall.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE STUDY OF WEBERIAN CHARISMA : A OEI4ERAL DEFINITION AND THEORY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
in Chapter One, the various approaches to political leadership were analysed end
the Importance of the charismatic approach to leadership was emphasized. Oiven
that the charismatic typology Is the central category utilized In this study, it
becomes crucial to examine the meaning of the concept Charlsmatic Leader in
Western political thought. This Is the elm of the second Chapter. Although the
historically assumed charismatic personality Is evident, the emphasis here is on
the contemporary meaning of the concept.' In the process of examining the
basic ingredients of Chorlsmatic Personality within the Western context, the
investigator renders a critique of the literature and discusses the validity of Max
Weber's classification of authority and contemporary analysis of 'Charismatic
Political Leadership' such as that by Richard EL Fogen, Ann Ruth WHIner, and
James W. Downton. Hence, this Chapter deals specifically with three broad
questions:
1. What are the typologles of 'Charismatic Leaders'?
2. Are charismatic leaders by definition authoritarian?
3. What motivates an Individual to follow a charismatic personality?
1 For the origins of the concept and its entry Into contemporary usage, refer to
Daniel Bell, Sociodicy : A Guide to Modern Usage. AMERICAN SCHOLAR. 35, Autumn,
1966, pp.702-05. D,r,kM is the Arabic word which roughly translates as charisma.
The first scholar to equate charisma with iiLi& was the late Gustave Von
6runebaum in connection with the person of Prophet Mohammed; see MEDIEVAL ISLAM
2nd Edition, Chicago : Chicago University Press, 1953, p.92. Another word closely
associated with iiti Is &T which H.A.R. Gibb calls the crown of true belier.
See STUDIES ON THE CIVILIZATION OF ISLAM, Boston : Boston Press, 1968, pp.191-2.
Arabic equivalents of charismatic leadership include Q/yids/ MubsriA,h • or Q/yidih
R,shid,h.
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tiethociologically, this study Is based on the Weberlan axiom that social scientists
has always differentiated between routine end extraordinary leadership2. That
is, the author accepts the forementioned generaflzetion as a valid theoretical
assertion. And by doing so, the core argument of whether there is such a thing as
'charisma' in a technological age Is avoided. 3	In a&Iition, the concept
charlsma is used here In a strictly technical manner end thus is devoid of
'moral' Implications.4
This Chapter deals with the concept of 'charismatic political authority' end the
various forms It takes In society such as hero worship end the demagogic based
mass leader. One is particularly Interested In the Western world's perception or
the 'charismatic leader', since much has already been written about the
charismatic phenomenon in the so called Third World system of states. 5 So
much in fact that scholars of the area wondered whether It is a sound practice to
brand all political pro-eminence among non-Western states 'charismatic' or to
believe that the Third World has become a perpetual source of charisma. A
significant segment of literature about the Third World, views the regimes of
many developing states as the projection of the personality of their leaders.
2See Max Weber ECONOMY AND SOCIETY. New York : Bedminister Press. 1968
pp.241-242.
3The reader may sense a sidestep on this issue. However, a distinction can be made
between 'media enhanced personalities' and political leaders who possess Weber's 'pure
charisma'. For an elaboration on this see Joseph Beosman and Michael 6ivant.
Charlsma and Modernity : The Use and Abuse of a Concept, SOCIAL RESEARCH. 69.
Winter. 1975, pp.571-80.
4Edward Shils reflects on the Importance of using charisma' as a value free
concept. See Edward Shils in Charlsma, Order and Status. AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW. Vol. 30. 1965. No.1-6. pp.199-213. For criticisms on the concept of
Charisma and Its contemporary usages. see especially: Carl J. Friedrich, Political
Leadership and the Problem •f Charismatic Power. 23. Feb. 1966. pp.3-24; k.J.
Ratnam, Charlsma and Political teadership. POLITICAL STUDIES. XXI. 1964, pp.
341-54; and tarl Lowenstein. MAX WEBER'S POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF
OUR TIME, Amherst : University of Massachusetts Press, 1966. pp.74-88.
5A few 'charismatic leaders' of the Third World. according to the literature, were
Nasser. Peron, Nehru, Mao. Castro. Sukarno. Kenyatta, Nkrumah. and U'Nu. The reader
is referred to Dankwart A. Rustow, The Study if Leadership. in Dankwart Rustow,
ed., PHILOSOPHERS AND KIN6S. New York : 6eorge Braziller. 1970; W. Howard
Wrlggins. THE RULER'S IMPERATIVE : Strategies for Survival In Arrica. New York
Columbia University Press, 1969, and Paul R. Dettinan, teaders and Structures in
Third World' Politics : Contrasting Approaches to Legitimacy. COMPARATIVE
POLITICS. Jan, 1974. PP.245-269.
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According to this view, if one Is to understand end explain Third World politics
one must grasp the political philosophy of Its leaders, because it Is their
personalities, their relationships with the associates and the masses which form
the core of political life. In other words, the charismatic leader overshadows
political programmes, policies, ideology, and Institutional structure such as
parties or pressure groups. Moreover, for these scholars of Third World
charisma and even movements - such as Nasserism, Peronism, Nkrumalsm, end
6ulded Democracy (Sukarno) are defined by means of an Individual. All such
movements and the regimes which they generate are seen as the self-expression of
these founder-leaders. The 'charismatic legitimation' of Mac. Nasser or Sukarno,
emerged when their respective nations rejected the legitimacy of the colonial or
neo-colonial rule and established mass supported political systems, which they
thought would secure their Independence.6
Charismatic studies are generally not 'rooted' as far as Third World states are
concerned, neither do they take Into consideration prevailing economic end
political forms and modes, despite their claims of doing so. Furthermore,
monopolistic uses of the propaganda apparatus by the leader aimed at reaching and
holding a sizeable segment of the populace and his psychological control have been
Ignored. As a consequence, political alternatives available to the messes are not
fully known, leaving the impression that the prevailing ruler is not only ideal,
but also Irreplaceable. 7 In this Chapter, the writer examines the qualitative
difference concerning charisma and attempts a general explanation of Its nature
in the hope of defining Its philosophical and political formulations. Secondly, a
partial explanation for the ahistorical approach to charisma by many scholars Is
to be found In the fact that they have used the same general approach for the study
of the concept irrespective of its geographic manifestation. This approach,
because of its 'universality' seriously underestimates 'uniqueness', which Is
6See Ruth Gunther, Personal Rulership. Patrlmolism, and Empire Building In the New
States, WORLD POLITICS. 20, Jan. 1968 and, Stuart P. Schram. Ilao Tse Tung as a
Charismatic Leader, ASIAN SURVEY, Vol.7, 1967. pp.362-86.
7Jean Lacouture, THE DEP1IGODS : Charismatic Leadership in the Third World, New
York : knopr Press. 1970, p.15.
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inevitable, particularly In en age where social and other environmental factors
have been enshrined as key variables of political analysis.8
2.2 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
One's study of the concept 'charisma' - both in a historical end contemporary
setting - can be neither exhaustive nor definitive. The present work, while an
in-depth analysis based on diverse date, attempts to set the social end political
boundaries which determine the emergence of charismatic authority end the
characterization of individuals as 'charismatic'. Prior to doing that.
identification of basic concepts such as Leadership, Charismatic Leadership, Epic
Myth, and the Cult of Personality, are vital in order to render them amenable to
use In an empirical study such as the present one. Deliberately, one uses the
notion 'identification' rather than 'definition' since the latter Implies a degree of
rigidity, which in one's view Is not useful when dealing with political concepts,
which hove been considered as products of socio-historicel end environmental
factors. Furthermore, identification of concepts via their main characteristics
and context is methodologically more helpful In the process of data integration and
the formulation of meaningful generalizations.9
As used in Chapter One, the concept 'leadership' means among other things, the
presence of a pre-eminent individual, who, In a given socio historical setting end
by virtue of his ability has created end sustained a mass following. To some
extent our definition of the concept follows the one suggested by Nathaniel P.
unman.' 0 Yet, It differs In the sense that one suggests that 'sustenance' of
e5•, Juhani Freud, THE SOCIOI.06Y OF MAX WEBER. New York : Pantheon, 1968. pp.
232-34.
9For further elaboration on this point refer to Conjectural Knowledge, in Karl
Popper, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE : An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford : Clarendon Press.
1979. pp.21-28.
10 Nathaniel P. Tillman, Jr. DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. Oxford : Clarendon
Press, 1979, p.308, writes that leadership is a behavioural process consisting of
stimulating persons, called followers, to act Integratively toward the achievement of
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followers is as important a characteristic, as Its creation. In any other sense,
Tilimon's general definition of leadership as a 'behavioural process consisting of
stimulating persons...to act Integratively toward achievement of group goals Is
accepted and used here with Identical meaning.
'Charismatic Leadership is nothing more nor less than a sub-category of
'Leadership' In general.1 1 One may say then, that the general characteristics
which are deemed as helpful In Identifying an 'ordinary' leader are present In the
charismatic one as well. In order to distinguish them. therefore, one must add
the special Ingredient(s) which would justify a charismatic leader's claim to
'exceptionality': I.e. the source of legitimacy of authority by a charismatic leader
is central to its Identification and constitutes Its main differentiating elements
compared to the 'ordinary'. 12 In one view, 'charismatic leadership', is
Identifiable by the explicit or implicit claim that a divine, or super power, has
arbitrated the authority of its possessor and the messes so perceive it. This could
very well be a 'myTh' or a well constructed political category based on
assumptions and perceptions. The result, nevertheless, is that such leaders hove
been called 'saviours of the people' and 'enlighteners of the masses'. One attempts
to determine under what conditions they emerge.' 3 At this stage, if one was to
group goals. It Is primarily a function of the situation within which it occurs, though
significantly influenced by personal traits and sLates-role. Traditional conceptions
overemphasized heroism (The Great Plan Theory) or universal traits and types. The
study of leadership requires the recognition or the primary imporLance of the
situation: the distinctions between actual, potential, and pseudo leaders; variations In
techniques and roles; projected images; and the character and responses or
leaders. Also see Robert W. Cox. The Executive Head : An Essay on Leadership,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. Vol.23. No.2, Spring, 1969, pp.214-16.
1 1 Robert C. Tucker, The Theory of Charismatic Leadership, DAEDALUS, Vol. 97.
Summer, 1966. pp.731-756.
12 See Max Weber, .me Three Types of Legitimate Rule, BEP.KELY PUBLICATIONS IN
SOCIETY AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol.4. No.1. Summer. 1958. p.7.
13H.H. Gerth & C. Mills (Transl) FROM MAX WEBER : Essays in Sociology. New York
Knopt, 1946. p.52. In their introductory note in this volume. 6erth and Mills speak of
charismatic leaders as self - appointed leaders who are followed by those who are In
distress and who need to follow the leader because they believe him to be extra
ordinarily qualified. in consequence of this, the person who possesses It is thought
to have either divinely instilled or exemplary leadership powers or at least
extraordinary qualiLies which most persons cannot acquire. It Is entirely irrelevant
conceptually whether the characteristics in question Is 'objectively' true from an
ethical, aesthetic, or any other viewpoint. It is important rather that it should be so
regarded by those who are charismatically dominated, i.e. the disciples. Max Weber.
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venture a generalization, one would note that historically, such personalities
appeared In time or political stresses, economic deprivations, mass persecutions,
end mess apathy. Essentially, the same conditions provide the Ingredients for the
emergence of a related 'leadership' type, which Is known as the 'cult of
personality'. Cult of personality means that this type of leadership Is devoid of
any claims to divine authority or naturally granted gifts. On the contrary, the
'cult of personality' leadership type can be said to lack the elements of the
'natural gifts' which are then artificially created by masterful manipulation of
mass media and the means of coercion.
One recognizes that not all scholars agree with the Identification of key concepts
around which this Chapter revolves. Yet, In substance, the suggested
Identifications do not diverge significantly from those used by the scholars of
political 'leadership and Its typologies'. 14 Nevertheless, one must offer
additional commentary on the type of leadership which provides and justifies the
'charismatic'. 6enerally speaking, a charismatic leader Is an Individual whose
pre-eminence rests on the susceptibility of the people to certain of his
appearances end modes of behaviour which augment en ever-present belief among
the masses irrespective of cultural background that there can be an Individual
endowed with unusual gifts commanding obedience and deference. At least, this is
the general notion derived from the literature on the subject. Yet placed In the
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY. op.cIt.. p.140. Also see Reinhard Bendix, Charismatic
Leadership and Domination, MAX WEBER : An Intellectual Portrait, London : PleUiuen &
Co Ltd. 1962, pp.296-328.
14For example, refer to: James V. Downton, Jr., REBEL LEADERSHIP : Commitment
and Charisma In the Revolutionary Process. New York : The Free Press, 1973; Max
Weber, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, New York : Oxford
University Press. 1947; FROM MAX WEBER : Essays In Sociology, translated by H.H.
Gerth and C.W. Mills, Philadelphia : Fortress Press. 1965; and MAX WEBER ON
CHARISMA AND INSTITUTE BUILDING, translated by SN. EisensLadt, 	 Chicago
University of Chicago Press, 1968; Jane Gardner, ed.. LEADERSHIP AND THE CULT OF
PERSONALITY, London : J.M. Dent and Sons, 1974; RIchard P. Fagen. •Charismatic
Authority and the Leadership .f Fidel Csst.ro, WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY. June,
1965. pp.278-262; A.R. Willner and D. Willner, The Rise and Role of Charismatic
Leaders, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.
358. March, 1965, pp.77-86; and A.R. Whiner, CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
A Theory, Princeton : Princeton University Center of International Studies. No.32,
1970.
79
context of modern European history, such notions are inadequately explained and
often distorted by the ideological cleavages that charismatically generated
'movements' have caused. Furthermore, there has been a distance Interjected
between the masses end leaders end, all too often, 'charisma' is as much the
product of myth as It Is the product of such skills as oratory, heroism, wisdom,
and generosity. One's purpose here is to delineate the sources of charisma end, to
the extent possible, seek to formulate and broaden criteria by which one can
separate 'myth' from reality. In so doing - emphasis will be placed on the
Weberlan theoretical Interpretations of 'myth' end its political Implications.15
Secondly, a working definition of the concept of myth has to be provided - a
concept which appears to be an Integral element In the 'creation' end maintenance
of a charismatic following.
'Myth' is used here In its dynamic dimension, I.e. the belief that It contributes to
social change while It also changes and adopts the new realities. 16 That being
the case, a 'myth' cannot be appropriately Identified with lower levels of socio-
political development, but it is present in all systems regardless of their
sophistication. For one's purposes one accepts the prevailing meaning of political
myth end the fact that Included In its meaning are such elements as 'fiction',
'nonexistence', and even falsity. However, fundamental in one's effort is the
understanding that what the masses of people believe Is as real as reality itself,
when It comes to engage in social action or social engineering. 17 Thus, the
15Since this thesis talks of Nasser as a charismatic leader, It is viLal to point out
that N.sser's success In mobilizing Arabs behind his movement should be attributed,
in large degree, to his remarkable myth—making ability - Pan Arabism (Arab Unity)
remains a myth in the Sorelian sense despite its ideological embellishments, because
many Arab writers agree that it is primarily based on 'feeling'. Such a myth cannot be
easily refuted by conventional logic, and therefore constitutes a potent instrument in
the hands of the Egyptian elite to mobilize the Arab masses and drive them to
revolutionary actIon. See Richard H. DekmeJlan, EGYPT UNDER NASSER: A Study in
Political Dynamics, New York : SLate University of Hew York Press. 1972. pp.56-57.
16Accordlng to the French syndicalist, George Sorel. a myth Is a body of Images
capable of evoking sentiment instinctively. See George Sorel, REFLECTIONS ON
VIOLENCE. Trans. T.E. Hume, New York : Alfred Knopf, 1914. p.32. Concepts similar
to Soreis myth include: Plato's 'Noble Lie', Ilosca's Political Formula', Paretos
Derivations' and LissweWs 'Political Myth'.
11 The myth does not easily lend itself to rational analysis, for It is based on
Intuition, Instinct, and belief. It Is specifically designed to create cohesion,
Inspiration and dynamism in a revolutionary movement. It Is noticed that effective
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Important consideration Is the universafltles myth offer and their value as an
explanatory device of political action. if people believe In the transcendence of
the supernatural they can come to accept Its personification as well. In the final
analysis the myth rests on faith. 18 Needless to add, that political movements
have emerged as a result of true faith In concepts which go beyond empirical
study or testing. 19 There has been soclo-political myth par excellence and It Is
one's purpose to examine such phenomena as well.
2.3 THEORETICALPARAMETERS OF WEB ER IAN CHARISMA
Any In-depth analysis of political charisma requires delineation of its theoretical
and practical parameters. Thus, there Is an Imperative need for the limited
objectives of this Chapter.
As a first priority, It must be stated that one Is primarily concerned here with
'secular' rather than 'religious' charisma. At the same time, It is essential to
keep In mind that In the history of Western civilization the dividing line between
'divine' and 'political' and religious charisma was never defined. From the time
of Pope Gelasius, who accepted the dubious theory of the 'Two Swords' to the
present, one has witnessed what can be called a peculiar, If not deliberate,
confusion of 'secular' and rellgIous' power, without this phenomenon ever having
been seriously studied by authorities on political leadership.
myth making is a necessary prerequisite ror successful national integration. Since
myth serves as the popularizer of ideology the two should be regarded as inseparable.
Myth making simplifies the doctrinal intricacies of the ideology bringing the doctrine
to the level of the masses. See 6eorge Sablne. A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY, 3rd
Edition. New York : University Press. 1961. p.894.
leA5 sincerely stated by Marion Levy. Jr.. In MODERNIZATION AND THE STRUCTURE
OF SOCIETIES. 2 Vols. Princeton : Princeton University Press. 1966, p.350 in the
eyes of a true follower of a charismatic Ieader...the fact that the leader says a given
thing Is right makes it right.
19 See Arthur Schweitzer, HitIers Dictatorial Charlsma. THE AGE OF CHARISMA.
Chicago : Nelson Hall, 1984. pp.65-93.
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In this thesis, one has adopted the basic theoretical categories of flax Weber and
his early definition of leadership, since the author believes these categories,
even though far from definitive, best serve the need of leadership differentiation.
Weber, In his work, takes for granted the fact that secular charismatic authority
Is a type of rulership resting on popular enthusiasm and acceptance of Its
existence. As such, It is fundamentally different from the other two types of
authority dealt with by Weber, I.e., traditional end rational-legal.
The power wielded by a charismatic Is derived from a source different from that
of a traditional ruler, and equally different from the power of a leader selected by
means of legal/rational procedures. A charismatic political leader, who derives
his power from the latter two sources (I.e., tradition/coercion, or law), may
augment It with psychological factors resulting from beliefs In myths and
personal talents, and the utilization of deception. This means, that the socio-
political environment of 'charismatic' leadership vary perceptibly from
'underdeveloped' to 'post Industrial'. One's research supports the proposition
that the level of development of a given society alone Is not a force which
prevents or generates non-rational authority. As a matter of fact,
technologically advanced societies are, and have been equally susceptible to the
emergence of charismatic and therefore non-rational authority. 20 Because
charisma Is the least developed by the three types of authority defined by Weber,
the basic problem facing us Is one of conceptualization. The theoretical
ambiguity, which is apparent in Waber's 1/IEORY 01 $X/AL AND ECONOMIC
IJRG4N/ZAI/6N, pervades even contemporary literature.2'
20Compare with Arthur Schlesinger, Jrs, argument that one ought not to apply the
notion of charisma to leaders In a democracy. In 0n Heroic Leadershlp. ENCOUNTER.
15, Dcc, 1960. 7. The writer is of the opinion that such attempts to reverse the
definition .f charismatic leadership are neither logically nor scientifically tenable.
They Illustrate a kind of reasoning backward. The consequences of a phenomenon are
confused with and substituted for the actual phenomenon. The charismatic phenomenon
Is not the same thing as its many possible consequences and cannot be logically defined
on the basis of any of them.
21 Here It is noted that charismatic political leadership has had an unbroken continuity
as a soclo-historical phenomenon for as long as there has been a Western civilization.
Webers charisma writings are chiefly to be found In. two works: THE THEORY OF
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OR6ANIZATIOH and POLITICS AS A VOCATION. Also see Dennis
H. Wrong, Ilax Weber : The Scholar as Hero, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY FORUM. 1962.
Vol.15, Summer, pp.31-37.
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Simply speaking, the Weberlan theory Is much too broad In Its formulations.
Being broad. It has diminished theoretical relevance. As a result, a significant
amount of research on the subject Is neither conclusive, nor scientifically
verifiable. For example, one scholar stresses the concept of charisma and Its
utility In lnstitution-building',another scholar studies party charisma, and yet
another scholar Is only Interested In the psychological dimension of the
charismatic leader-follower relationship. 22 The Implication of this
observation Is that scholars have not arrived at a common ground concerning the
components of tharisma.23
2.4 CHARiSMA AND POWER
In the Introduction a working definition of charisma was offered. Yet, as Is the
case with other concepts, there is no agreement as to the components of power. In
Ilorgenthau's view, the content and use of power, depend on a wide range of
political and cultural factors, so that the concept Itself covers all social
relationships that define the control of man over man, ranging from outright
violence to subtle psychological ties. 24 Whether It Is expressed in Stalin's
derisive comment. •How many divisions has the Pope? or more subtly as the
'political will' to defend oneself, or In Robert Dahl's terms as the ability to shift
the probability of outcomes, power invariably means Influence of one actor over
another.25 However, for these purposes, the concept 'power' means the ability
S.N. Elsenst.adt, MAX WEBER ON CHARISMA AND INSTITUTION BUILDING. op.clt.; I.
Horowitz, Party Charisma : Political Parties and Principles in Third World Nations,
INDIAN SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN. 3, October. 1965, pp.53-74; W.6. Runciman,
Charismatic Legitimacy and One Party Rule In Ghana, ARCHIVES OF EUROPEENUES DE
SOCIOLOGIES, 4, 1963. pp.145-165; and J.R. Downton, REBEL LEADERSHIP
Commitment and Charisma in the Revolutionary Process. op. cit.
23Strictly speaking. It Is not accurate to pin the charismatic label on every political
leader who displays qualities which attract the loyalty of large numbers of people.
Charisma Is a concept generally reserved for those unique persons In history who have
a profound break from the bonds of routinlz.d activity and who have been a
revolutionary force in the history of their society.
24Hans J. Morgenthau. POLITICS AMONG NATIONS The Struggle for Power and Peace,
3rd EditIon, New York : Knopt, 1960. p.9.
25Robert DahI, ihe Conce p t of Power, BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE. 11,1956. PP.201-215.
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of one to influence end to a greet extent determine the behaviour of others in
accordance with one's own wishes. Thus, like power, charisma is not a property.
It Is a relationship of an individual to others end of en Individual to his
environment. Hand in hand with this, when one speaks of charisma as a quality,
obviously one is talking neither about real or Innate gifts, nor about
demonstrable traits of psychology or character. What Is Involved is the impact
exerted upon environment, the 'effect' of behaviour. Charisma is. to a great
extent, a sociological, not a personal, quality. In the same way, Ideas of
charismatic type end milieu must be understood sociologically. Charismatic
qualities are in the realm of belief: they are the radiation of a personality in the
beliefs of others.
Power is a socio-political phenomenon rarely absent from any human
relationship. it is not surprising, therefore that systematic studies of the
concept have appeared throughout history. Philosophers and political theorists
from the days of Plato and Aristotle have been interested In power and its
political and social consequences of subordination and superordination. Yet, the
earliest studies of authority, which viewed it as the sanction to exercise power,
were concerned chiefly with its ethical connotations. Max Webers discussion of
charisma and legitimate political authority marks a major departure from earlier
interpretations.
As stated in the Introduction, the central theme of the present study In
'charismatic leadership', which Is considered a special kind of political power.
Charisma Is a type of leadership first identified by Weber. This being the case.
Weber's analysis of charisma and Its relationship to power serves as this
Chapter's major point of departure.
Dahis formulation is: The power of an actor, A, would seem t,o be adequately defined
by the measure ti which is the difference in the probability of an event, given certain
action by A, and the probability of the extent given no such action by A. p.2 14.
84
SECTION ONE : WEBERIAN CHARISMA THEORY:
FORMULATION AND CRITIQUE.
In order to understand Weber's formulation of Charismatic authority, one will
have to place It in the general context of his methodology ) his theory of
domination and authority, end his analysis of social change. Max Weber's method
combines typology and Yerstehen. This means that his method starts with a
situation and seeks to find a basic idea Involved In it. Interest is In the content of
the Idea, which is found through Yerstehen or sympathetic empathy 26 the basic
device by means of which Weber made the transfer from social action to general
social life Is a typology of a phenomenon. He developed the method of Verstehen,
the construction of typologies (also called ideal types) of behaviour, end used this
approach to comparatively study society by such typologies. In doing so, Weber
was faced with two problems relative to the meaning of behaviour.
First, the problem of the conceptualization of behaviour is complicated by the
fact that its meaning blurs into non-meaningful forms. Weber perceived this
problem as one for interpretation. To the degree that behaviour is rational (In a
logical scientific sense or 2+2=4 sense), it is understandable directly without
further ado. Beyond this, empathic understanding (sympathetic understanding of
behaviour on the basis of one's own) is of great assistance in explaining conduct.
Thus, one does not have to undergo another person's experience in order to
understand him/her. This Is the method of Yerstehen or empathic understanding
which Weber employed In his studies of legitimate political order.
Weber's second problem is related to verification. Yerstehen is not a complete
method in itself. Verification of subjective interpretation by comparison with
the concrete course of events is Indispensable. Unfortunately, this type of
verification is feasible only in cases susceptible to psychological
experimentation. For the rest, there remains only the alternative of comparing
Max Weber, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE. New York	 MacMillan
Company, 1944. pp.52. 53, 55, 60.
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the largest possible number of historical or contemporary cases which, while
otherwise similar, differ In one decisive point of their relation to the particular
motive or factor being Investigated.
In Wobor's epproech one finds elements of the oonorete nd elements of the
historical. Ideal types, as analytical tools for understanding leadership, for
example, are hypothetically concrete entities, constructed out of their relevant
components by the researcher for the purpose of precise measurement. In other
words, the Ideal-type Is an abstraction. Bureaucracy, too, is an Ideal type. In
Weber's writings there are two kinds of Ideal-types. The first Is historically
derived (bureaucracy, for example) while the second Ideal-type category is
theoretically derived, i.e. charisma and charismatic domination. Further
elaboration on this point Is necessary.
Domination, as historical fact, rests on that the premise that there was someone
who asserted leadership. Logically if one leads, others must follow. In this
illustration, A dominates B • who is subordinate to A. This situation of domination
and subordination may occur between A and B in many different areas of their
lives and on many occasions. For analytic convenience, one confines ones
interest In domination to political life. That Is, to the domination of a society.
organizations, political parties, or movements by one person or a few. In figures
1 ,2, end 327 this arrangement is applicable, a domination subordination
relation prevails between A and B, regardless of whether A Is one or few imposing
his/their will on B, en entire collectivity.
By the above process, Weber created three Ideal-types of authority: Charisma,
rational-legal, and traditional. His distinction among types are drawn in terms
of who has authority and the basis on which leadership Is accorded to those
exercising It by the persons over whom it Is exercised. In other words, Weber
Identifies the generic phenomenon of leadership by examining the conditions
27 See pp. 87-80.
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under which it emerges end the purposes for which it Is exercised, claimed, or
accorded. Finally, he attempts to distinguish among types of leadership in terms
of the reasons that it Is accorded to Individual types or groups of people.
The distinctions he makes are Important for two reasons. First, authority works
differently in the systems he deals with: the charismatic rulership is created by
those who are subject to It, It rests on the followers' belief In the qualities of the
leader; the legal regime prevails where rules determine the relationship between
the leader and those he leads; and, the traditional system, Is one where custom
prescribes the relationships between the leader and the rest of the community.
Secondly, recruitment patterns for leadership differs In each of the three types
that Weber identifies. Indeed, his general theory of domination Is an attempt to
show that authority and leadership recruitment work differently in the three
systems. The following figures 28 summarize the Weberlen theory of domination




A sends message to B
B obeys
Coercive	 Authority
Legal -rational	 Charismatic	 Traditional
2eThese diagrams are derived directly from any of lax Webers works. Thence, the
reader Is advised to consult Webers work passim.
29 The tables represent Webers Ideas as expressed in THE THtORY OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC OR6ANIZATION, op.cit. The ideas are not offered in one place, therefore,
one suggests that the reader read vassim.
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FIGURE 2
Weber's Notion of Authority.
Non Legitimate Authority.	 Legitimate Authority.
B obeys A without feeling	 B obeys A because there Is
It is correct; the role of	 a quality of 'oughtness'
threat or actual violence, 	 associated with A's
domination
FIGURE 3
Weber's Analysis of Legitimate Authority.
Legitimate Authority
Legitimate authority is characterized by a quality of 'oughtness',
which is derived from three things.
Charisma	 Traditional	 Rational Legal
A&B	 A&B	 A&B
A believes in his own	 B obeys A because	 B obeys A because
extraordinary qualities 	 of custom.	 it is lawful to do
and that It Is B's duty	 SO.
to obey.
B believes It is duty
to obey/follow A because
A has charisma.
The theoretical framework for charisma Is derived from Weber's general analysis
of domination discussed In his THEORY OP SX/AL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 30 In the Weberian thought, domination and power are linked
concepts. Power (macht) Is defined by Weber as the probability that an actor
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite
resistance, (and) regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.31
30 1b1d., pp.324-33, 341-45, 358-66. 382-86.
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This generic concept denotes the possibility of Imposing one's will on a single
person end en entire collectivity. Weber essentially confined his interest to the
latter, the domination of a sxiety, en organization or a movement by one person
or a few. The only manifestation of power he analysed in detail Is Ilerrscheft,
which refers particularly to the power exercised over a collectivity by a leader
or ruling group. Domination, the word used to translate Herrshaft essentially
conveys this meaning.32
As Indicated in Weber's analysis, domination via authority is a special type of
power. Authority Is a power relationship In which, the person who Imposes his
will on others, the ruler, believes that he has a right to the exercise of power
both for the leader and the led. These beliefs determine the relative stability of
domination (authority) as well as serve as criteria for distinguishing between
the systems.33
in addition to the beliefs of legitimation, there Is the notion of administrative
apparatus. Leadership, when exercised over a large number of people.
necessitates an administrative staff which will facilitate communication between
the leader and his followers. Bureaucracy Is a modern term for the apparatus
mentioned above. Together the beliefs and the bureaucracy provide the two
criteria for the institution of Weber's theory of domination, and one must
therefore relate these types to It analytically and empirically.
31 1b1d.. p.139.
Weber distinguishes two forms of domination of primary Importance: domination
by virtue of a constellation of Interest and domination by virtue of authorlty. Ibid.,
p.140. The former rests chiefly on control over economic conditions. Superior
economic resources make IL. possible to influence people by controlling the means of
their existence so that their self-Interest dictates that they act in certain ways. The
pure case Is monopoly. Authority rests on social positions In which Is vested the
legitimate right to command, backed by sanctioning power and complemented obedience.
The pure case In modern society Is a bureaucratic hierarchy.
33Weber developed a typology paralleling the fundamental modes ot stabalizing socio-
political relations. Power may be legitimized rationally, on the basis of the belief in
the legality of the rules/laws; it may be legitimized charismatically, when it. I
thought to rest on the magical or other personal properties of an Individual; or it may
be legitimized traditionally, claiming to rest on Immemorial custom.
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Charisma stems from the Greek verb char Izo which means literally 'gift of grace'.
Since Weber's work on leadership, charisma has come to refer to the perception
of en exceptional quality by virtue of which one emerges as a leader. 34 The
charismatic leader - whether a prophet, a hero or a demagogue - justifies his
domination (Herrschaft) by his extraordinary capacities and deeds. His disciples
accept his authority because they have faith in his person.
Under this type of authority, the administrative apparatus In a state is very loose
end unstable. The most trusted disciples usually play the role of the intermediary
between the leader end the masses. On the other hand, under the system of
traditional domination, the legitimation of power Is based on the belief In the
past, in the rightness and appropriateness of the customary way of doing things.
According to Weber, here legitimacy rests on an:
established belief in the sanctity of immemorial
traditions and the legitimacy of the status of these
exercising authority over them...Obedience Is owed to
the person of the chief who occupies the traditional
sanctioned position of authority end who Is bound by
tradition.35
The traditional leader Is one who is obeyed by virtue of his Inherited status. His
leadership and power are fixed by custom. When this type of authority, typical in
the patriarchal household, Is exercised over a society, the administrative
apparatus takes the form of patrimonial or feudal rule. In the patrimonial form
of traditional domination, the governmental officials are personal retainers
(servants, relatives, favourites) who usually depend on their leader for
remuneration. On the other hand, the feudal apparatus has a greater degree of
autonomy in the sense that officials are not personal dependents, but exercise
The word charisma has a history that goes back over 3,000 years to the Greek city
state system. The verb charizo. the source of charisma and charity, means a gift, to
freely give. According to one source, the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, the word
charisma means a free gift or favour especially vouchsafed by 6od. a grace, a
talent. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, Vol.2, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1933, p.288.
Charisma Is traced to Institution building and bureaucracy via the Christian church:
Church offices are... Impossible without charismatic endowment. p.288.
Weber, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOtIIC ORGANIZATION, op.clt., p.328.
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Independent jurisdiction, end usually own their domain. Under legal domination,
the belief In the rightness of law is the basis of legitimacy. The masses obey
rules, not because they believe that they are enacted by a charismatic or
traditional leader, but because they 'believe' that the proper procedures were
followed In issuing the rules. The leader holds his position in accordance with
legal procedures, be it appointment or election, end the power he exercises Is
limited by legally sanctioned rules and tenure. The typical administrative
apparatus corresponding to the legal type of leadership Is called bureaucracy and
Is characterized by Impersonality. Rules delineate In a rational way the
hierarchy of the apparatus, the rights and duties of every position, the method of
recruitment, promotions, and so on.36
The three types discussed above are never found In pure form. Real political
systems constitute a mixture of elements pertaining to all three types.
Nevertheless, for Weber, the typology Is useful as an analytical tool and helps the
researcher to Identify the various combination of legal, charismatic and
traditional elements In a real political system, as well as to find the reasons for
the discrepancies between Ideal-type and reality.
Weber found a synthesis for social structure and change In terms of his theories
of domination and social change. For him, social change finds its point of focus In
the conflict of three general principles, namely, traditionalism, rationality, end
charisma. Much of the tension in society is between treditionalizatlon and the
disruptive Influence of rationalization. But both of these principles have
frequently appeared in conflict with the charismatic principle as Is the case with
the following of some Individual because of presumed magical, supernatural or
other personal properties. Alexander the Greet, Napoleon, and Hitler are
examples In point. Charisma, In turn, by Its highly personal nature must be
36 1b1d., p.328. Weber says that the legal order basis on a belief In the iegality of
patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such
rules to Issue commands...Obedjence Is owed to the legally established Impersonal
order. Also see, 6erth and Mills eds., FROM MAX WEBER, op.clt., pp.221-224.
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transformed (routinized) into a rational or traditional form if the movement
structures and organizations it establishes are not to perish.
Weber's view of change constitutes a dialectical explanation of history. In terms
of conception of social development, his analysis of domination, especially
charismatic leadership, is a crucial element. In his thinkin g of dialectical
development of the societal level, charisma and bureaucracy are juxtaposed as
opposed forces. Insofar, as the charismatic leader Is synonymous with the
'creative personality', charismatic leadership Is contrasted with the 'technical
personality' of bureaucratic oriented society. The Hegelian doctrine of conflict
between contradictory elements entered Into the Weberlan conception of the
historical process. However, the conflict, according to Weber, lay in the
principles of tradition, rationality, and charisma.
Hence like Hegel and Marx, Weber believed that there is a discoverable direction
or laws of historic movement and that It Is the role of the analyst to identify
expressions or manifestations of conditions and to understand their bases in
historical terms. He clearly identified a trend towards bureaucratization in
Western civilization. Specifically, his view of the historic process is charisma-
routinization dialectic. He perceived a tendency toward the increasing
rationalization of the world and the decline of charismatic leadership.
Accordingly, scientific progress and bureaucracy are the enemies of charisma,
because they undermine the 'hero myth'. Put in other words, science and
bureaucracy have contributed to the disenchantment of the world' by destroying
the belief in heroes end supernatural, and by failing to put a new normative
belief system in their place. The normative system Is the source of belief in
charisma. In the Introduction the question was raised whether charismatic
leadership today Is a vestigial attitude among Third World nations, one that will
wither away and present no threat to the complete bureaucratization of these
societies, or whether it is a phenomenon which is present even among people who
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have made the most progress in material and bureaucratic terms. Max Weber, if
alive today and asked this question, would, one believes, answer that the latter is
the case since contemporary Western society surfers the consequences of
industrial alienation and powerlessness, which generate conditions making the
'charismatic leader' en appealing political type, who Is perceived by his
followers as the person who has the 'solution (s)' to all problems. Furthermore,
charisma Is a universal phenomenon end has persisted In all historic periods,
including the present one. Specifically, charisma persists and cannot be strictly
classified as a survival of the past even lilt Is nurtured by hero worship and an
old belief system. Rather It must be considered an Integral feature of the Third
World system of states. And, conversely, also an outgrowth of the very factors
that was Intended to eliminate the 'Irrational' In political life, I.e. rationality.
science, Impersonal Izatlon, and bureaucratization.
The simplest statement that can be made about the Weberfan dialectical view, Is
that Max Weber had a notion of historical change whether It appears explicit or
not. As one reads Webar, one sees the charismatic, traditional and legal
bureaucratic types of domination as constituting successive stages through which
all societies will pass sooner or later. Clearly, the contemporary period, at least
in the advanced Western states, Is dominated by the legal order, as evident by the
Increasing bureaucratization of life. However, elements of the 'traditional' and
'charismatic' are still In existence and continue to have en Impact on political
life In both Western and Third World political communities.37
Weber's definition of charisma include most of the elements generally
acknowledged as pertaining to the 'charismatic leader'. He describes it as:
A certain quality of an Individual personality by
virtue of which he Is set apart from ordinary men and
37 1t Is observed that some scholars would disagree with this interpretation of Weber
on this point. Parsons and Upset et ii, who have spent their lives trying to protect
Webers reputation, would probably argue that the typology (Charisma, traditional.
legal) was constructed by Weber for purely analytical purposes and it is not based on
any preconception about the direction and meaning of either historical movement or
political development.
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treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or
at least specifically exceptional qualities. These are
such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but
are of divine or as exemplary, end on the basis of them
the Individual concerned Is treated as leader.38
Weber described the power of charisma as relying on personaflty end how the
Individual Is regarded by his followers or disciples. That is, there are two major
factors In a charismatic leader-follower authority relationship. First, there is
en analytical distinction between the 'charismatic' and the 'ordinary.' The
charismatic Is perceived as an extreerdinary event or quality, one which Is in
contrast to elements of orderly social life. Therefore, the test of the 'great' hero
(a charismatic type) lies in his ability to leave a continuous impact on an
Institutional structure (state or religion). In other words, to transform social
life or structure by infusing into it some of his charismatic vision. Second, it is
essential that the charismatic individual be recognized or regarded as such: ThIs
racognitlon according to Weber, is a matter of complete personal devotion
arising out of enthusiasm, or of despair or hope. 39 Consequently, the
followers create the charismatic leader. The charisma Is his but the authority is
the by product/result of the intense and personal nature of the masses response to
charisma. In Weber's own words, It Is recognition of what is alone important.
As he put It it is recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is
decisive for the validity of charlsma.4°
As noted above, Weber emphasized the relational aspect of charismatic leadership.
Dr. Ann Ruth WHiner says that a close reading of Weber makes:
It is clear that he, no less than contemporary students
of leadership, recognized that leadership Is a
relational phenomenon, Involving the interaction of
leader and the followers towards goals and within the
context of situations... .As Weber repeatedly
emphasized, it Is not necessarily what the leader is
but how he is perceived by his followers that is
38Weber, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOIIIC OR6ANIZATION. ,p.cit.. p.359.
39 Ibid., p.359
40A.R. WHiner, CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP : A Theory. op.cIt., p.4.
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decisive for the validity of charisma.41
Moreover, Weber examined end emphasized the 'charismatic' In the area of
religion end politics. There Is the charismatic domination as exercised in the
religious sphere by the prophet, end In the political sphere by the elected war
lord, the demagogue, end the political party leader. 42 In his analysis of
POLITICS AS A VXATION, he observes that charismatic leadership has &ways
been with us, in all places end in all epochs. it has emerged In two major
categories, the magician and the prophet on the one hand, and the elected war lord.
the gang leader and Condotlerrl (leader of a band of mercenary professional
soldiers) on the other hand. 43 Political leadership In the form of 'demagogue'
and 'party leader' are Indigenous to the Western world. Yet, all charismatic
leaders have a mission and calling.
it Is possible to derive from the theoretical Insights of Weber a number of
propositions about charisma and the mechanism of legitimation. 44 Max Weber
treats the charismatic politician as a product of his following. The type of leader
emerges when his followers' belief system convince them that an Individual is
behaving In a way appropriate for one who claims charismatic legitimacy. Such a
belief system which Itself Is the product of socio-historical conditions, defines
the mode of behaviour of masses and leadership alike, setting forth particular
criteria for political legitimacy end prescribing the acceptable subtype of
charismatic leadership. The Important role played by adherents makes it
necessary that greater emphasis should be devoted to their beliefs than to the
41 lb1d., p.4.
4 Weber, POLITICS AS A VOCATIOW. op.cit , pp.3-4.
4 Ibid., pp.3-4.
Five points extracted from Webers work regarding charismatic authority are
discussed In Richard Fagens article, CharIsmatIc Authority and the Leadership of
Fidel Castro, WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY. June, Vol.18, 1965. pp.278-279.
There are is follows: (a) The charismatic leader Is the creation of his followers; (b)
An individual personality' or leader capable of generating a charismatic authority
relationship in one context may fall completely to generate that relationship in some
other context; Cc) the leader does not regard himselt either as chosen by or as solely
dependent on his followers, but rather as 'elected' rrom above to fulfill a mission; (d)
the behaviour of the charismatic leader in power is anti-bureaucratic; and, (e)
charismatic authority is unstable, tending to be transformed (routinized) through Lime.
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transcendental characteristics end function of the leader. In addition, It Is
evident that charismatic authority Is related to a specific context. Typically, an
Individual who emerges as a charismatic leader, tends to credit his authority not
to a following, but rather to a higher agency. Thus, such a leader regards himself
as 'called' or 'chosen' from above to fulfill a personal mission. He believes that
the legitimacy of his authority Is derived from 6od or history, and, consequently,
his followers are under divine duty to obey. Since the attitudes and goals he
espouses are usually the antithesis of legal and traditional ones, they are unlikely
to outlive his own existence. Therefore, the charismatic leader Is not likely to
produce stable and enduring Institutions and movements. This type of authority Is
unstable, tending to be transformed over time, into either traditional or rational
forms, and charisma Is routinized In political life when the leader links his
attitudes and goals to structures, such as, parties, movements and Institutions.
Thus, charisma can be routinized to the event that a leader's aura of legitimacy is
transformed to a political party, which preserves and promulgates his Ideas after
his death.
In any analytical discussion of Weberian charisma theory, several observations
are In order. First, Max Weber Is to be credited as being the first theorist to
recognize and to systematically describe charisma. There are numerous
discussions of leadership, as has been shown In the previous Chapter. The Ideas
which Weber presents, however, are unique. In discussing leadership, he was
careful to distinguish between authority of the traditional and legal types (power
Invested in a position, e.g. King or president) and personal power or charisma
emanating from the Individual attributes of the person.
Secondly, Weber Is partially responsible for the confusion In current or post
Weberian charisma studies, because he failed to complete the analysis of the
concept of charisma. For example, charismatic authority Is not as systematically
explored as the other types. James V. Downton makes the same point:
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...Weber's...treatment of charismatic authority is the
weakest link in his typology. It Is quite apparent that
his analysis of charisma lacks the depth and
systematic exploration that he gave to both the
traditional and rational legal types of authority.
Although he elevated charisma to an Important place
within his theory of social change, the concept was
scarcely developed beyond the elementary point of
definition.45
The point made here is that the concept charisma is less than fully developed.
Moreover, one can say that Weber has not fully defined the theory of charisma.
His contribution Is a broad definition, which quite often has been
indiscriminately applied by scholars and laypersons. Let us turn, then, to a
critical review of recent studies bearing on the success or failure of the
charismatic leadership literature as it relates to the systematic exploration of
the charismatic personality In politics.
Weber's 'theory' of charisma manifests the weakness of never having been
operationalized by Its originator. The German sociologist never did conduct an
empirical study using his Ideas dealing with types of leadership. 46 Thus, when
one talk's about empirical Weberlan studies of Charisma, one Is not referring to
Max Weber's studies alone but rather to scholars such as Talcott Parsons. Edward
Shfls. S.N. Elsenstadt, Ann Ruth Whiner, Richard R. Fagen, Reinhard Bendix and
others. 47 They are classified as Weberians because they take Weber as their
point of departure, and generally speaking, they are less critical of the weakness
of Weber's treatment of charisma than some other scholars such as James
Downton. They are, however, selective In borrowing from the master. For
example, Shils emphasizes the creative aspect of charisma, while Eisenstadt has
written a classic study on the subject which focuses on the Institution building
role of the concept.
Downton, REBEL LEADERSHIP, op.cit., p.272.
A close reading of both Reinhart Bendix's MAX WEBER : An Intellectual Portrait,
New York Peter Smith. 1962, and S. N. Elsenst.adt.s MAX WEBER ON CHARISMA AND
INSTITUTION BUILDING, op.cit., suggest that Weber did not empirically test his notion
of charisma beyond drawing upon his great knowledge of history and this only to
construct the charisma Ideal-type.
It is the writer's judgement that those named above should be called Weberians.
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Fogen. on the other hand, has Isolated five propositions from Weber's charisma
analysis, and has applied them directly to a specific political figure. A different
point of view Is offered by Whiner, who argues that the charismatic loader's
emergence is tied to his utilization of symbolic Ideological dimension of culture
in order to build support for himself and br his movement. This being the case,
this type 'leadership' while manifesting cultural patterns end societal elements
Is not bound by time and place.48
The differing emphasis of Weberian studies shows, In a concrete way, that the
charisma concept Is rich In meaning. Stated another way, charisma is a confusing
concept and no two writers agree as to what It actually means. According to
Lacouture even Its definition is problematic and so is its meaning as a cause of a
movement. Thus, he states:
...The nexus or connection between charismatic leaders
and followers Is thought to be 'special', 'unusual,'
'extraordinary,"very different', 'exceptional' ,'maglc',
'religious', etc. For some leaders designated as
charismatic, this connection Is claimed to be the
person's (1) oratory, (2) Ideology, (3) or his power
of example. In short, the nexus vary from leader to
leader, sometimes it changes during the period of
leadership and it may encompass one or all of the
various claimed nexuses.49
In fact, the best a person can do to explain leaders that
are designated as charismatic Is to go and get various
examples and testimonies from numerous sources to
state that, 'oratory' was the nexus, or Ideology or
something else or all of these...which proves the
elusive nature and reality of charisma.50
Similarly. James Downton and K.J. Ratnam argue that Max Weber Is to blame for
what they perceive as confusion in the literature of charisma. They assert that
48 5ee and compare A.R. Willners CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP : A Theory.
op.clt., and. WI liner and WHiner's The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leadership,
op.clt. In the latter study, the authors made a stronger argument for linking the
emergence of charismatic leadership mythology than A.R. Willner made in her book (the
former).




Weber's Intentions were not clear, end describe him Os: emphasizing the
psychological aspect of the leader-follower relationship only to shift to stressing
the social dimensions, with the expected result that conceptualizing charisma
becomes difficult, if not impossible. 5 ' An especially confusing element Is the
haphazard use of personal psychological aspects with social dynamics attributed
to these aspects.
Before proceeding any further In discussing post-Max Weber views of charisma,
it Is Important to establish several premises. First, It Is not necessarily
accurate to state that Weber's perceptions of charisma is 'confusing', as has been
stated by several scholars. Secondly, no scholar, seriously doubts the existence
of the phenomena Weber labelled charisma. However, It becomes a highly
problematic concept one attempts to Identify decisive attributes to the category
one calls 'charismatic political leadership'. If there has been end still Is a
question on the meaning and underpinnings of the concept charisma in the current
literature, in the view of this writer, ft has an identifiable origin: namely, too
many writers have not found the balance between the 'psychological' and 'social'
components of the concept and on equal number of them blame It all on Weber's
own lock of locus on these two aspects. To do that Is to criticize a scholar long
dead on the basis of ex post facto evidence and by contemporary emphasis on
psycho-analytical political science. That particular problem is not only present
In the treatment of Weber, but also In the treatment of many other scholars of the
19th century and the classic era. However, In the instance of Weber, not only did
a historical analysis play a role in the misunderstanding of his theory, but also
the way It became known to a significantly biased Anglo-Saxon world. As one
scholar has pointed out, Weber's categories have become available to the political
scientist and other scholars, by bits and pieces end often In such a manner that
secondary elements of his theory have been elevated to primary concepts.52
51 K.J. RaLnam, Charisma and Political Leadership, POLITICAL STUDIES. 12. 1964,
pp. 341-354.
A.W. Slngham. THE HERO AP4D THE CROWD IN A COLONIAL POLITY. Princeton
Princeton University Press, 1968. p.16.
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Above all, following the current trends, there is too much emphasis on the
psychologlcar versus the •soclai aspect of charisma. Even so, too many
questions concerning Its origin, content and Impact remain unanswered. For
example, how do certain Individuals acquire the magical, mysterious gift of
charisma? Why do people obey charismatic leaders? The answers one finds to
these questions In a sense, reflect the various analytical approaches. As noted,
there are three schools of thought: the concept of charisma Is discussed In terms
either of the social structure, the psychological make up of the leader and/or his
followers, or the combined social and psychological.
The theoretical debate on the role of environment variables In the conditions of
the emergence and effectiveness of the charismatic personality is still
inconclusive.53 The question of whether the leader Is representative of his
people or a marginal man within his society? summarizes the sociological
debate. One answer Is that the leader Is a marginal Individual, both in terms of
personal traits and his social standing In the society. A prominent exponent of
this view, Sigmund Neumann states: The leader has no friends, no equals. He
must abstain from the conform of intimacy. He trusts nobody...That Is the price he
has to pay for being 'superhuman'.54 But, It may also be that a leader's
'marginality' and apparent aloofness are the external manifestations of his
weakness. In other words, they are his mask. For Max Weber, however, the
'marginal man' could be a person straddling two cultures, which Is essentially
53 1t is Important to note that there is only one definition of charisma that
encompasses all the manifestations of the charismatic, offered by Max Weber:
...ext.raordinary quality of a person, regardless of whether this quality is actual,
alleged, or presumed. Charismatic, hence, shall refer to a rule over men to which the
governed submlt....the legitimacy of their rule rests upon the belief in magical powers,
revelations, and hero worship. The source of these beliefs Is the providing of the
charismatic successes, that is, through the welfare of the governed. Such beliefs and
the claimed authority resting on them therefore disappears, or threaten to disappear,
as soon as proof Is lacking and as soon as the charismatically qualified person appears
l.a be devoid of his magical power or forsaken by his god. Charismatic rule Is not
managed according to concrete revelations and inspirations, and in this sense,
charismatic authority is irrational. It Is revolutlonary in the sense of not being
bound to the existing: it Is written - but I say unto you.... See Max Weber, THE
THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, op.cIt., p.264.
See Sigmund Neumann. PERIIANENT REVOLUTION : Totalitarianism in the Age of the
International Civil War, New York : Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, pp.59-60.
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what Neumann meant by the phenomenon of marginality.55 In the Weberian
philosophy, the demagogic charismatic leader Is the 'in between classes'
Individual.
In both sociocultural end geopolitical terms the leader's outsider status is
evidenced by Intense feelings of nationalism. Napoleon, Ataturk, Stalin. and
Hitler ore examples In this point. Their nationalism Is derived from their
marginal national/ethnic group of their states. Neumann notes that Napoleon,
Ataturk and Hitler, for instance, were born outside of the countries they came to
rule or along their frontiers.56 tioreover, they did not belong to the dominant
ethnic group of multi-ethnic political communities, and often their most
receptive years are spent outside of these countries. "
Thus, It can be argued that marginal Individuals are not at all easy with their
environment, which produces a lack of balance In their social relations.
Psychological and social marginality is the motivation or drive which cause an
Individual to became the mouthpiece of an interest, a class, an ethnic group's
nationalistic desires, or an ideology/revolution. Winner followed Neumann in
defining marginality In both personal and cultural terms. For her marginality
has advantages and Its own dialectical tendency toward motion. Marginal
individuals are never static. They are motivated by frustration of their status -
as persons straddling two cultures - and appeal to frustrated and marginal
peoples In their societies. She advocates the plural possibility identificetions
the reader who Is Interested In the marginality literature is referred to Robert E.
Park In 'Introduction' to Everett V. Stonequist. The Marginal Man, AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY. 6, May. 1929; E. Hughes. SocIal Change and Status Politics
Essays on the Marginal Man, PHYLON. X. 1. 1949; and, Frant.z Fanon, THE WRETCHED
OF THE EARTH. New York : Grove Press, 1966, and BLACK SKINS, WHITE MASKS, New
York : 6rove Press, 1967.
6. 11. Burns, In ROOSEVELT : The Lion and the Fox. New York : Harcourt. 1956. It Is
a striking tact that some of the great popular leaders or our time have risen to power
from outside of the national heartIand. Lloyd George came not from England but from
Wales, Hitler not from Prussia but from Austria, Stalin not from Mother Russia but
from 6eorgia. MacDonald not from England but from Northern Scotland, just as
Napoleon was not a Frenchman but a Corsican. In a geographical sense Roosevelt was
not an outlander, but In a cultural sense he was. p.22.
57Neumann, PERMANENT REVOLUTION. op.cit.. p.59.
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thesis, which views the charismatic leader as an Individual, who Is marginal by
virtue of social origins end early exposure to varied environments, and who Is
Identified with or Is capable of Identifying with several different groups or
segments of society which serve as his/her base of support as a leader.58
Therefore, the backgrounds of charismatic political leaders Indicate that they had
the advantages, as well as strains, of multiple perspectives on the world. That is,
they were able, because of their class, religion, education, ethnic or rural/urban
provenance marginality In social end psychological terms, to appeal and respond
to members of different strata or segments of their societies. A consideration of
the leader and the crowd Is In order. That Is briefly, one must examine the
following of movements via the charismatic/mass hero and the crowd.
Social movements are mass enterprises Involving persons who have real or
supposed grievances against the present Institutional order. Available evidence
on the organizational aspects of political leaders characterized as 'charismatic'
Indicates that they led social movements. All have been the centers of attention of
mass movements either while alive or after death. Such movements existed to
vent grievances. 6enerally speaking, grievances may be of two kinds. First,
grievances may be limited to Individual structures (e.g. Churches or
governments) that are distasteful, annoying, or actively stultifying to certain
Individuals or groups. Second, other grievances may be more general and may
reflect a change In mess attitudes toward the entire Institutional order. Most
leaders of social movements fall somewhere between those dissatisfied with their
status In a single Institution, and those who are alienated from the existing
political order. It Is necessary to pay attention to the nature of alienation.
because alienated Individuals and groups are the raw materials of mass
movements. Economic factors produce frustration and alienation. Frustrated and
alienated persons and groups may be physically and economically uprooted. This
is related to how the social economic order impacts on the political system.
WllIner, CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP : A Theory, op.cIL, pp.50-5 1.
102
In terms of both numbers end enthusiasm of support, however, certain groups
have been among the most vulnerable to social movements ) especially those of the
totalitarian variety. William Kornhauser singles out Intellectuals, lower middle
class business men, and farm workers. They have In common a lack of enthusiasm
for the existing political order and the need to Identify with something or
someone. 59 The appeal of a charismatic personality may span generations. As it
was observed, Hitler symbolized different things to persons of different
generations. Similarly, Ataturk and Napoleon constructed 'movements' based on
diverse elements, but they Infused these movements with qualitatively different
Ideologies. Napoleon and Ataturk, like Hitler, were responsible for restoring
economic security to their respective nations, and were national leaders who
probably became symbols of the quality of manliness to the youth of France and
Turkey. Hitler, on the other hand, was the man who In the eyes of the older
generations restored order and security. As Shils end Janowitz observe:
For older men, who lived through the unemployment of
the closing years of the Weimar Republic and who
experienced the joy of being reinstated In gainful
employment by Nazi full employment policies, Hitler
was above all the man who tied provided economic
security.60
For another generation, Hitler played an Important role in its psychological
development. For men of the generation between 23-35 Shhls and Janowltz note
•who had first experienced Hitler's charisma in the struggles to establish their
manliness during late adolescence, Hitler was the prototype of strength and
masculinity. 6 ' And finally, it is asserted that:
for the younger Nazi youth he was a father substitute,
providing the vigilant discipline and the repression of
dangerous Impulses both In the Individual and the
social environment; for them he had the additional
59WilIiam Kornhsuser, ThE POI.ITICS OF MASS SOCIETY. 6iencoe, Illinois : The Free
Press, 1959, pp.55-78.
60 Edward A. Shils and M. Janowitz, Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht,
PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, Summer, 1948. p.289.
61 Ibid.. p.287.
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merit of legitimating revolt against the family end
traditional restraints.62
Thus, the generalization to be made on the basis of our Investigation Is that the
charismatic type does not constitute a specific or psychologically Identifiable
type. To the extent that such en Individual Is psychologically different from his
following or the population at large, he shores these tendencies with other so-
called political personalities' in general. From both psychological end
sociological perspectives, the charismatic person Is, generally speaking a
marginal Individual, able to make a broad appeal to the messes. As to his social
origins, he may came from any ethnic, racial, religious, class group, but is able
to Identify with and be accepted by a range of groups. To understand the public
opinion - here called charismatic response - which Is a factor In the emergence
of this type of leader, two arguments are offered. (a) that alienation Is related to
the 'charismatic' element, and (b) that there is always the desire to be
worshipped end the desire to worship.
The political scientist who studies charisma usually depends on some discipline,
such as psychology, to point out to him the importance of personality end its role
In politics and the method by which it ought to be studied. Without wishing to
underrate the utility of social psychology, it must be stressed that history and
folklore are equally useful sources In the study of political personality. Certain
types of historical arid folkloristic research are essential to understand the
progress of charismatic leadership research. Here, the term 'charismatic
studies' is used in Its adjectival form end speaks of 'charismatic' type of studies
rather than 'charisma'. By engaging in research of 'charismatic personality', in
other words, one does not intend a novel concept but to produce a work that links
several existing and related notions about the subject matter.
Since World War II there have been a series of terms used to describe 'personal
authority' some of which have achieved general acceptance. Cult of personality,
62 1b1d., p.287.
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individualistic leadership, authoritarian dictator, end marginal man, all have
acquired some use in the pest thirty years or so. While 'charismatic research'
suggests a special relationship between variants of leadership, more generally it
designates the relationship of types of popular leadershi p as a whole. subsuming
all non-traditional and non-legal/rational types of leaders. The task of
charismatic research, In one's view, is to lay the foundation for an adequate
understanding of the response of the followers in creating a charismatic leader or
any of Its variants. It may be argued that many scholars have dealt with the
subject and for a considerable period of time. That may be true, but most studies
are partial and Inadequate. The fact Is that the political myth of heroism, the
true nexus between the thought and feeling of a populace, and emergence of
charismatic authority has been largely neglected. It has not been studied in Its
own right. Cuthbertson argues this point as follows:
Students of politics have neglected myths, although
myth has been treated as a construct in political
theory since the time of Plato. Political mythology,
however, is rarely analyzed in specific terms.63
According to Cuthbertson, today myth and epic have been neglected by economic
determinists, •who have pigeonholed them in the superstructure, and by
behaviorists, and by social scientists as well. 64 There are several reasons why
myths are poorly used by social scientists. Among them, that (1) social
scientists define myth in broad sketchy terms, but (2) the few political theorists
who do use myth, erroneously perceive it only in terms of its totalitarian nature.
The author argues that myth has a greater capacity to build as well as destroy
political order vls-a-vls the revolutionary function of messianic, cultural,
catastrophic, utopian and inconoclastic myth categories. Related to one of the
four myth categories, the political messianic myth, Is the emergence of a hero, or
prophet or the individual with supernatural power. One might say that the
charismatic individual Is usually associated with messianic tradition, thus
6Ibertson Cuthbertson. POliTICAL MYTH AND EPIC. East Lansing : MIchigan State
University Press 1975, p.15.
ibid., p.14.
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linking charisma end political myth.
Many of the standard studies of charisma contain little data on the role of the
political myth.65 In most cases authors deal with the charismatic leader's
ability to focus end channel diverse grievances and interests in a common appeal
end little else. They have In other words, abstracted from charisma an Internal
quality end activity. Social and expressive aspects of the concept 'charisma' have
been attended to only when they have intruded inescapably in attempts to define
the appeal that charismatic leaders hold for the masses. And this because one can
hardly characterize the attraction of charismatic leadership without noting that
certain personal qualities Identify the role of a leader, while other qualities
explain his mass following. But a more exact or general study of the charismatic
individual - who legitimizes his claim to a leadership role by associating himself
with the heroes and myths of the culture - has been by and large left aside.
The point above Is that political scientists have used the data on the emergence of
charismatic leadership, but they abstracted it from its folklore context. They
have usually bypassed the social underpinnings to explain what charisma is, or Is
not. There Is, for example, discussion of the contemporary meanings of the
concept, the importance of variant (the demagogue) versus another variant (the
revolutionary), end its Impact upon social issues end the messes. However,
rarely do they specify what one would need to know to recognize an Instance of
what has been called 'cultural management'. That Is, the strategies used by the
charismatic leader to legitimize his claim by associating with himself the sacred
symbols of the culture.66
Ann Ruth WHiner Is one of a small group of writers who have emphasized the role
of the 'Hero Myth' In charismatic research; and, Hans Garth and C. Wright Mills
have linked Weber's discussion of charisma to Hero Worship. According to Garth
Ibid., p.2.
A.R. WHIner and D. WHiner, The Rise and Role of Charismatic Le.ders. op.cit.,
p.77.
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and Mills. Max Weber, followed In the footsteps of Thomas Cerlyle, end used the
term 'charisma' to explain the developments caused by the heroic
personality/individual. In en edited work, Gerth end Mills say:
Weber's conception of the charismatic leader as
continuation of a 'philosophy of history' that after
Car lyle's HEROES AND HERO WORSHIP has influenced
a groat deal of nineteenth century history writing.61
Wiflner explicitly links charisma and myth, when she observes that:
The charisma of a leader Is bound up with end, indeed,
may even depend upon his becoming assimilated, in the
thought and feelings of a populace, to its sacred
figures, divine beings, or heroes. Their actions and
the content of these actions, recounted in myth,
express the fundamental values of a culture, including
Its basic categories for organizing experience and
trying to resolve basic cultural and human
dilemmas.68
The charismatic leader, one suggests, is able to communicate to his followers a
sense of continuity between himself and their legendary heroes and their
mission.69
The simplest statement that can be made about a charismatic leader is that he is a
hero of some sort. To advance beyond it, It is necessary to attempt to take the
'hero' apart and to isolate him for a separate examination of his attributes which
appear to have been the most influential In bringing about a sense of ewe and
reverence among his followers. This awe is at the core of charismatic response.
Naturally, such a study requires an examination of epic heroism, which according
to Cuthbertson, has Its own type of politics:
Political myth is the mechanism of charisma, linking
the hero to the community. Myth Is a primary source
for legitimizing and maintaining political power. The
deprivation of myth is the beginning of power politics.
67 6erth and Mills. eds., FROM MAX WEBER : Essays in Sociology. op.cIt., p.53.
Willner and WHiner, The Rise and Role of Charismatic teaders, op.cIL, p.82.
lbid., p.83.
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Myth custodians are power holders. Myth establishes
moral consensus In the community and is accompanied
by social sanctions. Myth stabilizes the relationship
of the Individual to politics by restricting the purely
organic state with the element of moral
purposiveness.70
This brood definition which •lso highlights Plax Weber's contention that
charismatic leadership has existed everywhere end at all times, end that, in
particular terms, a leader so defined Is not that difficult to recognize. The key to
the mythical qualities of such leaders Is to be found in their superhumanness. In
the political myth context, the epic hero is a phenomenon that answers these two
conditions.
Yet, myths have been considered a system of dialectical logic, which can be
constructed as a substructure in all human thought.71 Thus, In the 'epic hero'
It Is possible to discover patterned elements of belief present in heroes of all
societies, though the concrete manifestation of these elements would vary
according to the particulurities of each community, end with them the meaning of
the epic hero.
The word 'hero' has been given many meanings, varying from the all encompassing
definition, a mythological or legendary figure often of divine descent endowed
with great strength or ability to the more limited one of 'a man admired for his
achievement and qualities. 72 It is within the limits of the former definition
that the epic hero derives Its meaning.
70Cuthbertson, POLITICAL MYTH AND EPIC. op.cit., p.156.
71 CIaude Lsvi-Strauss, Th. Structursi Study of Myth. JOURNAL Of AMERICAN
FOLKLORE, 66, 1955, pp.236-241.
72TH( OXFORD EN6LISH DICTIONARY. 2nd Vol., 1971. pp.369-390.
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2.5 CONCLUSION
The consideration raised at the outset of this Chapter was: Flow does the Weberlan
thesis that people have always differentiated between 'leadership' of the routine
and extraordinary types, square historically with what one knows of man's
attitude to political authority. In many Important respects political attitudes and
practices do square with what Max Weber and Weberlan writers (particularly
Ann Ruth Wfllner) have noted about charismatic authority. From historical end
philosophical sources, one can establish the presence of the 'charismatic' in the
existence of unique individuals who by virtue of their 'exceptionality' ought to be
deferred to and obeyed, vis-e-vis, the epic hero, prophet, saint, demagogue,
founder of the new movement (both spiritual end secular), and party leader. In
addition, it Is evident that leaders have used the concepts 'charisma' and 'cult of
the personality' to enhance their status as secular rulers and the control of
political life of communities. Kings, tyrants and political leaders, whether they
imposed their rule, exploited public opinion or were granLed it by election - all
needed to have their office established: i.e. legitimated their rulership to those
who were subject to its authority by claiming by virtue of the office to possess
charisma or generate awe and hero worship. Traditionally, in the West, leaders
who wanted either to acquire power emil or rationalize the possession of power
and its exercise, often have Identified themselves to the masses as 'saviours of the
people', 'enlighteners of the masses', and, likened their positions of power, office
to 'divine rule', or a uniquely personal mission. Thus, one's initial conclusion is
that the Weberlan thesis Is valid, that is, the charismatic leader type has existed
for the entire period of Western civilization: In no period or society, was the
'charismatic' absent. Put differently, charismatic leadership has been an
Integral part of the Western tradition, Its political philosophy and practice.
it Is pointed out that the charismatic leader may be identified by the enthusiasm
by which his public appearances, words, and actions are met with among the
population. His following Is almost never the whole population, but Its
log
commitment to him Is the best evidence available that he is In fact recognized by
It as 'charismatic'. Although It Is true that all leaders have more than 'natural
qualities', It Is only the 'charismatic ones' who are perceived as having either
natural qualities to an extraordinary degree or as being superhuman. With these
(charismatic) Individuals the ability to generate enthusiasm Is greeter than with
other leaders. Such Individuals ore In certain cases not motivated solely (If at
all) to obtain power, to be of service to others. Nor are they motivated by the
ordinary reasons for choosing politics as a career. With various degrees of
emphasis, charismatic leaders view themselves as 'agents' of a higher authority
than the existent state, and they expect to be recognized as such. Many, If not all
of them give every Indication that they are themselves true believers In
something, which lies beyond the ordinary range of human experience and
perception. And they expect those who are closest to their persons, also, to be
true believers. Their emergence to power stirs up a good deal of emotionalism
among their followers and among those who are not prepared either to acknowledge
a new source of charisma or for a revolutionary change. For the charismatic
leader and those he leads, existential social and political relationships are
artificial, static, end In need of transformation. The transformation is to proceed
In accordance with the leader's inspiration. The inspiration may be political, for
example, Hitler's belief In his unique mission to construct a politically greater
Germany, the One Thousand Year Reich. Thus, in regard to the charismatic
leader's impact, the evidence present upholds the following generalizations. Such
a leader, for his followers, Is considered outside or above the law or social
norms.
The charismatic leader's purpose Is to generate a new 'consciousness' for those
who will accept and later for all, Irrespective of their willingness to accept his
authority as 'charismatic'. According to Harvey Wheeler.
Man creates for himself a divine master who proceeds
to teach man new ways, out of which emerge new
cultural forms, which In turn requires men to adopt
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new forms of consciousness.73
Arguably, equating a charismatic leader with the notion 'divinity' Is riot
Inappropriate because some charismatic followers do so. When It comes to telling
their followers, what is In accordance with the will of God, or, is historically
possible, the charismatic leader is perceived by his followers as one who is a
superhuman, a god, or Intimate with God. The charismatic leader's ability to
stimulate or assist In the process of the development of a 'new consciousness'
while never directly addressed by Max Weber's writing on charisma,
nevertheless, is inherent in his notion that charisma is a revolutionary force.
Downton's discussion of specific case studies, drawn from historical end
contemporary 'great' figures, offers data on the revolutionary aspect of charisma.
The point one made relative to 'new consciousness' Is that idea (the seed of new
consciousness) is linked to charismatic personalities. That is, a new mode of
thought is often traceable to en idea originating with or given a particularly
appealing twist by a charismatic leader. One does not wish to get Into the debate
as to whether idea or material is more important. For example, Marxist and non-
Marxist (as well as many disputants) are divided on this point. One simply states
here that, while pursuing a Weberian thesis, a number of writers found evidence
that charismatic leadership played a role in the generation of new consciousness.
Charisma, as noted, is a revolutionary force itself, it destroys old institutions,
and replaces them with ones more attuned to current needs. Wheeler sketches
this process as follows:
But men (charismatic leader and his followers) with
new consciousness are new men and new men need to
declare the old gods dead and to create new and more
appropriate gods to go with their new consciousness
and their new needs, and so on.74
The above does riot mean either that there Is en irreversible trend toward
charismatics In Western civilization or that charismatic leaders may affect




changes In the historical process unaided by followers' commitment and a
favourable soclo-historical environment. The data shows the contrary Is the
case. One might, therefore, say that there are some individuals (charismatic)
who con generate loyalties to themselves, which ordinarily rest with traditional
and rational legal systems. And, for such an Individual, the status q (the pre-
emergence situation) continued survival can only be Interpreted as the failure of
a mission. Hence, the charismatic leader, in some cases, measures his effect
(success of his mission) In terms of destruction, modification of something which
predates his emergence, and he offers a substitution of his own creation for what
hod existed.
One found leadership to be a behavioural process Involving a leader, followers,
end soclo-historical situation. Each element Is of equal importance. A leader
must conform to the society's or group's Idea of what Is acceptable qualified
criteria for leadership. However, during extraordinary times, the group seeks
out Individuals who are 'deviant' for special leadership roles. Hence, such
leadership may not only deviate from norms, but is expected to do, and would fail
If It tried to behave, for example, as a routine-type leader would, since by
definition, the situation requiring recognition of the 'charismatic' Is not one
which can be dealt with by ordinary or routine means. One has observed that most
studies treat leadership (particularly the charismatic type) as a personality
variable rather than a situational one. The present study's data suggest
otherwise: leadership Is clearly a function of both situation end personality.
A major conclusion Is that the charismatic Individual does not constitute specific
psychologically Identifiable types. To the extent that such individuals are
markedly different, psychologically, from their followership or the populace,
their share tendencies with other so-called neurotic political personalities.
From both psychological and sociological perspectives, It was found, that the
charismatic person may be a marginal individual, who Is able to make a broad
appeal to the masses because of his very marginality.
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Three approaches to the influence of socio-cultural and personality factors on the
choice of political careers and the appeal of the demagogue variant charismatic
personality, viz., Lesswell, Neumann, end Whiner were offered. The Lasswell-
Neumann explanations were rejected, and that of Whiner accepted as having the
greatest explanatory power of the three, because Winner's analysis dealt with
specifically the charismatic leader and recognized and emphasized the appeal
aspect of the charismatic leader. The other two, while providing some Insights,
made It difficult to generalize from politici an oer se or, even demagogue as a
category, to charismatic leaders in particular.
Finally, It is noted that the essence of charisma cannot be found In the work of a
single theorist. The concept charisma Is still In need of refinement If it is to be a
useful tool in political analysis. Fegen has put It very well, when speaking of
charismatic studies. He commented that they represent In part a very genuine
groping about for a conceptual framework which might be of service In the
analysis of Twentieth Century polltics. 75 Max Weber did not systematize his
views and insights regarding charismatic authority as well as he did those he had
relating to traditional rational legal systems of authority. Although some others
hove tried to complete the task Weber only begun no one as yet has been
successful In making of charisma anything but a provocative notion.
Charisma, today, is more nor less en unfinished conceptual framework. However,
within the seventy years since Weber coined the 'charisma' some scholars
(Weberions, particularly Wiliner, Fagen, and Bendix) have made contributions to
the framework. I have In turn borrowed both directly from Weber and the
forementioned analysts. The analysis of charisma used In this study is the
distillation of the insights of these Weberian writers. For example, the notion of
'charismatic response', comes from Wiliner; also, from her, one took, the notion
that the 'epic myth' contained valuable Insights on charisma. Fegen's synthesis of
Weber makes one's work easier than It would have been otherwise. In fact, the
75Fagen, Charismatic Authority and the Leadership or Fidel CasLro, op.cit., p.278.
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five propositions he abstracted from Weber constitutes minimum criteria for
identifying a charismatic political leader. Adding WHiner's Indexes
(particularly, charismatic response) to It, a researcher has the beginnings of an
empirical based framework adequate to locate, Identify and categorize that elusive
pal Iticlan, the charismatic leader.
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PART TWO
THE ROLE DYNAMICS. POLITICS AND IMPACT OF GAMAL ABDEL NASSER
CHAPTER THREE
A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF GAMAL ABDEL NASSER (1918-1970):
Personality . Traits. Plotives. Imeoes and Role Dynamics.
3.1 INTRODUCTION'
The objective of this Chapter is to develop en understanding of the personality,
traits, motives, Images end role dynamics of Carnal Abdel Nasser, from the time of
assuming office as the sovereign of Egypt till his death In 1970. Its aim is to
provide an empirical picture of Nasser's life, thought, political socialization arid
eventually, his emergence to leadership status not only in Egypt but, In the Arab
world as a whole.
A political portrait of Carnal Abdel Nasser can be a difficult and controversial
exercise since the reconstruction of his life calls on the writer to strike a
balance, between, on the one hand, molding him into a hero, 2 end, on the other,
examining the subject In the light of critical relief in the negative sense of the
word.3 In trying to avoid these two extremes, one contends that there will be
as many versions of Nasser as there are students who wish to write about
1 A note on the translation. Because the Arabic language has its own alphabet, there
Is no standard English language spelling for Arabic words. Common nouns are spelled
as they are most usually reproduced In English. An attempt has been made to spell ill
book titles and names as their writers spell them in translation.
2S.e for example Robert St. John, THE BOSS. New York : Mc6raw-H1II Book C...
1960. And consider Derek Hopwood's comments ...the title gives a foretaste of the
style, popular. intimate, a little sensational, It was a day by day, sometimes minute
by minute, account of Abdel Nassers rise to power. All the tricks el the trade are
employed : conversations are recalled In exact detail, the village rather than the
cosmopolitan background stressed, the homely family man portrayed with a taste for
transversely stripped ties and American movies. The reader is left with a vivid
impression of the events of his life and his character - real or imagined - but with
little •Ise... Derek Hopwood, Some Western Views of the Egyptian RevotuUon In
P,J. VaUkiotis Cod), E6YPT SINCE THE REVOLUTION. New York : Goerge Alien & Unwin.
1968. pp.181-195.
30f the latest works within this framework, see Tawliq Al Hakim, AWDAT AL WA1
(The Return of Consciousness) Translated by Bayly Winder. London : The Macmillan
Press Ltd. 1966, and the reply by tiohamed Auda AL WAI AL IIAFKUD (The Lost
Consciousness : A Reply to Tawlig Al Hakim) Cairo Dir ii Kahera al Haditha. 1967.
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him.4
This undertaking, however. Is not a biography of Nasser In the conventional,
narrative sense5 nor Is It an attempt to link Nasser's words and actions to his
organic or psychic makeup.6 What Is attempted Is the constant handling of the
subject as a more or less Independent variable - or to use Sidney Hock's
terminology, en event making Man 1 portrayed as a 'unique Individual',
manipulating end being manipulated by the setting.
One's purpose of political biography Is to allow one to understand not only what
our chief actor did, but why. Thus, a political biography Is also a case history
which should move one to the realizations of the actions of the chief actor as an
aspirant end Incumbent of a position, and, the successes or failures of that
Individual in different situations. in studying Bamal Abdel Nasser personality,
role and setting one Intends to develop a reconstruction by linkage politics around
the following themes: 'National independence', 'Able Le&Iership', 'Flexibility of
Action', 'Arab Nationalism', 'Unity of 'Ranks and Aims", 'Non-Alignment',
'Positive Neutrality', 'Anti Colonialism', and 'Revolutionary Socialism'.
4The position her. is by no means Sn. of the relativity of history. Rather, the
point is that there can be no history without a point of view, and every historian
should make his or her own view explicit, To write the history that interests one Is
not to distort or misuse history. To quote Popper: The only way out of this difficulty
is, I believe, consciously to introduce a preconceived selective point of view Into enes
history; that is, to write that history which Interests us. This does not mean that we
twist the facts until they fit Into a framework of preconceived Ideas, or that we may
neglect the facts that do not fit. On the contrary, all available evidence which has a
bearing on our point of view should be considered carefully and objectively...but It
means that we need not worry about all those facts and aspects which have no bearing
upon our point of view and which therefore do not interest us. See Karl Popper, THE
POVERTY OF HISTORICISM, New York : Harper Torchbooks, 1964. p.150.
5For an example of this see Peter Mansfield. NASSER. London : Methuen Educational
Ltd.. 1969.
6The vulgarization of Uie psychoanalytic model and ti overly dogmatic application,
along with the impression that the Freudian approach was inclined to slight situational
variables far too much, has led to its rejection as an inadequate conceptual framework
for contemporary political biography.
7Sidney Hook, THE HERO IN HISTORY. Boston : Boston Press. 1943, p.116.
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3.2 OBJECT FYEi
The following pages wIll attempt to examine end review the political Impact of
Gamal Abdel Nasser on Interacting with Egypt's case history, his rise to power.
end the events that led to his regimes legitimization based on charisma and
foreign policy. The first section of this Chapter Three deals with leadership
efficacy end points of departure. This section examInes the colonial legacy, the
preoccupation with National Independence and the anc/en rI,na, the Free
Officers Movement, The Evacuation Agreement, the Baghdad Pact, Israel end the
Palestine Question.
The second section of this Chapter looks at Nasser's charisma In initiating
various foreign policy moves. The Bandung Conference, the Czech Deal and the
Adoption of Arab Nationalism are discussed. A conclusion attempts to evaluate all
the contents of Chapter Three in terms of Nasser's prestige, stature and political
impact on the Egyptian and Arab peoples.
3.3 t.EAtERSHVP. LESITIMACY AWl) CHARISMA
The quest of legitimacy, according to DaM, Is the process by which a leader
strives for mass acceptability on the bases of some Ideological Justification for
his position of leadership. To the extent that the people accept these ideological
Justifications, the leadership is considered legitimate. At the general level, the
particular strategy that a leader follows to acquire legitimation is usually
determined by his relationship to the prevailing Ideological milieu. 8 Thus en
analysis of the historical conditions and social processes that DIves rise to
charismatic eruptions In the social and political structure must be mentioned.9
See Robert P. DahI, Further Reflections on the EIitist Theory of Democr.cy',
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW. 60. June. 1966. pp.296-395.
9Peter BIau, CrItIcaI Remarks on Webers Theory or Authorlty. AMERICAN
POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW. 57. 1963, pp.305-309.
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Due to its elusive nature, charisma has been given diverse meanings end
interpretations by scholars. 10 At least in one respect Weber's writings can be
cited as a source of ambiguity. In discussing the relative importance end
interaction of the psychological and the social aspects of charismatic authority,
tie emphasized the former, ...a certain quality of en individual personality by
virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men end treated as endowed with
supernatural, superhuman, or at least, specifically, exceptional qualities?11
In this sense, therefore, charisma is a 'gift of grace' that exists 1ndepenoenty
from the social context. Yet Weber went on to recognize the need for the social
acknowledgement of charisma without which the leader's possession of this gift
becomes Insignificant. Although an individual may feel In himself the possession
of gifts of grace, these become relevant only when recognized by others, charisma
Is viewed here as a relationship between leader end follower vis-a-vls the
political and social environment rather than, solely, the personal attribute of the
leader The leader reveals himself through heroic performvws en.d nessia,ic
message. These two components are mutually reinforcing, the leader's
performance may represent the unfolding of his message, or the message may
contain his programme for heroic activity.
The initiation of the charismatic relationship depends on whether the leader's
performance-message fits the crisis situation. If the leader's performance and
messages are not correctly attuned to the cultural ethos and the deeply felt needs
end expectations of the crisis-torn society, the process will not begin. The
leader's performance should be a type that Is regarded as exemplary,
extraordinary, or heroic by the leader's own society. The accompanying message
typically contains a bold prescription to remedy the prevailing crisis situation,
as well as a utopian promise for the future. While attuned to the need's end
10See k.J. Ratnam, Charisma and Political L.adership, POLITICAL STUDIES. XXI.
No.3, September. 1964. pp.341-354; and, Claude Me, CharismaUc Legitimation and
Political lnt.egratlon., COlIPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY, Vol.9. No.).
October, 1966. pp.1-13.
11 Max Weber, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOIIIC ORGANIZATION, Translated by
A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, New York : Oxford University Press. $947.
pp.350-359.
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problems of the existing society, the message includes values and modes of
behaviour significantly different from those in practice. Yet the revolutionary
nature of the message does not preclude the selective Incorporation of certain of
the prevailing values end symbols. In this sense there Is a latent blend end
continuity between the old and the new; the leader may selectively invoke history,
myth, end past heroes to reinforce the sanctity of his mission. To capture a mess
audience, he propagates the highlights of the message In simple end explicit
terms. On the basis of the promises - reinforced by heroic activity - the leader
establishes en initial charismatic bond with the masses.
The personal qualities of the leader constitute another dynamic variable in
promoting the leader-follower Interaction. A leader's possession of exemplary
qualities Is always determined by his society, according to its peculiar
culturally-derived criteria. In terms of his own milieu, the potential
charismatic is an outstanding personality, endowed with great dynamism,
sensitivity, and resourcefulness. These personal gifts become Instrumental in
Imparting to his followers the values end maxims of the message. Judging by
more universal criteria, he is also a revolutionary inclined to take major risks.
The leader proceeds to effect a value transformation on the basis of the legitimacy
flowing from the nascent charismatic relationship. Increasingly, he exercises a
diffuse end Intense Influence over the normative orientations of the masses.
Thus, the leader fills the value -belief vacuum created by the social crisis with
his own belief system or ideology as promulgated in his message. As the new
values, perspectives and policies of the leader find acceptance among the masses,
they can be said to become subject to his charisma and he becomes their
charismatic leader. In view of the reciprocal relationship, the notion that the
charismatic •...Is always the creation of his followers, 12 explains half the
story. It Is necessary to add: to the extent that the leader has succeeded in
12Richard Fagan, Charlsmatic Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Cast,ro, THE
WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY. Vol.18, 1965 pp.275-284.
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imparting Ms value to his followers, they are his creation.
One of the principal criticisms of charlsma is that the term lacks any rigour
and thereby defies analysis. Some social scientists maintain that there must be
operational Indices for Identifying ead measuring the extent of charismatic
appeal. There is much validity to the charge that there are no direct operational
Indices for measuring charisma empirically. Such a situation Is readily admitted
by various scholars. But, just as much as there may be no direct Indices for
measuring charisma empirically, the use of indirect indices such as the
'establishment of the message' can provide a high face plausibility In validating
the presence of charisma. For the purpose of establishing the assertion that
Nasser was a charismatic leader In three senses: Eptian, Anti-Imperialist, end
Arab nationalist, one has emphasized the context or setting within which charisma
operated (the formative years, 1952-1956) together with the message as
reflected In political action. Thus the methr,Jology encompasses triangulalions
and the impressions of people as recorded by the authorities cited. The concept of
triangulation has also been utilized in reference to the various historical events,
e.g., the Baghdad Pact and the creation of Israel. The Suez Crisis of 1956 has
been eschewed to a larger extend because, as pointed out, the crisis bad no
fundamental connection with Suez, the Canal or the Canal company. In a&tition,
the nationalization of the Suez Canal Is linked with the power politics of the
Aswan High Dam, an Issue that 'opens another kettle of fish,' and, is beyond the
scope of this Chapter. What follows Is an Inquiry into the factors that constitute
what one has opted to call the political biography of Oemal Nasser.
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SECTION ONE LEADERSHIP EFFICACY AND POINTS OF DEPARTURE
Historiographers have always contended that every revolution is shaped by the
history of its people and their interpretations of the formative events of their
pest. 13 Egypt, In the middle of the twentieth century, experienced certain
factors that fermented a revolutionary atmosphere; the pressures of
Industrialization, the dislocations of the Second World War coupled with the loss
of the 1948 Palestine War. Thus to the majority of Egyptians, revolution meant
on the one hand, the negation of Egypt's colonial past and, on the other, promise of
political community. 14 Yet, to understand fully the exhilaration of the
revolutionary perIod, 1952-1970, the colonial legacy deserves to be
mentioned. 1
3.4 THE COLONIAL LEGACY AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE
Egypt's colonization can be said to have began with the commercial penetration of
the 19th Century, including direct British occupation, and ended with Egyptian
nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. The domination of the British dates
from 1839, when they intervened effectively to curtail the power of the Albanian
officer Mohammed Mi (1805-1849), the founder of the lest foreign dynasty to
rule over Egyptians. However. It was only In the wake of the successful army
revolt of 1882 by Colonel Ahmed Orebi, the first hero of Egyptian nationalism,
13Nadav Safran, EGYPT IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY : An Analysis of the
intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt, 1604-1952. Cambridge : Harvard
University Press, 1951, Chapter Four. See also Charles Wendell. ThE EVOLUTION OF
ThE EGYPTIAN NATIONAL IMAGE. London : University or California Press. 1972. pp.75-
120.
14Jacques Berque, EGYPT : Imperialism and Revolution, London : Faber and Faber.
1972. Also see James C. Davies, Towards a Theory of Revolutlon, AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol .27, Fob, 1962.
15 The problem of the researcher here is to describe the colonization of Egypt from
the point of view or the nationalist revolutionary. The method used Is that of
situational analysis, as distinguished from that of sympathetic' or 'empathic'
understanding through subjective reenactment. For clarification of the methodological
distinction see, Karl Popper. OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE : An Evolutionary Approach,
Oxrord : Clarendon Press, 1979, p.27.
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that direct British occupation was brought Into being. The year 1919 was one of
nationalist revolt with Saad Zoghloul, a popular nationalist leader, giving voice to
the popular resentment of foreign rule. This continued wave of armed rebellion
end strikes exerted pressure on Britain to unilaterally end Its established
protectorate end Egypt declared en Independent monarchy in 1922.16
actuality this declaration served only to veil the continuance of British powers
that assumed the responsibilities of securing communication, Egyptian defence,
and protection of cepitulatlons. A later 1936 agreement 11 did officially end the
British occupation of Egypt but not the end of various grievances, as Fabumrii
points out:
The humiliating British occupation, the lack of
sufficient political power or Industrial strength, and
Britain's disinclination to treat Egypt as a full
sovereign state...even despite the treaty of 1936, gave
rise to politico-psychological tensions. Egyptian
feelings of Inferiority was expressed In fierce and
aggressive bitterness and ese8
Although events In Egypt were dominated by the British, one widely recognized
failure was In the creation of a genuine political community, I.e. one that
commands allegiance on the basic moral authority for the Individual. Instead,
British rule succeeded In Imposing and stabilizing a colonial authority with the
aid of indigenous allies - the Egyptian (Turko-Albanian) monarchy, the
aristocracy, and occasionally the nationalist WaN Party' 9 - the four main
political forces In the country until the Nasserite revolution of 23 July
P.J. Vatikiotis, ThE MODERN HISTORY OF EGYPT : From Mohammed All to
Mubarak, London Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1905. pp.169-296.
17 1n this year. 1936, the Egyptian army opened its officers corps to some of the
Middle and Lower classes. Nasser was a member of the second entry of such men and
officer cadet it the age of 19 in the Abbaslya Military Academy.
Thin L.A. Fabumnl, ThE SUDAN IN ANGLO EGYPTIAN RELATIONS : A Case Study in
Power Politics, 1800-1956. London : Longman, 1960. p.413. Between 1882 and
1922. Britain declared sixty-six times its intention of withdrawing from Egypt, but
the frequency of their repetition robbed the British words of credence. Quoted from
Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Weni. MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, London : Penguin. 1957. p.36.
19Witness the 4th February 1942 incident when Sir Miles Lampson (later, Lord
Killearn), the British Ambassador forced King Farouk at gun point to recall the pro
British Wafd cabinet to power and to clamp down on other parties that haboured pro
Axis sentiments. This Incident was later to add another bitter coLe in Anglo Egyptian
history. See Miles CopelandTHE GAME OF NATIONS, New York : Simon and Schuster,
1969, p.90.
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1952 .20 Thus, one recognizes in Egypt's history the process of colonization and
its Inevitable result : The rise of nationalist resistance. That recognition
provides orientation for the analysis of the successful nationalist
revolutionaries, The Free Officers and their leader, Oemal Abdel Nasser.21
The foreign domination of Egypt hod some unique characteristics. Large scale
settlement by the British was absent, nor were Egypt's elites totally excluded
from political activity. However, the power to affect crucial decisions regarding
the course of Egypt's history was a monopoly of the British. 22 Nevertheless.
just enough of a taste of political power tantalized the Indigenous elite who were
kept off balance In a position of calculated Inferiority not without racist
overtones. As Albert tiemmi observed. In his classical study of the colonial
experience,: it is remarkable that racism is a part of all colonialism under all
condltlons. 23 British colonialism in Egypt proved no exception with Lord
Cromer, the British pro Consul from 1882 to 1907, best recording the racist
underside of British colonial rule. In his MOOERN ECYPT, 24 Cromer defends
Britain's role In civilizing berbarous Egypt leading one to understand the
cultural amnesia of the colonized Egyptian : better to forget the 'defects' of his
religion, the 'inferiority' of his culture end 'slovenly' of his personality. To
became human, In the eyes of Cromer, was to depart from the barbarism and
cultural wreckage of a 'subject race'. But to go where?, the question begs to be
asked. The Egyptian knew well that to retrieve his personality is not by
assimilation, for by adopting the ways of the colonizer Is to become nothing but a
clever monkey, a good imitator, never the genuine article. In writing MCOERN
EOYPT. Cromer unintentionally reveals the frustration of the colonized: for the
colonized Egyptian, there was no way out except to throw off the yoke of
Imperialism, disillusionment, and press forward to collective salvation.25
20 1om thU., E6YPT. London : Ernest Benn, 1958. pp.112-113.
21 See Anwar El Sadat. REVOLT ON THE NILE. New York : John Day, 1957.
22See Anthony Nutting. NASSER. London : Constable. 1972. See Chapter on the Years
of Subservience.
235 Albert Memmi, PORTRAIT DU COLONISE : Precede dii Portrait dii ColonisaLeur,
Corea : Buchet Chaste, 1957. quoted In Safran, EGYPT, op.cIt.. p.57.
24See Lord Cromer, MODERN EGYPT. Vol.11, London : MacmIllan, 1908. pp.150-174.
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Nationalist revolutionaries, like Nasser In his early life, faced up to the trauma
of colonization and by claiming history as an ally they attempted to shake the
certitude of ruling aliens end undercut their tendency to eternalize the status quo.
Thus, It was the straightforward national cause - Independence from foreign rule
- that moved Egyptians In en earnest and exalted state. 26 As Nasser was to
express to his closest school friend Hassan el Nesher In September 1935:
Today the situation is critical end Egypt is in en
impasse. It seems to me that the country is dying.
Despair Is great. Who can end lt?...W here are the men
reedy to give their lives for the independence of the
country? Where is the man who can build the country
so that the weak and humiliated Egyptian can stand up
again and live free end independent? Where Is
dignity? Where Is nationalism? Where Is the so
celled activity of our youth?...T hey say the Egyptian Is
a coward, that he Is afraid of the slightest sound. He
needs a leader to lead him In the struggle of his
country. By these moans this same Egyptian would
became a thunder clap which would make the walls of
tyranny tremble.
Mustafa kamil (an Egyptian Nationalist) said: if my
heart moves from right to left, If the pyramids move,
If the Nile changes Its course, I shall not change my
principles.
We have said several times that we are geing to work
together to wake the nation from Its sleep, to bring
surging forth the forces hidden within Individuals.
But, alas, so far nothing has been carried out.
My dear fellow, I expect you at my place to discuss
these matters on 4 September, 1935 at four In the
afternoon. I hope you won't fail to come.27
25 See Ahmed Abdallah, THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AND NATIONAL POLITICS IN EGYPT.
1923-1973, London : Al Saqi Books, 1965.
A similar point Is reflected in Gamal Abdel Nasser. ThE PHILOSOPHY OF ThE
REVOLUTION, as he later summed up the political activities or Egyptians In terms of
'positive action' which was later subject to revlsion: At a certain phase of my life,
'positive action' meant enthusiasm. But I later came to realize that I ought not to be
alone In that enthusiasm. To be effective. It had to be communicated to others. I was
then a student at the El NAHD4 school (fittingly the reawakening), leading many
demonstrations in those days. shouting myself hoarse, followed by other fellow
students. In our insistent demand for complete independence. But it was to no avail -
our cries dud Into faint echos that mov.d no mountains and blasted no rocks. Thin I
came to believe that 'positive action' could be found in the solidarity and agreement of
all leaders of the nation. So our rebellious, roaring ranks went around visiting these
leaders In their homes, calling on them, In the name of Egypt's youth, to agree en
concerted actlon... (Washington : Public Affairs Press, 1955, p.3 1.)
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Thus, for the occupied Egyptian en understanding of the origins end consequences
of British rule was crucial, since they faced a situation for which their
traditional culture provided little orientation. To understand the Egyptian
nationalist revolutionary one must grapple with Cramer's Egypt: a new 'exotic',
end profoundly disorienting Si tuetlon, as depicted by Nasser's experience:
The truth, however, Is I did not feel at ease within
myself...l had within me a feeling of distraction which
was a mixture of complex end intermingling factors: of
patriotism, religion, compassion, cruelty, faith,
suspicion, knowledge and Ignorance.28
The full Implication of this was that behaviour could no longer reliably be guided
by traditional patterns. The Egyptian culture no longer existed: It had been
shattered by the process of British colonization. The domination of a global
multifaceted Western expansion made the Egyptian nationalist recognize that real
power lay outside the national boundaries end that Egypt had been drawn into a
global web of Western economic and political forces beyond Its control.29
History else revealed to the Egyptian that national resistance had been crushed by
British power. Equally Important was history's confirmation of the colonial
situation as an objectively verifiable reality characterized not only by the
damming of nationalist aspirations but also the destruction of Egypt's past.
Finally, history revealed to the colonized Egyptian that resistance was part of his
legacy end the only way to be rescued from the racism of colonial rule. 3° The
call for revolution was Increasingly heard as 'the logic of the situation' was seen
as a need for 'repossession of the world' end that 'cell for Its remaking' led to a
multiplicity of nationalist orientation reformist Islam - symbolized by the
Moslem Brotherhood (/khwan). 31 liberal nationalism - symbolized by the
27As quoted in Robert Stephens NASSER : A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. London : Allen
Lane. The Penguin Press. 1971. p.35.
28 Quoted from Derek Hopwood, EGYPT : Politics and Society. 1945-1984. London
Allen & Unwin, 1985. p.35.
2'Pet.er Mansfield, THE BRITISH IN EGYPT. London : Weidenreld and Nicoison, 1971,
p.49.
30See P.11. Holt. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN EGYPT. London : School of
Oriental and African SLudies, 1967. pp.136-161.
31 See Richard P. MItchell. SOCIETY OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERS. London : Oxford
125
Weld, 32 NatIonal Socialism symbolized by the Young Egypt Party (Mist el
Ta/at) nd the various communist parties. From the wide array of
contenders for the nationalist mantle it was the Free Officers led by Gemal Abdel
Nasser that ultimately destroyed the monarchy end eliminated the colonial
presence.34 It was from their coup d'etat of July 1952 that the Instruments
were forged to make possible a real break with the colonial pesi And it was
Nasser who led the Egyptian people at Suez In 1956. when the colonial legacy was
at last repudiated. The Free Officers, In effect, added a new dimension to the
Egyptian political structure and became the rallying point for most opposition
groups. They, as other groups had, regarded Independence as a prerequisite to
reform and pledged that:
Among the objectives of the Free Officers In the
launching of a campaign against corruption In all Its
aspects, against bribery, favouritism and abuse of
Influence. But we should not combat such evils unless
we are completely freed from imperialism. Any other
step would be tantamount to an unpardonable treachery
to the fatherland.35
University Press, 1969; ChrIstina Phelps Harris. NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION IN
EGYPT : The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Hague : Mouton. 1964. and Hassan .1
Banns, COLLECTION OF THE LETTERS OF ThE MARTYR IMMAM HASSAN EL BANNA (In
Arabic) Beirut : Dir at Andalus, 1965.
3 See Jacob M. Landau. PARLIAMENTS AND PARTIES IN EGYPT. Tel Aviv : Israel
Publishing House, 1953, pp.54-89.
33See James P. Jankowskl, E6YPS YOUNG REBELS : Young Egypt',1933-52,
Standford : Hoover Institution Press. 1975.
On the military coup d'etat of July 1952 which overthrew the monarchy and the
ancien regime, see Rushed ci Barawy. ThE MILITARY COUP IN EGYPT : An Analytic
Study. Cairo : Renaissance Bookstore. 1952; Jean and Simmone Lacouture, EGYPT IN
TRANSITION. London : Methuen, 1979; Jean Lacouture, NASSER : A Biography, U.S.A.
Alfred Knopt, Inc.. 1973; P4. Vatikiotis. NASSER AND HIS GENERATION, London
Croom Helm. 1978; P4. Vatikiotls, THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS : Pattern for New
Nations?, Bloomington : Indiana UniversIty Press, 1961; Anwar Abdel tialik, EGYPT :
MilItary Society. Translated by Charles L. Plarkhann. New York : Random House, 1968.
3 Ouoted from El Barawy. MILITARY COUP. o p .cit., p.200. See also T. Cayier Young.
The CrisIs In the Near East, SOCIAL FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ed. Sydney
NetUeLon Fisher. Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1955. p.253.
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3.5 THE FREE OFFICERS MOVEMENT (Al2ubøt pF,dJ)p4)36
As was stated previously, In responding to nationalist revulsion against the
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. the then Wafd government liberalized the
admission policy of the Military Aemy, opening the doors of the Aemy to
native Egyptian youth, regardless of family background, social class, or economic
status.31 Eighteen months later, a new class of twenty year old lieutenants
graduated. Of the eleven men who composed the founding committee of the Free
Officer group in late 1949, eight entered the Academy in 1936. These were
Lieutenant Colonel 6amal Abdel Nasser. Major Abdel Hekim Amer. Wing
commander Abdel Latif El Boghdadl, Lieutenant Colonel Anwar (1 Sadat, Lieutenant
Colonel Husein Shefel, Lieutenant Colonel Zakariayya Mohieddin, and Major Salah
Salem . Major Kernel Al Din Husein and squadron leader Hassan Ibrehim, also
members of the founding committee were graduated from the Military Academy a
year later in 1939. Another member, Major Khaled Mohieddin, graduated In
1940. FIve of the Free Officers group were born In 1918. two In 1917. and one
each In 1920. 1921, and 1922. The average of the members of the Revolution
Council in 1952 was thirty three years. Only three of them had higher education
other than military training. With one exception all had seen active service in
the Palestine War.38 Excluding General Muhammad Noguib. the figurehead of the
36 A prediction or revolution for Egypt at mid century would have required no great
prescience. As Shiekh Ilustafa Abdel Razek said In AprIl 1946, Two generations •f
young men, whom we do not know, are now growing u p . They will change the face of
Egypt. Quoted in Lacouture, NASSER. •p.clt., p.125. But, to have predicted that a
coup d'etat by a band of military conspirators would have been an extraordinary
accomplishment. After the July coup, an Impression of inevitability was created and
largely accepted by both hostile end sympathetic Western observers. However, the
regime's own myth that the Free Officer rule was the necessary outcome of the
complex sequence of events involving the rise of nationalist resistance and the
disintegration of the old order Is misleading, since It makes it difficult to accurately
assess the Free Officers Movement. One contends that an unvarnished view of their
origins and their earlier struggles for power is crucial for the understanding of their
development from an unknown secret society to Egypts ruling elite. A sense of
historical contingency, centering around Gamal Abdel Nasser, goes hand In hand with
the analysis of the Free Officers movement.
37See footnote 17.
36See Jean Lacouture, NASSER : A Biography, U.S.A. : Alfred tnopf, inc., 1973; Also
see Nassers Memoirs of the First Palestine War. translated by Walld thalidi,
JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES. Winter, 1973, Vol.11, No.2.
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1952 RevolutIon, all had been Involved in some kind of political activity earlier
in their careers. Most of these officers were of humble beginning, from all parts
of Egypt. Their fathers end grandfathers were peasant farmers, small owners, or
minor officials. However, outside the core group, one finds other adherents to the
Free Officers movements of aristocratic background and comfortable economic
status. Such, for example, were wing Commander All Sabri end his brother Hesan
Sabri. The same Is true of Colonel Serwet Okesha.39
Secondary schooling during the early thirties meant constant contact with the
pre-1936 agitation directed against the British, end also over Palestine and the
Suez Canal. Student political activities of those days were under the influence of
the ultra nationalist Wafd. Moreover, these young men attended the Military
Academy during the period of an all-nationalist government. During the Second
World War, they witnessed the greatest concentration of British troops ever seen
In the Middle East, and found their duties limited by the British, who were wary
of them.40 Some of them even hoped for an Axis victory as a short cut to the
fulfilment of national aspirations.41 Many of them were Impressed by the
mobilization capability of Europe's Fascist military state and derided the
hardships that laced the democracies of the era. Ironically, those who attended
staff college were introduced by British instructors to the systematic study of
political history of the Middle East. It is reported that British instructors of the
Staff College stated that Gamel Abdel Nasser, Anwar El Sadat, Zakariayye
Muheiddin and Abdel Hakim Amer were exceptional and highly motivated students
with a genuine Interest in social reform. 42 It is also observed that political
education of Gamal Abdel Nasser was most Intense and thus merits some mention.
El Barawy, MILITARY COUP. .p.cit., pp.69-74.
40See Anwar El Sadat, REVOLT ON THE NILE. New York : John Day. 1957.
41(1 Sadat was later to cooperate with two Nazi spies during W W.II. See (1 Sadat,
REVOLT ON THE NILE, op.clt., and his SEARCH FOR IDENTITY, New York: Harper & Row,
1977.
42tacouture, E6YPT IN TRANSITION. op.ciL, see the Chapter on A Short History .t
the Tree Orrlcers. pp.96-106.
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Contrary to popular belief, Gemel Abdel Ilasser was not born In Benni Murr of
Asslut Province, but In the city of Alexandria. 43 Although his father, Abdel
Nasser Hussein, In his capacity as en assistant postmaster 1 was frequently
transferred from one place to another, It was In Alexandria end Cairo - the two
cities of Egypt - that Nasser received his primary, secondary, end military
education. He was exposed •t en early age to both sides of the Egyptian
environment: Upper Egypt ln the Said, end Lower Egypt, or the Delta region, In al
Beheira where he began his schooling In the Khatatiba primary school. The
remainder of his elementary schooling was completed In Alexandria end Cairo.
His secondary schooling began In Heiwan, outside Cairo, continued in the Ras el
Tin secondary school in Cairo in 1936. The location of the schools Nasser
attended at an early influenced his political orientation. it is well known
among Egyptians that the Nanda School in Cairo was always in the forefront of
political demonstrations.44
Political demonstrations were commonplace among Egyptian secondary school
students In the thirties. Nasser's experience In this regard began in Alexandria
and continued through 1936 in Cairo. The perIod 1930-35 was one In which the
constitution was abolished, parliaments suspended, and rule was by royal decree.
The Wafd, which was still the party of the masses, was able to rally most of the
students In demonstrations against Ismeel Sidky's government In 1930, and
against succeeding governments, until the Wafd returned to power In 1936. It Is
almost certain that Nasser was at the time a Wefd sympathizer, If not a follower.
His attachment to the cause of the party was perhaps strengthened a year later
when the Wafd made it possible for him, as well as other secondary school
graduates, to enter the Military Academy. His first application for admission to
the Academy, Immediately upon graduation from secondary school In June 1936,
was turned down. He proceeded to enroll in the College el Law In Cairo. where he
spent five months between October 1936 and February 1937 5 later, he re-
43Compare, Stephens, NASSER, •p.clt., p.12; Lacouture, NASSER,, op.clt., p.24; St.
John, THE BOSS. op.cIL, p.44.
MansfIeId, NASSER. op.cIt., p.84.
P.J. VatikioUs, NASSER AND HIS 6ENERATION, London : Croom Helm. 1976. pp.83.
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applied for admission to the Academy and was accepted.
Other events influenced the development of Nasser's political career. Graduating
as a Second Lieutenant from the Military In 1938. he was posted with a line
Infantry outfit In Mankabod. Asslut province, In Upper Egypt. His promotion was
rather fast. He reached the rank of Captain In September 1943, at the same time
receiving an appointment as instructor In the Military Academy. All this
occurred soon after an event that left a deep impression on many Egyptians: the
Palace Incident in February 1942, when a British ultimatum to king Farouk
supported by tanks led to a change of government.46
Thus, to recapitulate briefly what has been said, for Oemal Abdel Nasser, early
school life was spent mixing study with militant activity end demonstrating both
against the British presence end Egyptian politicians. He was exposed to all
political currents of the time, including the Wafd, Young Egypt, and the National
Party. He felt personally and with adolescent Intensity the problems of Egypt,
perhaps more Intensely then his fellows. He called these days 'feverish' and a
period of boiling over. As he wrote In THE PHILOSOPHY THE REYOU./T/ON:
lhe present situation is crlticel...we are just about to bid life farewell and meet
death. Despair Is a solid structure; end who Is to demolish It? 7 A serious
youth, known by his lecturers as 'extraordinarily mature for his age', he began to
Internalise Egypt's problems, following the pattern of those future leaders who
seem to bear within themselves all the problems of their society. He was also
searching for a pattern for his own life. Reaching adolescence and adulthood he
was attracted to the discipline and the study of military life and gained quick
promotion. He was later to write throughout my life I had faith In
milltarism. 48 Having graduated from the Abbasly. Military Academy, he was
StJohn, THE BOSS. .p.cIt., p.61.
47Quoted from p.47.
Nasser, ThE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION, •p.cit., p.20. Anthony Eden, in a
letter of reply to Marshall Bulganin on 17 September 1956 distorted this reference as
evidence of Nassers self confessed addiction to mIlIt.arism. Anthony Eden, FULL
CIRCLE. Boston : Houghton, Mifflin & C.., 1960, p.487.
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posted to Mankebed in Upper Egypt where he met Abdel Hekim Amer. Zakeriayya
Muhle&lin, end Anwar El Sadat. Sadat was later to depict an Insightful picture of
Nasser:
fly Impression was that he was a serious minded youth
who did not share his fellows' interest in Jesting; nor
would he allow anyone to be frivolous with him as
this, he felt, would be an Insult to his dignity. Most
of my colleagues, therefore, kept their distance from
him....he had obviously erected en almost Insuperable
barrier between himself and other people.49
By this time, Oemal Abdel Nasser had certain definite political elms. No doubt.
like many other young Egyptians, he felt humiliation over the easy compliance of
his government with British dictation. He was aware, too, of the economic end
social backwardness of Egypt. Evidence of this is found in Sedat1s REYT OF TIlE
NILE. as well as Nasser's statement.
Nasser's sophistication In politics began with his attendance of Staff and Command
College between 1945 end 1948. followed by his appointment as Instructor in the
Army Administration School in July 1949. Between these assignments, he had
seen duty in the Palestine Campaign, including a difficult siege at Fafluja. By the
time he was assigned to the Staff College as Instructor In November 1951 • his
political ideas had taken definite shape. end plans for revolutionary action hod
already taken the form of the Free Officers movement. Nowhere in Nasser's
activity prior to the Coup of July 23. 1952 is there any suggestion of rash
behaviour. With the exception of his own admissions of complicity in the
attempted assassination of a prominent political figure. whIch, according to the
PIIILO.5OPIIYOF Il/EREVOL UT/ON, he later regretted, there is no known instance
In which Nasser engaged In unpremeditated acts of violence. Although intensely
political. Nasser must, contrary to the common view, be considered cautious.
deliberate and calculating.50
4 Sadat. ThE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY. ,p.cit., p.114.
50Some authors have dwelled on this aspect and come La the conclusion that to Nasser
everything was a conspiracy shrouded i deep mystery. They seek La explain his flair
for intrigue. See Vatikiotis NASSER AND HIS GENERATION. op.clt.. p.210; St. John,
THE BOSS. op.ciL. p.83.
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II one was to analyze in detail the background of every officer active In the Free
Officers novement one would find at least one common factor behind their
Involvement in politics: frustration with an autocratic regime which could not
handle the question of Anglo-Egyptian relations and, worse still, betrayed the
army in battle. A corollary force affecting their political behaviour was
Identification of the ruling institution as en evil to be dispelled like the foreign
occupying power. Further reasons for the political concern of this army officer
group emerge from an examination of how and when the Free Officers group was
organized. Recruitment techniques for membership In the group are also
revealing. One might accept one or more eunts of the formation of the Free
Officers group as given by some of the founding members themselves. Anwar El
Sadat, In his account, talks of two branches organized within the movement; one
military under the command of 6amal Abdel Nasser, the other civilian under his
own command. Infiltration of army commands end secret recruitment of
sympathetic officers had, according to EJ Sadaf, brougifl Jnembershjp by 1947 to
the number one thousand.51
In his E6YPT, Tom Little accepts Sadat's account, but other analysts speculate
that between 1 941 and 1949 there was no organized group of Free Officers.
Rather, many of the Free Officers operated Independently of each other,
collaborating, infiltrating army personnel and spreading their message, which
was then vague, for many of the officers continued to adhere or belong to one or
other of the organized political groups, such as tlisr el Fatat. The Muslim
Brethen, and the Communist party.52
Any cohesion among these officers was based until 1949 entirely on their
personal relations end contacts. There was a nucleus of officers who were
contemporaries in the Military Academy and Staff College. many of whom served
51 E1 Sadat, IN SEARCH OF IDENTITY. op.clt, p.114. For a sharply contradictory
account on the role of Sadat, see Mohammed Helkal, AUTUMN OF FURY, London : Andre
Deutsch, 1983. p.42.
52 Vatlklotis, THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS, op.clL., pp.64-66.
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together in various commends and capacities. One hears end reeds about relations
between Nasser, El Sadat, end Zekarieyya Muhieddin In hankebed on their first
army post assignment. Similar relationships and close friendships between
Nasser and Abdel Hakim Amer developed while both were serving In the Sudan.
Naturally, these were strengthened during the Palestine War. It was the war In
Palestine which decisively placed the Free Officers on course toward revolution.
Nasser was a commanding officer of a unit of the Egyptian Army which moved into
Palestine. He was immediately dismayed by the Inefficiency and the lack of
preparation of the Egyptians who were fighting against greatly Inferior numbers.
The slaughter distressed him and he himself was wounded In the chest. In the
battle for the Negev Desert which began in October 1948 Nasser and his unit were
trapped at Falluja near Beersheba and, together with several other Free Officers.
held out against Israeli forces end were eventually able to counter-attack. In
retrospect, he saw this episode as a symbol of a determination to pursue the real
fight against all those forces which oppressed Egypt. As he later wrote We were
fighting in Palestine but our dreams were In Egypr.53 He was also noted to have
been deeply moved by the words of a dying colleague: The real battle is in
Egypt".54 However, It would be hasty to presume any ideological cohesion
between these men in their early contacts, or any collective conspiracy based on
neatly organized plans for revolutionary action. Not all of the Free Officers
acquired political aspirations - even views - by way of revolutionary activity,
edherence to, or affiliation with one or another of the existing political and
religious groups. Many of them may well have been 'converted' politically by
their colleagues over a long period, during which they maintained contact with
one another.
The activities of the Free Officers In 1950 and during most of 1951 were
confined to, firstly, the publishing and circulating of pamphlets - attacking
government officials end the King - among members of the armed forces as well as
students and other civilian groups, secondly, efforts to infiltrate army commands
See Nasser, E6YPS LIBERATION. sp.cit., p.82.
5 See Nasser, "Nasser's Memoirs of the First Palestine War". op.cit., p.19.
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for the recruitment of members. Non-member sympathizers were sought among
civilian groups opposed to the status quo. The committee also enlisted the support
of opposition journalists who, In 1950 and 1951, were conducting a vigorous
press campaign against the King. Through these journalists the Free Officers
were able to air their grievances. Rashed El Barawy In THE fl/I/TART COUP IN
ECYPT states that as early as 1945 a group of officers Issued secret circulations
under the general heading, 'The Army Oives a Warnlng, signed the Free
Officers. These circulers were allegedly concerned with evacuation of British
troops from Egyptian soil and demanded vigorous action by the Egyptian
government to achieve this end.55
Within the army the Society of Free Officers used the cell system. A cell
consisted of not more than five to ten members with the link between these cells
being In the hands of Nasser. An intelligence network was possible because
members of the Executive were placed in staff positions close to the Army High
Command; Major Saleh Salem, for example, had access to the office of the Chief of
Staff, whereas Lieutenant Colonel El Sodat managed a contact with the Palace
through the King's private physician.56
Circumstances during this period have led some analysts to doubt the authenticity
of the Free Officers and conclude that the military never occupied a vanguard role
In the nationalist movement. This Is recognized by Nasser and other Free Officers
but, despite the fact that the Egyptian military as an Institution had forfeited its
Identification with the nationalist Inclination, men of highly nationalist
orientation did undertake military careers. Available biographical data on the
men who played a central role In the revolution suggest that their nationalist
orientation had already been formed before joining the military. 51 The
Palestine experience convinced Nasser and his associates that the King and his
EI Barawy. MILITARY COUP. op.cit.. p.3 12.
See EU Sadat, REVOLT ON ThE NILE, op.ctt.. p.87.
57 Abdel Latir Al Boghdadls, MEMOIRS. Part 1 and 2, (In Arabic), Cairo : Al Makt.ab al
tlIsrI al HadIth, 1977.
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government were not interested In the notion or army's welfare. Thus the Free
Officers were equating national liberation with the destruction of the anc/an
rag/ma. It Is postulated that Nasser at the time had seriously accepted the idea
that the army should lead In bringing political end social change. The assumption
of a political role for themselves was nevertheless encouraged by the fact that In
neighbouring Arab states army officers were replacing traditional civilian
leadership on the grounds of treason, incompetence and unrepresentativeness. It
has been suggested by students of Arab politics that a career in the army was an
avenue to bringing about sociopolitical end economic changes. Plajid Khoddurl in
his INDEPENDENT IRAO argues this role for officers In Middle Eastern
Armies.56
The fact that Ideological persuasions of the young men who coalesced around
Nasser covered the full range of political thought from right to left, from Moslem
fundamentalism to Marxism, Impelled Nasser to minimize these differences
probably due to the exigencies of conspiracy. With great skill he maintained the
unity of the core participants by avoiding discussion of the kind of society the
Free Officers eventually would build. Attention was riveted instead on the
Immediate task of consummating the revolution. Ideological differences were
submerged In en emotionally powerful nationalism, which evoked the shared
dream of an Egyptian Independence and sovereignty. Thus ft was Nasser's
appreciation of the clear cut military hierarchies which Induced him to reason
that, In a revolutionary situation, the military could be en important
organizational weapon:
The situation demanded the existence of a force set In
one cohesive framework, far removed from the
conflict between Individuals and classes, and drawn
from the heart of the people. A force composed of men
able to trust each other; a force with enough material
strength as its disposal to guarantee a swift and
decisive action. The conditions could be met by the
Army only.59
See Plajid Khadduri, INDEPENDENT IRAQ. in his chapter The Army Officer : His Role
in Middle Eastern PoIltics, London : Oxtord University Press, 1951. pp.71-82.
Quoted from St. John, ThE BOSS. op.cit, p.36.
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Post- 1952 Egyptian analysts have tended to draw parallels between Gamal Abdel
Nasser In 1952 and Ahmad Orebi Pasha In 1882. Nasser. like Orabi, rallied
native Egyptian army officers against those persons Identified with the ruling
Institution or monarch. Both men prefaced their movements with a demand for
reform In the military establishment. Orabi sought the Ministry of War for
himself, whereas the Free Officers seventy years later sought appointment of a
senior ranking officer, General Muhammed Naguib, acceptable to them. Both
Nasser and Orabi were 'underdogs', men derived from the people. There is,
however, a sharp distinction, advantageous to Nasser, which Orabi could not have
hoped for In his time: the Egyptian army after seventy years had achieved a
greater degree of Egyptianization. The political experience of Army officers In
1952 was derived from thirty years of Intense Egyptian nationalism, culminating
in their participation in an all Arab national struggle for Palestine in 1948 and
1949. The Orabi Revolt In 1887 was not bound up with the aspirations of a
sophisticated Egyptian nationalist class, as was Nasser's Free Officer's movement.
Thus, the Free Officers saw themselves as virsdicators of the promise of Egypt's
nationalist movement. That claim was challenged, by the Muslim Brethen among
others. Yet through their efforts to destroy Egypt's colonial dependency, Nasser
and the Free Officers did give new meaning to a history that for the majority had
became meaningless. By seizing power and using It to destroy the material and
cultural structures of colonial domination, they placed the revolutionary
transformation of Egypt and the redefinition of Its roles In global politics on the
historical agenda. The coup d'etat moved towards revolution. The process of
building an authentic political community was at lest begun. Egypt's
revolutionaries aimed to transform their society, and that transformation was
Itself part of the global drama of decolonization and national renaissance. Within
a concretely defined historical situation, the meaning of Nasser's actions must be
understood within the links between leadership, charisma, power and Ideas.
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The official mythology of Nasser end the Free Officers was that, once they had
conceptualized their purported role as that of a vanguard, i.e. sweeping away the
cien rt.e. they would step aside allowing the Egyptian people to take
command of their destiny. However, as It turned out, reality dashed his hopes as
the Free Officers were 'compelled' by circumstances to retain the reins of power.
It was this notion of Nasser as a 'reluctant dictator' that gained credence
evidenced by, firstly, the absence of a Free Officers blueprint for the new society
end, ndly, Nasser's early avoidance of publicity. Furthermore, Nasser
established the argument:
I ordered that no name be given any publicity except
that of Neguib's. I wanted all the light cast on him. I
gave this order principally to avoid a split In the Free
Officers. We were all of us either thirty two, thirty-
three, or thirty-four years old, except Khaled
Moheiddin, who was a little younger. We were all
equal in rank. I know how the British and our
Internal enemies would try to pit us one against the
other, If we gave them a chance. But If we had the
sense to let an older man like Naguib be the
figurehead, we could retain our unity.60
Seen In this light, the evidence leads to the view that the Free Officers Intended to
wield decisive power, but to wield It directly end, In the same spirit, Nasser
claimed that:
For a long time It Ithe vanguard of Free Officers]
waited. Crowds did eventually come, and they come In
endless droves - but how different Is the reality from
the dream. The masses that came were disunited,
divided groups of stragglers. The sacred advance
toward the great objective was stalled, end the picture
that emerged that day looked dark and ominous; it bode
danger. At this moment I felt with sorrow and
bitterness, that the task of the vanguard, far from
being completed, had only began.6'
Henceforth, to complete the Nasser-Orabi parallel : Nasser took his experience
from the failures of his forerunners, concluding from Orabi that the army must
John, THE BOSS. op.clt., Chapter 9. pp.98-99.
61 Nasser, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOlUTION, op.cIL, pp.33-34.
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be truly national, from Mustafa kernel that words were not enough, end from the
experience of the 1919 rebellion that there was nothing so treacherous to his
cause as the Egyptian ruling class.62
3.6 THE ARMY MOVEMENT AND THE PRIORITY OF EGYPT'S INDEPENDENCE
In EOYPTS I hERA 1/ON .111E PHIL CSWWY 1/fE REV( UT/mv • Nasser reiterated
that eny stuct of the struggles of [the Egyptian] people...would discover that the
Revolution [Army Movement] of July 23rd marks the realization of the hope held
by the people of Egypt...of self government and complete sovereignty.63
Surprisingly, although the stalemate In Anglo-Egyptian negotiations had
preoccupied the old regime and hod been one factor precipitating the army
movement, the proclamations of Oenerel Headquarters and the personal statements
of Noguib were relatively casual regarding this issue.64 Only slight reference
to Egypt's foreign relations was made in connection with the aiciwi r/e In an
attempt to strip It of any virtue In the eyes of Egyptian end world public opinion.
The omission reflected the temporary Indifference of Egyptians, who had been
preoccupied with the internal plight of the country during the few months of the
ancien rqiwe end who were weary of so many promises of Independence for
Egypt. 65 The army officers silence reflected fear of British intervention, a fear
mode more vivid by the psychological Impact of the presence of British troops In
the Canal Zone base. Thus, the army officers emphasized Internal reform and
refrained from any official action that might Incite foreign residents to seek the
protection of foreign powers.66
Tom Little. MODERN E6YPT, London : Ernest Benn LImited, p.142. See also, ibrahim
Abu-Lughod, The Transformation of the Egyptian Elite : Prelude to the Urabl Revolt,
THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XXI. No.3. Summer, 1967. pp.325-44.
63Quoted from p.18.
64E1 Barawy MILITARY COUP, op.cIt., pp.54, 207-209.
65VatIkiotis. THE EGYPTIAN ARIIY IN POLITICS. op.clt.. pp.40-41.
66E1 Barawy. MILITARY COUP. op.cIL., pp.35-36.
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Since the avowed causes and objectives of Nasser end the Free Officers movement
were primarily domestic problems, it might appear Irrelevant to have chosen the
above mentioned themes to Illustrate Nasser's role dynamics as the subject of this
Chapter. To the contrary, It Is the shift from the preoccupation with Egypt's
Independence to concern with Egypt's external problems that constituted the
fundamental 'elevation' of Nasser from a mere national leader to a household name
In the Arab, African and Asian circles. In addition to this shift, It was the
conduct of Nasser's foreign policy end his achievements of international stature
rather than the implementation of internal reform that made other's recognize the
charismatic dimension of his leadership.
In his proclamation as the leader of the Army movement, Nasser put the
responsibility for the deterioration of Egypt's internal conditions end external
relations squarely on the shoulders of the anciov, regime. Later he considered
such deterioration Impossible without the support of Egypt's political parties and
blamed the conditions on them instead. Nasser went so far as to state that the
removal of the ex-King was not our primary objective - which could have
belittled the Idea of a revolution - our main objective is to Install a sound
governmental system to replace the corrupt one. 61 The ancien regime could
not have operated without the cooperation or the acquiescence of the politicians of
the old regime. in fact, many old regime politicians68 shared In the inc/rn,
regi.we's deeds, which were, to some extent, a reflection of the abnormal
conditions69 In Egypt more than the weakness end corruption of the politicians
Involved.
The army and the civilian agencies were purged. 1° in the meantime, the
67lranslated from 6amal Abdel Nasser, KHUTUB AL RAIS JAMAL ABD AL NASIR
(Speeches of President 6amal Abdel Nasser) 3 Vets.. Cairo : IlaLabia tiajils ci
Khadamat., Vol.1, p.34. see also p.43.
68Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.clt.. p.34, El Barawy, MILITARY COUP. op.clt.,
p.106.
690 Barawy, MILITARY COUP, op.cIL., p.128.
70EI Berawy, MILITARY COUP. op.cIt., pp.212-2t4. N.guib, EGYPT'S DESTINY,
op.cit., p.138. See the adverse Impact in Walter P. Sharp, Bureaucracy and Politics -
Egyptian Moder in TOWARDS THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,
139
government fixed lower prices for essential commodities end home rentals and
took other public welfare measures. 7 ' But the Army Movement objectives
which had been most strongly emphasized In the proclamations were restoratlon
of sound constitutional life end exerclse of true parliamentary life.
Plasser explained that when the army officers carrled out this revolution they
never thought to rule, or lead; [their] first object was to restore the true
constitutional life. He even went so for as to state that ...their first Intent was
restoration of the dissolved parliament. 72 This would have meant the return of
the Wafd majority. On another occasion Nasser qualified the meaning of this
promise by stating that the army stipulated as prerequisite for the reconvening of
the dissolved parliament that the Wafd party carry out agrarian reform and
eliminate the capitalists' monopolistic Influence on government so that the
poverty stricken masses would be relieved from exploitation by the wealthy.73
Discontent from most groups, 14 disturbances, and disagreement on these Issues
eventually precipitated Mohammed Neguib's taking over of the premiership.75
Mohammed Naguib's first step as Premier was to Issue the decree 76 of agrarian
reform71 which, to the army officers, was tantamount to an Ideology. 78 His
ed., William J. Sitfin. Bloomington : IndIana University Press. 1957. p.160.
71 N.gulb, E6YPS DESTINY. •p.clt., p.140; El Barawy, MILITARY COUP. •p.cit.,
pp .242-45.
72Translated from Nasser, KHUTUB AL RAIS. I. December. 20. 1953. pp.163-64.
This promise was reiterated on April 12. 1954. Ibid., pp. 196-200. See also Naguib,
EGYPT'S DESTINY. op.cit., p.136.
73Doreen Warriner. LAND REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT IN ThE MIDDLE EAST : A Study
of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq . London : Royal Institute of international Affairs, 1957. pp.
10-15; El Barawy, MILITARY COUP, op.clt., pp.62-84. 212-13.
74Nagutb, E6YPS DESTINY. op.cit., pp. 145, 148-51. 153-54.
75Ibid.. pp.145-66; El Barawy. MILITARY COUP. •p.cIL, pp.27-28; Nasser. KHUTUB
AL RAIS. I, pp .164. 200-01. Contrast with WaiLer Z. Laqueur, NASSER'S EGYPT.
London : Wiedenfeld & Nlcolson, 1957. p.5.
76For the constitutionality of the decrees and approval of the state Council. see
Jacob 11. Landau, PARLIAMENTS AND PARTIES IN EGYPT. Tel Aviv : Israel Publishing
House, 1953.
17 Up to the time of 1955. an area of 250,000 acres had been distributed to 69.000
famIlIes, comprising about 415,000 persons... out of a population of 22 mlflion.
Quoted from Warriner, LAND REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. op.clt.,
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second major step was Issuance of regulations for the reorganization of political
parties.79
The reorganization and purge of the political parties developed into a prolonged
attack against some of the loaders of the Wafd and other parties rather than being
focused on the reform of party programmes. 8° The Free Officers were
determined to disarm the political parties of any legal and constitutional basis for
renewal of their activities. On December 9, 1952. Mohammed Naguib abrogated
the Constitution of 1923 and appointed a committee of fifty members with a wide
range of representation 81 to draft a new constitution to be submitted to public
referendum• The problem of licensing political parties ended on January 16,
1953, when all parties, except the Muslim Brotherhood which claimed to be a
religious society not a political party, were banned.
Next, a transitional period of three years to prepare the citizenry for a
democratic life was declared, and a provisional constitution was proclaimed.82
The Command Council, composed of those officers who were the founding members
of the Free Officers, was renamed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and
became the actual governing body of Egypt. 83 The cabinet was to become
responsible to ft rather than to the people. The provisional constitution Invested
In •the council of the revolution and the council of ministers...(the Power) to
consider the general policy of the state and...to supervise the work of individual
ministers. 84 The voting procedure within the RCC and the inclusion of most of
p.35. See also pp.31-49. elth Wheelock, NASSERS NEW E6YP : A Critical Analysis.
New York : Praeger, 1960. p.77. Contrast, the above with Liqueur. EGYPT IN
TRANSITION. op.cIL., pp.5-15.
78WarrIner, LAND REFORI1. op.ciL. p.10.
79NaguIb, E6YPrS DESTINY. op.cIt.. p.151.
801b1d., pp.152-153.
81 Nasser, E6YPFS LIBERATION. op.clt.. p.77. For the legality •r this move. see
Landau. PARLIAMENTS AND PARTIES IN EGYPT. op.clt.. p.191; Vatikiotis, THE
EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS, op.cit.. p.82.
82Th. provisional constitution Is citad in Naguib. EGYPTS DESTINY, .p.cIt., pp.155-
66.
Articles Vil-IX of the provisional constitution in IbId.. p.166.
141
Nasser's supporters In It assured Nasser's control of It. Appointment of other
loyal army officers to higher Civil Service Jobs assured the RCC control of
governmental machinery end implementation of new regime policies.
On flay 5, 1953, the committee of fifty, which had been chosen to draft a new
constitution, recommended a republican type of government for Egypt. Without
submitting the committee's recommendation for public referendum the new
regime approved the recommendation on June 17 and abolished the monarchy.85
On the following day Egypt was proclaimed a republic, and Mohammed Naguib was
declared provisional President for the duration of the transition period. At the
same time he retained the post of Prime Minister. Thus, within a year, all
aspects of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary life come to an official end
- the subjects were even omitted from public school curriculum 86 - and the
new regime actually became military 67 and absolute in character.68
The alliance of the officers with the well organized and well disciplined Muslim
Brotherhood shifted the center of power away from the Wafd Party. The people
relied on the army as a result of the failure of old regime governments to satisfy
their ever increasing needs and desires. 89 As the first Egyptian professional
group exposed to modern technology and ideas on a large scale, the officers were
84Quoted from Article XI of the provisional constitution In ibid.. p.166.
851bid., pp.176-77.
86Ahmad Atiyyat, QAMLJS AL ThAWRAH AL PIISRIYYAH. (Dictionary of the Egyptian
Revolution), lit ed, Cairo : MaktabaL a! Anglo al Masriyyah, 1954, p.158.
67The Egyptian Army officers by overthrowing the anclen re,Ime and consequently
taking over the reigns of government, were proof of the Ideas of Ibn Zhaldun of the
predominant role of the army during the period of decline, fall, and rise of regime, or
tlao Tie Tung stated, 'Whenever one wants to seize state power and keep it must have
• strong .rmy...All political power grows out of the barrel of the gun. Quoted from
PEKING REVIEW. December, 5, 1961. p.9, in Earnest Kux, Communlst Tactics in Non-
Aligned countries and the Ideological Quarrel Between Moscow and P.klng. in NEW
NATIONS IN A DIVIDED WORLD : The international Relations of the Afro Asian States,
ed. Kurt London. New York : Praeger. 1963. p.271.
88Landau, PARLIAMENTS AND PARTIES IN EGYPT. .p.clt. pp.178-79.
89Morroe Berger. MILITARY ELITE AND SOCIAL CHANGE : Egypt Since Napoleon.
Princeton. N.J. : Princeton University Center for International Studies, Wilson School
of Public and International Affairs, 1960. pp.1-2; VatikIotis, ThE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN
POt. I TICS. op .clt.. pp.242-43. 250.
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imbued with radical end vigorous motions about the modernization of Egyptian
society.90 The continued presence of British troops in Egyptian soil and armed
conflicts with Isreel increased their stature. Their revolution, without support
from or commitment to any other group,91 bolstered Nasser's claim that at this
stage carrying out both the declared end undeclared objectives of the Army
movement could be met only by the Army 92 and not by the hesitant)
reluctant, end conservative politicians of the old regime.93
In the meantime the Egyptian Army officers were mindful of the achievements of
Turkey and Iran. The examples set by these military governments were neither
uncommon to military regimes In the Middle East nor In conflict with the
Egyptian military officers' Ideological background and their strong Inclination
towards an authoritarian regime.94 By abrogating the Constitution of 1923 and
eliminating even the slightest aspects of parliamentary life, Nasser deprived
himself of the bases for legitimacy. To negate the charges of his opponents he
denied any desire to govern and likened his task to that of guardian In charge for a
limited period to protect the sacred inherited rights of the people from the
corrupt politicians of the old regime end the agents of Imperialism.95 When
they liquidated parliamentary life they did not repudiate It completely, for the
Sixth and ultimate principle of their movement was the establishment of a sound
democratic reglme 96 with freedom and liberty for the country but not
necessarily for the Individual.97
90Berger, MILITARY ELITE. op.cit., pp. 3. 4, 27-28.; Vatikiotis, ThE EGYPTIAN ARMY
IN POLITICS. op.cIt.. pp.217. 240-47.
91 Vatikiotis, ThE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS. op.cit.. pp.75. 77.
92gjotad from Nasser, E6YPS LIBERATION. sp.cIt.. p.42.
93khaddurl Is of the opinion that backing down on established democracy Is not
unusual with military regimes. See Khadduri in SOCIAL FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
edited by Sydney NetUeton Fisher, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1955,
pp.178-79.
94Vauklotis, THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS. op.clL. pp.XII, 71-72. 83-84.
95l4asser, E6YPTS LIBERATION. op.cIt,. pp.42, 7 1-72.
960'joted from Nasser, HUTUB AL RAIS, op.clt.. III, p.546. See also Ibid.. I,
pp.198-199. See Articles III and IV of the programme of the Liberation Rally in
Nagulb, E6YPS DESTINY. op.clt., p.164 and p.136.
97liorroe Berger, ThE ARAB WORLD TODAY. Garden City. N.Y.: Doubleday. 1962.
pp.49-52, pp.33-34.
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The Army officers, by evoking the Islamic ideals of equality, brotherhood, end
social Justice, sought legitimacy as the leaders of a really Indigenous democratic
system as opposed to the alien, Imported parliamentary system of the old
regime.98 Appeals to Islamic Ideals end the glorification of the early Muslim
period were also Intended to please the Muslim Brotherhocd. The army officers
flocked to the pulpits of the mosque to preach their new Ideals purportedly
Inspired by religious principles. At the same time they realized the need for
organized popular support to counterbalance the parties and groups of the old
regime and to prevent the accumulation of power in the hands of any rivals,
Including the Muslim Brotherhood. 99 They also wanted to offset any defections,
and more importantly, they wanted to control end direct the various students and
professional organizations. For these purposes the army officers created a new
organization which they named Ray's! ii Iahrir ('Liberation Organization',
commonly known In English as the Liberation Rally) to distinguish it from a
political party and to disassociate It from the evils they attributed to the old
political parties. Nasser emphasized the Liberation Rally's national character
and objectives In the motto. UnIty, Discipline, end Work 10° under a new
liberation banner.' 01
Thus with the overthrow of the ancien regime end later the elimination of
political parties, two forces influenced the power structure in Egypt - the army
and the British, still the most important pillar in Egypt's politics. After
securing internal support Nasser felt confident to attack the British occupation of
90Bruce M. Brosthwlck. •The Islamic Sermon as a Channel of Political
Communlcatlon. ThE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. XXI. No.3., Summer. 1967. pp.299-300;
VatikioUs. THE E6YPTIAN ARIIY IN POLITICS. •p.cIL. pp.80. 241; Berger. MILITARY
ELITE, op.cit., pp.21-22; Naguib. E6YPS DESTINY. op.clt., pp.172-74; Liqueur.
NASSERS EGYPT. op.cit., pp.20-22. pp.26-27.
99Vatikiotis. NASSER AND HIS GENERATION. o p .cIt.. pp.79-80; 83; Naguib. E6YPTS
DESTINY. •p.cIL, pp.161-64. Tom R. Little, fgypt Since the Coup (flat of 1952.
WORLD TODAY. X. April, 1954. p .142; Berger, MILITARY ELITE. op.cit.. P.27.
IO°NaguIb. E6YPS DESTINY. op.clt., p.179.
l °'The Liberation flag, which become the flag of the United Arab Republic In 1958.
coni5tS of red, while and black horizontal bars (signifying the new blood or the
future, the purity of our ideals, and the black corruptIon of the past)... Quoted rrom
ibId.. p.165.
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Egypt. To justify these drastic changes in Egyptian politics. Nasser
preposterously asserted that the British occupation was made possible by support
from rulers of Egypt and their proteges 102 - who ruled in name only.103
Nasser claimed that without such local aid Imperialism would have found Itself
isolated and with no advantage in remaining In Egypt. At the very least It would
have easily been forced to evacuate. One way, then to combat imperialism was to
expose end fight its Egyptian collaborators. 104 Such an accusation negated the
real hegemony of British military and diplomatic power. 105 However, In a more
realistic admission, Nasser warned that imperialism, which developed various
disguises under such names as protection, mutual defence, end alliance, would not
leave the country willingly and peecefufly. 106 In addition, he deplored the old
regimes futile methods of combating Imperialism by street demonstrations.107
Nasser stipulated that to guarantee a victory against Imperialism all Egyptians
should take military training and peel their energies In preparation for en all out
national struggle (not guerrilla Warfare), thus making it too costly and risky for
imperialists to remain. 108 Partial opposition, In addition to being costly and
unfair, would not guarantee ultimate victory.
In one of his first and most important policy speeches, on March 28, 1955, at the
Military Academy, Nasser designated six points as principles for the new regime.
The first principle was elimination of imperialism and Imperialist 'stooges'
('traitors') among the Egyptians. He admitted the existence of two schools of
1O2plasser, KHUT1JB AL RA1S, Ill, op.cIL. pp.546, 652-53. Contrast with Albert
Hourani. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement : Some Causes and lmpllcati.ns, THE MIDDLE
EAST JOURNAL, IX. No.3, p.241.
1O3Nasser, IZHUTUB AL PAlS, Ill. .p.ciL. pp.653, 665.
lO4IbId.. III, pp.662-63.
105rh. most important fact about the occupation Is that It was imposed by acts of
force. Quoted from Houranl, ThE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, IX, No.3, p.241. But It
should be remembered that political power results In a psychological relation between
those who exercise such power and those upon whom It Is exercised. It gives the
former control over the minds and actions •f the Iatter. Quoted from Fabumni,
op.clt.. p.202. For Nassers awareness of this psychological relations, see his KHU1UB
AL RAIS, I. P.105.
l0bNasser, KHUTUB AL PAlS, I, pp .105-106, III, pp . 652-54.
IOlIbId.. I, pp.150-51.
108(bid.. pp.105-06. Nasser, E6YPS LIBERATION. op.cit., pp.50-Si.
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thought - one that advocated the elimination of Imperialism first and the
maintenance of the revolution and a second that advocated liquidation of
Imperialist 'stooges' first end then elimination of Imperialism. Before coming to
power, Nasser said he was of the first school of thought. But now he resolved to
eliminate the Imperialist 'stooges' first, by whom he actually meant the enemies
of his regime.' 09 Then he laid down in order of priority five additional
principle which became the objectives of Nasser. His second principle was the
elimination of feudalism; the third, the elimination of monopolies and control of
government by capital; the fourth, the establishment of a strong national army;
the fifth, the establishment of social justice; and the sixth, establishment of
sound democratic llfe..1 1 0
Fighting the native agents of Imperialism before the imperialists themselves
marked a complete departure In the Egyptian attitudes towards the BritIsh.1
Up to this point, Egyptians had thought of the native rulers as branches of the
tree of Imperialism with the foreign master as the roots. The prevailing concept
had been that if the native servants were eliminated, Imperialism could create or
bring in new ones; whereas if the root of the tree (I.e. foreign rule) were
removed, the native agents would wither. This view was remnant of the
prevailing supremacy of British Imperialism in the nineteenth end early
twentieth centuries. However, after the Second World War, the shift of the
center of power In International politics from Europe to the United States end the
Soviet Union, the weakening of Oreat Britain, the emergence of the Afro-Asian
peoples, end the establishment of the United Nations had a tremendous effect on
Anglo-Egyptians relations and caused basic changes In the character of
colonialism. The continuation of British occupation after the Second World War
was not based on the sheer might of British forces in the canal zone alone, but on
lOgIbId.. pp.162-63.
I lOTranslat,ed from Ibid., p.546.
11 IllIsham Sharabi, NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION IN ThE ARAB WORLD. Princeton.
N.J. : Van Nostrand. 1966. A traitor Is usually a political enemy; the highest form of
usson Is Lo be an agent or lackey of Imperialism. p.99.
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the legal foundation of a treaty concluded with native Egyptians. Removal of these
Egyptians would deprive the British of legal grounds as well as material support.
Nasser attempted to export this device by especially advising the Sudan1 12 and
later Morocco1 13 not to minimize the danger of Imperialist stooges, the
elimination of which would be en arduous job to be undertaken before fighting
Imperialism. He described the shift In priority as a point of deperture...the
greatest victory Egypt ever echieved.' 14 Nasser attempted to Impress upon the
Egyptians that the Army movement was a 'revolution' end not a coup d'etat end
emphasized that "it was a revolution against Imperialism and reaction, a
revolution expressing the hopes of the country."1 15
Although these six principles were originally outlined by Nasser after concluding
the Evacuation Agreement, partly to divert the attention ct the Egyptians, Nasser
described the Evacuation Agreement as the 'end of the smaller struggle" and the
achievement of Egypt's independence as the beginning of the largest struggle,
which would be the struggle to eliminate all residues of Imperialism such as
social injustice end economic deprivation".'' 6 It should be stressed that the six
principles were neither a spontaneous response to a special occasion nor designed
to serve limited political expediency. Rather they were a planned, well
understood set of objectives of the Army movement that Nasser later adopted. The
fact that he persistently reiterated these six points in speeches abroad end at
home is evidence of their Importance. To capture the admiration of his Egyptian
audience, Nasser asserted that the objectives of the revolution..were 'not' but
your objectives...lts aims were laid down by you, your fathers end
I l2Even as early as August. 26, 1953. 6amal Abdet Nasser. PIAJMUAT KHIJTAB WA
TASRIHAT WA BAYANAT AL RAIS JAMAL ABD AL NASIR. (Collections .f speeches.
statements and announcements or President 6amal Abdel Nasser) in 4 parts. Cairo
Maslahat ci IsUlamat. 1960, Part I, p.57. In drawing a parallel between Egypt and
MorocCO stated. horocco will achieve Its freedom and independence from the French
only after the Moroccan people unite and purge themselves from traitors. For
Imperialism will not last in a country which purged u.s ranks from its enemy and the
traitors.
1 l3Nass.r. KHUTUB AL PAlS. III. p.512.
1 141ranslat.d from Ibid.. p.505. S.. also Nass.r. E6YPS LIBERATION. op.cit.. p.58.
1 15$asser. KHUTUB AL RA1S, III. pp.625-26.
I 16$asser. tIAJtIUA'T KHUTAB. Part I. pp.738. 749.
147
grandfathers." 17 However, he did not specify these objectives and admitted that
the issues were not written, but rather emanated from our esplretions.1 18
This is not en attempt to deprive the leaders of the Army movement of any grasp
of political concepts, nor to undermine their ability in planning or organization.
Rather the Army Movement', original lack of sny definite plan or ideology was en
element of its strength end a source of flexibility that might explain the
developments In Its political structure and the different trends In Its policies and
methods in responding to changing internal and external condItions.1 19
In abstract terms Nasser traced the various stages in the development of these
aspirations and described how they began in the form of a vague hope, then
developed in a defined Idea, and finally Into a practical programme at midnight
July 23rd. 12° It Is the development of these aspirations among the Egyptians -
primarily In Nasser - and his methods of trying to fulfil them that this Chapter
endeavours to discern so it might help explain the various trends of Nassers
domestic and foreign leadership.
3.7 NASSER AND THE EVACUATION TREATY
In the midst of the quarrel with the Egyptian political parties and after the
abrogation of the 1923 ConstItution, Noguib declared, the constitution of our
movement is the determination for the evacuation of the last foreign soldier from
our soii." 2 1 On another occasion he stated that in relations with Oreat Britain
the Egyptians heve two alternatives end no third one - either evacuation or
I 1ljranslat,e from Nasser, KHUTUB Al RA1S. HI. p.676.
I lBTranslat.ed from Ibid., III. p.676. See also Nasser 1 EGYPT'S LIBERATION. op.cIt.,
p.58.
1 i9Warriner, LAND REFORII. op.cit., pp.10-il; VaUkiotis, ThE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN
p0iiTICS. op .ciL p.68; Berger, MILITARY ELITE. op.clt., p.23; John S. Badesu,
•,troduction . THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION, by Gamal Abde) Nasser, Buffalo,
N.Y.: Smith, Keynes and Marshall, 1959. p.11.
l200uoLed from Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit.. p.28.
l2lf4aguIb, EGYPT'S DESTINY. op.clt., pp.215; Fabumnl, op.cIt., p.304.
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annlhlletion. 122 Nasser, meanwhile, continued to attribute the causes of
various acute problems, Including the bitter quarrel with Israel, to the existence
of Imperialism. 123 Neither the tightening of the siege at Fafluja, Palestine, nor
the delicate task of negotiating the Rhodes Armistice with Israel distracted him
from Egypt's Independence.' 24 Nasser knew that Egypt was In no position to
force the British out of Egypt. whether by negative tactics (such as abrogation of
the 1936 treaty), by mass demonstration, by resorting to the United Nation, or
by open armed conflict. On the other hand, tie was also aware the British would
not leave without pressure. 125 Thus he resorted to a multitude of methods as the
situation justified, but continued to place great emphasis on negotiation. He
attempted to persuade the powers friendly with Britain, In particular the United
States, to exert pressure on her to reach agreement with Egypt and sought
mechation by such friendly countries as Pakistan and India. 126 His indifferent
silence towards Israel gave currency to the rumour that the new regime might
consider a settlement with Israel after concluding en evacuation agreement with
Britain.' 27 However, the Egyptians did not hesitate to resort to guerrilla
warfare to worsen the living conditions of the British forces in the Canal
Zone.' 28 Thus 1 when the unfruitful negotiations with the British In the fall of
1953 were postponed indefinitely, Nasser launched a vigorous propaganda
campaign urging Egyptians to join the National Ouard and to prepare for the battle
l22Atiyyat, QAPIUS AL THAWRA. op.cit, p.156.
I23Nasser, E6YPS LIBERATION. op.cIL, pp.24, 76. 98; Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA1S. I,
p.152; Badsau, ThE PHILOSOPHY. op.cit., pp.16-19. LitLi., WORLD TODAY. X, p.145.
124Apparenuy Nasser relished the Israeli officer, Yaroham Cohen, who wrote
regarding Nasser, •the subject which Gamal Abdel Nasser always talked about with
me...was the struggle...against the English and how we organized the underground
resistance movement against them...and how we were able to muster world public
opiiOfl behind us. Quoted In Nasser, E6YPFS LIBERATION. op.ctt., p.24.
i25piasser, IHUThB AL RAIS. op.clL, III. p.105.
l26Ibid., I. pp.150-51, 160. and AWyat, op.clt., pp.156, 160. 162. rerer to the
opening of military training camps and speeches of Nasser and Naguib. See also Little,
E6YPT. op .clt., p.244.
l27Naguib, E6YPS DESTINY. op.cit., pp.216. 220. 231, Fabumni, op.cit.. pp.309-10;
Lacouturs, NASSER. op.cit, pp.212-14.
126See Hassanein Abdel Kader, Egyptian Public Opinion In the Post-Revolution Era,
EGYPTIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, No.40. July, 1964, pp.124-42, maintains that
the establishment of guerllia warrare was primarily t. fight the British, not the
IsraelIs. Fabumni, op.clt., p.314, quoted a description of the deplorable deteriorating
condition of the British service men in the Canal Zone.
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to liberate the fatherland from the usurpers - the British Imperialists.
The foray with the British In the Canal Zone did not last long. In early 1954
Nasser was Involved In a struggle with Neguib - the gravest struggle of his
political career - and the whole country appeared to be on the verge of civil
war. 129 The army movement was jeopardized by the split within the Free
Officers. As a result of the schism between Nasser and Naguib, It appeared as If
the military regime and Hoguib became the rallying point of old an new groups
that opposed Nasser.' 3° On the surface, the personal quarrel 131 gave the
Impression that Naguib favoured restoration of constitutional life whj1 Nasser
was for the maintenance of military rule end, further, that In the negotiation
with the British, Noguib was for complete and prompt evacuation while Nasser
was more conciliatory. Accusations of selfishness, secret collaboration or
compromising relations with the British were used by both sides. The strong
opposition In the cavalry clearly Indicated that Nasser was In serious trouble.
end it was his shrewd leadership and ability for survival that saved him and his
regime. Naguib's reinstatement as President proved the gravity of the situation
and his strength as a rival. 132 With such a popular opponent Nasser
demonstrated his mastery of Intrigue 133 to such an extent that Naguib later
described Nasser's manoeuvres as tantamount to a second coup detat)34
Whereas Neguib relied on popular support, Nasser first strengthened his grip on
l29Merry-go Round, NEWSWEEK. XLIII. April 26, 1946. p.47.
l 3OTom R. Little. Changes or Leadership in (gypt, WORLD TODAY. XI, February,
1955. p.52; Naguib. E6YPTS DESTINY. op.cit., p.200; Vatikiotis, THE EGYPTIAN ARMY
IN POLITICS, op.clt.. pp.88-90.
l31 Naguib. E6YPS DESTINY. op.cit., PP.160. 189-98, 203-07. spelled out his view
and those of his opponents within the Revolutionary Command Council; See also Robert
st. John, ThE BOSS, op.clt.. pp.140-42.
I32lacouture 1 EGYPT IN TRANSITION. op.cIt., pp.183-84; St.John, THE BOSS, op.cit..
pp.166-68. Both describe the seriousness of the opposition and mutiny against Nasser.
See also Little, WORLD TODAY. X, p.148. Vatikiotis, NASSER AND HIS GENERATION.
op.clt.. pp .91-92. contends that Nasser regretted the original decision to accept the
reinstatement or Naguib.
l33Naguib. E6YPTS DESTINY. pp.206-08; LILLIe, WORLD TODAY. XI. pp.252-53;
VatRiOtis, NASSER AND HIS GENERATION, op.cit.. p.91; St. John, ThE BOSS. op.ciL.,
pp.1SB59.
l34Naguib, E6YPS DESTINY, op.clt., p.208.
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key positions In the army and police where power counts end then in the Labour
unions with mass sit-down strikes.
In the midst of this power struggle end the concurrent fight with the Muslim
Brotherhood, Nasser decided to come to an agreement with the British. 135 Thus.
guerrilla activities In the Canal Zone suddenly ceased and calm prevailed. This
abrupt change was pertly because Nasser was In no way ready to accept the
responsibility posed by the British threat to take retaliatory measures if the
hostile actions did not cease 136 However, the more Important reason was to free
Nasser's hands to crush his rivals at home.' 37 To win Oreat Britain and the
United States to his side, Nasser labelled his opponents Communist stooges and
Muslim fanatics.' 38 Further, he showed willingness to comprise to reach a
settlement with the British. The British, aware of Nasser's Internal
difficulties' 39 contacted the Muslim Brotherhood in an attempt to use the
rivalry among Egyptian groups to increase their bargaining power with
Nasser.' 4 ° The British were also anxious to reach an agreement with Nasser as a
' 35me fact that the Muslim Brotherhood, succeeded In launching their strongest
attempt to overthrow Nassers regime In 1965 afl.er ten years of being crushed
Indicate the strength and entrenchment or their •rganization. See kemal H. Karpat,
ed., POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FHOU6HT IN ThE CONTEMPORARY PUDDLE EAST, New York
Praeger. 1968. pp.116-17.
I36LIttl.. WORLD TODAY. X, p.250; 11W., E6YPT. •p.clt.. p.146; and Marlowe, FOUR
ASPECTS OF E6YPT. op.clt.. pp.391, 400, attribute the guerrilla wartare to the
Muslim Brotherhood as a means of embarrassing Nasser, contrast with Ishak Musa al
Husaln. ThE MOSLEM BRETHEN : The 6reatest ot Modern Islamic Movements, Beirut
kayatss College Book Cooperative. 1956, p.133.
l375t.John, ThE BOSS. op.clt., p.155; Lacouture, NASSER. op.clt., p.208; LittI.,
WORLD TODAY. XI, p.56; Fabumni, op.clt., p.315.
l38flaguib, E6YPFS DESTINY. op.clt., p.187. El Sadat., REVOLT ON THE NILE. op.cit..
pp.78-79; 6amal Abdel Nasser, The Egyptian Revolution, FOREIGN AFFAIRS. XXXIII.
No.2. January. 1955. p.209; Jefferson Caffery. Recent Developments in Egypt. ThE
EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY, edited by Harvey P. Hall. Washington, D.C.: The
Middle East Institute. 1955. p.117.
139*i Husain, ThE MOSLEM BRETHEN. op.clL., p.133.
1405e. a summary of the Nasser regime accusation of the Brotherhood connivance with
the British in Egypt. Revolutionary Command Council. •The Great Plot for the
overthrow of the present regime prepared by the Muslim Brethen and the men of the
British embassy in Cairo : Dissolution of the Muslim Brethen and closing of Its general
headquarters and branches In Egypt. AL AHRAPI. Jan 15, 1954, translated in MIDDLE
[ASTERN AFFAIRS. V. Ilarch, 1954, pp.44-100, clt.ed in Kemal karpat, POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL ThOUGHT IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST. New York : Frederick A.
Praeger. 1968. p.116 and p.117.
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prelude to Improving Anglo-Arab relations.141
There was also international pressure by friendly powers on both Egypt end Great
Britain to reach a settlement satisfactory to Egypt's aspirations. Nasser first
oomproiuiaod and agreed to include Turkey as a aeraber of the Arab Collective
Security under which the British would be allowed to reoccupy the canal base if
any one of the member countries were attacked by en outside power. He also
agreed to extend from fifteen to twenty months the period for complete evacuation
of the canal base. The British government matched the Egyptian concession by
agreeing that Iran be excluded from those countries which if attacked would be
cause for the reoccupation of the canal base and also by agreeing that British
technicians remaining to service the canal would not wear military uniforms.142
Finally, on July 27, 1954. the Egyptian and British representatives Initiated the
Heads of Agreement (later known as the Evacuation Agreement), which on October,
19, 1954. was ratified and became effective.' 43 Accordingly, Nasser was hailed
by the Egyptian propaganda machine as the 'hero of evacuation'.
Conclusion of the Evacuation Agreement was received with a mixture of
apprehension and rejoicing at home and abroad - from the Neutrals, the
Communists, the Western Bloc, the Arab countries, and Israeli and Zionist
quarters. In England, opposition to the Treaty came from the extremists (who
' 41 LiUie, EGYPT. op.cit.. pp.244-45, and Naguib, E6YPTS DESTINY. op.cit.. pp.225-
26. assert that Britain made the first concession. Contrast with Lacouture, EGYPT IN
TRANSITION, op.cit., pp. 206-08; Fabumni. •p .cit., pp.225-26; Plariowe, FOUR
ASPECTS OF EGYPT. op.cit., p.400.
142However, Nasser previously considered the first detault...to resemble
Imperialism in a particular Khakhi uniform. Nasser, KHUTAB AL RA1S, I. p.105. See
also Fabumni pp.308-09. Nasser did not hesitate to launch a criticism of Churchill for
insisting on the British wearing the Khakhi unirorm as a vital Issue.
t43Anthony Nutting, who signed the treaty for Britain, described how deeply moved
Nasser was by what he took to be a resolution or the national question for Egypt:
Even in this sentient atmosphere, his sense of humour did not desert him. As his
aide, All Sabry. put the treaty in front or me for signature, I discovered that my
fountain pen had run out ot ink and I had to borrow Nassers. Then, having signed my
name, as an automatic reflex I put the pen In my breast pocket. Nasser held out his
hand and with a broad grin said, 1 think you have already got enough out of me in this
treaty. Please can I have my pen back. See Anthony Nutting. NASSER. London
Constable, 1972. P.72.
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became known as the Suez Rebels) of the Conservative government. But, on the
whole, the British government end public accepted the Agreement In the hope that
It would open a new chapter in Anglo-Egyptian relations and serve as a prelude to
the establishment of the long awaited Western defence system for the Middle East.
In the West the agreement was hailed as an act of statesmanship that would lead to
closer relationships with Egypt.' 44 India. the leading neutral power, as well as
pro Western Pakistan, congratulated both sides and hoped the new government
would remove the friction between the signatories, contribute to Middle Eastern
stability and tranquility, and strengthen world peace. 145 Isreel's apprehension
that British withdrawal from the Suez Canal base might remove restraints on
Egypt In seeking a second war with Israel was allayed by the British. 146 The
Communist countries attacked the Anglo-Egyptian agreement as en Imperialist
conspiracy leading to a Middle East defence system. 14? Oenerally, the Arab
governments, especially Pro Western ones such as Iraq, enthusiastically
welcomed the Anglo Egyptian agreement as a good model for Anglo-Arab relations
and as a nucleus for strengthening Middle East defence. 148 On the other hand,
Arab nationalists, particularly the 'progressive' ones, did not share their
governments views end bitterly denounced the Nasser for betraying Egypt's
liberation. The evacuation agreement aroused suspicions that Nasser and the new
regime were part of a Western master plan to check communism by establishing
strong military regimes favouring social reform to replace obsolete pare
constitutional governments in the Middle East. 149 In addition, rumours of peace
with Israel Inflamed the Arab public.
Nasser and his supporters considered the agreement a document for the liberation
of Egypt from more than seventy-two years of British occupation. Public
144FabumnI, ,p.clt., pp. 3 15-17.
145 1b1d.. pp.317-18; Little, EGYPT. op.clt.. pp.245-46.
146 Hourant, ThE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. IX, No.3, p.239; Fabumnl, o p .clt., pp.317-18.
l4lfabumnI. op.cit.. p.3 18. Y. Bochkaryan. False Friends at the Arabs, NEW TIMES.
Mo5c0w, No.2, 1954. pp .11-15. attrIbutes the agreement and coups to American
politiCs and conspiracies.
14 FabumnI, op.cIt, p.3l9.
149 L1ttle, EGYPT. op.clt., pp.255-56; Al Husain, THE MOSLEM BRETHEN. op.clt., p.133;
Lacouture. NASSER. op .ciL.. p.208.
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opinion, however, was sharply divided on its value. On July 27, 1954, the day of
the Initiation of the Heads of Agreements which Nasser described as the
Implementation of the groat objectives of the Revolutlon...An agreement to end the
occupation end arrange the evacuation of the British troops...from Egypt. 150
Nasser's supporters flocked to the streets of Cairo to celebrate the Ilnalisatlon of
the agreement end to hell him as the 'Hero of the Evacuation'. On the other hand,
the Initiation of the agreement gave the opposition a final chance to rally the
public against Nasser's military rule. Criticism of the agreement Involved
President Naguib but primarily came from the powerful Muslim Brotherhood, the
dissolved Weld party, the Communists, end almost all major political groups In
Egypt. 151 The criticism concentrated on the following points: (1) That the
agreement was a step backward In the struggle towards the liberation of Egypt;
(2) that it was less advantageous than previous treaties that the last Weld
government proposed, the refusal of which cost Egypt heavily in lives and
property; (3) that the agreement embodied the essence of mutual defence with
6reat Britain, this time with the addition of Turkey; (4) that the agreement was
the nucleus for en overall Western plan for the defence of the Middle East linking
the fate of Arab states to that of their usurpers; that it was a prelude to peace
with Isreel, the liquidation of the Palestine question, and permission for Israel to
use the Suez canal; and (5) that although the 1936 Treaty would expire in just
two years, the Evacuation Agreement Indefinitely linked the fate of Egypt with
that of Great Britain. Opposition to the agreement grew throughout the summer of
1954 and reached a peak in the attempt on Nasser's life In October 26, 1954.
Thus, the Evacuation Agreement was a major event in the history of Egypt; It was
a great Improvement over the treaty of Preferential Alliance of 1936, and It
broke the deadlock In Anglo Egyptian negotiations that hod persisted since 1946.
A balance sheet of advantages of the Evacuation Agreement Indicates that Nasser
150 M RaIn, ThAWRAT 23 YULYAH. op.cit., p.190.
151 A1 Husain, ThE IIOSLETI BRETHEN. op.clt., p136. states that the Muslim
Brotherhood distributed a criticism of the treaty by Naguib while he was stifl
president. See also Lacouture, NASSER. op.clt., p.208.
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Indeed merits credit as the Hero of Evacuation' - because he concluded the
Evacuation Agreement with eli the risks involved, not bacause of the excellence of
Its provisions. Conclusions of the Agreement removed one of the serious problems
In Anglo-Egyptian relations. Even though Arab nationalists regarded the
Evacuation Agreement as a step backwards In the achievement of Egypt's
Independence, Nasser hod sought the agreement for two steps forward In
accordance with an ancient but not very well known Umayyad tradition of
submission to the adversary' 52 end in accordance with Leninist tradition.' 53 In
other words, Nasser sought to neutralize the British In his search for full control
of power In Egypt. 154 The positive consequence of the Evacuation Agreement was
the complete transformation of Egypt's power structure Into one single organ,
Nasser's military regime.
However, In as much as the Evacuation Treaty gave Nasser complete control of the
power structure In Egypt, it generated new problems. Nasser said, Every time
the revolution achieved a new success, a new and heavy burden was also thrown
upon my shoulders l55 The primary burden was opposition within the Arab
World. Therefore, after the attempt on his life and the consequent elimination of
the Muslim Brotherhood, Nasser began to tour the country to sell the Agreement
to the Egyptians which he likened to those involving concessions or loss of
territories concluded by such major powers as the Federal Republic of Germany,
France and even Great Britain. 156 Nasser pointed out that none of the citizens of
those countries described the agreements as treason, but rather accepted them as
acts of statesmanship. Despite losing popularity with both Egyptian political
groups and the masses, Nasser thought conclusion of the Agreement would be In
15260 th Pluawly., the founder •f the Ummayad dynasty, and 'Abd al Plalek, the
greatest Umayyad Caliph, did not hesitate in their civil strife and struggle for power
to pay tribute to Byzantin, the enemy of islamdom. Plejid Khadduri, WAR AND PEACE IN
Thf LAW OF ISLAM. Baltimore : The John Hopkins Press. 1955. pp.215-16.
l53for Lenins submissiveness to the Germans in conc'udIng the Agreement of Brest
Litovsk . see Isaac Deutscher, STALIN : A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. New York : Oxford
University Press. 1949. pp.165-87.
lS4Iosoa Ones, Some Factors In the Communist View of Neutrality. NEW NATIONS.
London : Constable, 1973. p.96.
lSSNasser, E6YPS LIBERATION. op.clt., p.59.
l5óNasser, KHUTUB AL RAIS. III. pp.512-13.
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the best Interest of his rule. According to President Naguib, Nasser believed that
he could afford to alienate every segment of Egyptian public opinion If
necessary, In order to achieve our goals. l5l Indeed, even If the treaty had not
provided for the total end prompt evacuation of British troops, It did provide
Nasser with en opportunity for eliminating his rivals within E gyp t (the
• Imperlallst stooges') and this is another instance of his departure from being
solely preoccupied with the problem of independence. The new regimes relations
with other Arab countries, especially Syria and Saudi Arabia, were not cordial,
and Its prestige reached Its nadir after the execution of the Muslim Brotherhood
leaders. 158 On the other hand, Oreet Britain In particular end the West In
general wore expecting Nasser to Join some sort of Middle East defence
system. 159 On his part, Nasser, troubled at home and unpopular In the
neighbouring Arab countries, was in a precarious position and in no hurry to Join
such a system. The current of events In 1955 pushed him away from the West
Instead. That year began with the Baghdad Pact 160 the Israeli attack, and the
Bandung Conference - events which led to the adoption first of positive
neutralism and later Arab Nationalism.
l57Nagulb, E6YPS DESTINY. o p .cit., p .191. Nasser stated a similar opinion In his
E6YPTS LIBERATION. op .cit, p.74.
1 5LIttIe. E6YPT. op.cit.. pp .255-56; St. John. THE BOSS. op .clt.. p .186; Al Husalni,
THE MUSLIM BRETHEN, op.cIL, p.136.
l59Fabumnt, op.cit, pp.315-16. 319.
160 1t has always been contended that the timing and Implications or the Baghdad Pact
led Nasser to reject It at. first band. Th. fact that DulIes and Eden shifted the
emphasis from Nasser's Egypt to Hurl ii Said of Iraq further alienated Nasser and.
Edens liter attempts to woo Hussein's Jordan In joining the Pact, went against an
earlier promise by Eden to Nasser that he would not attempt any further lining up of
conservative states against Egypt. The dismissal of Glupp Pasha of the Arab Legion by
Hussein and the deteriorating Suez Crisis and aftermath made Nasser adopt a 'policy of
no return.' From then on, Nassers use of the word 'imperialist' cam. to mean Britain.
Israel, France, the United States, and to a certain extent the Soviet Union. The word
'stooge' was used as a label against all those Arabs who challenged Nasser at various
points In time. See Richard Hofst.ander (ed.) E6YPT AND NASSER, Vol. 1.11,111. A FACT
ON FILE PUBLICATION. U.S.A. : Fact on File, Inc. 1973, for the documented sequence of
events during Nasser's regime.
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3.8 NASSER AND THE BAGHDAD PACT
Egypt' prominent political, strategical, commercial, cultural, end religious
position made her the first Arab country (1946) to be approached by Britain
concerning the idea of establishing a Middle East Defence system. Various British
efforts to deal individually with the other Arab states (with or without the aid of
Turkey) did not fare any better than the first attempt to conclude previous draft
proposals with the anc/an rag/inc. All Western efforts to get the Arabs In any
defence commitment were considered as attempts to maintain the status quo and,
In particular, to safeguard the gains of Israel. 161 The League of Arab States
reacted with their own regional Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-
operation Resolution (The Arab Collective Security Pact), which was drafted In
April 13. 1950, sIgned on June 17, 1950. and was ratified on August 23.
1952. 162 Nasser went even further and denounced any military pact, regardless
of Its objectives, Including the Arab Collective Security Pact. 163 However, from
the very beginning of the Army movement, Nasser had sought understanding, aid,
and cooperation with the United States end the West on new bases. 164 His efforts
climaxed in the Evacuation Agreement which laid the foundation for regional
collective defence system that included Turkey end was a common denominator
between a Western defence system and the Arab Collective Security Pact. The
Evacuation Agreement reads In part:
161 5ee J.C. Hurewltz, DIPLOMACY IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST. Vol. I: A
DOCUMENTARY RECORD. 1535-1914; Vol.11: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD. 1914-1956.
Princeton ,N.J. : D. Van Nostrand C... 1956. Vol.11. pp.308-lI.
l62teague of Arab StaLes, COLLECTION OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS PASSED BY THE
LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES OR SIGNED WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL OR6ANIZATIONS).
Cairo : MaLabi Dar ii Nisher III Jamlat at Misriyyah, 196-. pp.18-25.
13EI Barawy, MILITARY COUP. op.cit.. PP.208-10.
164NaguIb, E6YPS DESTINY. op.cit.. p.235; Lacouture. EGYPT IN TRANSITION,, op.cit..
p.208. See Gamal Abdel Nasser. Egypts Prime Minister. Lt. Col., 6amal Abdel Nasser
: What Should the U.S. do In the Iliddle East? interviewed by John Low In U.S. NEWS
AND WORLD REPORT. XXXVII, September, 3. 1954. pp.26-32, where Nasser outlined
that the major problem facing the Arab world was not the possibilIty of outside
Communist invasion, but rather internal Infiltration by Communists making actual and
potential political capital out of the economic underdevelopment, exploitation and
poverty. Nasser was of the opInion that Internal Communism was borne out of
poverty.'
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Article 4: In the event of an armed attack by an outside
power or any country...partly to the treaty of Joint
Defence between Arab League states...or on Turkey,
Egypt shell afford to the United Kingdom such
facilities as may be necessary In order to place the
Bose on a war footing.
Article 5: In the event of a threat of an armed attack
by outside power on any country mentioned
above...There shall be immediate consultation between
Egypt and the United KIngdom. 165
To further reckon with the West Nasser repeatedly stated that Internal
communists were the most serious threat to Egypt and to the developing world and
bragged about the harsh methods used to eliminate them in Egypt. 166 In addition,
Nasser gave public assurances that if there Is ever a government here that wants
to be on the side of the Russians, I don't think It can be this government.167
Furthermore, Nasser chided most of the Arab countries for not being able to
comprehend the realism of Egypt's deal with the West. 168 However, the
accommodation between Egypt and the West was shortlived. On January 6. 1955,
the announcement by the governments of Turkey and Iraq of their Intention to
conclude a pact of mutual cooperatIon' 69 provoked Nasser's government to
furious attack. 170 Since the Baghdad Pact was the manifestation of Dulles's
Northern tier concept by which different military organizations Joined together
to combat any communist danger. Nasser's outrageous attack was not anticipated
by Western observers and was difficult for them to understand. 171 The
announcement of the Turko-Iraqi Agreement so enraged Nasser that at times he
almost collapsed physicolly. 172 Nasser openly declared an all out political war
l65Quoted rrom Hurewitz, DIPLOMACY. II, op.cIt, p.384.
l6bNas,er. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT. XXXVIII. Sept. 3. 1954. p.26.
1671b1d.. p.32; S.. Lacout.urs, NASSER, .p.cIt.. pp.209-10.
l6eLtttl., EGYPT. op.cit., p.256.
1695.. text and statement. In Hurewltz, DIPLOMACY, II. op.clt.. pp.390-91. See also
Mohammed Khalil. ed. THE ARAB STATES AND THE LEAGUE : A Documentary Record. 2
VoIS.. Beirut : Khayats. 1962. II. p.285.
l7O5ee Lacouture, NASSER. op.ciL., p.210; Little, EGYPT. .p.cit., pp.262-63; St..
John, THE BOSS. op.clt., p.169.
171$asser, tIAJPIUAT KHUTAB. Part I, p.295 ( March 31, 1955); See Arun KanU Das,
AnglO Egyptian Relations In Retrospect, MODERN REVIEW. Calcutta, CII, No.5,
November. 1957. pp.359-69. p.366.
l72WIIton Wynn. NASSER OF EGYPT : The Search for DignIty. Cambridge. Mass
Arlington Books, 1959, p.112. 0n Lop or IL all, the Baghdad Pact challenged Egypts
leadership of the Arab world. Egyptians regarded it as an attempt by the West to build
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against Hurl al Se'Id, the Iraqi Prime Minister, and moblilsed all his energy for
the effort.
Although Nasser began his tirade against the Turko-Iraqi pact from the moment It
was announced, he picked out the weak and unpopular Special Agreement later
ratified by Iraq anti Great Britain In accordance with article I of the pact as a
focal point of his criticism and outrage.' 13 Therefore one will deal with both as
one Instrument unless otherwise specified.
The primary purpose of the Baghdad Pact was claimed to be the maintenance of
peace and security In the Middle East region which necessitates taking the
required measure in accordance with artIcles 51 of the United Nations
Charter. l 74 The Pact was aimed at strengthening the governments of the
member states and coping with the Internal subversive activities of local
communists. For this purpose a committee to fight subversion was established.
Although the founders of the Baghdad Pact relied on repressive measures to cope
with the spread of communism, they belatedly realized the Insufficiency of such
measures. 175 The objectives of the Special Agreement between Iraq and Great
Britain were spelled out by the Prime Minister of Iraq when he Introduced the
draft of the Special Agreement 011930; second, to cement and strengthen the
bonds of brotherhood and security of the member states of the Arab Collective
Pact, and third, to Improve relations with the countries of the region for their
security and to cope with the Zionist influence. 176 When Anthony Eden, the
British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Introduced the Bill of Special Agreement at
the British parliament, he evaluated the real benefits of the Baghdad Pact for
up Ira q as a competitor to Egypt as regional leader. Nasser regarded this as proof of
Western hostility to his regime.
17 aiId KhalidI, Nasser and the Arab Worid, MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XXXIV. No.4.,
AprIl. 1959. pp .30-34. 51.
174Hur.witz. DIPLOMACY, Ii. ,p.cit., p.390.
175DavId 1. tiorlson, Arab Affairs Through Soviet Eyes. MIDDLE EASTERN FORUM.
XXXVII, No.1. January, 1961. pp.11-36.
l76 See Hasan al Dujayli. MIThAQ BAGHDAD. (the Baghdad Pact) In Arabic. Baghdad :
Matbat al Raltah, 1956. p.129-30.
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Oreot Britain; (1) BrItain's membership would raise her prestige and increase
her Influence In the Middle East, and (2) enable her to maintain peace and
stability In the area and to minimize International tension.' 7? During the
debate, Anthony Nutting, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, stressed
that British strategical Interest centered around strengthening the Northern Tier
of NATO, which would require mutual cooperation with the concerned states of the
region. 118 Mnon Pienderes, the Prime Minister of Turkey, hailed Britain's
Joining the pact as a great event which would 1111 the political vacuum and restore
peace, confidence, and stability In the Middle East.119
Comparison of the British Evacuation Agreement with Egypt end the Special
Agreement with Iraq clearly points up Egypt's relative Independence from Britain
in comparison to Iraq's dependence on British support. 180 This provided a basis
for Egypt's characterization of the Special Agreement as a step backward in the
Independence movements of Arab countries - a step which erased Nasser's
laborious effort to exclude, from the Evacuation Agreement, attack or threat of
attack on Iran as a cause for the British to reactivate the Suez Canal base.18'
Nasser charged that Iraq had violated its obligation under the Arab Collective
Security Pact by concluding the Baghdad Pact, thereby causing the split among the
Arab states. However, there were splits even before the pact 182 The Irony Is
that Nasser and his supporters 183 who had previously denounced •the [Arab:)
117 1b1d., pp.90, 121-22.
178E11 kedourle, Pan Arabism and the British Policy'. ThE MIDDLE EAST IN
TRANSITION : Studies In Contemporary History, ad. Walter Z. Liqueur, New York
Prieger. 1958. p.111.
179 a1 Dujayli, IIITHAQ BAGHDAD. op.cit., p.9-10.
l8OSee ArtIcle 5 or the Baghdad Pact In Hurewlt.z, DIPLOMACY. II, •p.cIt.. p.392.
There Is no comparable article In the Evacuation Treaty.
l 8 l Accordlng to Little, EGYPT, op.cit., pp.259. 262. Nasser tacitly approved the
Inclusion of Iran. Later, after the signing or the Baghdad Pact. Egypt accused Iraq of
undoing Egypt's etforto. See halil, THE ARAB STATES. II. op.cIt., p.281. This.
provides evidence that Egypt's attacks on Iraq were a distortion of facts.
1825ami Hakim, COVENANT Of THE ARAB LEAGUE AND ARAB UNITY. 1st ed., Cairo :
tiaktabat ii Anglo at Mlsrlya, 1966, pp.84-86. 95-105. The right of a member state
to conclude a treaty was reiterated In the latest debate on the Baghdad Pact in early
1955. See KhalIl, THE ARAB STATES. II, op.clt., p.238.
l53fayez Sayegh (ed), THE DYNAIIICS Of NEUTRALISM. Boston : Boston Press, 1975.
p.18O.
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Collective Security Pact under ImperIalism" 64 had the nerve to condemn Ir& for
allegedly violating It, foregoing her obligation under the Covenant of the Arab
League, and not consulting Its members. 185 In fact, the preamble of the Baghdad
Pact emphasized adherence to and even endorsement of the Arab Collective
Security Pact more emphatically than the Evacuation Agreement did. Indeed, the
di (ferences between Iraq end Egypt were not new at the creation of the Arab
League.' 86 The new element was that the Baghdad Pact created division along
Ideological rather than along dynastic lines 187 and was used to pit and instigate
one Arab government against another 188 after they achieved a relative degree of
Independence from Great Britain. Egypt had not submitted the draft of the
Evacuation Agreement to the Arab League, but expected Its fun support and
endorsement for her claims more than Iraq or any other Independent Arab
country. 169 Supporters of the Baghdad Pact and opponents of Nasser attribute
Egyptian criticism of the Pact to Nasser's personal egotism l9O and his jealousy of
Hurl al Said who "stole the limelight" 191 from him by concluding the Pact, an act
which Nasser considered a personal insult. Many attributed Nasser's attack to the
fact that It was the Baghdad Pact" end not the Calro Pact", 192 an argument
suggesting the traditional rivalry between the governments of Iraq 193 and Egypt
I841ioted from El Barawy, MILITARY COUP. op.cit., p.209.
l85See Al Dujayll, MITHAQ BA6HDAD, op.cit., pp.149-50.
l8bTom R. Little, "The Arab League : A Reassessment, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, X,
No.2, Spring, 1956. pp.140-41.
l87 Fayez Sayegh, Recent Trends Toward Arab Unity", LANDS EAST. II. No.3. April,
igSB, pp.10-12; Al Dujayli, MITHAO BAGHDAD. op.cit., p.49; J.C. Hurewit.z, MIDDLE
EAST P0I.ITICS : The Military Dimension. New York Praeger. 1969. p.461,
•cnowledgC5 Western instigation.
18bSt. John, THE BOSS, op.clt., p.190; Nasser, MAJMUAT IHUTAB, Part I, p.120,
AprIl 19. 1954.
169See Lacouture, NASSER. op.cit.. p.209; Little, EGYPT. op.cit., pp.258-59.
l9OKhalII, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cIt., p.264; St. John, THE BOSS. op.cIL, p.190.
But Little, EGYPT, op.cit.. p.262. maintaIns a different view.
l 9 l Lord Blrdwood, NURI AS SAiD : A STUDY IN ARAB LEADERSHIP. London : Cassel,
1959, p.23 1. Tom R. Little. "Review of HURl AS SAiD". MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXV,
No.9. November, 1959. p.37. ridicules this interpretation.
102 Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. 1956. February, 26, 1956, p.50 denied
such charges. A later statement of Nasser concerning the pact In which be said that
if the new organizatlon...whlch comprises, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, is a defence
organization and has no hostil. policy towards the Arab countries, then the question of
the pact will became a domestic matter for its signatories.., substantiated these
charges". Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. April-June, 1960,
p.162.
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much more then a personality clash between their leaders. 194 Others charged
that although Nasser showed very little Interest In the affairs of the other Arab
states, he would not tolerate any Arab state adopting a foreign policy which would
not reconcile with Egypt's. 195 Egypt's sudden vituperative propaganda against
the government of Iraq WQ5 crn5ldercd meddling in the offair5 of a sovereign Arab
states, 196 which antagonized even those Iraqis who had never approved of Hurl al
Salds policy. 197 This led to charging Egypt with neo-Imperialism among the
Arab and African countries - a charge which became louder and more frequent as
Nasser's rivals were overthrown or replaced by pro-Nasser sympathizers.198
Still others charged that Nasser's attack against the Baghdad Pact was in part bad
faith or a change in policy evidencing immaturity on the part of Nasser.199
Nasser in turn accused Great Britain and to a lesser extent, the United States, of
changing their amicable policy to one harmful to Egypt. 200 Ineed Nasser was
adamant about not signing en evacuation treaty with Great Britain If It were
conditioned upon entering a military pact with the West. 201 Nasser also
suspected that Nun al Said secret contacts end subsequent agreements with
Pakistan, Turkey, and the United States were aimed at undermining and isolating
Egypt.202 Persistent denials by Turkish and Iraqi leaders of any prospect of
193Kamal SaliW, Crusades, Mongols and Mamluks, MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XXXVI. No.7,
1960, pp.31-34, 46-47; khaliI, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cIL, p.268; and Peter
Malcolm HelL, EGYPT AND THE FERTILE CRESCENT. 1516-1922 : A Political History.
London : Longmans, 1966. pp.18-19. 300-0 1.
1945ee Nassers view of Hurl Al Said In Little, EGYPT. .p.cit., pp. 256-57; Al
DujaYl i. PIITHAQ BA6HDAD. op.cIL. p.50. Constrast with Hurl Al Saids view of
Nasser in khaliI, THE ARAB STATES. Ii. op.clt., pp.256. 275.
l9SLaqueur, NASSERS EGYPT. op.cIt. p.29; Nasser MAJPIUAT KHUTAB, Part I.
pp.349. 382. 460.
196haliI, THE ARAB STATES. II. op.cit., p.279; .1 DujayIl, MITHAQ BAGHDAD. op.cit..
pp. 149-50.
l9lLittle, EGYPT. op.clt., p.263.
l gaDas. MODERN REVIEW. CII. No. 5, Laqueur. NASSERS EGYPT. op.cIt., p.27.
lQ9Nasser, MAJMUAT KHUTAB, Part I. pp.459, 460 656. See accusation and (dens
claims of Nassers bad faith in Wheeiock. NASSERS NEW EGYPT. op.clt... p.235.
2O0MIles Copeland, ThE GAME OF NATIONS. op.clt.. pp.76-77.
201 Nasser, MAJMUAT KHUTAB, Part I, pp.120, 460; Nasser. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REPORT. XXXVII, September 3. 1954, p .27; Khalll, THE ARAB STATES. II. op.cit..
pp.236-37; Nasser. SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958. pp.250-51, July 27.
1958; Gamal Abdel Nasser, Where I Stand and Why. LIFE. XLVII, No.3. July 20.
1959, p.97; Little, EGYPT. op.cit.. pp.261-62; Lacouture, NASSER. op.clt., p.210.
202L1tt)e, EGYPT. op,clt., pp .259-60. First, the concluding of the agreement of
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Iraq's joining the Pakistani-Turkish Pact allayed Nasser's suspicion of Hurl el
Sa'id.203 Furthermore, the assurance of the Iraqi Ambassador Muss al
Shabsndar2O4 that nothing would lead to the establishment of a Western military
pact without Iraq's consulting the members of the Arab Collective Security
Pact205 assured Egypt her future plans for and role In the security pact were
Intact.
The announcement of establishment of the Baghdad Pact shortly after these
assurances Infuriated Nasser, for It presented him with a diplomatic MIT
.4CCOMPL/. In the presence of the pact initiated by Turkey, Egypt either would
have to join the Baghdad Pact on more or less equal looting with Iraq Instead of
enjoying hegemony as she did In the Arab League or, even worse, would have to
face isolation.206 Inherent in the controversy was the conflict between Nasser's
desire and Western interest. Nasser's intention of establishing, organizing, and
strengthening an Arab collective defence system, which would probably include
Turkey, and of seeking Western arms and support without signing a defence treaty
with the West was considered unacceptable. 207 Nasser claimed not to feel it
necessary to •sit down and write a confession that we are on the side of the
Wesr.208 This provoked Fadil el Jamali, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs
end former Prime Minister, to ridicule Nasser saying, The West will not supply
Friendly Cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey on April 2. 1954 (Text In Hurewitz.
DIPLOMACY. II. op.clt., pp .345-6; second, the concluding by IraQ of a Military
Assistance Agreement with the United States on AprIl 21, 1954 (text In Ibid., pp.346-
8); and later the announcement of the initiation of a pact of Turkish Iraqi cooperation
justified Nasser's suspicion.
203LlLt1e. EGYPT. op.cit... pp.260-61. Nasser was sure Iraq would not join the
Pakistani-Turkish Pact and received assurance from FadH al Jamali. Prime Minister of
Iraq. See Nasser. MAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I, p.120, for statement by Nasser on April
19, 1954.
24Se. Little, EGYPT. op.clt.. p.260, and KhaliI. THE ARAB STATES. II. op.cit.. p.272,
for the Iraqi version of these assurances. Contrast with the Egyptian version In
khaliI. ThE ARAB STATES. II. .p.cit.. pp.283-84.
205 kha111, THE ARAB STATES. op.cit.. II. p.284. See also Little, EGYPT. op.cit., p.59.
6See Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. AprIl-June 1960. p.162 (April 24.
1960); Little. EGYPT. pp.262-63; St. John, ThE BOSS. op.cit.. pp.189-90.
207Nasser, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT. XXXVII. September 3. 1954. p.30; KhalII.
THE ARAB STATES. op.cit.. II. pp.282. 284; Nasser. MAJMUAT KHUTAB, ParL I.
pp.458-59.
208 Nasser. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT. XXXVII. September. 3. 1954. p.32.
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these arms for the sake of your black coloured eyes, but only if you come to an
understanding with it.209 Nasser's plan was unpalatable end even unthinkable to
the West, not only because Western interests - especially concerning Israel -
would conflict with those of Egypt end other Arab countries, but also because the
Western powers never felt that Egypt had the ability to fend the Canal Zone, let
alone to help other Arab countries.210 Ultimately there was a conflict of
Interests between an Arab collective defence system end a Western defence system
for the Middle East. The Arab bloc Itself pursued contradictory objectives. The
foreign ministers of the Arab League stated In December 1954, they would not
allow or approve any alliance concluded outside the Collective Security Pact. At
the same time, they sought co-operation with the West on the basis of solving
Arab problems justly, and strengthening the Arabs by supplying them with
arms.21 1 Nasser was hoping to gain time to Implement some of his social reform
programme with long awaited Western aid. 212 In order to consolidate his regime
and, in the meantime, to patch the rift with some Arab countries 213 and restore
any Middle Eastern defence system. The West was hoping that Egypt and other
Arab countries would realize the Communist danger and drop their objections to
the Baghdad Pact.24 Others would maintain that Nasser was dissatisfied with the
slowness, quantity, and type of Western aid he was receiving and with its
ineffectiveness in pacifying the Egyptians. Realizing the difficulty of achieving
peace and prosperity in Egypt and the skepticism which greeted his newly adopted
pro Western policy, Nasser found it much easier to appeal to the emotions of the
209Quoted from khaIll, ThE ARAB STATES. op.ciL., ii p.233. See the interpretation of
reasonableness In achieving national interest in Hourani. THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
IX, No.3, pp.254-55.
21OFor a change of British attitude, see Lecouture, EGYPT IN TRANSITION, pp.204-05.
According to Little, EGYPT. op.cit, p.243, CotoneI Nasser... said that Egypt was
ready to maintain the base and, as the Egyptian army was Incapable of doing so. would
accept British technicians ir Britain did not intend a veiled occupatIon. Nasser
admitted his weakness In his PIAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I, pp.208-9. For the material
values of the Suez base, see Fabumni, op.clt., pp.141-42.
2lIKhaIii, THE ARAB STATES. Ii, op.cIt., p.285.
2l2tacouture, EGYPT IN TRANSITION. o p .ciL pp . 208. 210; khalil. THE ARAB STATES.
ii, op.cit., pp.263, 284. See Nassers criticism of Point Four in Nasser. U.S. NEWS
AND WORLD REPORT, XXXVII. September 3, 1954, p.29.
213LItUe, EGYPT, op.cit., p.262; Nasser, PIAJMUAT KHIJTAB, Part I, p.177; St. John.
THE BOSS. op.cit.., pp.186-187.
21411 We, EGYPT. op.cit., p.262.
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Egyptians end other Arabs215 end direct their wrath against the unpopular el
Sa'id end his Baghdad Pact despite the risk of antagonizing the West. On the other
hand, Nasser end other opponents of the Baghdad Pact did not believe In the
Inevitability of en eli-out nuclear war between Communist and non-Communist
countries.216 Instead Nasser believed that the fear of mutual annihilation would
be a strong deterrent against a third world war. If war were to erupt, by
refusing the West the use of their soil for military bases the Arabs hoped to
remain neutral.217 Further, the Arabs felt that the cold war was a struggle for
world domination 218 and they lost confidence In both sides alter the loss of
Palestine.219 Further, the meager capital resour of the Arab countries were
badly needed for social end economic development and were not adequate for
expensive modern weaponry. Above all, to newly Independent nations such as
Egypt and the other Arab countries the policy of non alignment and neutrality
became synonymous with sovereignty and resistance to alliance, especially with
former masters. 220 What Egypt wanted 'was not a pax britannica, americana, or
sovietica, but just peace. 221
Besides divisions in the Arab world,222 the Baghdad Pact suffered a more serious
215 Tom R. Little, Nasser and the Cold War Strategy, MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XXXIV,
No.4 (AprIl. 1959). pp.23-24; Nasser, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, XXXVII,
SepLember 3. 1954, pp.20-29. See the differences In Nasser's approach to Egypt's
•conomic problems In Charles Issawi EGYPT IN REVOLUTION : Economic Analysis,
London : Oxford University Press, 1963, pp.53-55; Walter Z. Laqueur, THE SOVIET
UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST. London : Routiedge & Kegan Paul, 1959, p.215;
tieelock, NASSERS NEW E6YPT. op.cIt.. pp.222-23.
216Nasser, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT. XXXVII. September 3, 1954. pp .31-32. See
also Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.ciL.., p.236.
217Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. 1958. p.234, July 22. 1958; See
George Hanna, PACTS OR TRAPS. (In Arabic). al Harithiyyat. No.6, Beirut Dar ii 'jim
Ill Malayyln, 1955. pp.65-66.
2laNasser. ibid., 1956, p.49.
219 Ibid.. p.49.
220Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. 1958. p.208. June 21. 1958; Charles
P. Schleicher, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Cooperation and Conflict, Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc.. 1962. pp.296-98.
221 Schlelcber. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. op .cIL, p.299.
2221.5. Amery, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTIONS. 2nd ed. London : Oxford University
Press, 1953, p.157. stipulates this factor as a prerequisite of an alliance. In
contrast, Schilecher, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. op.cIt.. pp.307-08, emphasizes the
subjective or national interest more than common background In the formulation of an
alliance.
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weakness from subjective or human relations. 223 One fundamental prerequisite
of military alliances is that the enemy be clear and known and that his potential
threat be real to all members.224 In the case of the Baghdad Pact, the Iraqis In
particular and the Arabs In general had never experienced Russian occupation;
there were no Russian bases, troops, or economic concessions In the Middle East;
until recently there were not even diplomatic relations between Russia and other
Arab countries.225 Arabs were concerned with Western colonialism, concessions,
military bases, and recently and more seriously, with Zionism end Israel.226
Nevertheless, even radical Arab nationalists stated that 11 the Arabs were free
today from colonialism, foreign occupation, Zionist threat and dismemberment and
had to take a stand In global struggle, a stand which would be closest to their
Ideals and national Interest, they would take the side of the Western democracies
rather than most of the Eastern dictatorships. 227 Why? Apart from the atheist
overtones of Marxism-Leninism. It was widely remembered by the Arabs that the
Soviet Union recognized and approved the partition plan for Palestine, supported
Israel with arms at her Inception, endorsed her admission to the United Nations,
and gave her diplomatic and moral support.226
Therefore, Hurl al Sa'ld's attempt to warn his fellow Iraqis of the gravity of the
remote but potential danger of Russia and Communism and to minimize or Ignore
the existence of British troops on Iraqi soil was doomed to failure. 229 His
223 1nis Claude, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES : The Problems and Progress or
International OrganizatIon, 2nd ad., New York : Random House, 1959.
224Hans eIsen, Collective Security and Collective Self Defense under the Charter of
the United Nat.ions, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. XLII. No.4,
October. 1946, pp.163-84; Schlelcher. INTERNATIOIIAL RELATIONS. op.cit., pp.313,
315.
2250n the other hand, there are the Inductive factors for the spread of communism
stated In Bernard Lewis, The Middle East Reaction to Soviet Pressures, THE MIDDLE
EAST JOURNAL, X, No.2, Spring, 1956, pp.129, 132-3.
6 Nasser, MAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I, p.289.
227Quoted from 6eorge J. Tomeh, SyrIa and Neutralism, THE DYNAMICS OF
NEUTRALISM, edited by Fayez A. Sayegh op.cit., p.124.
228 AIfred II. Lfflenthal, WHAT PRICE ISRAEL, Chicago : Henry Regnery, 1953. pp.148,
158. 222-23.
9 Al Dujayll, MITHAQ BA6HDAD. op.clt., p.152.
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premises for siding with the West were that he could drive a wedge between the
West end Israel, force the latter toward the East, end thereby drain or weaken
lsroeVs real strength.230 His over-emphasis of the Russian danger rather than
that of Zionism was contradictory to his past stands. During the Second World
War Hurl al Said regarded the Palestine question as the root of all the evils
which disturbed end weakened Anglo-Iraqi relations. Any Improvement In this
respect will tend to improve and strengthen these relatlons. 231 In a quarrel
between the West and Communist Russia. Hurl al Said expressed the same
sourness about the Zionists: Israel Is the clear and present danger. Communism
secondary.232 Secretary of State Dulles also unequivocably stated that the Arabs
are more fearful of Zionism than of Communism, end they tear most the United
States become the backer of expansionist Zionism. 233 The most outrageous stand
of the Western powers was their persistent pressure on the Arab countries to
join a military pact against Russia with whom the Arab countries hod no direct
involvement and the refusal of the West, especially the United States, to be even
neutral In the Arab-Israeli conflict. Instead the West gave generously and
without conditions full military, financial, and moral support to Israel, some of
whose settlers from Russia and Eastern Europe were Inclined toward Communist
ideas and institutIon.234 It Is this Arab resentment against joining any Western
defence pact much more than the soundness of Nasser's views, the cleverness of
his approach, or the righteousness of his claim that explains his success and the
rise of his popularity.
Thus, In general, the Baghdad Pact was hailed by Its members and In the West as
en act of statesmanship and a bold daring step by Hurl al Said. However, It was
23O KhaliI, ThE ARAB STATES. II, op.clt., p.273. See also at Dujayli, IIITHAQ
BA6HDAD. op.ciL., pp.29, 53, 60-61. 63, 76, 83. Indeed, any rapproachm.nt or the
Arabs with the West invokes Zionist worries and rears more than the arms the Arabs
obtain do.
23t Quoted rrom Majid Khadduri, INDEPENDENT IRAQ : A Study in Iraqi Politics Since
1932, London : Oxford University Press, 1951. p.170.
232Qtjoted rrom Hurl al Said, Plartyred iraqi Premier Leaves a Last Testament,
LIFE. XLV. No.4, July 28. 1958. p.26.
233 HurewiLz, DIPLOMACY. II, op.cit., p.341.
234 or a rigorous, myth shattering account on the origins of the special relationship
of the Wests support ror Israel see, Noam Chomsky, ThE FATEFUL TRIANGLE : The
United States, Israel, and the Palestinians, U.S.A. : South End Press, 1983.
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received with coolness by Israel 235 with resentment end ecepticism by
neutralist India, with antagonism by the Communist bloc236 who called it an
Imperialist plan, and with furious opposition by Nasser and Arab nationalists.
The fact that no other Arab country other than Iraq joined the pact and the strong
opposition of the Arab, to the pact further explains Arab reaction to Nasser's
foreign policy in the next two years. Conclusion of the Baghdad pact diverted the
wrath of the Arab nationalists from Nasser to the already unpopular Nun al
Sa'ld.237 More importantly, Nasser's opposition to military pacts brought him,
after a turbulent, bloody month, in line with the mainstream of Egyptian
thinking. Thus he diffused the opposition and temporarily consolidated his
regime. The results of his opposition to the Baghdad Pact demonstrated Nasser's
power end influence, in the negative sense, by preventing other Arab countries
from joining the pact. Opposition to the pact overshadowed all of Nasser's
activities and directed e11 of Egypt's efforts toward the Arab countries and the
opposition against the membership of any Arab country in any regional
organization that does not emanate from the Arab countrles. 238 Nasser did not
confine himself to mere objection. As a counterattack against the Baghdad Pact he
vitalized the Arab Collective Security Pact by establishing the Mutual Defence
Pact between Egypt and Syria on October 20. 1955.239 followed a similar pact
with Saudi Arabia on October 27. 1955,240 a pact with the Hashemite Jordan on
March 8-17, 1956,241 end even with Yemen on April 21, 1956. 242 These pacts
created the Joint Arab command, thereby virtually isolating the Pro Western
Iraqi government from the rest of the Arab countries. 243 As a result, Nasser
235 The linking and equalizing of Israel's opposition to the Baghdad Pact with Nasser's
criticism of the Pact were ridiculed In the House of Commons. See al Dujayli, MITHAQ
BAGHDAD. o p .cIL p.63.
236Hurewit.z, DIPLOMACY. II, op.cit., p.415.
237Albert Houranl, The Decline .r the West in the Middle East, 1I. INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS. XXIX, April. 1953. p.168. Lacouture, EGYPT IN TRANSITION. op.cIL.. p.221;
Wynn. NASSER OF EGYPT. op.cit., p.106.
23ö1ranslated from Nasser, MAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I, p.460.
2395ee Text In the MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. X. No.1, Winter 1956, pp.77-79.
24OSee KhaliI. ThE ARAB STATES. II, op.cIL., pp.242-45.
24lSee Ibid.. pp.267-89.
242See Ibid.. pp.250-3.
24See Little, EGYPT. op.clL, p.263.
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restored end enhanced Egypt's leadership, revived her interest In strengthening
the Arab League and the Collective Security Pact, and looked to the adoption of
Arab nationalism for Egypt.244
The Baghdad Pact shaped the divisions among and within Arab countries along the
lines of foreign policy rather then along the dynastic lines of the past: For the
Baghdad Pact was the starting point of the greet struggle between the advocates of
complete inclependence...end the agents of Imperialism, who work...In order to
turn the whole Arab world Into a part of the British sphere of Influence.245
After the Evacuation Agreement Nasser begun moving toward rapprochement with
the West. Conclusion of the Baghdad Pact, as Nasser put it, mede useless the
greatest opportunity which the concluding of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of
October, 1954, provided,246 for the Baghdad Pact marked the end of the semi
truce 241 and the beginning of Nasser's rift with the West. From the Baghdad
Pact onwards, British policy consisted of a series of defeats or retreats
culminating In the futile invasion of Egypt at the end of 1956. 248 Nasser
complained that the British government did not stop with the Baghdad Pact, but
continued political and economic pressure against other Arab countries to Join It.
Hence, Nasser was reacting to British pressure.249 The results were e series of
external political events which led, by a complex process of reaction and
Interaction, to the most unforeseen results.250 The Egyptian government
claimed that all the events which befell the Arabs In 1955 and 1956 were only
244 Gamal Abdel Nasser, interview with Premier Nasser: Afl.r SUeZ, a Pow.rrul
Arab World? Interviewed by Sam Sauki, NEWSWEEK, XLIV. July 26. 1954. p.35.
Nasser began to steer toward wooing Arab peoples and governments. See Nasser,
KHUTUB AL PAlS. I, p.141. November 29, 1953.
245Kha1111, THE ARAB STATES, Ii. op.cIL, p.279.
246Nasser. MAJMUAT KHUTAB. I. p.460. March 26. 1956.
247 1b1d.. p.460.
248L1ttle, EGYPT. op .cit., p.261.
249Nasser, MAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I, p.459. Contrast with the British claim that.
they did everything to appease Nasser. See Wheelock, NASSERS NEW E6YPT. op.cit..
p.235. See also Mohammed Heikal, NASSER : The Cairo Documents, U.S.A : Doubleday
& Company Inc.,1972, where Nasser is reported to have said 1 do not act. I react.
0.54. Witness the CIA attempt to bribe Nasser wIth *3 million In Heikal, also
Copeland, THE GAME OF NATIONS, op.cit., p.112.
0 Issawi, EGYPT IN REVOLUTION. op.clt., p.55.
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the outcome of the signing of the Baghdad Pact.2 51 Among these events was the
Israeli attack of the Gaza Strip on February 28, 1955.
3.9 NASSER. ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINE OUEST ION252
The gravity of the February 1955 attack was not in the military engagements, the
type of weapons used, the number of armed forces engaged, or the number of
casualties, end certainly not In the amount of territory exchanged. Its
significance was not even In the immediate reaction: rather It was In Its Impact
on the formulation of Nasser's future policies and on his priorities. However, to
be able to appreciate the significance of these policIes and their Implications,
together with the reasons why Nasser and the Arabs adopted such policies, the
historical setting deserves to be mentioned.
Although Palestine was an Arab Muslim country, the establishment of a national
home for the Jews there was essentially a problem first for Syria and then for
Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Egyptians, least Involved In the Palestine
problem ,253 were less antagonistic than other Arabs to the Zionist movement.254
Their attitude may be explained partly by the active role of some Egyptian Jews
In Egypt's national movement and partly by the preoccupation of the Egyptians
with independence.255 However, Egypt gradually began to realize the Impact of
25t KhaIil. THE ARAB STATES.II. op.ciL, p.279.
252 The problem for the researcher when dealing with the Arab-israeli-Palestine
conflict is to avoid using terminology that may be considered to be unwittingly
endorsing the status quo. But, rather to question the relevance of the use or
semantics. For an elaboration on this point, see L. Hamalian, The Middle East : The
Semantics of the Palestine Ouestion. ISSUES. IX. No.3. Autumn. 1965. pp.24-33.
253See Zaghiuls statement in Georgians 6. Stevens, ad.. THE UNITED STATES AND THE
MIDDLE EAST. Englewood cllrfs. N.J.: Prentice HaIl, 1964. p.15.
254Don Perstz. Report on the U.A.R - Israeli Relations, MIDDLE EAST REPORT 1959:
NATIONAUSII. NEUTRALISM. COMMUNISM : The Struggle for Power. Ed. William Sands
Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute. 1959. p.34. Elmer Berger, WHO KNOWS
BETTER MUST SAY SO!. New York : American Council for JudaIsm, 1955. pp.12. 14.
John Marlowe, FOUR ASPECTS OF EGYPT. London :Allen & Unwin. 1966, pp.330, 338.
5Jacob H. Landau, Abu Naddarah : An Egyptian Jewish Nationalist, JOURNAL OF
JEWISH STUDIES. Iii, No.1, 1952, pp.30-I, 37. 42-3. Landau refers tO some anti-
Jewish incidents, but in general the reeling discerned was anti-European and anti-
Christian.
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Palestine primarily because of religious sentiment, but also partly because of
commercial, geographical, strategical and, consequently, political factors, and
because a national home for the Jews was considered a spearhead for world Jewry
and Western Imperialism. Furthermore, during World War II end after the
establishment of the League of Arab States, Egypt gradually became interested in
end identified with the problems of other Arab countries, especially the Palestine
problem. Section 5 of the Alexandria Protocol of October 7, 1944, later Annex B
of the Charter of the League of Arab States, and the granting of permission for a
Palestinian representative to attend the Arab League meetings signified the
Importance of Palestine to the Arab states.256 The situation In Palestine
deteriorated after the Second World War, and the British - feeling unable to
continue or, more likely, simply yielding to Zionist and American pressure 257 -
relinquished their mandate and referred the case to the United Nations. Pressure
on member states by private Zionist groups wrested a resolution from the United
Nations recommending the partition of Palestine into two states - one Arab and
the other Jewish.258 This partition resulted in a chaotic state of war.259 The
United States government, the chief sponsor of the November 1947 Partition
Plan, realized Its implementation would result In further bloodshed and turmoil.
Accordingly, on May 14. 1948, the United Nations General Assembly passed a
resolution which:
Taking account of the present situation In regard to
Palestine,...
1. Empowers a United Nations Mediator In
Palestine...to exercise the following functions...
(lii) Promote a peaceful adjustment of the future
situation of Palestine...
Relieves the Palestine Commission from the further
exercise of responsibilities under resolution 181 (II)
of 29 November 1947260
2 S.. KhalIl. THE ARAB STATES. II, •p.cIL.. pp.55, 61. r.sp.ctiv.Iy, for ho
provisions.
2575ee Regina Sharif, NON JEWISH ZIONISM : It Roots In Western History, London
The Zed Press. 1965.
2SBLIlIenthal. WHAT PRICE ISRAEL. op.clt., pp.46-80.
259HurewILz, MIDDLE EAST POUTICS. op.cIL.. p.457.
260U.N. Document sf565. General Assembly : Official Records : Third Session:
Supplement No.1, Lake Success, 1948. pp.5-6, 8-9. Quoted from Hurewitz,
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Contrary to what In the West Is generally celled Israel's War of Independence or
Llberetion against intervention by Arab states, most of the Palestinian populated
major cities and coastal land reserved by the Partition Plan for the would-be
Arab state were occupied by Zionist forces prior to the entry of the Arab states
Into Palestine on ticy 15, 1948. ThIs was affirmed by Ben Ourion who later
testified that untll the British left, no Jewish settlement, however remote, was
entered or seized by the Arabs, while the Heganah...captured many Arab positions
and liberated Tiberlas and Haifa, Jaffa and Safed. 261 Thus, despite support from
other Arab countries, the Palestinian armed forces proved defenceless against the
well-trained Zionist forces:
There were...eighty thousand Palestinian Jewish
men...Such overwhelming force could not be
marshalled by the Palestinian Arabs, probably not
even together with the Arabs of the edjoining
countries.262
Also, apparently a quarter of a million Palestinian Arabs either fled, were
deliberately expelled according to Plan Dalet, or were terrified (witness the
whispering campaigns) and left their homes and property .263 in the face of
these brutal crimes against humanity In a contiguous country and against
humanity In a contiguous country and against the Arabs of Palestine who are
strongly bound by many ties to the people of neighbouring Arab Stetes, the
Egyptian government could not remain Indifferent. 264 Thus Egypt and other
members of the League of Arab States felt obligated to take collective action to
defend a sister Arab country which lies between the Arab East and Arab West and
which has special historical and religious significance265 to the Arabs and
DIPLOMACY. II, op.cit., p.460.
2 DavId Ben Gurion, REBIRTh AND DESTINY OF ISRAEL, New York : Philosophical
Library. 1954. p.530. See also Hurewltz. MIDDLE EAST POLITICS. II, op.cIt, p.457.
22Quoted from Salo W. Baron, Prospects of Peace in PaIestine, THE NEAR EAST :
Problems and Prospects, Ed. Philip W. Ireland. Lectures on the Harris Foundation,
1942. ChIcago : University of Chicago Press, 1942. p.121.
263Waljd Khalidi, PIan Dalet : Master PIan, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXVII, No.9.
November, 1961. pp.23-25.
2640uoted from E6YPT AND THE U.N.. in KhalII. THE ARAB STATES, II, op.clt., p.56.
265 1b1d., II. p.558.
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Muslims -second only to Mecca and Medina. Such action is politically expedient.
The right to such collective action is guaranteed under the Charter of the United
Nations.266 In addition. Palestine is especially important to Egypt geopolitically
end historically as her only land linkage with the countries of the Arab East. The
Importance end linkage of Palestine to Egypt from historic times was echoed by
Nasser's clear awareness that Rafah was not the real outer boundary of our
country, and that our own security required the defence of the boundaries of the
sister Arab states among whom we were placed by fate. 267 For he was certain
that what was happening in Palestine could happen in any of the Arab states.268
In addition, Egypt felt that the establishment of a modern progressive Western
state on her border would physically separate her from the rest of the Arabs and
also present a potentially serious threat to her developing industry and commerce
in that region.269 In addition Egypt hod her own Immediate objectives for
entering Palestine.270 The outcome of the Arab expedition In the Palestine War
was disastrous. The Arabs failed to wrest from the Zionists the lands retained for
them in the Partition Plan already occupied by the latter. Instead the Israelis
seized more of the land that had been elloted to the Arabs, a development which
resulted in an even larger number of Arabs being mode homeless. The entry of
Arab armies Into Palestine made the Arabs appear to be the aggressors.271
2 Ib1d., II, p.560.
267 Quoted from Nasser. EGYPt'S LIBERATION, op.cit., p.94. Nasser was further
convinced when a state of mourning was announced in the Israeli Knesset during
withdrawal of Israeli troops In 1957. See Nasser. SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS.
January-March. 1960. pp .1 18-19. March 7. 1960.
268 QuoLed from Nasser, EGYPFS LIBERATION, op.clt., pp.97-96. Nassers worries and
fears became reality when hundreds of thousands of Egyptians. Syrians. and
Jordanians were expelled or evacuated as a result and consequence of Israeli
occupation after the June 1967 War. See THE NEW YORK TItlES. February 13. 1970.
p.34.
269Charles D. Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD : Nassers Arab Nationalist
Policy. New York : Praeger, 1963. p.94. Eliahu Sassoon in 6uela Cohen (Moderator).
How to Speak to the Arabs A Macnv Round Tabl., THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL.
XVIII. No. 2, SprIng, 1964, p.146; Marlowe. FOUR ASPECTS OF EGYPT. op.clt.. p.327.
270 tlarlowe, FOUR ASPECTS OF EGYPT. .p.cit.. p.237. The direct objective of Egypt In
the entry into Palestine was to prevent Prince Abdullah of Transjordan from annexing
the part or Palestine assigned to the Arabs to his domain. Martial law was declared by
Egypt not La protect or secure the army but to quiet opposition and divert the aLtention
of the people from their plight. See El Barawy. MILITARY COUP. op.clt.. pp.160-61.
211 Naguib. EGYPS DESTINY. op.cIt.. p.17. Cecil Hourani. The Moment of Truth
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Thereby, the Israelis won both militarily and dlplomatically.272
The Arabs states were quick to blame their defeat273 On the Interference of the
United Nations; the economic, political, end military pressure of all the major
powers - East ana west - against them,2?4 end the major powers- unqualirleti
support of the Zionists. The statement of Abdul Rahman Azzam (nicknamed Abu el
Kalam, 'talkative') of the League of Arab States that If the Arabs had not accepted
the armistice of June 1948, they would never have been defeated In
Palestine,275 Is a typical excuse of the Arab governments In covering up their
weaknesses Instead of learning their real causes. 276 The Arab officers who
fought In Palestine added to the list of causes: corruption, Arab diplomacy, lack of
preparation and modern weapons, Inefficiency of the Arab armies, lack of
coordination and of a unified Arab command,277 and In some cases, the treason of
some Arab governments, especially the Egyptian ancien rime's defective arms
scandal.278 The truth was 1n the face of the enemy the Arabs were not a state,
but petty states, groups, not a nation; each fearing and anxiously watching the
other and intriguing against Ir. 279 Consequently, the Arabs accepted the second
truce of July 18, 1948 In compliance with the Security Council Resolution and
sought other means to handle the Palestine problem. Although Egypt was the last
Towards a Middle East Dialogue, THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER : A Documentary History
of the Middle East Conflict, ed. Walter Z. Laqueur, New York : Bantam Books, 1969,
p.246.
272John H. Davis, THE EVASIVE PEACE : A Study of the Zionist/Arab Problem. London
John Murray. 1968.
273Nasser, THE PHILOSOPHY. op.cit., pp.98-99. rightly refers to Arab self-deception
in never admitting publicly and solemnly that. their failure was in leadership and selr
description.
274NaguIb, E6YPS DESTINY. op.cit., pp.18-19; El Sadat, REVOLT ON ThE NILE. op.cIt.,
p.91; Nasser. SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. 1950. p.584 • October 9, 1959.
Marlowe. FOUR ASPECTS Of EGYPT. op.clt., p.329. contends that the time of the rlrst
truce the Arabs had proven Incapable of defeating the Zionists.
275I EGYPT AND ThE U.N.. quoted from khaIil. ThE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit, p.57.
276Na55er, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. 1958. p.72, March 2, 1958.
2771b1d., p.72.
278 for details on this, refer to Copeland, ThE GAME OF NATIONS, op.cit.. pp.34-67; El
Sadat. REVOLT ON THE NILE. p.42; Nasser, E6YPS LIBERATION. op.cit., pp.55-60.
HofStaflder. FACT ON FILE PUBLICATION, Vol.1, p.45.
2790uot,d from Musa ci AlimI, Th. Lesson of Pal,stino, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL.
III, No.4, October, 1949. p.385.
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Arab country to be involved in the Palestine War and was the least enthusiastic,
at the end of the war she found herself the only country fighting lsrl. Desertion
by the others outraged all major factions In Egypt and drove a wedge between
Egypt end the other Arab governments.280
Israel's main purpose In concentrating on Egypt in 1948 was that without Egypt.
no other Arab state will talk.281 Hence, the Israeli attack of late 1948 and
early 1949 against Egypt forced her to conclude the Armistice Agreement of
February 24, 1949, with Israel which resulted in the backing down of the other
Arab countries. Thus Israel's attack against Egypt achieved the Israeli objectives
in bringing Egypt to the peace table in February 1949.
The main objectives of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel as stated
in Article I were promotlng the return to permanent peace in Palestine
end...mutuol assurances concerning the future military operations of the
Parties. Peace between the parties was to be based on the conthtions of Articles
11(2):
No element of the land, sea or air military or para-
military forces of either Party, Including non regular
forces shall commit any warlike or hostile act against
the military or para-military forces of the other
Party...or shall advance beyond or pass over any
purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line.
and Article IV (3):
It is emphasized that It is not the purpose of this
agreement to establish, to recognize, to strengthen, or
to weaken or nullify, In any way, any territorial,
custodial, or other rights, claims or interests which
260Nasser tried to play down Egyptian disinterestedness in Palestine by attributing it
to a campaign of conspiracies and Intrigues Ithati was waged Iby some Egyptiansi
saying that the Arabs and thos. who joined the Arabs were the source .r d.r.at. and
consplracy. Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. 1959, p.256.
July 23, 1959. See also Marlowe, FOUR ASPECTS OF E6YPT. op.cit.. pp.330-31. 336.
351. and AL AHRAI'I. Cairo. Daily issues, 1946-1949.
2 QuoLed from Ben 6urion In THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 18. 1967. p.16. This
statement is also reproduced in I.F. STONES WEEKLY, Washington. D.C.. XV, No.23,
July 3, 1967. p.1.
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may be Ossertefi by either Party In the area of
Palestine or any part or 1oclity thereof covered by
the Agreement.282
The same principles and provisions were restated In Article II of the Israeli-
Lebanese Agreement of March 23, 1949,283 In Articles III (3) and IV of the
Israeli-Jordanian Agreement of AprIl 3, 1949,284 end In the Article II of the
Isreell-Syr Ian Agreement of July 20. 1 949265
In defiance of the unequivocal prohibitions against any military move or gains
under the armistice agreements the Israelis occupied the Gulf end Port of Eliat In
March 1949,286 thereby completely separating Egypt from the rest of the Arab
countries end adding a serious source of contention 287 between Israel and Egypt.
Israeli occupation of Eliat further complicated the already existing Egyptian
blockade of ships and goods destined for Israel through the Suez Canal by
extending the blockade to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran on the grounds
that Egypt was still technically In a state of war 288 with Israel.289
262Quoted from the text as reproduced in KhalIl, ThE ARAB STATES. II, op.cIL,
pp.585-86. The Israelis cling to Article I while the Arabs hold last to Articles 11(2)
and IV (3).
3 lbid.. p.596.
4 Ibld.. p.60 1.
5 Ibid.. p.606.
6See justification given in Moshe Dayan, 'Israels Border and Security ProbIems
FOREI6N AFFAIRS. XXXIII. No.2. January. 1955. p.253. See also Anthony S. Reyner,
The Strait or 1iran and the Sovereignty of the Sea, ThE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. XXI.
No.3, Summer. 1967. p.404, which states. The Palestine Mandate had a corridor to
the Gulf of Aqaba. In 1947. the United Nations 6eneral Assembly did not include this
short coast in the Palestine partltion plan, which tie Arab states refused to accept.
287Nasser, MAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I, p.220. September 13. 1954; Part I. p.658.
June 14, 1957; Wynn, NASSER OF E6YPT. o p .clt., pp.130-31; Naguib, E6YPFS
DESTINY. op.cit., p.228. See also the vitality or [hat to Israeli trade and relations
with African countries in kamIl Al Sharif, 'The Challenge of NigerIa', MIDDLE EAST
FORUM, XXXVII. No.1, January. 1961, p.36; Abbe [ban The Outlook for Peace in the
Middle East', PROCEEDINGS OF ThE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. XXVI. No.3, May
1957. p.313. For Weizmanns visit to Truman concerning this Issue, see Lihienthal,
WHAT PRICE ISRAEL. op.clt., p.70.
8 Israel clings to Articles I and IV of the Suez Canal Convention, the former of which
reads in part:
Article I: The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, In time of war is in
time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of IIag.
'The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of the block.de.
Quoted from text reproduced in Ilurewltz, DIPLOMACY. I. op.clt., p.203.
On the other hand, Egypt holds fast to Article X, which modifies other articles by
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Other Immediate sources of friction and actual fighting between Egypt and Israel
were the armistice line and the demilitarized zones. The nature and function of
the Armistice Agreement of February 24. 1949. between Israel and Egypt are
defined by Article V (2):
The Armistice Demarcation Line Is not to be construed
In any sense as a political or territorial boundary.
and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims
and positions of either party to the Armistice as
regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine
Question.290
Land originally reserved by the United Nations Partition Plan for the Indigenous
Arab people of Palestine that bed fallen under Israeli control was annexed to
Israel; while any land originally allotted to Israel to which she bed not yet
extended her control In 1948-1949 was considered to belong to Israel. Thus,
Israel persistently advanced In the demilitarized zone, subjected It to her
Jurisdiction, and expelled more Palestinian Arabs. 291 Israel. In the name of
self-defence and security, expanded beyond the United Nations Partition Plan and
the Armistice Agreements of 1 949•292
stating provisions of Articles IV.V.VII shall not inLerter. with the measures whch His
Majesty the Sultan and his Highness the Khedive...mlght find it necessary to take for
securing by their own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public
order. p.204.
269 N.guib, E6YPS DESTINY. •p.clL., pp.228-29. 232, rques that the .mbarqo was
temporary. Nasser justified the blockade because it. Involved national terriLorial
waters. See Nasser, MAJMUAT KHUTAB I, Part I p.658. See also p.220; Nasser
SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. January-March, 1960, pp.143-45, March 3. 1960;
April-June, 1960. p.163 ,April 24. 1960.
0 0uoted from Khalll, ThE ARAB STATES. ii, op.clt. p.586.
2 'ThE NEW YORK TIMES. February. 26, 1960, pp.1, 3. See also the opposition of the
Chief of Staff of UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) to israels
abuse of authority in the demIlItarized zone In E.H. Hutchinson. VIOLENT TRUCE : A
MiliLary Observer Looks at the Arab Israeli Conflict, 1951-55. New York : Devin
Adair. 1956. p.111; Cremeans. ThE ARABS AND ThE WORLD. op.cit., p.199; Fred J.
Khoury, The U.S. and the U.N. and the Jordan River Issue, MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XL.
No.4. May. 1964, p.21. Both Arabs and Israelis crossed the armistice lines to commit
violence and aggression and were censured by the United Nations, but the scope.
magnitude, planning and role of government were sharply different. See Fayez A.
Sayegh. THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. Information Papers No.2, New York : The Arab
Inrormation Center. 1956, p.6 which refers to U.N. Document and Report S/3660 of 27
September, 1956, Part. 1. See also Hutchinson, VIOLENT TRUCE. op.cit., PP.90-92.
VIOLENT TRUCE. op.cit., pp.112-13. The maps on these pages illustrate
the aggrandizement of Israel from 1947 to 1949.
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The most tragic consequence of the establishment of Israel Is the plight of the
Palestinian refugees who were deliberately expelled according to Plan Dalet from
their homes before, during, end after the Palestinian War of 1948. 293 The
General Assembly's resolution of December 11, 1948, In Article Xi, which has
been reiterated at almost every United Nations annual meeting. resolved that the
refugees wishing to return to their homes end live at pe with their neighbours
should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and the
compensations should be paid for loss or damage to property. 294 However,
Israel in cooperation with the Zionist organizations, Instead conducted en all out
campaign abroad to perpetuate the misery of displaced Jews 295 in some countries
to pressure them to migrate to lsrae296 Even in democratic and prosperous
countries where Jews have achieved political, social, and economic rights and
privileges and are relatively satisfied, they have been subjected to moral
pressure end religious defamation.29? Thereby Israel is making physically
Impossible the restoration of the Arabs to their homes on the grounds of
endangering Its own security. Article I of the Law of return of 1950. passed by
the Knesset on July 5, 1950, declares: Every Jew has the right to come to this
country as en oleh... 01eh is interpreted...es e Jew immigrating to Israel for
settlement.298 Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister of Israel, defiantly stated that
Israel categorically rejects the insidious proposal of freedom of choice of the
refugees, a declaration which aroused the fear of the Egyptians and other Arabs
that some extra territory must be found for the refugees at their expense.299
293Don Peret.z, 1he Arab Refugees : A Changing ProbIem. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. XLI.
No.3. AprIl. 1963. p.564 poInts out to the plight of the unskilled Palestinian refugee
worsened and that rehabilitation, repatriation, economic prosperity, or settlement of
the refugees would not solve the problem, but it. spreads resentment to Israel and has
turned into a political and psychological problem of homeIessness.
294Quoted from KhajIl, THE ARAB STATES. op.clt., ii, p.584.
295LIlIenthal, WHAT PRICE ISRAEL. op.cit., pp.34, 36-7.
6Elmer Berger, WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO!. op.clt., p.13. cIted the ruthless
and cynical activities of Zionism which is willing to play with the destiny of 50.000
Jews (In Egypt) for a little money and in order to be able to Lake out a few hundred a
year to israel. See also pp.15, 109.
297 Ben Gurion...dld not scruple to quote Jewish scripture...Every day spent abroad,
he pointed out., violate the precept of the Talmud that says. Wboever dwells outside
the land of Israel is considered to have no 6od. TIME, January. 6. 1961. p.30. For
reaction In the United States, see THE NEW YORK TIMES. December 30. 1960. p.4.
8 Ouoted in Fayez A. Sayegh. THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT. op.clt.. p.49.
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Another source of friction has been the Arab economic boycott of Isreel which has
probably been more Irritating to the Israelis than the Arab military or
diplomatic offensive. However, since the Israelis are not dependent on Arab
markets and economies they can endure this boycott. All these problems derived
from the original problem of Palestine and their solutions depend on a settlement
of the general problem.
The United Nations Conciliation Commission was entrusted with the difficult task
of settlement of the Palestine Question In Its entirety In 1949. 300 As a result of
Its work both Israel and the Arabs agreed to the Lausonne Protocol of May, 12,
1949, which reads In part:
The United Nations Conciliation Commission for
Palestine, anxious to achieve as quickly as possible
the objectives of the General Assembly's Resolution of
December 11, 1948, regarding refugees, the respect
of their rights and the preservation of their property,
as well as territorial and other questions, has
proposed to the Delegation of Israel and to the
Delegations of the Arab States that the Worklng
Documents attached hereto, be taken as basis for
discussion with the Commission.30'
The resolution admitting Israel to the United Nations on May 11, 1949, stated in
part:
Recalling Its resolutions of 29 November 1947 and 11
December 1 948 and taking note of the declarations and
explanations made by the representative of the
Government of Israel before the ad hoc Political
Committee In respect to the Implementation of the said
resolutions,
The General Assembly...decides to admit Israel to
membership In the United Nations.302
9Stitement of Ben 6urion In the knesset is quoted In Cremeins. ThE ARABS AND ThE
WORLD, op.cIt., p.203.
300KhiIil. THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cIL.. pp.583-84.
301 0uoted from ibid., II, p.607.
302 The U.N. General Assembly Document 273/Ill, tl.y It, 1949. Quoted from Ibid., ii,
p.607.
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Once admitted to the United Nations, Israel began to avoid implementation of the
Lausanne Protocol,3O3 stipulated conditions that rendered Impossible the
convening of the Conciliation Commission, 304 and insisted on direct negotiation
with the Arabs without United Nations supervision. Finally, Israel ruled
unilaterally that entry of the regular armies of the Arab states Into Palestine on
May 15, 1948, m&le all the United Nations resolutions on Palestine null and
void.305 Upon Israel's deliberate violation of the armistice agreements by
occupying Eliat. In view of Israel's procrastination in implementing United
Nations resolutions, and In fear that Israel might pressure Jordan to sign a peace
treaty, the Arab League passed the following resolution on April 13, 1950:
No member State of the Arab League may negotiate or
conclude a separate peace (treaty) or any (other)
political, military or economic agreement with Israel.
Any state which takes any such course shall be
considered to have withdrawn from the Arab League
forthwith in accordance with Article 18 of the Pact of
the League.306
Before evaluating Nasser's policy toward Israel It is Important to examine the
elements of this most complicated conflict and its prospect. One will start with
the establishment of Israel and the use of force.
The establishment of a national home for the Jews In Palestine was from the
outset created by force. For:
No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners,
3 Fayez A. Sayegh, ThE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT. op.ciL., pp.41-42.
304IsraeIi criticism of the value or the United Nations Conciliation Commission to
Israel is expressed by Eliahu Sassoon (the Israeli who did most of the negotiating) In
Cohen, THE PUDDLE EAST JOURNAL. XVIII. No.2. p.147. Contrast the suspicion of
Egyptian Arabs in Elmer Berger, WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SOIIP op.cit., pp.26-
106 and Alfred M. Lilientha), THERE 60ES THE MIDDLE EAST. New York : Devin Adair,
1957. p.121. who maintains that Israel rejected United Nations supervision in their
negotiation with the Arabs to have a tree hand In dictating their conditions and to
release herself from any obligations.
305Quoted from ISRAEL DIGEST. New York : Israel Office of Information, VI No.46,
November 10. 1955. pp.1-2 in Fayez A. Sayegh, ThE RECORD OF ISRAEL AT THE UNITED
NATIONS, Information Papers No.3.. New York : Arab Information Center. 1957. p.123.
306 0uot.ed in Khali!, THE ARAB STATES. II, op.cit.. p.167.
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believed that the Zionist programme could be carried
out except by force of erms...Decislons requiring
armies to carry out are sometimes necessary, but they
are surely not gratuitously to be taken In the
Interests of serious injustice.307
From the outset, the king-Crane Commission warned against subjugation of the
Palestinians emphasizing that:
To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish
Immigration, end to steady financial and social
pressure the land, would be a gross violation of the
principle just quoted and of the people's rights.308
Since 1947 and more emphatically in the Alexandria Protocol of October 7. 1944,
the Arabs warned In vain that there can be no greater Injustice and aggression
than solving the problem of the Jews of Europe by another Injustice, I.e. by
inflicting injustice on the Arabs of Pelestine.309 President Franklin D.
Roosevelt who wanted peace between the Arabs and the Jews in 1945 believed
that a Jewish state could be established and maintained in Palestine only through
military.. [forcer.31 ° Likewise, the United States, the architect of the United
Nations Partition Plan, realized the chaos that ensued in Palestine and the
difficulty of implementing the plan without further bloodshed. Consequently, the
United Nations resolved postponement of the Implementation of the Partition Plan.
Thus, Israel was brought into being by:
Not an agreed decision but force of arms and all that
the United Nations was able to do afterwards was to
take note of the fact and try to prevent any further
change from being made by similar methods (by the
Arabs).3' 1
307Quoted from 6eorge AnLonIu, tHE ARAB AWAKENING : The Story of the Arab
National Movement, London : Hamish Hamilton, 1938. p.449.
308Quoted from Harry N. Howard. ThE KING-CRANE COMMISSION, Beirut : Kystas,
1963. p.350.
309 Quoted from Khalil, ThE ARAB STATES, Ii, op.clt., p.55.
310 QuoLed from United States Government papers made public for the first time In ThE
NEW YORK TIMES. May 19. 1961, p.27 In Lillenthal, WHAT PRICE ISRAEL. op.cIL,
pp.9 1-93 who criticizes Franklin D. RoosevelL and his sympathy with Zionism.
311 Quoted from Thomas Edward Maurice McKlUerick, FABIAN INTERNATIONAL ESSAYS.
New York : Praeger, 1957. p.121. In Tomeh, THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRAliSM, edited by
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Even liberals end humanit8rians unmasked their Intentions by stating that there
Is only one test of whether en ethnic community Is Indeed a nation. That test Is
312 For war:
...is manifested by the physical struggle of armies to
occupy the same space each seeking to annihilate.
disarm, or capture the other; by the political struggle
of nations to achieve policies against the resistance of
others; by the Ideological struggle of peoples to
preserve or extend ways of life and value systems; end
by the legal struggle of states to acquire titles, to
vindicate claims, to prevent violence, or to punish
offences by recognized procedures or regulated
violence.313
As for the Israeli clamour concerning the Arab threats of throwing them into the
sea, annihilating them, suffocating them by economic boycott, or isolating them
Internationally, or of the Arab second round or Nasser's sacred march, not
one of these aims has been attained. None of them is even remotely in sight.314
However, these threats of Arab belligerency played into the hands of the Israelis.
Nasser belatedly admitted the harmfulness of his bombastic statements end said
that while the Arabs were stating their position toward the Israelis, the latter
actually attacked the Arabs.315 In truth, A conqueror, said Clausewltz. els
always a lover of peace, he would like to make his entry Into [another] state
unopposed.316 A similar statement was echoed by Eben, Peace in the Middle
Fayez A. Sayegh, op cit., p.123.
312 Quotad from Richard H.S. Crossman, Palestine Regained. ENCOUNTER. XIV. No.7.
July, 1960, p.47, In Michael E. Fancher. Comment.ry : Dr. Ralph Bunche. Mythical
Knight in Jerusalem, MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XLII, No.1, Winter, 1966, p.65.
313QuoLed from Quincy Wright, PROBLEMS OF STABILITY AND PROGRESS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Berkeley and Los Angeles : University of California Press.
1954, p.149.
314QuoLed from Abba Eban, Realit.y and Vision in the Middle East, FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
XLIII. No.4. July. 1965. p.628.
315W1th regard to Israeli fear of Arab threats, Nasser said 1 am sorry that only
Israeli charges are remembered...And dont forget, when you speak of Israeli
apprehensions. that. they are the ones who launched attack on us in 1955. 1956 and
1967. Quoted from Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser Talks an exclusive interview by
William Attwood, LOOK. March, 19. 1968, p.64, see also p.62. See also Nasser,
MAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I, pp.429-30, November 8. 1955. p.783. January 16. 1958;
Gamal Abdel Nasser, A Talk with President Nasser an exclusive interview by Arnold
de Borchrave, NEWSWEEK. February, 10. 1969. pp.33-34.
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East can only be produced by those who have the capacity to make war In the
tli&lle EesP.311 For wor Is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse
with en admixture of other means.318 Likewise, •peace is a continuation of
conflicts only by other means.319 In reality, as confessed by Israeli statements,
the Israeli capability320 to choose the time and place of any large operation and
ability to wage the war have been demonstrated since 1947. From the outset in
1947 the Israelis understood their objectives end worked to achieve them:
In the period of transition, as it were, from war to
peace, it is our business to put all our energy Into our
re-enforcement....Every year, every month, validates
our positive achievements: our wider bounds, the
advance of Jewish Jerusalem and its embodiment into
the State...ere far more convincing than any formal
recommendation of the United Nations that is
stillborn. 32 1
The Israelis achieved their objectives by TAITACCOMPLI in 1948, 1919, 1956.
end 1 967 and afterwards sought to maintain the status quo:322
First, that so long as a 'right of conquest', and its
cousin a right a right by 'felt accompli', remain on the
books they represent a failure of the hope of peace
through justice, and constitute an open Invitation to
aggression end craft. Second, that so far as the Middle
East is concerned, any appeal to (alt eccompli Is an
1bQuotd in Norman L. Padelford and George A. lincoln. THE DYNAMICS OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. London : PlacPliIIan. 1962, p.455.
317 Statement by Abbe Eban quoted In ThE NEW YORK TIMES. June 26, 1968. p.4.
318QuoLed from Karl Von Clausewitz, WAR, POLITICS. AND POWER : Selections from ON
WAR, AND I BELIEVE AND PROFESS. Trans. & ed. by Edward P1. ColHns, Chicago : Henry
Regnery. 1962, p.255.
319SovIet Marshall Shaposhnlkov quoted In Padelford and Lincoln, THE DYNAMICS OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, op.cit. p.25.
520 According to Pinhas Rosen. Israeli Minister or Justice, The Premier and all other
members of the Cabinet are convinced there will be no war because our neighbours
would not dare to attack us and because we have no intention of attacking anybody.
Quoted from THE NEW YORK TIMES. February 27. 1960. p.7.
321 Quoted from Ben Gurlon, REBIRTh AND DESTINY OF ISRAEL. op.clt.. p.484. In
similar vein , Dayan. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. XXXIII. No.2. p .267. belittled International
order. See also Hutchinson • VIOLENT TRUCE. op.cit.. p.133.
2U.S. Congress, House of representatives, A New Status Quo in the Middle East by
Benjamin S. Rosenthal of New York in the House of Representatives, March 19, 1968.
1966. C0PI6RESSIONAL RECORD. Vol. 114, Part 6. pp .7054-7056. Paper edition,
pp.2045-2048 In George B. de Huszar, ct al. BASIC AMERICAN DOCUMENTS, Ames,
Iowa : Littlefleld. Adams & Co.. 1953.. pp.1 14-15.
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indictment of all who have contributed to a result thus
confessed indefensible...
...But there is no fait accompli, nothing which on the
basis of a persistent repudiation of the original
agreement, end the desolation of eight hundred
citlzens...can set up a claim of right...323
Since the Arab-Israeli conflict concerns the existence of the Arabs and the
Zionists in Palestine and also includes all aspects of their lives It may be
considered the most complex conflict In modern times. First, e&h side is
strongly convinced of its historical, legal, moral, end geographical claim to
Palestine. The Arabs emphasize their being the majority of the population In
Palestine324 for thousands of years end assert, therefore, that neither the
Belfour Declaration,325 end the Palestine Mandate, nor the eventual United
Nations Partition Plan of 1947 take this away. Nevertheless, the establishment
of Israel wes done In the name of self-determlnetlon.326 The validity of these
British declarations and promises was revealed In the Balfour memorandum which
323Quoted from William Ernest Hocking, What Is a...FalL Accomplir REPRINT FROM
AFME NEWS AND MIDDLE EAST DI6EST, I. Nos.3, 4, 5, April, flay, June, 1957, quoted
in de Huszar, BASIC AMERICAN DOCUMENTS. op.cit., pp.45-49.
324 Though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will L. be rightful
must be reasonable...the minority possess their equal rights, which equal law must
protect, and to violate would be oppression. Quoted from George B. de Huszar et. al.
eds., BASIC AMERICAN DOCUMENTS. op.cit., pp.114-15. 'We say that the pursuit or a
value Is legitimate if. and only if. we have the reason to expect that it will not Inflict
intolerable damage upon any other value which is also vitally important damage upon
any other value which is also vitally important to us. Quoted from karl V. Deutsch.
POliTICS AND GOVERNMENT: How People decide Their Fate, Boston : Houghton Mifflin,
1970. P.13. See the concept of majority rule versus minority rights In John C.
Livingstone and Robert 6. Thompson, ThE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED, New York
Macmillan. 1963. pp.50-52. See also George Hourani, Palestine as a Problem of
Ethics', MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION BULLETIN. III, No.1, February 15, 1969.
pp.17-18. For the Jewish claim, see pp .18-19, 24; Cremeans. ThE ARABS AND THE
WORLD. op.cit.. pp.180-97.
325 As far as Palestine is concerned the Powers have made no statement of fact which
Is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which, at least In the letter, they
have not always Intended to violate'. Quoted rrom a memorandum by Lord Balfour in
Government of Great Britain. DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREI6N POLICY. IV, reproduced
in Soraya Antonius, An Arab Looks at Britain', MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XXXVI. No.4,
AprIl, 1960, p.29.
3261rom a lecture by Donald C. Blaisdell, 'Can Responsible Foreign Policy be made
Democratically?' delivered at the American Council for Judaism In New York, June 6,
1960, p.3, quoted In Tomeh, ThE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, edited by Fayez A.
Sayegh. op .clt.. p.123.
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stated:
In Palestine we do not propose to go through the form
of consulting the wishes of the present
Inhabitants...Zionism [Is] of far greater Import than
the desires end prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who
now Inhabit that ancient land...321
Further, from the Arab viewpoint, Israel Is completely alien to the Middle East.
Is Inhabited by people brought from far away, end Is maintained by the Western
Imperialists against the will of the Arabs as a spearhead for Europe In the Middle
Eest.328 Even the founders of Israel have confessed that Israel Is a part of the
MId(lle East only In geography:329
Ben Our ion said today that Israel faced a graver danger
from her own growing Levantine atmosphere than from
the hostile Arab states that lie at the nation's
frontiers...
...The Premier said that almost 55 per cent of those
who migrated to the state since Its beginning came
from Africa and Asia.
"If, heaven forbid, we do not succeed, there is a danger
that the coming generation may transform Israel Into a
Levantine state.33°
The Arabs rejected Israel because the artificial creation end Imposition of en
alien and religiously exclusively community on the lands Inhabited by an
Indigenous Arab people of Palestine was a forced transplantation which the
organism rejects.331 With equal vigour the Israelis assert they are reclaiming
or 'liberating' part of their Eretz Israel ('Historical Israel') end that they are
327Quoted from a memorandum by Lord Balfour In Government of Great Britain.
DOCUMENTS 014 BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY. IV. reproduced in Soraya Antonius. MIDDLE
EAST FORUM, XXXVI. No.4, p.29.
328Nasser. SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958. p.105, March 11. 1958; John S.
Badesu, The Problem of Stability among Middle East Governments. THE EVOLUTION OF
PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY. Harvey P. HaIl, ed. Washington. D.C.:The Middle East.
tnstlt.ute, 1955. p.24.
329 0uot.ed from Ben 6urion, REBIRTH AND DESTINY OF ISRAEL. op.clt., p.489. This
view was echoed by Abbe (ban Atflnity is now more Important than vicinity. Quoted
from FOREIGN AFFAIRS. XLIII, No.4. p.631. See also (ban, PROCEEDIN6S OF THE
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. XXVI. No.3. p.115.
°QuoLed from THE NEW YORK TIMES. October 25, 1960. p.5. This also appeared In
the TIMES, January 6. 1961, p.30.
1 Quoted from Ferial 6hazoul, THE NEW YORK TIMES. March 3. 1969. p.30.
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entitled to carve out a small portion of their ancestral land to their modern
notion state.332 Otherwise, they assert, It would have been an Indelible disgrace
to the human conscience If a world...hed not been able to carve out this tiny notch
of territory to be the sanctuary of the sudden recuperation of the Zionists in
Palestine and the renewal of Its sovereIgnty In Its ortgtnal tom.33 fl cI%n
the Jews more than Greece end Rome, hove determined the spiritual evolution of
all succeeding generations. Thus any attempt on the part of the Arabs to restore
their homeland by force would be regarded as aggression against international
order and law.334
Once Israel was established the Zionists denied the Arabs their Inalienable right
to live In Palestine on the basis that they did not come back to Israel in order to
work and shed our blood for a binotional state. 335 After the establishment of
Israel either side could not accept the other as a partner. 336 Each contender
mistrusts the other side, believing that It would only adhere temporarily to those
aspects of an international agreement337 advantageous to tt. 3 By indicating her
willingness since 1947 to meet with the Arabs anywhere any time for the sake of
332Eban, PROCEEDIN6S OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, XXVI. No.3. p.115.
For evaluation of the validity or the Jewish historical right from moral, religious.
historical and political bases, see Alfred Guillame, ZIONISTS AND THE BIBLE. New York
Palestine Arab Refugee Office, 1956, pp.2, 4. See also the views of the King-Crane
Commission on the political rationale or justification of the claims of the Zionists in
Howard, p.351. Thaf. they have a right to Palestine, based •n an occupation or two
thousand years ago, can hardly be seriously consldered. Quoted from report of the
king-Crane Commission reproduced In Howard. THE K1N6-CRANE COMMISSION. op.clt...
p.35 1.
333Quoted from (ban, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, XXVI.
No.3. p.112, 115.
4IbId.. pp.1 12, 115.
335 Ouoted from Pinhas Sapir, one of the founders .f Israel. in THE NEW YORK TIMES.
November 23 1969, p.2.
336 6eorge Hourani, MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION BULLETIN, Ill. No.1, p.25. See
the realistic and reverse views of some Zionists and Arab commandos. AL FATAH.
reversed Its previous Arab stand and now accepts a bilingual and binational state. See
ATLAS. XVII, No.3, March, 1969, p .27; XVII. No.4, April, 1969, p.20.
37For accusations against the IsraelIs, See Elmer Berger, WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST
SAY SO!. pp .26. 106. See also Husayn in Cohen (moderator). THE MIDDLE EAST
JOURNAL. XVIII, No.2, p.155. Charges were levelled against the Arabs by Dayan,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XXXIII. No.2. pp.254-56.
8D.yan, FOREIGN AFFAIRS. XXXIII, No.2, p.255; DavId Ben Gurlon. An Exclusive
Interview by William Attwood : Ben Gurlon Talks. LOOK, XXII. No.8, AprIl 15, 1958,
p.99.
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peace. Israel scored a tangible diplomatic victory. 339 The Israelis, unlike the
Arab refugees, were at ease to offer peace talks with the Arabs in general broad
terms without specific proposals necessary for fruitful negotiations. What the
Israelis need "is not to speak of peace or to speak the truth to the Arabs; It is to
believe in this new 'truth"'.340 The Israelis want direct face-to-face talks
without any United Nations or International supervision so that Israel would have
a free hand In dealing with the Arabs.341
The complexity of the Arab-Israeli conflict lies In Its Involvement In the Cold
War - mainly the unqualified support and commitment of the West (particularly
the United States) achieved by Zionist Influence end propaganda. 342 In fact, one
American Rabbi has said, "Important and responsible Arabs, the Ichud group
(liberal and moderate Israeli group), Mr. Dulles end Mr. Byroade have all agreed
- Independently end In different language - that the core of this problem is in the
attitudes of American Jews".343 Althougñ ñavtnq supported t?e Ard case S^l'?CD
1952, the Soviet Union did not become established as pro-Arab until 1955. The
local Communist parties of the Arab states and Israel were caught between
condoning and denouncing the Zionist movement and Israel In accordance with the
fluctuation of Soviet policy and In complete disregard of the fate of local
Communist parties In both Israel and the Arab states. 344 It is should be
emphasized that It Is not In the Interest of Russia to see Israel destroyed. The
French bet that Moscow will prevent the Arabs from destroying Israel - the only
factor that Induces the angry Arabs to lean on Russia". 345 Just as In the case of
9 Nasser, PIAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I, p.657. June 14. 1957; p.665. July 1, 1957.
For Ben 6urions reply. see Ben 6urion, LOOK. XXII. No.8, p.95. For evaluation of
Israels peace efforts, see ttadawl, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XL. No.2, pp.28-29. The
tragedy of the Arabs is that while they might it best prevent the State of Israel from
expansion they were talking about its destruction. See Cecil Hourani, THE ISRAEL
ARAB READER. ediLed by Walter Z. Liqueur. op.clt.. p.246.
0Husayn In Cohen. ThE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. XVIII. No.2. p.155.
341 EImer Berger. WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY 501. op.cit., pp.26. 106.
2See Noam Chomsky. THE FATEFUL TRIANGLE, op.cit.. pp.1-43.
343 Quoted from Elmer Berger. WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO!, op.cit., p.10 1. See
also p.105; Peretz. MIDDLE EAST REPORT 1959. p.35; Edward H. Buehrig. "The Arab
World and the United States". MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XXXIII. No.7. July. 1958, pp.9-10.
4WalLer Z. Liqueur, COtIMUN!SM AND NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST. New York
Praeger, 1956, pp.45, 110-11.
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the Partition Plan, Russia would win by either alternative: keeping the discord
end keeping the edge or by overfloodlng Israel with large numbers of Communist
Jews from Eastern Europe and Russia as a feethold for Communism In the Middle
East.346 The Israeli military preponderance vis a vis the Arab military
vulnerability end diplomatic futility make Inconceivable any direct negotiations
between Israel end the Arab countries. In such a diplomatic stalemate It might be
possible to utilize parllamentary dlplomacy of the United Nations for peaceful
settlement.347 However, this Is feasible only If the super powers have a tacit
understanding that renewed Arab-Israeli fighting might bring them to head on
collision despite themselves346 end thus Impose a settlement349 upon the
reluctant Israelis and the less reluctant Arabs similar to the 1947 Partition Plan
of Palestine.350
Indeed, among all Egypt's vital foreign problems Palestine351 was the only one
referred to in the first proclamation of the Army Movement of July 1952, as
Justification for the movement. However, the reference was not to renew Egypts
pledge to restore the rights of the Arabs In Palestine, but to Illustrate the degree
of corruption, Inefficiency, end adventurism of the ancien req/ma. Nasser's
regime, noted for religious tolerance toward non-Muslim communities In Egypt,
gave meaning to the motto, Religion belongs to God; and the Fatherland belongs to
e11.352 Nevertheless, when It came to Israel, Nasser was quick to recognize that
Quoted from C.L. Sulzberger. togics Power of Vice Versa. THE NEW YORK TIMES.
January 28. 1970, p.38.
Forum Comments, MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XXXII. December, 1957. p.3; Laqueur.
COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM, Op.Cit... p.266; No Easing of Mideast War Danger.
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT. LXV. No.4. July 22. 1968. p.60.
347 Charles Henry Alexandrowicz, The Secretariat and the Secretary General,
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW OUARTERLY, XI. 1962. p.120 reproduced in
Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendiovitz, eds., THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER. Vol.111.
THE UNITED NATIONS. New York : World Law Fund. 1966, p.313. See also Ii Thants
moral pressure In THE NEW YORK TIMES. January 29. 1969. p.1.
John C. Campell. THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE MUTED COLD WAR. Denver. Colorado
University of Denver, 1964. p.3 1.
9See text of the Russian proposal in ThE NEW YORK TIMES. January II. 1969. p.2.
0For U.A.R resentment, of the imposed settlement see THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR. June 14. 1969. p.2; June 23. 1969. p.11. For Israeli resentment, see THE
NEW YORK TIMES. March 19, 1969. p.12; March 31. 1969. p.1.
3 El Barawy, MILITARY COUP. op.ciL.. pp.203. 205.
2James Bali), NoLes on the New Egypt, MUSLIM WORLD. XLIV. July-October, 1954,
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Even Israel itself is but a result of Imperialism.353 Nasser's amicable
gestures toward Israel were due to American promises of support for Egypt354 in
wresting en agreement from the British on evacuation355 in return for Nasser's
greeing to peaceful settlement with Israel. Nasser also hoped to secure the
Western economic and technical assistance necessary to achieve social reform and
raise Egypt's standard of living, which he celled the greatest struggle. 356 Even if
Nasser was planning a second round against Israel, he realized Egypt was in no
position to fight Israel before strengthening his armed forces or before British
evacuation.351 Emphasis on social and economic improvement358 was, moreover,
a reflection of Nasser's realization that the the defeats of the Egyptians and Arabs
were caused mainly by their weakness359 rather then the strength of the Israelis.
The dedication and efficiency of the Israelis was reflected in the morale of Egypt's
army officers.36° In essence, Nasser assumed that If the Egyptian government
were to grow strong and popular, It would become able to negotiate with Israel
without fear of popular uprising. 361 At the outset, Nasser did not wont to divert
pp.227-35; Mary Rowlatt, 'The Egyptian Situation', CONTEMPORARY REVIEW. July 1.
1953, pp .19-23 and Naguib, E6YPT'S DESTINY. op.cit.. pp.173-74.
353QuoLed from Nasser, E6YPTS LIBERATION. op.cit., p.98. See also George Kirk,
'The Role of the Military in Society and 6overnment : Egypt'. THE MILITARY IN ThE
MIDDLE EAST. Colombus : Ohio Stat.e University Press, 1963, p.75.
354Lacouture, NASSER. op.cit., pp.232-33. Nasser complained about and resented the
Western policy of imposed peace' with Israel which he termed 'surrender' in his
PIAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I, pp.199-201. 431. 460. 673. and Nasser, SPEECHES AND
PRESS INTERVIEWS. January-March. 1960. pp.142-43. March 3. 1960.
3555ee Elmer Berger, WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO! op.cit., p.20 regarding the
harm that would befall Egypt by continuing the war with Israel.
56Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. January-March, 1960. pp.142-43.
March 3. 1960; Nasser. KHU11JB AL RAIS. I. pp.460. 668; Nagulb, EGYPS DESTINY.
op.cit., pp.220-21. 227. An Israeli writer noticed that 'the old slogans of
Independence and unity are in the process of being superseded by the call for social
reform'. Quoted from David Arid. 'The Decline of the Gods', HAMIZRAH HEI4ADASIl.
IV. Spring. 1953. pp.161-67.
7 Nasser, P1AJMUAT KHUTAB, Part I. pp.87, 690.
3 An Israeli writer considered that 'the various reforms promulgated by the Nasser
regime - economic, social, political - are aimed at creating the Indispensable
background for building an army of one million men who will redeem Egypts lost honour
and satisfy her national aspirations'. Quoted from K. Kaddlsh, 'The Egyptian
Revolution and its Dangers'. BETRAM. September. 15, 1952. pp.26-28.
9Nasser, IIAJtIU.AT KHUTAB. Part I, p.690. See Elmer Berger. WHO KNOWS BETTER
MUST SAY SO!. op.cit.. p.20. and Wynn. NASSER OF EGYPT. op.cit, p.132.
°Lacouture, NASSER. op.cit., p.232.
1 Eimer Berger, WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO!. op.cit.. p.20.
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the wrath of Egyptians against arty external power, whether Israel or Britain.
Instead, Nasser considered the greatest Internal enemies of the people...the
Communists who serve foreign rulers, the Moslem Brotherhood which seeks rule
by assassination in an era that has outlived such practices, and the old time
politicians who would like to re-establish exploitation. 362 Nasser went as far
as any Arab leader ever dared363 by Implicitly seeking Israeli endorsement of
Egypt's policy end deploring that Israel, by opposing the Anglo-Egyptian
Agreement on the Canal Zone unfortunately Is acting willingly or unwillingly,
like the Communists. 364 Even, more boldly, though not known to many Arabs at
the time, he abandoned the blockade and allowed passage of goods or ships under
the United nations flog to and from Israel through the Suez Canal and the Straits
of Tlran.365 Nasser's rapproachment with the unpopular, pro Western Nun al
Said and with Turkey, his endorsement of Anthony Eden's proposals,366 and his
preference for settling the Palestine problem on the basis of the Bernodotte and
the United Nations Partition Plans even after the February 1955 Israeli
attack,367 encouraged Western and Israeli leaders to speculate seriously on
Nasser's willingness to accommodate the West. especially In regard to
Palestine.368 The fact that Nasser sent one of his most trusted men, Ccl. Anwar
El Sadat, to probe the feelings of Iraq and other Arab governments toward Egypt's
desire to settle the Palestine problem lest they attack his regime was another
sign of his desire for peaceful settlement with Israel.369 Nasser's inclination
2Quoted trom Nasser. FOREI6N AFFAIRS. XXXIII. No.2, January, 1955. p.209.
3LittIe, E6YPT. op.cIt., p.255; Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT, op.cit.. pp.13 1. 139.
364Nasser, MAJMUAT KHUTAB, Part I, p.220. December 13. 1954. See also pp .1 19-
20, 431.
5Fayez A. Sayegh, ed, THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM. op.cit., p.185; Wheelock,
NASSERS NEW EGYPT. op.clt.. p.222.
36 Na,ser considered that Eden's proposal, would mitigate tensions In the Middle East.
See Nasser. tIAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I, p.430. November 12. 1955.
367 1b1d.. p.430. Later Nasser was less reserved In endorsement of Eden's proposal.
See pp.433-34. and Wynn. NASSER OF E6YPT. op.cit. , p.13 1.
8 To the latter British Labour M.P. Maurice Orbach, Nasser spoke of his hopes' and
his lively sympathy for Mr. SharetL. Quoted from Lacout.ure. NASSER. op.cit..
p.233. See also Wheelock, NA5SER NEW E6YPT. op.ciL. p.209. Contrast with
Laqueur, NASSER'S EGYPT. pp.23, 35.
369Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT. op.cIt.. p.130; halII, THE ARAB STATES. Ii, op.clt..
p.273; Laqueur, NASSERS E6YPT. op.cit., p.23, contends that in Col. Nasser's
frequent Interviews with foreign Journalists...he Is at pains to explain that Israel can
have peace at the price of unspecified territorial concessions. Privately, the leaders
of the Junta have made It clear that they would regard such concessions as a first step
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Inspired on American Journalist to state, "I had watched the Palestine problem
closely for a decade, end I knew that there never had been such a good chance of
getting a settloment.3l0
Despite this, Dayan charged that Nasser was no different from other Arab leaders
In denying Israel the right to exist end that Nasser was no less Inflammatory than
other Arab leaders in their propaganda and their belligerent political attitude.371
in order to evaluate the gravity of the Israeli attack of February 1955 It should
be emphasized that almost all of the pending problems and sources of friction
between Egypt and Israel were Inherited from the old regime, and their settlement
is linked with the overall solution of the Palestine problem.
The Israelis claimed the February 1955 attack was provoked by Egyptian
infiltrators and saboteurs 372 who terrorized the peaceful civilian inhabitants on
the border.373 Israel claimed that penetrations by her troops were necessary to
chase Egyptian intruders from Israeli territory and to prevent recurrence of
towards the complete dismemberment of Israel. Balance this view with Peretz,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XLI, No.3, April, 1963, p.558, which contends that in most Arabs
lands there is...less freedom of expression, especially on such a sensitive subject as
the Arab Israeli dIspuLe. See also p.559.
370 Quoted from Wynn. NASSER OF EGYPT. op.cit.. p.130.
371 Moshe Dayan attributed Nasser with saying Israel Is an artificial state which
must dlsappear...to a representative of the Greek newspaper KATHIMERININ, on May 8.
1954. Quoted from Dayan, FOREI6N AFFAIRS. XXXIII. No.2, p.255. St.John, ThE BOSS
p.188. attrlbuLed Nasser with saying on March 4. 1954, if we go to battle again we
can retrieve all that we lost ..The time for action and not for words is approaching.
In a thorough search of all of Nassers speeches and Interviews no trace was found of
any reference to such an Interview or statement by Nasser as the one cited by Dayan.
The statement was made after the Israeli attack of February 1955.
372Dayan, FOREIGN AFFAIRS. XXXIII. No.2. p.263. See also Ben Gurlon, LOOK. XXII.
No.8, p.95; SLJohn,THE BOSS. op.cIt., p.186. However, both tioshe Dayan and Ben
Gurion were later accused of carrying out the mysterious secret mission. See Fayez
A. Say.gh, ad. THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM. op.cit., p.192.
373 lsraers claIm was not substantiated by Henry Byroade, the American Ambassador
In Cairo, United Nations Mixed Armistice Commission reports, and THE NEW YORK
TIMES chronology for the preceding six months. Quoted from Wheelock, NASSERS
NEW EGYPT, op.cit., p.222. On the other hand, Nasser MAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I,
p.658, June 14. 1957. p.690, July 20, 1957. denied the existence of the FEDAYVIN
prior to the February 1955 attack. Lacouture, NASSER. op.cit.. p.236, Wynn, NASSER
OF EGYPT. op.clt., p.113; and Fayez A. Sayegh, ed, THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM,
p.192, appear to support Nassers views. See also Hutchinson, VIOLENT TRUCE,
op.cit.. pp.1 16-19.
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Incursions Into her territory, thereby preventing a major war with Egypt and
other Arab countries.374 Israel's purported desire for a peaceful border end
peace with Egypt end her Arab neighbours is negated by Israel's reluctance to
allow freedom of movement to United Nations observers, by her abrogation of
three Local Commander Agreements, by the usurping of United of United Nations
powers end rights, end by her refusal to grant minor concessions along the border
that would represent no material loss to Israel but would mean a livelihood to a
number of Arab famllies.375 According to tioshe Brilliant:
Those bloody border Incldents are seldom
eccldental...They are retaliation, part of a deliberate
plan to force the Arabs to the peace table. Some call it
reelistic', others cyniceV - but it promises to be
effective.376
Other objectives of the border Incidents cited by critics of Israel were to alert
the major Western powers and remind them of their commitments to protect and
maintain Israel. 377 Others attribute the February 1955 attack to the border
incidents near the Al Auje demilitarized zone; others to the blxkede of the Suez
Canal and the BAT 6ALIM incident in September 1954; and still others to Israeli
impatience With Nasser after Egypt concluded the Evacuation Agreement with
Oreet Britain.378 It seems more reasonable that the February attack was part of
the activist tough policy adopted by Ben Gurion to bring the Arab states to a peace
conference. Still another source attributes the attack to Israel's miscalculation
of Egypts indifference toward Arab problems end of the strife with Iraq against
the Baghdad Pact which might cause Egypt to sign a separate peace treaty with
Israel.379 At any rate, the Israelis, after Nasser refused to sign the Baghdad
pact, began to consider his rise to power a serious menace.38°
3l4Lacouture. E6YPT IN TRANSITION. op.cIL, p.235.
3l5Quoted from Iloshe Briflhant in HARPERS. March. 1955, In Hutchinson VIOLENT
TRUCE. op.cIL, p.116.
3l6Quoted In IbId., p.116.
3771b1d.. p.120; Elmer Berger. WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO!, op.cIL.. p.13.
37L..couLure. NASSER, op .clt., p.233.
379fayez A. Sayegh, ed. THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM. pp.168-89.
380flutchlnson, VIOLENT TRUCE, op.cIL., p.121; Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD.
0p.It., p.190; Dayan, FOREI6N AFFAIRS, XXXIII, No.2, p.255; (ban, PROCEEDINGS OF
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Further, critics of Isreel attribute the border Incidents to an attempt to maintain
tension in order to Justify arousing mistrust against the Arabs 38l end kindling
the Israeli's spirit causing them to forego their differences end unite. Further,
the border incidents were thought to be a testing ground for the strength of Israel
against her Arab neighbours end could be used as Intimidation and deterrent
eventually to subdue the Arabs and bring them to the negotiating table. 382 On the
other hand, the border Incident policy may have been Implementation of a sound
geopolitical reality of the Middle East:
The definition of this [ geopolitical realityl Is that
there can be no ruling over Jordan without rule over
the Euphrates end the Nile...
It Is better that we decide over whose dead body the
unity of the region will be.383
Such objectives are not just those of the fanatical and radical Israelis, but:
Every Zionist wants, as you want, fulfilment of the
State of Israel within her 'historic borders', but very
few Zionist are willing to admit this. Only when this
desire becomes a reality, as in the case of the capture
of Sinai and the 6aza Strip do they celebrate the rise
of the Third Kingdom of Israel.384
This idea is also found in the programme commitment of a large number of Israeli
political parties385 and of the World Zionist Organization movement, 386 In the
Israeli press, and even In official statements and announcements by those who
THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. XXVI. No.3. p .1 15. Even after the humiliating
defeat. of Nasser In June 1967 the Israelis consider Egypt .r all the Arab states as the
only threat to Israel. ThE NEW YORK TIMES. June. 4. 1968. p.1.
3 J.C. Hurewitz, Regional and International Politics in the Middle East. ThE UNITED
STATES, op.cit.. p.98.
32Hutchinson, VIOLENT TRUCE, op.clt.. pp.121. 134.
3830uot.ed from Cohen, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. XVIII. No.2. p.159.
34OuoLed from Rashid Husayn In Ibid.. pp.154-55. See also p .162; Lacouture.
NASSER, op.cit.., p.238. This prediction and experience materialized Into reality after
Israels second occu pation of Sinai since June 1967.
385See excerpts from the programmes of the IsraelI political parties in Hutchinson,
VIOLENT TRUCE. op.cit., pp.127-28. and Fayez A. Sayegh, THE ARAB ISRAELI
CONFLICT, op.clt.. pp.71-72.
36See quotation from Nahum Goldmann In Cremeans. THE ARABS AND THE WORLD.
op.cit. p.165.
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deny any such aggrandizement of israel. Ben Surlon clearly stated Israel's
overall objectives as follows:
It has already been said that when the State was
established it hod only six per cent of the Jewish
people remaining alive after the Nazi Cataclysm. it
must now be said that It has been established in only a
portion of the land of Israel.381
At another time he said, •The creation of the new State by no means derogates
from the scope of historical Eretz Israel .388
Others have a more subtle design for the establishment of Eretz Israel, the first
stage of which Is to talk about achieving defensible borders. 389 Other Israeli
leaders have spoken more belligerently and openly than Dayan concerning Israeli
objectives In the border Incidents. The magazine FRONTPAGE of July 29. 1954.
reported that Menachim Begin, who by his own admission distinguished himself by
erasing the city of Dir Yassin and accomplishing the massacre of all its population
In the 1947-1948 war, 'proposes to carry out limited military operations from
time to time, for the annexation of various areas'.39° In terms of a 1.4/1
ACCOIIPLI, the International reality of power politics, and a preventive war
policy, Yoacov Libernam, a member of Israel's Herut party, stated In New York In
January 1956, that Israel should take the offensive Immediately end capture
strategic points along Its border'. 391 He correctly predicted that 'world opinion
would accept his proposed course after it was successful'.392
387 Quoted from State of Israel. 6OVERNMENT YEAR BOOK, 5713 (1952). p.15, (in
Introduction), In Crsm.ans, THE ARABS AND ThE WORLD. op.cit.. p.185
3 Quoted from Ibid., 5716. 1955. p.320.
389 1n 1955, Ploshe Dayan stated, The term irontier security' has little meaning in
the context of Israels geography. The entire country Is a frontier and the whole
rhythm of national life is affected by any hostile activity from the territory of
neighbouring states'. Quoted from Dayan. FOREI6N AFFAIRS. XXXIII. No.2. p.250 and
compare with the 'defensible boundaries' objective which was embodied in the United
Nations Security Council resolution of November 1967 and was made one of the
principles for future peaceful political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. See
THE NEW YORK TIMES. November 23. 1967, p.5.
390 Quoted in Hut.chinson, VIOIENT TRUCE. op.clt.. p.133.
in Ibid., p.133.
2Quoted in Ibid., p.133. Western public opinion became resigned to the de facto
occupation of Sinai, Jerusalem, the Western Bank of Jordan and the 6olan Heights by
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The Israeli Investigations of 1960-1961, which resulted in its most lengthy and
serious cabinet crisis, indicated that en unauthorised spy mission led to the
Israeli attack of February 1955 against Egypt, infuriated Nasser, and torpedoed
Egyptian Israeli relations. The essence of this episode, commonly referred to as
the Lavon Affair after Pinhas Levon (then Minister of Defence), is as follows.393
Neither Lavon nor Prime Minister Sharett knew about the mysterious spy mission
•t the time. A secret mission into Egypt was engineered by Ben Ourlon while out
of office and conducted with the cooperation of some high officials of the Ministry
of Defence. The capture of the spy ring, the execution of some of Its leaders, and
the Imprisonment of others provoked one of the most extensive anti-Nasser
propaganda campaigns In the West by Israel and her sympathizers. Nasser's
critics underplayed the importance of the spy ring (the Jon Darling Network) and
vehemently attacked him for his harsh measures and for using the episode to
relieve his internal trouble end to create a cau ce/bre 394 to impress the Arab
Prime Ministers who were attending an Arab League meeting.
This Israeli attack on Egypt without any tangible provocation395 and the killing
of some thirty-eight Egyptian soldiers and wounding of another thirty-three, the
blowing up of Egyptian police and military posts, and the deep penetration of
Israeli forces aroused general world criticisms of Israel,396 even from some
sources hitherto quite favourable.
Israel since 1967.
3 The essence of the Lavon Affair connects It with discovery of th. spy ring In Egypt
and the role of Ben Gurlon. See THE NEW YORK TIMES. October 24, 1960. p.3;
November 17, 1960. p.5; December 26, 1960, p.4; January 13, 1961, p.4; March 1.
1961, p.5. See also Fayez A. Sayegh, ed, THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cIt.,
pp.190-92.
94St.John, THE BOSS, op.cIt.. p.187, and Lacouture. EGYPT IN TRANSITION. op.clt..
p.234, both played down the importance of the spy ring. Contrast with Nassers
Indignation in his MAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I, p.187 pressed alarm about the harm that
the spy ring might have inflicted upon Egypt at. a lime when relations with the West
were at the best and relations with Israel were quiet. This was before the execution
of the Muslim Brothers who had made an attempt on his life. See also Fayez A. Sayegh
ed, ThE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM. p.190. and Hutchinson, VIOLENT TRUCE. op.ciL
p.116, concerning the fairness of the trial.
5Wheelock. NASSERS NEW E6YPT. op.clt.. p .222; Fayez A. Sayegh. ed.. THE
DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM. op.cIt., p.186.
396 Lacouture, NASSER. op.cit.. p.236.
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The question which arises out of all this Is: Why should Nasser hove been so
preoccupied with this particular Israeli attack on Gaza? The territorial
objectives of Israel and her activist defence sInce 1953 were not unknown to
Nasser.397 The explanations are that Nasser had become more experienced with
the manner In which Israel Implemented international agreements end
resolutions, and he greatly doubted the sincerity of Israel. Nasser stressed that
•the facts which appeared after the dissipation of the smoke of the raid on Gaza
were a point of departure In our thinking and In the trends of events of the whole
regime.398 The Israeli attack was made with modern weapons, and it was the
first massive attack on territory under Egyptian control since 1949 for which
the Israeli government openly took direct responsibility. 399 Nasser linked the
Israeli attack with the continuation of Egypt's opposition to military alliances and
assertion of Independence. He felt the Gaza attack was part of a Western Plan to
force Egypt to join the Baghdad Pact or suffer humiliation at the hands of the
Israelis Consequently, credence would be given to the views of the Western
powers and pro Western Arab governments regarding the feebleness of Egypt's
military forces and Egypt's ability to defend herself and other Arab countries
against Russian onslaught.400 This would point up to Nasser his need of Western
aid.
It was even more depressing to Nasser that the poor showing of the Egyptian army
was exploited by his Arab rivals to undermine his struggle to restore his role of
leadership since the Baghdad Pact. 401 The Immediate result of the Israeli attack
of February 1955 was a violent upsurge of Egyptian sentiment against the
Israelis which Nasser could not ignore. But, above all:
37Accord1ng to Cremeans, THE ARABS AND ThE WORLD. op.cIL., p.200. the Israelis
launched their active defence In Autumn 1953. See also Nasser. IIAJMUAT KFIUTAB.
Part. I, p.783, January 27. 1957.
398 Translated from Nasser, IIAJPILJAT KHUTAB. Part I. p.691. July 22, 1957. See
also p.416 (Nassers statement on October 1. 1955). Wynn. NASSER OF EGYPT.
op.ciL., p.122, consIders the 6aza attack the second point of departure of Nasser s
policy.
9Fay.z A. Sayegh. ad., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM. op.ciL. p.193.
400 Nasser. MAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I, p.691.
401 Wheelock. NASSERS NEW EGYPT. op.clt., p.218; St. John, THE BOSS, op.cit.,
pp.189-90.
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The one matter that had concerned Nasser most was the
attitude of the young Egyptian army officers toward
him end the revolution. This was more vital than
getting British soldiers off Egyptian soiLlO2
The February 1955 attack put Nasser In a real predicament. He could not
retaliate In kind without courting military defeat and disaster to his regime;
neither could he Ignore or stifle the boiling anger of the Egyptian people and in
particular of the army. First he consoled himself with the moral victory which
the Mixed Armistice Commission and the United Nations Security Council403
provided by Indicting Israel. However, the Arabs were no longer Impressed with
the moral value of condemnations by the United Nations since Israel had
repeatedly defied United Nations resolutions with Impunity.. 404 Therefore,
Nasser resorted to halfway measures - retaliation against Israel by launching
guerrilla warfare and establishing the FEDAYYIN (literally, sulclde squad or
'self sacrifice) composed mainly of Palestinians. 405 In so doing, he avoided
direct confrontations between the Egyptian and Israeli armies; yet he showed the
Israeli attack did not go unchallenged. More Important, he conducted a vigorous
propaganda campaign to dramatize the engagements with the Israelis real or, in
some cases, fictitious - to pacify the public and bolster their morale, a
manoeuvre which later In 1967 proved too reckless. 406 Border clashes with
Israel and verbal attacks against Zionism removed Nasser's stigma of making
peace with Israel and aligning of Arab leadership after Bendung conference of
1955. The hesitation of the West to provide Nasser with weapons convinced him
402 Quotod from St. John. THE BOSS, op.clt., p.204. Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT, op.cIL.,
p.116 sLated similar views - The Gaza attacks led t. the one thing Nasser always bad
feared most - trouble Inside his army'.
403KhaIiI, THE ARAB STATES. II, op.cit , p.634. II. appears that Nasser did not resort
to the FEDAYVIN until February 1955.
404Nasser, PIAJIIUAT HUTAB, Part I. p.279. March 3, 1955. and p.349, July 9,
1955. recasts his doubts on the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council.
405 1b1d., p.658. June 14. 1957; Lacout.ure, NASSER. op.clt.. p.236; Wynn. NASSER OF
EGYPT. op.clt.. p.126. Dayan. FOREIGN POLICY. XXXIII. No.2. p.263 in 1955 alluded to
the appearance of well trained guerrillas on the Egyptian side in late 1954 and earlier.
406tacouture, NASSER, op.clt.. p.237; Wynn. NASSER OF EGYPT. op.cit.. pp.126-28;
THE NEW YORK TIMES. October 26. 1960, pp .1. 6. Nasser again took pride In the
activities of the EL FATA1J and other organizations. See Nasser, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10.
1969, p.34.
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that he would have to look elsewhere.
Until the Israeli attack of February 1955. Nasser believed that the defeat of the
Arab armies In the Palestine War of 1948 was due to the weakness end
inefficiency of the Egyptians much more than the cleverness end strength of the
Israelis. After the February attack Nasser concluded that economic development
would not do the Egyptians any good If they were unable to defend their
independence, protect the factories, end preserve their achievement in social,
economic. Industrial, and technological fields. 407 Thus, the Levon Affair led
many Western diplomats to conclude that the Israeli attack of February 1955 was
the fateful event that tlpped off...Nesser to what he was really up against and was
responsible for decisions to seek arms from the Soviet UnIon.408
The uncompromising nature of the dispute, the adamant stand of the Arabs and the
Israelis against each other, the image each held of each other, the disagreement
among the super powers, the inability and ineffectiveness of the United Nations to
impose a settlement, and the inability to use a piecemeal tactic precluded any
compromise or peaceful settlement. Then, only the build up of military and
diplomatic strength vis a vis the other party appeared a practical course of
ectlon. 409 Nasser, through attendance and participation of the Bandung
Conference, found what he had been impatiently seeking.
407Naer 1 PIAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I. p.469, Na,ser, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT.
XXXVII. pp .27-28, Dorsey. THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY. op.clt., pp.78-
9; Nasser. SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. 1959. p.354. Desmond Stewart, YOUNG
EGYPT. London : Allen WIngate. 1958. p.185.
8 THE NEW YORK TIMES. October 26. 1960. pp.1. 6.
4O9 Quoted from Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD. op.cIt.. p.190.
198
SECTION TWO CHARISMA AND FOREIGN POliCY
3.10 NASSER. BANDUPIG AND POSITIVE NEUTRALITY
Positive neutrality as a foreign policy was not entirely innovational In Egyptian
history but had its roots In Egypt's geographical position and sttus. 410 Egypt's
location,4 ' 1 her international trade routes, end her complex international
waterway prepared her for neutrality In International afIaIrs.412
Despite Nasser's rcjection of Military Pects or "Joint Defence" with the West
end his call for positive and "clear neutrality" 413 he gave the impression that
once the British agreed to evacuate Egyptian soil and Egypt became sovereign
there would be free co-operation with the West for the defence of the Middle East.
The Evacuation Agreement of 1954 mode it even more difficult than before for
Egypt to maintain neutrality legally If war should erupt between Greet Britain
and the Communist bloc because of Egypt's obligations under the treaty, the
stationing of British troops on Egyptian soil, and the proximity of Egypt to
Western military bases In the area. 414 In the meantime, however, Nasser
gradually began to grasp the reality of the existence of a balance of terror and the
possibility of mutual annihilation415 which would make a world war between the
two blocs less likely. He saw that once the British evacuated Egyptian soil they
would not have legitimate reasons to reactivate the Suez Canal base. The paradox
Is that inasmuch as Nasser was anxious to expel the British from Egypt, he was
410 'According to the Law of Nations now In force, neutrality means simply and solely
non participation In a war, Quoted from Walter Hofer, NEUTRALITY AS THE PRINCIPLE
OF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY, Zurich : Schweitzer Spiegal Verlag. 1957, p.5.
411 Charles Issawi, E6YPT IN REVOLUTION : An Economic Survey. London : Oxford
University Press, 1954. pp.10-li. The cost. was the loss of Egypts Independence for
more than two thousand years.
4l2Cromer, MODERN EGYPT. II, op.cit., pp.384-87.
413 1n El Barawy, MILITARY COUP. op.clt., pp.210-Il; Little, EGYPT, op.clL., p.258.
414The questIon Is not whether we are being neutral, but rather It Is a problem of not
being subjugated to control of a foreign power. TranslaLed from Nasser, MAJMUAT
KHUTAB. Part I, p.430. See also Leonard Binder, THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION IN THE
MIDDLE EAST. New York : John Wiley & Sons, Inc.. 1964.
415 Nasser, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, XXXVII, SepLember 3, 1954. p.54.
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also Interested in free cooperation with West end In seeking Western economic.
inflitary, and diplomatic assistance.
Nasser was acutely aware of the need for foreign capital end technical aid to
achieve his social end economic programme.4 16 In en attempt to attract capital
the new regime removed previous obstacles to foreign Investment and Introduced
new concessions end Inducements. 417 Nasser hoped (or was led to hope) that
American aid would be forthcoming as soon as he signed an agreement with Great
Britain.418 But at the beginning of 1955, despIte these efforts, foreign capital
was not forthcoming. 41 9 By then Nasser realized that the achievement of Egypt's
Independence was much simpler than achieving Egypt's complex social and
economic development. 420 However, the economic reforms Nasser had achieved by
then were commendable In comparison to those of the anclen recline or other
Arab countries, but they were far short of the rising expectation of the
Egyptians421 and were Ineffective In dispelling discontent. 422 At the time Nasser
received an invitation to the Bandung Conference he was faced with many problems
- his popularity among the Arab countries, his battle with al Sa'Id over the
Baghdad Pact, and the Israeli military challenge. In addition he was troubled at
home with discontent - even among the Free Officers - as a result of the frictions
his government was encountering at home and abroad.423
4l6 Pdasser's main disappointment upon seizing power was the availability of resources;
see also Little, WORLD TODAY. Xi, February. 1955, p.58; F.yez A. Sayegh. ed, ThE
DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM. op.cit.. p.185.
417LIt.tle. WORLD TODAY. X, April, 1954. p.146; El Barawy. PIILITARY COUP. op.ciL.
p.7l; Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY. o p .cit.. pp.168-69. 239-40.
418Little, WORLD TODAY. Xl, February. 1955. pp.57-56; Nolte, ThE UNITED STATES.
op.Cit.. p.158.
4l9Criticism of the kind and quantity of American aid was leveled by both Nasser. U.S.
NEWS AND WORLD REPORT. XXXVII. September 3. 1954. p.29. and Nolte. THE UNITED
STATES. op.clt.. p.158. Richard Nolte was designated American Ambassador to the
U.A.R. during the June war of 1967.
420Lacouture, NASSER. op .cit., p.208.
421 The AmerIcan Universities Field Staff, EXPECTANT PEOPLES : Nationalism and
Development , k.H. Silvert. New York : Random House. 1963. p.29.
422 Binder, THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION. op.clt.. p.269, Is of the opinion that Middle
Eastern governments accept foreign aid simply as a means of staying In power. See
also Nolte, THE UNITED STATES. op.cit.. p.149; Hurewltz, THE UNITED STATES. op.clL
P.111.
423 Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT. op.cit.. pp.1 16-17.
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Nasser was not immediately enthusiastic about the Bendung Conference. 424 The
conference was to Include countries With a vast cultural, economic, ethnic,
linguistic, and Ideological diflerences, 425 making any worthwhile agreement
miraculous. The general Impression was that even If the Afro-Asian conference
were actually to materialize, It would turn...Into an afternoon tea meeting.426
However, the success of Pakistan In excluding Israel from the conference and in
even denying Israel the privilege of sending observers, 427 the persuasion of
I4ehru,428 and the endorsement of the Bandung Conference by the League of Arab
countries In attending the conference looked more promising. Also, the
conference would give him temporary relief from his trouble at home.
Despite their diversity the sponsoring countries had enough common goals, as
Indicated In their letter of Invitation, to convene en International conference to
achieve the following objectives:
(a) To consider social, economic, and cultural
problems and relations of the countries represented;
(b) to consider problems of special interest to Asian
and African peoples...problems affecting national
sovereignty and of racialism and colonialism; (c) to
view the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples
In the world today and the contribution they can make
to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.
The firing spirit for calling the conference was to protest against the failure of
the Western powers to consult with them and to share with them sufficiently in
decisions affecting the countries of AsIa.429 Other undeclared, immediate
424Ib1d., p.115.; Georgiana Stevens. Arab Neutralism and Bandung, THE PIIDDLE EAST
JOURNAL, XI, No.2, Spring, 1957. p.145.
425 6eorge ticTurnan tah)n. THE ASIAN AFRICAN CONFERENCE Bandung, Indonesia.
April. 1955, Ithaca. N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956. pp.2-3.
426See William Sands, Middle East Bsckground, THE UNITED STATES. op.cit, p.15.
427Kahin, THE ASIAN AFRICAN CONFERENCE. op.cit.. p.3; Stevens, THE MIDDLE EAST
JOURNAL, Xl, No.2, p.145.
428Stevens, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. Xl, No.2. p.146; LitUe, EGYPT. op.cit.,
p.264; SI. John, THE BOSS, op.clt., pp.160. 191; Lacouture. NASSER. op.clt.. p.222.
429 Ouoted from text of the invitation reproduced in Kahin. THE ASIAN AFRICAN
CONFERENCE. op.cit., pp.3-4.; Also see Kh.Iid I. Babas and Cecil V. Crabb, Jr.,
Nonallgnment as a Diplomatic and Ideological Credo, THE ANNALS. CCCLXII.
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objectives primarily concerned China's relations with her neighbours and the
fear that China's deteriorating relati3ns with the United States might endanger
International peace. Also, the sponsoring nations Intended to attempt to reduce
China's dependence on Russia and to foster establishment of en Independent
Chinese policy. Whatever Nehru's Influence on Nasser. their Immediate common
interest430 was their strong opposition to the Baghdad Pact. Nehru's opposition
was based on his resentment at Pakistan's receiving military end economic aid
from the West under the Pact's provisions. Nasser, Infuriated by Iraqs pursuing
a policy independent from his own, feared being isolated from the other Arab
countries who might join the pact end Iraq's resuming her pre-World War fl,
leadership in the Arab world. Nehru hoped to enlist Egypt. the leader of the Arab
end Islamic countries, to the camp of nonalignment and peaceful coexistence as an
antidote to Pakistan's Indulgence in Western regional alliances. For his part.
Nasser felt It Important to win the support of Nehru for Palestine and other
causes of independence. The welcome Nasser received at Bandung from such
international leaders as Nehru, Chou En lot, U'Nu of Burma, and Sukarno of
Indonesia had a profound Impact upon the shaping of his foreign policy in line
with the nonaligned powers. 431 More important, the Bandung Conference pointed
out to Nasser the alternative to complete dependence on the Western powers.ln
political, economic, and possibly military fields.432 Nasser urgently needed a
market for Egyptian cotton after the West's refusal to buy it. Chou En Let's
reediness to purchase Egyptian cotton and his suggestion that other members of
the Eastern bloc would do the same, in the opinion of most informed writers, were
the determining factors in Nasser's adoption of positive neutrality.433 The
cordial relations between Nasser end Chou En Let opened a channel for a more
serious problem, the possibility of en arms deal with the Communist bloc. Thus,
Nasser found moral strength and profit in joining the non aligned nations and
November, 1965, pp.7-8.
43DL, E6YPT. op.cIL., p.264.
4 Tom R. Little, Nasser and the Cold War St.rategy, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV.
No.4, April, 1959, pp.22-26.
432 Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., ThE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cit. pp.196-97.
433 1iLt1e, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, No.4, pp .23-25. 46-49; Little, EGYPT, op.cit.,
p.266; Nasser, MAJIIUAT KIIUTAB. Part I, p.461.
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discovered the value and significance of Egypt's leading an Arab neutral bloc.434
Nasser took the lead at Bandung In proposing support of the Palestinians and
North African's right for independence, freedom, and self determination. Indeed,
the Bandung Conference was a victory for Nasser and all Arabs because of the
unanimous support given to their causes In Palestine end Algeria. 435 Nasser
recognized that his vIsit to India was a turning point In my political
understanding. I learned end realized that the only wise policy for us would be
(one) of positive neutrality end nonalignment.436
Aside from misinterpretations and conflicts, the meeting at Bandung became a
historical event in the annals of the Afro-Asian peoples. The Importance of the
Bandung resolutions Is not In the unanimity with which they were adopted, nor In
the loftiness of their principles, nor In the scope and vitality of the subjects
covered. Rather, their importance lies in their acceptance by end their impact on
the conferees, the Communist bloc, and the Western powers. The success of the
Bandung Conference suggested the establishment of liaison offices and/or the
convening of another conference of the Afro-Asian countries. Indeed, the
principles of Bandung were recognized as the pillars of the foreign policies of
these Afro-Asian countries - even substituting for the Charter of the United
Nations.437 The Bandung principles were made even more meaningful by their
unqualified reinforcement first by the Communist bloc and later reluctantly by
the West.
Ideologically, traditionally, diplomatically and strategically, Communist Russia
opposes neutrality end nonalignment. Communist leaders - Lenin, Stalin, Mao,
and Khrushchev - leave no room for the existence of neutrality. Lenin derided the
434Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD. opcit.. p.145. Contrast with Little,
EGYPT. op.cit., p.267. who underplays the significance or Nasser leading the Arabs.
435Kah1n, THE ASIAN AFRICAN CONFERENCE. op.clt.. pp.12. 17.
36 Quoted In Wheelock, NASSERS NEW EGYPT. op.cit.. p.225. from Rustom S. karanjia.
ARAB DAWN, London : Lawrence & Wishart, 1959, p.187.
437SLevens, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XI. No.2. p.148.
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neutrality concept:
Any kind of propaganda of neutralism Is either a
hypocritical cover for counter revolution or an
appearance of complete unconsciousness...The Idea of
neutralism Is nothing but a mistaken end contemptible
pretext.438
Although Stalin Is credited with originating the concept of peeceful coexlstence,
he suspiciously attacked:
neutralism (whlch)...'conni yes at aggression end
unleashes war. It represented en Impermissible
passiveness that set ot not to prevent the aggressors
from doing evil things.439
Likewise, Mao denied the existence of neutrality end strongly advised:
The Chinese people either lean to the side of
tnper(a1tsm or to the side of soctaUsm. There Is no
exception to this rule. To sit on the enve
impossible, and there is no third path...Neutrality Is a
hoax. The third path does not exist.440
Until 1955 most Arab countries were opposed to having any commercial,
cultural, or diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.441 Khrushev's rise to
power, the cold war stalemate, the adoption of peaceful coexistence, 442 the fear
of mutual annihilation and the balance of terror, the conviction of the soundness
and ultimate victory of the Communist system,443 end the fertile opportunity in
8 Q&ioted from V.1. LenIn. WORKS, Moscow : Plarx-Engels-Lenin InstItute, 1950. XXIX.
In Mosca Onoe, Some Factors In the Communist View of Neutraltty. NEW NATIONS.
London : Constable, 1956. p.92.
439 1b1d., p.92.
440 Quoted In Onoe, NEW NATIONS, op.ciL., p.93.
1 For an explanation of Russlas inactivity in the Middle East. See Binder. ThE
IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION. op.cit., pp.257-58.
2 For an advocacy of peaceful coexistence, see NikIta S. Khrushchev. 0n Peaceful
CoexlstenCe. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. XXXVIII. October, 1959, pp.1-18. For a sharp
criticism, see George F. Kennan, Peaceful Coexistence : A Western View, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS. XXXVIII. No.2, January. 1960. pp.171-90.
443 ScM lecher, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, op .cIL. pp .89-90.
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the Middle East444 encouraged the Soviet Union end created a favourable condition
for Egypt. From 1952 the Soviet Union gradually began to support Egyptian and
Arab causes but did not actively enter the field until 1 955•M5 The unexpected
conciliatory attitude of the Chinese toward India, their conciliatory attitude
toward other Afro-Asian countries. and their vigorous support of the Palestinian
end other Arab causes won the admiration end appreciation of Nasser and the
Arabs. Nasser wanted to break Great Britain's monopoly over Egypt and to be free
to establish political, cultural, and commercial relations with other powers. He
found the opportunity In Bendung. Conversely, the United States, who, except for
a short Interruption during World War I, had been a leading neutral country until
1941, took the lead in attacking nonalignment and positive neutrality. John
Foster Dulles made the preposterous charge that to adopt an Independent or
neutral policy and be indifferent to the Cold War was not only impractical end
unattainable but the principle of neutrallty...except under very exceptional
circumstence...ls an immoral and shortsighted conception. 446 This criticism
brought a sharp rebuff from an Arab writer:
To pass impartial Judgement does not require that a
neutralist select the midpoint between two positions.
Nor does an Impartial position have to be equidistant
from both extremes. Moreover, a neutralist rejects
the thesis that, in order to be impartial he must
balance his Judgements which appear to favour one
bloc by an equal number of judgements favouring the
other.447
444Manfred Haipern, THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA. Princeton. N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1963. pp.400-04.
445 Panachl In Fayez A. Sayegh, ed.. THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.clt., p.116.
446 Ouoted from John Foster Dulles, The Cost of Peace, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN, XXXIV. June 10. 1956. pp.999-1000. In Muhammad ii Farra In Fayez A.
Sayegh, ed, THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cIt., pp.235-36.
447 Quoted from Fayez A. Sayegh, ed.. THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.clt., pp.93-
94.
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By taking an active part In the drafting of the Bandung resolution448 Nasser
became credited with the term positive neutraIIty.449 Positive neutrality did
not mean negativism. To the contrary, It meant an active role In world affairs, In
the prevention of war, end especially In matters of liberation versus colonialism.
In Nasser's words World Peace does not mean 'no war'; It requires co-operative
efforts for the creation of political stability, economic development and social
Justice. 450 Positive neutrality gave the slogans of Nasser's regime a new
philosophical content end International outlook. 45 '	 It broke the Western
monopoly In commerce end opened alternatives In arms purchases and other deals
with the Eastern bloc.452 Nasser's own status as one of the leading members
(Nehru, Nkrumah, Sukarno, end 1110) of the non aligned bloc453 enabled him
gradually to supplement and, for a while, to replace the six objectives of the
Army movement with the ten Bandung principles.454
As defined by Nasser, A social Ideology takes root only when it expresses the
hearts, minds end souls of those who adopt 1t. And, •the social Ideology of a
nation ls...a natural evolution carried to its fulfilment 455 Whether positive
neutrality is to be considered a policy,456 en idea, a belief, a faith,457
SchleIcher, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, op.clt., pp.299-301; Ernest W. Letever,
$ehru. Nasser and Nkrumah on Neutraijsm, NEUTRAUSPI AND NONALIGNMENT : The
New States in World Attairs, ed. Laurence W. Martin, New York : Praeger, 1962. p.95.
449 Abd al Munim Shumays. ASHR SANAWAT Fl PIASHRIQ AL SHAMS. LIen Years
during the Rise of the Suni, Cairo : .1 Dar at Qawmiyyah lii Tibaah wa-al Nashr,
1962. pp.32, 36; Nasser, PIAJPIUAT KHUTAB. Part I, p.735.
0 Translated from Nasser, MAJMUAT KHUTAB. III. p.579. Speech .1. Bandung. April
19, 1955; See also KhalII, ThE ARAB STATES. II, op.cit. pp.987-86.
451 i learned and realized that the only wise policy for us would be one of positive
neutrality and nonallgned. Quoted from Karanjia, ThE ARAB DAWN, op.clt., p.187. In
Wheelock, NASSERS NEW E6YPT. op.cIt., p.225. Nehrus Influence...gave the
rudimentary neutrality .f Egypt a philosophical content. Quoted from Utile, EGYPT,
op.cit., p.264.
42Fayez A. Sayegh, ed.. THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM. op.cit.. p.196.
453Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD. op.cit.. p.145.
Nasser, KHUTUB AL RAIS. III. p .572; See Kahin. THE ASIAN AFRICAN CONFERENCE.
op.cit., pp.84-85 for THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE.
5QuoLed from Nasser's statement. in MIDDLE EAST NEWS DISPATCH in MIDDLE EAST
FORUM, XXXVI, No.4. AprIl. 1960. p.21.
456 "When we proclaim a policy of non alignment and positive neutrality we mean that
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end "Ideology 458 or a frame of InId, lS9 Nasser used the term
Interchangeably with nonalignment 460 end adopted It as on Ideology for Egypt. At
one time Nasser equated positive neutrality with Arab nationalism...[which]
means positive neutrality end non olignment.461 He later equated It with o
socialist, democratic end co-operative system. 462 And later Arab Socialism
was added. 463 Literally speaking, the Arabic term for positive neutrality, hived
liobi • means: Iiobi 464 positive reaction", hived465 nsutrality" end thus
differs from the legal end traditional concept of neutrality. 466 Although Nasser
reiterated the principle of coexistence, he did not use the word to mean peaceful
cohabitation with Imperialism or Zionism. 461 "It Is the policy rather than the
internal logic or philosophical foundation which gives the meaning of the
we shall stand by the people. Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS,
1958, p.100. March 9. 1958. PosItIve neutralism is neither a principle nor an
Ideology, but a specific policy expressing a principle and a definiLe ideological
commltment,. Quoted from ibId., p.101.
7 6iovanni Sartori. Politics. Ideology, and Belief Systems, ThE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW. LXIII. No.2. June. 1969. p.401, discusses the difference
between an idea and faith
8 The national revolution has developed into a faith in positive neutrality and non
alignment. Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, July. 1960. p.6;
Contrast with Hofer, who concluded. 10 sum up. we may say that neutrality cannot of
Its very nature become a philosophy,, political Ideology, still less a way of life; it. is
simply an Instrument...of foreign policy." Quoted from Hofer, NEUTRALISM AS THE
PRINCIPLE OF SWISS FOREI6N POLICY. op.clt.. p.39.
459 Binder. THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION. op.ciL., pp.241-48.
460 Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958. p.100, March 9. 1958.
461 0uot.ed from Nasser's SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958, p.288.
462 1bid.. p.288
463 AdoptIon of socialism as the socloeconometric system of the state added an
ideological dimension to the neutralism of the U.A.R. quoted from Fayez A. Sayegh.
ed. THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM. op.cIL, p.2 16. See also Binder, THE IDEOLOGICAL
REVOLUTION, op.cit., p.248.
464Hans Wehr, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN WRITTEN ARABIC. ed.. J. Milton Cowan,
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961. p.1049. (philosophically : constructive
and sure rather than sceptical).
465 Han Wehr, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN WRITTEN ARABIC. edited by J. Milton Cowan,
Ithaca. N.Y.: Cornell University Press, p .22 1.
6 The policy India has sought to pursue Is not a negative and neutral policy. IL is a
positive and vital policy. It is a positive and vital policy that flows from our struggle
fro freedom". Quoted from Jawharlal Nehru in Babaa and Crabb. THE ANNALS. CCCLXII.
November. 1965. p.8.
467 tluhammad Badawi and Muhammad Tatat aI-Ghaniml, THE CREATIVE REVOLUTION IN
ARABIC SOCIETY (in Arabic), 1st ed., Alexandria : ManshaaL al-Maaarif. 1961 p.132.
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theory.468 Nasser assessed his positive neutrality 469 during his speech on the
nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956, as a dam out of...glory and
dignity, freedom end independence....e dam against (foreign) ambitions.a He then
described his positive aspect of neutrality In Its all-embracing scope:
Egypt has advocated peace end the implementation of
human rights. Egypt has advocated those principles
which were recognized by the United
Nations...freedom, the right of self determination, the
eradication of Imperialism, peaceful coexistence, non
elignment...We will be hostile to those who are hostile
to us. and will be at peace with those who are at peace
with us.47°
Regardless of what others think of Nasser's positive neutrality, It became the
permanent pillar of Egypt's foreign policy, Its instrument, Ideology, and
philosophy.
Positive neutrality appealed to all major segments of the Egyptian
fltionllSts.471 For the first time since the end of 1954 even those who were
disenchanted with Nasser rallied around him on this issue. For neutrality was
synonymous with independence and freedom, principles which unite the Egyptians.
Further, positive neutrality provided the new regime with a palatable ideology
bearing Nasser's trademark and differing from the slogans of rival nationalistic
elements. It was a philosophy and Ideology with a scope extending beyond the Nile
Valley or the Muslim Brotherhood. Nasser's speculation became a reality:
That the discussion of this Conference would be a point
of deporture...[endj the beginning of a new role toward
the achievement of peace and justice..472
Quoted from Binder, THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOUJTION. o p .ciL. p.199.
4695ce definition of PoaItive Neutrality In KhaIid I. Bibia, Arab Positive
Neut.rality, MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XLI. No.1.. Winter. 1965. p.12. See also Binder.
THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION. op.clt.. p.248; Michael Brecher, Neutrallsm : An
An.lysIs. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL. XVIII. No.3. Summer. 1962. p.224.
470 Quoted In Khalfl, THE ARAB STATES. It. o p .clt., p.767; See also Badawl. ThE
CREATIVE REVOLUTION IN ARABIC SOCIETY, op.clt., pp.130-31.
471 Lacouture, NASSER. op.cit.., p.221-22.
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Coming back home I found out from the response It hod
that it Is the only possible policy which could get the
broadest support from the Arab people.473
Since Bandung It has become the fashion to Invoke the
Bandung splrlt on every possible occasion.474
Furthermore, after the Bandung Conference, Nasser discovered that every citizen
In the Arab region was calling for nonalignment and positive neutrality end will
believe In It",475 and Nasser progressively developed the doctrine of
neutralism, putting It Into the frame of Arab netionalism 476 which has a deep
seated feeling of neutrality. Nasser's adoption of positive neutrality coincided
with the aspiration of Arab nationalism 477 and gained for him the leadership In
the Arab world. 470 An Egyptian writer went further end claimed Nasser's "Arab
nationalism not only aspired the course of positive neutrality but imposed it".479
The writer concluded, if President Nasser had been the guide of Arab
nationalism, this nationalism would not have materialized except in the shadow of
positive neutrality and nonalignment".480 Concerning military alliances and the
Baghdad Pact Nasser was aware that "all Arab peoples rejected [the Baghdad Pact]
and considered it as continuation of foreign domination".481 	Even Arab
governments, both pro-Western and Neutralist ones, rejected the pact. 482 "For
every new prime minister who came to power lately, started his rule by
2 Nasser, HUTUB Al RAIS, III, p.580.
3 Quoted from KaranJia, p.187. in Wheelock, NASSERS NEW E6YPT, oP.cit.. p.225.
4?4Quoted from Stevens, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XI. No.2. p.148.
475Translated from Nasser, PIAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I, p.74.
46Quoted from Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD. op.cIL. p.145.
477See Albert Hourani, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, XXIX. AprIl. 1953. pp.168-70.
4ThFayez A. Sayegh. ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM. op.cit.. p.178; Cremeans.
THE ARABS AND THE WORLD. op.cit., p.145; Antoine Jazza. "A Critique of Nasserism,
MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, No.4, April, 1959. p.18.
479 Translated from Shumays, 'ASHR SANAWAT. op.cit., p.36.
0 Ibid., p.32.
1 TransIated from Nasser, TIAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I, p.640.
482 A11 these traditionalist states are neutral though they do not have diplomatic
relations with the Soviet Union. because it has become impossible for an Arab state to
be anything else. Quoted from John C. Campbell. THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE MUTED
COLD WAR. Monograph I. 1964-65. p .21. See a IisL ot Arab stands and status in Fayez
A. Sayegh. ed.. THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM. op.cIt., p.l65.
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disassociatmg himself from joining that pact". 483	"Political power is a
pSyChologl51 relation between those who exercise It end those over whom It is
exercjsatj"484 Thus, Nasser's presence at the Bandung Conference enabled him to
take en Independent stand from the West end to oppose the Western powers 485 end
to prevent them from Including Egypt or other Arab countries In the Baghdad Pact.
Nasser successfully used his positive neutrality as the most effective means to
overwhelm his Arab rivals, first Nun ci Sold and later Qasim end others.486
Surprisingly, although Israel was the first Middle Eastern country to recognize
Red China, Chou En id emerged more Intransigent than the Arabs In supporting
Palestinian rights.487
in conclusion, the adoption of positive neutrality by Nasser caused the West to
lose confidence In him ansi made the split among the other Arab countries more
acute.466 But consequently, his "policy of positive neutrality and non alignment
emerged victorious and all the world recognized It including the two super
powers, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.489 He was courted by the Communists and from
1958 through 1966 by the West, end until 1967 he succeeded in maintaining a
balance between them. 490 Once Egypt felt relatively free from direct attack she
483 Translat.ed from Nasser, IIAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I. p.460.
484Quoted from Hans J. tlorgenthau, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS : The Struggle for
Power and Peace, 3rd ed., New York : Knopf. 1962, p.29.
45 The negative aspect of power which is - a more common form of power on the
International level is the ablllty...t.o prevent another nation taking action considered
undesirable". ibid., p.111.
46Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. 1958, p.100; Halpern, ThE POLITICS OF
SOCIAL CHAN6E IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA. op.clL, p.403; Binder, THE
IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION. op.cIL, p.269; Hurewltz, THE UNITED STATES. op.clt..
pp.111, 149.
4e7 KahIn, ThE ASIAN AFRICAN CONFERENCE. op.cIt., p.16.
5 6amaI Abdel Nasser, ADAM AL •1NHIYAZ PUn Aqwal al Rais Gamal Abdel Nasser
INonalignment : From Speeches of President Gamal Abdel Nasser) Cairo : at Dar al
Qawmiyyah LII Tibaah wa-al Nashr, Ca, 1965. p.25.
9 Nasser, ADAM AL INHIYAZ, op.cit., p.29. See also Nassers speech on November
27, 1955, in Khalfi, THE ARAB STATES. i, op cit., p.627.
490 "PosiLIve neutrality seems L.a be based on balancing the two power blocs against
each other and sometimes trying to play them otf. Quoted from Jansen. india and the
Arab World", MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XXXVI. No.4, AprIl, 1960. p.20.
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followed a policy of Independence end gradually begen to exert her Influence end
power.49 1 Thus, Nasser declared:
The fourth battle of assertion of our Independence was
the defining of our Independence... i.e., the assertion of
our International personality and the course of our
pollcy....Our battle for assertion of our Independent
personality was Intertwined with the battle of search
for arms and the attendance at Bandung.l92
The arms deal and the Bandung Conference were two 'battles' In the same 'war',
the 'war' of assertion of Independence.493
3.11 NASSER AND THE CZECH ARMS DEAL
The three pillars of power In Islamic society are the men of the sword, the men of
letters, end the men of religion. Today as well as in the past the men of the sword
are perhaps the most important.494 Inasmuch as a modern army is the hallmark
of sovereignty,495 newly developing countries like Egypt gave military
development496 priority over social or economic development. Vulnerability to
outside attack and the need for Western protection at a time when Egypt was
striving for independence made the development of a modern army essential In
1 Fayez A. Sayegh, ad. THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM. op.cIL, pp .111, 115, 214.
492 Translated from Nasser, MAJMUAT KHUTAB, Part I. p.692.
Shumays, 'ASHR SANAWAT. op.clt., pp.30-31, for similar statements.
4 Men of the sword lard the guardians of the state. Majid Khadduri, WAR AND
PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM. Baltimore : The John Hopkins Press. 1955. pp.87-85.
Arabs generally conceive of their independence in terms of three (actors:
armed strength, economic strength and independence of initiative in the field of foreign
relations. Quoted from Nadim Dimeshkle, The Impact of the Cold War on the Arab
World, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIX, No.10. December. 1963. p.16. One major mark
of independence and influence...is military strength, and the development of a national
army is therefore a natural concomitant of independence. Quoted from Badeau, ThE
EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY, edited by Harvey P. Hall, op.clt., p.29.
496Hurewltz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS. op.cIL, pp.447-48. A growing portion of state
budgets goes (or military expendlture. Quoted from Badeau, THE EVOLUTION OF
PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY, op.clt., p.29, See also SamI Shawkat, The Profession of
Death, translation from his HADHIH AHDAFUNA IThese are our Aimsi in ARAB




The fact that the movement of July 23, 1952, was an army movement and that Its
leaders were professional military men meant that armaments would take a high
priority among Its objectives. 498 Furthermore, since the Egyptian army assumed
responsibility for defending Egypt and the Arab Eastern countries alter British
evacuation, acquisition of arms became more imperative.499 Accordingly, the
establishment of a strong, modern Egyptian army was the major objective
declared by the army leaders on July 23. 1952; afterwards It became one
Nasser's major objectives. One reason for Nasser's making concessions in
concluding the Evacuation Agreement with Britain in 1954 was to remove the
American reservations about supplying Egypt with modern weapons. The fighting
with Israel after February 1955, the West's failure to check Israel, Western
procrastination In providing Nasser with promised weapons, and the continued
pressure on Egypt and other Arab countries to join a Western defence system for
the Middle East led to a feverish search for weapons from any source. The
conclusion of en arms deal in September 1 955 with the Communists was the first
time Nasser had initiated an act instead of reacting. It led to fierce reaction from
his opponents and wild jubilation among his supporters.
Nasser repeatedly asserted that the battle against military alliance imposed upon
us from outside powers led to the fighting on the truce line with Israel - mainly
the famous Israeli attack against Gaze on February 28. 1955. He continued,
lhus the third battle In the series of assertion of independence [is the] battle
against arms monopoly.500 Nasser gave the following reasons for concluding the
Russian arms deal. First, the arms deal broke Western imperialism's monopoly
over supplying the Egyptians with weaponsSOl and was en assertion of national
THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY. op.cIt.. p.29.
498Nasser, KHUTAB AL RAtS, III, pp.546, 558,, 586. The building or a modern
Egyptian army victUaLed in rank between the fourth, rUth. and sixth objectives ot the
Army Movement.
499HurewILz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, op.clt., pp.126, 129.
00 Translated from Nasser, tIAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part I. pp.690-91. July 22. 1957.
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sovereignty.502 Further, the Russj(n arms deal was considered essential to the
exercise of positive neutrality.503 it aimed at restoring to the Arabs their
dignity end their defence end the emancipation of the Arab countries still under
the 'Imperialistic yoke', end at strengthening the Arab Collective Security
Pact.504 Above all, it aimed at protecting Egyptian factories and fields, 505 the
fulfilment of the army movement end economic Independence 506 for the
maintenance of social democratic life. The modernization of the army has played a
greet role507 in the modernization of Egyptian society in education, health,
Industry, and social Integration, and In development of a modern Western semi-
state.508 Nasser's Indignation towards the West Intensified when be became
aware that israel's army has been able to obtain arms from England, France,
Belgium, Canada, Italy end from various other states, and that it can always
find someone to supply it erms. And while the Western Press confessed that
Israel's army can defeat all the Arab armies combined, the British, American, and
French governments not only denied Nasser needed weapons509 but Instigated
1 Hurewitz, DIPLOMACY. II. op.clL, pp.404-05 Nasser's announcement of the
purchase of the Czech arms was on September 25. 1955.
502 14asser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. 1958. p.107. March 11,, 1958; 1959.
p.215. More significantly, Arabs saw the action of Egypt as a dramatic assertion of
the sovereign right of Egypt. Quoted from Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF
NEUTRALISM. op.cIt., p.197.
503 Some might say that we want neutrality but only the strong could achieve
neutrallty. Translated from Nasser MAJMUAT KHUTAB, Part I. p.208. (August 21.
1954). The arms transaction was the first expression and positive neutralism the
name. Quoted from Fayez A. Sayegh. ed. THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.clt..
p.146.
504Hasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958. p.180, May 15, 1958. it Is our
duty to protect the Arab people so they may not be turned Into refugees as Zionists and
Imperialists had turned the Palestine people into refugees, p.354.
we were to build our country economically and Industrially, then we must
depend on a strong national army to protect these buildings and achievements.
Translated from Nasser, MAJP1UAT KHUTAB. Part II. p.56 1, July 30. 1959.
50 'Above all we had to establish an economic Independence over monopoly and the
domination of government by capitalism. Then we have had to establish the principles
of social friendship, build a strong national army and lay the foundations of a sound
democr.cy. Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958. p.180.
507 Morroe Berger, MILITARY ELITE. op.cIL. p.7; Stewart, YOUNG E6YPT. op.clt..
p.185; Nagulb, EGY pT'S DESTINY. op.clt., pp.68-69.
508 The Russian concept of modernization is Industrialization and nationalization of
Western enterprise. See W.W. KuiskI, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY
A6E, New York : lippincott., 1964. pp.338-345.
509 1n Nasser's speech on the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, he revealed a
British newspaper's saying, We know that every time the Arabs get angry we gave
them weapons like dolls with which to play. Quoted In Khalil. ThE ARAB STATES. II.
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their allies to refuse to provide him weapons. However, anger over the Anglo-
American arrangements for the military modernization of Iraq, no less - and
probably more - than fear of Israel's military might, helped condition Egypt for
the Initial acceptance of Soviet weapons. 510 Equally antagonizing to Nasser was
the policy of the West - especially of Great Britain until 1955 - of providing the
Arab countries with weapons (obsolete ones)51 1 to achieve the political
objectives of dj y ide and rule.,512 Western denial of arms for Egypt might be
considered one of the greatest diplomatic blunders In the Cold War.513
Eventually, however, Nasser mode the agreement with the Communist bloc to
supply arms in accordance with our needs...on a commercial basis. This act
infuriated the West and paved the way for Russia establishing a foothold in the
Middle East after an attempt of two centuries.514 Nasser's opposition to the
Baghdad Pact and Egypt's leadership among the Afro-Asian countries mode the
courting of him decisive to Communism's gaining a foothold in the Middle East.515
Russia's new tactic toward Egypt also marked the end of the Stalin 1st era that was
characterized by Russian caution and inactivity in the Middle East.516
op.clt.. p.755. See also ThE NEW YORK TIMES. October 26. 1968. p.6.
5lOQuoLed from Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS. op.cit., p.464.
511 5ee Anthony Nutting, NO END OF A LESSON : The Story of Suez, London : Constable,
1967, p.1 13.
5l2Hurewltz. DIPLOMACY. op.cIL., pp.461. 464; Campbell, ThE MIDDLE EAST IN ThE
MUTED COLD WAR. op.cIt., pp.6-7.
5l3 Nasser concluded that nothing In the way of arms then in prospect from the West
could save Egypt and he must seek massive support elsewhere. Quoted from ThE NEW
YORK TIMES. October, 26. 1960, p.6.
5145ee the early attItude of Russia In Ivor Spector. Programme of Action of the
CommunlsL Party of Egypt. reproduced In THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. X No.4, Fall,
1956. pp.427-37. See also Walter Z Laqueur CO1t1UNIS1 AND NATIONALISM IN THE
MIDDLE EAST. London Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956, pp.31, 42-46. For an Egyptian
perspective on Communism In the MIddle East see Mohammed Hassaneln Helkal. SPHINX
AND COMtIISSAR : The Rise and Decline .1 Soviet Power, London : Constable, 1972.
Chapter One The First Red Waves.
515 0ur success In Communist construction will be of exceptional significance for the
destinies of the peoples of Asia. Africa. and Latin Amerlca. Quoted from Nikita S.
Khrushchev, in Kux, NEW NATIONS. op.clt., p.258. See also Campell. THE MIDDLE EAST
IN THE MUTED COLD WAR, op.cit.. pp.24, 28.
516L.queur, COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM, op.cIt., p.260; Binder, THE IDEOLOGICAL
REVOLUTION. op.cit., p.250; Campbell, THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE MUTED COLD WAR.
op.clt., p.25. Moscow devised it present Middle Eastern policy in 1955 after the
6eneva summit made it plain that no nation was prepared to risk nuclear war, almost
regardless of provocation. Quoted from C. I.. Sulzberger, THE NEW YORK TIMES.
February. 7. 1969. p.34.
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The West reacted to Nasser's announcement of the arms deal with outrage end
denunciation 5 17 fearing other Arab countries would follow Nasser's example and
open the Arab East to Communist inflltratlon. 518 Nasser ridiculed such fears
while It Is your government which Is pushing us towards what you are afraid may
befall us.51 9 Pro-Western Arab governments restlessly pressed the West to
provide them with weapons of the same quality end under similarly generous
conditions to match Nasser's Impressive arsenal. 520 Nasser hed reached the
position where he was able to provide assistance to other liberation movements, a
development which caused more problems for the Western powers.52 Most of
Nasser's critics recognize his Internal reforms and achievements, but they
attribute the arms deal to a scheme to extricate himself from the Internal
problems posed by his failures in Implementing promised reforms. They claim
that he found it much simpler to divert the wrath of Egyptian and Arab public
opinion toward outsiders, especially Israel, by restoring the traditional practice
of blaming outsiders for all the evils that had befallen Egyptian society.522
Others called Nasser a man of bad faith who was trying to ploy East against West
to get the best out of both.523 Still others thought that such massive arms were
unnecessary and beyond the capacity of the Egyptian army to command and that
Nasser's primary purpose was political end psychological - to silence his Arab
rivals and threaten Israel.524 Some considered the arms deal a diplomatic and
517 Dismay was the first reaction of the Western powers, followed by an anxious
search for some way to reverse from the momentous change In EgypUs historic
policy. Quoted the Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD. op.clt.. p.146. See also
Wynn. NASSER OF E6YPT. o p .cit., p.121; JeanneUe Clarvoe Tierney. ThE CRISIS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST :1956, Cambridge : Center of international Studies, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 1958. p.29.
518 1n contrast among the Arabs LIttIe concern was felt about opening the door to
Russian lnfluence. Quoted (rem Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD, op.cit.,
p.146. See also Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM. op.clt.. pp.200.
202; Wynn. NASSER OF E6YPT. op.cit.. p.12 1.
519 Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. 1956. p.367.
520 Implied in IbId., p.367.
52t Walter Z. Liqueur. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST. London : Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1959.
522Wheelock, NASSERS NEW E6YPT. op.clt., p.223; Lacouture, NASSER. op.cit., p.208.
523Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT. op.clt.. p.121; Nolte, Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE
DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM. op.cIt.. p.199.




However, most of these critics, willingly or unintentionally, omitted the role of
the British, and indeed, the bitterness of the Egyptian-Iraqi dispute, no less
than that of the Arab-Israel dispute, could not fully be appreciated without
examining the arms-purveying policies of the Western powers. The Western
powers were using their monopoly of arms supply to the Arab governments and
Israel to play one rival against another, accordingly dividing and ruling among
rival Arab governments and to wield political power In the Arab-Israeli
conflict.526 However, some pro-Israeli critics underestimate the role of the
Baghdad Pact or the Israeli attack In Nasser's actions. If attack by a hostile
neighbouring country which is still legally in a state of war with violent truce
cannot be considered a cause for Nasser to seek arms to defend himself and his
regime, then for what purposes do states maintain and equip armies? When the
Western powers sold modern weapons to the Arab countries under their direct or
indirect control, critics never raised the question of the gravity of the
implication nor did they fear that small countries might lose their economic and
political Independence.527 The fact that a deal with Russia was Intolerable in the
light of Western communist phobia was heavily exploited by the Israelis to entice
American and Western opinion which until then had the same newspapers
carefully overlooked the fact that israel had done so seven and a half years
before - the only difference between the two transactions being that, while Israel
had paid for the arms it had purchased from Czechoslovakia in American dollars,
donated ostensibly for charitable causes, Egypt was now disposing of Its surplus
cotton In exchange for erms. 528 The further Irony was that objections should
come from Western powers, the champions of free enterprise and free trede
among nations,529 as If, being denied in the West, Egypt was not entitled to look
525Presldent Nasseri policy towards Russia at that time was suspected of no more
van foolish invotvement. Quoted from Little, MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XXXIV. No.4,
p.24.
52bQuoted from Hurewiti. MIDDLE EAST POLITICS. op.cit.. pp.461-2.
52lLaqueur, THE SOVIET UNION, op.cIL. p.221; C.M. Woodhouse, The Western Case
•9 .Inst Nasserism, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXI V. No.4, April. 1959, p.49.
5280uoted from Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.clt.. p.199.
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elsewhere 530
COfllUSi of an arms deal with Russia by Nasser. regardless of volume,
disturbed the military superiority of Israel (which the West preferred to call a
balance) 531 by which Is meant enough arms for Israel from all available sources
to enable her to defend herself against all Arab challengers without the need for
direct United States intervention In any war.532 Based upon such superiority,
Israel had developed a policy of maintaining its demonstrated military advantage,
as the most reliable defence arrangement:
But once...Czechoslovakla with Soviet blessings, began
to sell heavy military equipment to Egypt at
substantial discount, a sense of Insecurity spread
through Israel...This departure (was) liable to bring
about a revolutionary and ominous change In Israels
security situation.533
Therefore, the Israeli government declared that they reserve for themselves full
freedom of action at the time and in the manner (they) shall find suitable.534
The gravity of the arms deal can only be evaluated In regard to the Arab-Israeli
conflict. For if these weapons are ever used, as they were in 1956 and 1967, it
would be against the other side. In most countries of the world military men play
a loading role in shaping the policies of their governments. But Israel Is a state
In a 'Oarrison',535 a nation in Arms.536 The total life of Israel - Its
9 Ibid., p.195.
530 Quoted from Nolte, THE UNITED STATES, op.cIL., p.162.
531 Nassers indignation against such Western standards of equality is evident in his
tirade on the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in Khalil, ThE ARAB STATES.
II, op.ciL, p.755.
532 0uoted from ThE NEW YORK TIMES, July 16. 1967, p.11. Ben Gurions position
was that. so long as Israel maintained military superiority (which he preferred to call
military balance) over the combined forces of the Arab states, and so long as it could
successfully preserve and rectify its borders by retaliatory raids, it would be safe.
Quoted from Amos Perimutter, The Israeli Army in Politics : The PersisLence of the
Civilian over the MiliI.ary. WORLD POLITICS, XX. No.4, July. 1968. p.626. The
equilibrium, rather, was fixed by Israels scientific, technological, and industrial
superiority, which the Arab states could not reasonably expect t.o match in the
foreseeable future. Quoted from Hurewltz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS. op.ciL., p.451.
See also see a similar statement in THE NEW YORK TIMES. March 24. 1970. p.3.
3Quoted from Ilurewitz, DIPLOMACY, II, op.cIt., pp.406. 409.
4QuoLed from Moshe Sharett, October 18, 1955, in ibid., p.407.
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military, Its industry, its economy. Its policy, Its Ideology, end even its culture
- is centered around the conflict with the Arabs. Threat and even the actual
Israeli preventive war In 1967 were condoned by writers who are considered
advocates of world peace and order.537
The ernest desire of Ilasser end the other army officers538 was to see en Egypt
free end strong.539 In Nasser's thought the power of Egypt end the Arab states is
to be found in three basic sources - strategical location, vast oil and raw
material resources, end vast population.540 Nasser's geopolitical approach Is
reminiscent mode known by the British geographer, Halford Mackinder, 541 the
American naval officer Alfred Mahan, and later the 6erman founders of the
535 'Grand strategy - which combined the military effort with political, economic,
psychological and diplomatic campaign - was the responsibility of the War Cabinet.
Quoted from Leo Heiman, War in the Middle East : An Israeli View, MILITARY REVIEW.
XLVII, No.9, September. 1967, p.56. The generally accepted national goals of Israel
are : defence of the nation; development of a viable economy; creation of socially
integrated nation. Quoted from Irving Heymount, israeli Defence Forces, MILITARY
REVIEW. XLVII. No.2, February, 1967. p.39. The Issues of war and peace and of
policy toward the Arabs from 1948 to the 1967 war have commanded the highest
priority in the ideology and practices of the political institutions of Israel and above
all of its milit.ary. Quoted from Perimutter. WORLD POLITICS. XX. No.4, p.626. See
also pp.637. 639.
6 Quoted from Ben Halpern, The Military in Israer, THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES, sd.. John J. Johnson, Princ.Lon, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1962. p.350. Contrast with J.C. Hurewitz. The Role of the
Military in Society and 6ov.rnment in Israel, THE ROLE OF ThE MILITARY. op.ciL.,
p.103; Hurewltz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS. op.cit., p.373.
537Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas de Katsenbach. THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW. New York : John Wiley & Sons. 1961. p.2 12.
Desire is not enough to achieve objectives. 	 Dedication and sacrifice are
preconditions. See Eugene Staley. THE FUTURE OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Political Implications of Economic Development, New York : Frederick A. Praeger, Inc..
1961. pp.218-9.
9 Quoted from Nasser, E6YPS LIBERATION. op.clt., p.49. See also p.78.
0 Ibid., pp.105-07. See Ahmad Khalidi, An Appraisal of the Arab-Israeli Military
Balance, MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XLIII. No.3, pp.55-57. Contrast with Hasan Mustafa,
ARAB MILITARY COOPERATION : u.s History. Importance. Organization and Objectives.
(In Arabici Beirut Dar .1 TalIah. 1965. pp.153-55. Mustafa points out that the
Arabs vast geographical area is a hindrance under current conditions and makes It
difficult to move Egyptian forces to Israeli borders. On the other hand. Israels poor
geographical location causes her to be on the offensive. See Halford J. Mackinder.
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND REALITY : A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, New
York : Henry Holt., 1942. pp.139-40. Mackinders basic theory of strategical IocaLion
and safe basis gives consideration to social organism.
541 Even Mackinder, DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND REALITY, op.cit.. p.139, gave final
consideration I.o the economic reality of man power.
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geopolitical school542 as well as the Communlsts.543 Whereas Ben Gurlon
considered geo'grephy...In the main, a static element", he conceived the declsive
aspects of dynamism, creation end growth".544 Nasser belatedly realized that
geographical positions and raw materials could be a source of weakness545 If not
utilized and protected 546 With financial resources end modern weapons547
Nasser believed, We are 23 mIllion and there Is no reason why we cannot build
en army of hundreds of thousands".548 Nasser's estimate even In terms of the
number of soldiers proved Illusionary.549 For Israel with Its population of 2.5
millions could mobilize at least ten percent of Its population (250-300
thousand), while the bordering Arab countries with a population of approximately
45 millions could mobilize less than one percent of their population (about 300
thousand), and many of these could not be put Immediately Into the battlefield.
The Egyptians refused to believe that Israel achieved Its military superiority
largely by Its own efforts and Ingenuity and not, as they Insisted, with the
collusion of the Western powers"550 The Arabs' vast geographical area,
542 1bid., p.VlII, Harold Sprout and Plargaret Sprout, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS, Princeton, N.J. Van Nostrand, 1962, pp.334-35.
3Lenln wrote in 1923, "The outcome of the struggle depends In the last resort on the
fact that. Russia, India, and China, etc., constitute the vast majority of mankind.
Quoted In Laqueur, COMIIUNISM AND NATIONALISM, op.cIt., p.293.
4Quoted from Ben 6urion, REBIRTh AND DESTINY. op.cit., p.489.
545Eventually Nasser realized that strategical location and resources proved to
contribute to our weakness. Our strategical position was the main cause of our
occupation. The same applies with equal vigour to our great wealth and immense
resources". Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958. p.133.,
March 30, 1958.
545 1b1d., p.134.
547 'Abd al Nasir saw the arms problem of Egypt arising primarily from modern
weapons starvation". Quoted from Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, op.cIL, p.138.
The great powers have prevented any of these weapons from reaching us." Quoted
from Nasser, NEWSWEEK. XLIV. July 26. 1954, p.38. See also Naguib, EGYPFS
DESTINY. op.clt., p.18; El Barawy, MILITARY COUP, op.clt., p.193. tlustafa, ARAB
MILITARY CO-OPERATION, op.cit., pp.139-40, was more realistic contending that the
Arab numerical superiority was actually unattainable and was less mobile than the
Israeli forces. After the tragedy of the 1967 war Nasser realized that "the problem is
not In the airplanes, really,... (IL Is In thel pilots. We have more planes than pilots,
the Israelis have two pilots for avery airplane". Quoted from THE NEW YORK TIMES.
February, 9, 1970, p.6.
8OuoLed from Nasser, NEWSWEEK. XLIV. July 26. 1954, p.38.
9Heiman, MILITARY REVIEW, XLVII, No.9, p.65, estimated the Israeli army to be
250-300 thousand and the Arabs. 300 thousand, I.e., "Israel mobilized 10 per cent;
Arabs one half per cent". p.65. A similar account is found in Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST
POLITICS, op.cit., table 19 estimates the active and borderIng Arab states have 400
thousand soldiers and Israel about the same. p.450.
0QuoLed from Hurewltz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS. op.clt., p.138.
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population, end raw materials played Into the bends of the Israelis, who pictured
themselves as David, the Arabs as 6clith.5 51 In reality, the situation was
reversed. There have been several attempts to measure the military strength of
the Israelis in comparison to the Arabs In general and the Egyptians In
particular.552 The wide discrepancy end uncertainty may reflect the axiom that
•figures do not lie, but liars can figure.
Even with correct Information on the quantity of weapons it would still be
difficult to assess the impact of the arms deal on Egypt's military strength. In
order to measure the military power of any state consideration must be given not
just to the Immediate military value, the quantity, end the quality of arms
available,553 but also to the deviation, conversion, development, and future
Invention of material and services. 554 These factors reflect the scientific
progress, technological developments, and productive capacity of the state to
supply its army.555 For military power is Interdependent with other types of
1 Ben-6urjon, LOOK. XXII. No.8, p.95; Heiman, MILITARY REVIEW. XLVII. No.9. pp.65-
66. israels domain is about 1/400th of that from which the Arab people have been
Iiberated. Quoted from Eban. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.
XXVI. No.3, p.114. Arab independence stretches through 13 sovereign sLates across
4,000.000 square miles with a total population of 100. 000.000. Israel Is a single
sovereignty established in a small area of 8,000 square miles with a population of only
2 and one ball million. The Arab preponderance Is thus reflected in territory.
populaLlon, mineral wealth, strategic importance and a formidable capacity for
diplomatic manoeuvre, especially In International organizations where numbers count.
Quoted from Eban, FOREI6N AFFAIRS, XLIII. No.4. p.627.
2For an Arab view on evaluation of Arab-Israeli strength prior to the June 1967
war, see Ahmad Khalldi, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XLII, No.3, pp.58-60; Ilust.afa, ARAB
MILITARY CO-OPERATION. op.cIt., pp.148-54; Campbell. THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE
MUTED COLD WAR. op.clt., p.17; Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT. op.clt., p.120.
3 in a quantitative race the key question Is 'How much?. In a qualitative race, It. is
'How soon?. A quantitatIve race requires continuous expansion of milItary resources,
a qualitative race continuous redeployment of them...A qualitative race, however,
tends to be a competition of elites rather than masses. Quoted from Samuel P.
Huntington. Arms Races : Pre Requisite and Results, PUBLIC POLICY : A Yearbook of
the Graduate School of Public Administration. Harvard University. 1958. CambrIdge,
Mass.: Harvard University. 1958. pp.75-77, reproduced In Hurewitz. MIDDLE EAST
POLITICS. op.cit., p.445.
554Stephen B. Jones, The Power Inventory and National SLrategy. WORLD POLITICS.
VI, No.4, July, 1954. pp.428-30.
5 The successful Powers' of the future. Iteopold S. Ameryl predicted, would be
•those which have the greatest Industrial basis. It would noL matter whether they
are In the center of a continent or an island; those people who have the Industrial
power and the power of invention and science will be able to defeat all others'.
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power - economic, psychological, political, or technological. 556 Thus, the
military strength of a country which imports armaments cannot be measured by
the amount and type of equipment Import alone. it Is Impossible to measure the
military power of a country without taking Into account the spiritual, non-
material aspects of Its people: their leadership, organization, morale, training
to use their weapons, dedication to their cause, and ability to fight. 557 Even
potential allies or enemies must be Included. It Is these psychological factors
that are often determinant. 558 Unfortunately, the only accurate test of military
strength Is actual combat. 559 After the arms deal of 1955 Nasser maintained a
standing army equipped with the most sophisticated conventional weapons better
than those used by the combined Arab armies actively engaged In fighting with
Israel since 1948. E gyp t also was able to manufacture Jet fighters and other
modern weapons, Indicating her progress In Industrial and technological
development resulting from the modernization of the army. In short, the Russian
arms deal increased Egypt's military and industrial capacity In relation to the
other Arab countries, which reinforced Egyptian hegemony In political, cultural,
and religious leadership, If not in financial matters. Yet between 1948 and 1967
Egypt's power in relation to Israel's hod declined woefully.
Nasser had complained that "in the comedy of the war of 1948 that befell upon you
the Egyptian army...did not have the chance to fight but was a victim of
stabbing...of treason, conniving, armistice and Israel's lli".560 Nasser
Quoted from Sprout & Sprout. FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. op.cit..
p.338, quoting Leopold S. Amery, The Successful Powers. ThE GEOGRAPHICAL
JOURNAL, London, AprIl, 1964, p.441.
6 Organski, WORLD POLITICS, op.clt., pp.195-96; Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham
Kaplan. POWER AND SOCIETY : A Framework for Political Inquiry, New Haven. Conn
Yale University Press, 1950, pp .92-94. ThIs Is not to argue that geographic variables
no longer have pollLical significance. In many situations the mountains, deserts.
oceans, and other geographic realities still present obstacles to political undertaking,
both military and non milit.ary. Quoted from Sprout & Sprout. FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, op.clt., p.39.
557Organski. WORLD POLITICS. op.cit., pp.173-74, 178, 181-84.
558Jones. WORLD POLITICS. VI. No.4, p.447; Lasswell and Kaplan, POWER AND
SOCIETY, op.ctt., p.295; Organskl. WORLD POLITICS. op.cit., pp.202-04.
559 Organski. WORLD POLITICS. op.cit., pp.150. 440-41.
0 Translated from Nasser, MAJMUAT KHUTAB, Part. I, p.280. March 3, 1955.
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repeotedly ottrthuted the Egyption defeot' to lock of unified command b 2 the
complex end rigid organization of the Egyptian army, 563 end poor leadership564
but not to a lack of fighting spirit. In a manner reminiscent of the Illusion of the
Ottoman Sublime Porte regarding the reaction 01 the mighty French armies of the
1799 Napoleon Expodition to Syria to the sight of his moustache, Nasser
envisioned the Israeli soldier in Iraq al Ilanshiyyah In 1948...frlghtened and
fleeing on the first sight of Nasser and the Egyptians and leaving behind tanks and
armor. 565 Under such a delusion Nasser was unable to assess the strength of the
Egyptian forces in 1956 or in 1967. It Is difficult to estimate the reel strength
or the Egyptian forces in the 1956 or 1967 wars. Despite most tangible evidence
end unbiased reports, Nasser's refusal to admit or acknowledge that the Israelis
were capable of providing one of the best fighting armies In the PIi&ile East
without any outside support566 led to a disastrous defeat In 1967567 and almost
brought the Arab armies and the Arab nation to the brink of disintegration. And,
It became apparent that the strategy of the June 1967 war was pre-planned, as
General Hod stated:
Sixteen years planning had gene into those InItial 80
minutes. We lived with the plan, we ate the plan, we
slept on the plan. Constantly we perfected it.566
The possibility of annexing part of Old Jerusalem had been seriously considered
since 1964,569 and the Arabs provided the pretexts Ithe Isreelisi had difficulty
1 MusLata, ARAB MILITARY CO-OPERATION, o p .cIt.. pp .117-48. Must.ata pointed out
the urgent need, objectives, and value of unifled Arab military command. See also
pp .117. 130-33.
5628oth In 1956 and In 1967 EgypL, Jordan and Syrian had a military alliance...We
proved it, was just a paper pact. Quoted from Ben Gurion, LOOK, XXII. No.8, p.96.
See also Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, THE SIX DAY WAR, London :
Heinemann, 1967, p.90; Tom R. Little, MODERN EGYPT. New York : Praeger, 1967,
P.274.
563HeIman, MILITARY REVIEW. XLVII, No.9, p.59.
564NaguIb, E6YPS DESTINY. op.cit.. p .16, LIttle, MODERN EGYPT. p.275.
5 TransIated rrom Nasser, MAJMUAT KHUTAB, Part I, p.280. March 3, 1955.
6 The Egyptians refused to believe that Israel achIeved Its military superiority
largely by Its own efforts and ingenuity and not, as they insisted, with the collusion or
the Western powers, Quoted from Hurewlt,z, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, op.clt.. p.138.
7CecIl Hourani In Walter Z. Laqueur. ed., THE ISRAELI-ARAB READER, op.clt., p.245.
566Quoted from Randolph and Winston Churchill, THE SIX DAY WAR, op.cIt.. pp.62-63,
65-66, and p.91.
569 Jerusalems master plan drawn up in 1964, was meant to outline development for
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In Inventing themselves.570
The June 1967 war was precipitated by Nasser's policy of brinkmanship which
mode palatable to world opinion the Israeli claim of exercise of preventive
war.571 The Egyptians and the other Arabs have only themselves to blame for
being taken by surprise. 572 The devastating defeat of the Arabs and their
resultant disillusionment may be attributed to poor Egyptian training,573
Inability to use the Russian weapons,574 end poor Intelligence which drastically
underestimated the strength of the Israelis.575 In addition, Nasser was framed In
the supposition that belng In the possession of some of the more spectacular
Instruments of modern warfare lit gave him the j ...IllusIon of having become a
modern military power was tested and proven in Egypt In 1967.576
Nevertheless, It was the arms deal with Russia that put Nasser Into the orbit of
Arab leadership. Therefore 1 its importance Is not in the actual military strength
fifty years...The planning Learn had clear Instructions to Lake Into account the
possibility of ultimate reunification and to make provisions for interconnection and
Integration' or the two sectors. Quoted from THE NEW YORK TIMES. Play 12, 1969,
p.24.
570Quoted from Cecil Hourani in Walter Z. Laqueur, ed.. THE ISRAELI-ARAB READER.
op.cit.. p.256.
571 Cremeans, ThE ARABS AND THE WORLD. op.ciL. p.145. Once Nasser had Liken the
first step there was a very strong temptation to advance further towards the brink.
And then, at a certain point, retreat became Impossible. Quoted from Waiter Z.
Laqueur. THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM : The Origins of the Arab Israeli Conflict. 1967.
New York : MaclillIan, 1968, p.62.
572laqueur, THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM. op.clt., pp.105-06.
5?3 Egyptian officers, however, still scandalize their mentors by continuing polo at
the 6eIra Club In Cairo. The discipline of the Red Army is not for Egyptian youth.
Quoted from THE NEW YORK TUIES. July 16. 1968. p.3.
574for the Impressive role of the Russian advisers since the June 1967 war, see THE
NEW YORK TIMES. October 22, 1968, p.12.,
575 The excellence of Israeli intelligence was a decisive factor In their victory In
1967. See Heiman, MILITARY REVIEW. XLVII, No.9, p.60. Contrast with dismal
Egyptian intelligence cIted in THE NEW YORK TIMES. June 10. 1967, p.12.
576Nasser attributed the loss of the 1967 war first to American and British air
attacks (THE NEW YORK TIMES. June 10, 1967. p .12) and then to an unusual aid;
Mohammed HeIkai' account. THE NEW YORK TIMES. October 7. 1967. p.1. Finally,
Nasser claimed that the Egyptian defeat was not so much of the Israelis cleverness.
but the conceit and complacency of our generals. Quoted from Nasser, NEWSWEEK.
February, 10. 1969. p.34. See also HeikaFs criticism of Egyptian officers in THE NEW
YORK TIMES. October 14. 1967. p.4; October 21, 1967. p.2.
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with which It Imbued the. Egyptians, rather It is in the psychological, political,
end even economic significance of giving Nasser a blank cheque for Arab
leadership. The West at first attempted to reconcile Nasser to Its camp by hastily
offering generous economic aid of the sort he had long sought and even arms
similar to those supplied under the Russian arms deal and on more generous terms
then In the past. But it is doubtful that the West underbid Russian prices.577
The more concessions the West made to Nasser the more convinced the Arabs
became In Nasser's strategy. The Czech arms deal brought the Arab East Into the
Cold War end opened the door of the Middle East and Africa to the Soviet Union
which caused the West and pro-Western Middle Eastern governments greet
discomfort. The West feared that the arms deal would make Nasser dependent on
the Soviet Union. especially after June 1967.576 Nasser end his supporters
pointed out that the soundness of his policy In dealing with the Russians resulted
in both East and West competing to woo him with aid of all kinds. The West did not
fear that Egypt might compromise herself by obtaining arms from a major power
until the Russian arms deal was announced.
Only then did the West worry that Egypt might be mortgaging her cotton and
diverting her meager resources from badly needed welfare programmes to
armaments.579 However. Egypt then had the smallest per capita military
expenditure of any Middle Eastern country except Lebanon. 560 The pro Western
Arab governments, parties, and groups joined the West In attacking Nasser as
having sold out the Middle East to satisfy personal ambitions, and the cry rose to
check Nasser while he was still weak.561 MIlitant Western 'neutrophobia [wasi
ready to go all the way even to the 'brink of war'. In order to deter or to defeat
571HurewIt.z, MIDDLE EAST POI.1TICS, op.ciL, p.463.
518 For evaluation of Arab leaders views of Nasser's dependence on or independence
from Russia even after the June 1967 war, see ThE NEW YORK TIMES. July 16. 1968.
p.3. See reaffirmation in Ibid.. January 15, 1969. p.16. Eastern European informants
have been arguing that Soviet influence here had been greatly exaggerated in the
Western press. Quoted from Ibid.. p.16.
579 'When you are in debt t.o somebody, you are always in a strong position. Debtors
are always stronger than creditors. Quoted from Nasser, NEWSWEEK. February 10.
1969, p.36.
0HurewItz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS. op.cIL, pp.447. 448.
1 Wynn. NASSER OF EGYPT. op.clt., pp.120-2 1. That chance was to avail itself in the
Suez Crisis and subsequently the Tripartite invasion.
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neutralism and assertive Egyptian Positive Neutralism.'582 Thus, the mistake of
the West in fighting Arab nationalism under the guise of stemming the advance of
Communism Instead of differentiating between Arab nationalism and Communism
resulted In forging en alliance between Arab nationalism end Communism
Instead.583 The same error was made designating the Communist bloc as
Eastern', thereby Identifying It with the Afro-Asian countries, and further In
describing any reform movement as Communist Inspired and thus crediting
Communism with reform. Surely Identifying Arab nationalism with Communism
was wholeheartedly welcomed by the Soviet Union In order to Identify itself with
the Afro-Asian-Arab liberation movement. The British concentrated on their
plan to get rid of Nasser - a plan reminiscent of Palmerstones plan to curb
Mohammed All In order to eliminate Russian Influence In the Ottoman Empire.
The more the West attacked Nasser the more popular he became and the closer his
cooperation with Russia. The drift from the West was climaxed in the 1956
Tripartite 'military Intervention' In Egypt.584
2Quoted from Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRAUSM, op.ciL, p.200.
3 Campbell, THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE MUTED COLD WAR. op.ctL, p.9.
584 1n 1956 two successive crises were creaL.ed by the nationalization of the Canal
Company and by the invasion of Egypt. The act of nationalization completed the
destruction of the balance of power in the Middle East: the Anglo-french invasion
sought to restore that balance in Western interests. The decisions which led Israel,
France and Britain in their combined assault on Egypt were taken separately between
January and May of 1956, several months before the nationalization of the Canal
Company. The Suez crisis thus had no fundamental connection with Suez. with the
Canal or with the Canal Company. That crisis emerged rather from the conflict
between the West and Arab nationalism, from the aspiration of the Arabs to liquidate
the empire of the infidel within the realm of Islam and from the determination of the
West to maintain It Arab empire. France needed Algeria and England needed Iraq to
retain their status as Great Powers....The Suez Crisis marked a turning point In the
history of Europe, Asia, Africa and Egypt if not in that of England or of the Middle
East. It gave as great a stimulus to the Asian renaissance as the victory or Japan in
1905 so that the evacuation from Port Said was hilled as the equivalent of Salamis. It
also stimulated African endeavors to secure full independence from Europe, diverted
American attention from the Invasion of Cuba by Fidel Castro on 2 December 1956 and
so helped to bring new centers of world revolution into existence. In Egypt the Anglo-
French-Israeli assault failed to overthrow Nasser but strengthened his position
Immensely and unexpectedly, making the revolution popular as never before and
rallying to his support the richer classes impoverished by Ida policies. The war
destroyed British influence In Egypt as completely as the 1840 crisis bad done. It
revealed the bankruptcy of the legend of French civilization in Egypt, ending the role of
[evantine communities as intermediaries between East and West, the history of the
Jewish community after 2.200 years and the Alexandrian period of cosmopolitan and
semi-colonial Egypt.... Quoted from EAST AND WEST OF SUEZ : The Suez Canal in
225
Perhaps the Russians got the best of the deal by supplying military hardware
which otherwise would have become obsolete.585 But what more could the Arabs
ask than to have the friendship of a major super power In their grave struggle
against Israel and Western 'Imperialistic' powers?566 The agreement, hailed In
the Arab world as a blow to colonialism, projected the U.S.S.R. Into the Middle
East as a champion of Arab nationalism and catapulted Nasser to a position as its
unchallenged leader. 567 However, the irony is that:
Soviet penetration into the Middle East. far from
threatening Israel, has raised a convenient
smokescreen, for where the United States finds
Communism, she seldom looks further under the
woodpile. In this connection It is Important to
remember that until Suez the Communist party was
the only political group In the Arab countries that
advocated peace with Israel.588
The creation of Israel was the leverage the Soviets used to spread their influence
in the Arab world. If It were not for Israel, Russia would be less welcome in that
area.589 But the fact remains that Russia won Its new Influence In the Middle
East almost by defoult.590
The arms deal was a diplomatic defeat for the West.591 The more the quality and
HIstory, 1854-1956, by D.A. Farnie, Oxford : The Clarsodon Press, 1969, pp.718,
740.
585 Thus, both sides to the transactions may regard them as economically
advantageous, depending upon their own subjective valuation of the products Involved.
Quoted from Robert bring Allen. MIDDLE EASTERN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE
SOVIET UNION, EASTERN EUROPE. AND MAINLAND CHINA. Charlottesville, Va.:
University of Virginia, p.52.
6 As influential, perhaps even more Influential than the economic considerations, is
the fact, that the Arabs seem to feel that they have found an ally In their political and
military difficulties with Israel and a fellow protagonist against Western powers.
Quoted from Ibid., p.65.
57 The new Soviet approach made It possible for the Arab masses to applaud the
Soviet Union as a powerful friend without thinking about Communist Ideology. Quoted
from Wynn. NASSER OF EGYPT. op.cIL.. p.122.
8Quoted from Forum Comments. MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XXXII. December. 1957, p.3.
Another statement echoing I.e the same tune, l'he French bet that Moscow will prevent
the Arabs from destroying Israel - the only factor that Induces the angry Arab to lean
on Russia. Quoted from Sulzberger, THE NEW YORK TIMES. January 28. 1970. p.38.
9 Quoted from U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, LXV, No.4. p.60. For a similar
statement see NEWSWEEK. February. 17. 1969. p.46.
0HEWSWEEK. February. 17. 1969. p.46.
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quantity of the Russian arms were revealed the higher Nasser's popularity rose In
the Arab countries. The arms deal pacified the army and healed the schisms
within the ruling group. Nasser's leadership become unquestionable. 592 The
arms deal not only opened for the Arabs new sources for the type and quantity of
weapons they needed; it proved new markets for their raw materials and semi-
Industrial products and made possible en alternative for Importing machinery and
equipment. One economic end technical consequence of the arms deal and the
Arab-Israeli arms race was the engagement of Egypt In production of some of the
most sophisticated conventional weapons such as supersonic jets and rockets,
which, in terms of standards of Industrialization, was a great accomplishment for
an Impoverished country.593 However, even suppression of Nasser would not
have definitely eliminated Russian Influence, for Western policy In the Arab East
transformed the area into fertile soil for Communism. 594 The crown of Nasser's
victory came when his Arab adversaries - his arch enemy, Nun al Sa'id of
1raq595 -publlcly supported and endorsed him. Thus, the arms deal with Russia:
Was not just another trade agreement...The agreement
stressed Egypt's independence, and was instrumental
In making Egyptian leadership acceptable to most
Arabs.596
'Perhaps more exciting to the Arabs than anything else, however, was the reaction
in Washington. Dulles looked panicky. He quickly dispatched his Assistant Secretary
of State. George Allen, to Cairo on a breathless mission which nobody yet can explain.
The Egyptian press was dellght.ed. In the old days, Egyptians had to crawl to
Washington, Washington has come crawling to Cairo. Quoted from Wynn, NASSER OF
EGYPT. op.clt., p.120.
592 1bid., pp.120-22; Allen, MIDDLE EASTERN ECONOMIC RELATIONS, op.clt.. p.123.
593Hurewltz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS. pp.474-75; tlust.afa. ARAB MILITARY CO-
OPERATION. op.cit., pp.137, 150.
594Nasser, LIFE. XLVII, No.3, pp.96-110, or Nasser, MAJtIUAT KHUTAB, Part II.
p.457, July 14, 1959. Nasser blamed Hurl al Said and the West for the spread of
Communism in Iraq and other Arab countries which did not have diplomatic relations
with the U.S.S.R. and In which Communist party activity was not legitimate.
5 'What could President Jamal Abd an Naslr do but seek the assistance of Russian
arms when he found that he was unable to safeguard the very existence of Egypt and
repel the aggression against her through the (hel p of) Western powers? Quoted from
Khalil, THE ARAB STATES. II, op.cit.. pp .272-73. For a similar statement by Hurl at
Said, see Khalll, ThE ARAB STATES. II, op.clt., pp.273-74. For the stands of other
Arab leaders. see Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM. op.clt.,
p .20 1.
6 Quoted from Salah El Seraty. fconomlc Development by Revolution : The Case of
the U.A.R.. TIlE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. XVII. No.3, Summer, 1963, p.222.
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Nevertheless, the important thing is that:
The reaction In the Arab world was hysterical.
Overnight, Nasser's popularity skyrocketed to heights
never achieved by a modern Arab leader. He was the
new Soladin. the new Prophet, the oil powerful hero.
the soviour of the Arab world. Arab refugees In their
camps went wild with celebrations. Nasser's photo
went up everywhere.59?
3.12 NASSER AND ARAB NAT IONALj
Nationalism has been one of the most dynamic forces In modern society. Like any
other social phenomenon 1 It has developed in scope and objectives even within the
some country.598 Nevertheless, certain of its elements remain relatively
common.599 Foremost among them are: speaking a common language; Inhabiting
the same territory; having the some ancestry and history; confessing the same
religion; adhering to the same Ideology, culture, or philosophy; adhering to the
some Ideology, culture, or philosophy; desiring to live together; benefiting from
material and economic integration; developing a community of interest or
objectives; possessing a common fear of Insecurity; or failing under the same
administrative jurisdiction. The existence of one or more of these elements
creates a feeling (genuine or fictitious) of belonging to the some nation which is
different from all other nations (and is usually believed to be a superior to all
others). The consummation of nationalism Is the formation of the sovereign
state.600 Likewise, the methods for the creation and development of nationalism
very.601
597 Quoted from Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT, op.cIt.. pp.119-20.
598 For the development of 6erman nationalism, for instance, see Louis 1. Snyder, ed.,
THE DYNAMICS OF NATIONALISM : Readings In Its Meaning and Development. Princeton,
N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1964, p.369. See the definition of nation', nationality'.
'nationalism', and other derivates us given by eminent authors, leaders and
dictionaries In Ibid., Appendix, pp.369-73. See also C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, The
Ummah-Analytic Approach, STUDIA ISLAMICA. X, 1959, pp.5-22.
599 Snyder, THE DYNAMICS OF NATIONALISM. op.cit., pp. xvi-xviii.
600Schleicher, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. op.ciL, pp.32, 49.
01 Ibid., '-63. Examples of methods and means used are schools, mess media, emblems
and symbols, institutions and organizations.
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There Is almost unanimity of opinion that the Arabic language Is the spirit end
raison d'etre of Arab nationalism.602 After the fall of Baghdad In 1258 Egypt had
been one of the most Important centres of Arabic language and literature and since
the Napoleon expedItion (1798-1801) whIch had restored her hegemony.
Nevertheless 1 a separatist, secular Egyptian nationalist movement began to
develop. Some Egyptian nationalists claimed that the Arabic language and culture
which developed in Egypt are territorial in character end are not conditioned by
general Arabic civilization. 603 To complete the estrangement of Egypt from other
Arabic speaking countries, Egyptianizatlon of Arabic (I.e. the use of spoken
Egyptian Instead of classical Arabic) was attempted, and the suggestion was made
to replace the Arabic alphabet with the Latin alphabet as had done In Turkey.604
These attempts originated with and were inspired by Europeans on the pretext of
their making It easier for Egypt to modernize by hbereting herself from the
shackles of classical Arabic. They were echoed among nationaUst Egyptians who
advocated disassociation from the Arabs. On the positive side, even those who
strongly advocated a Mediterranean culture differentiated between culture (which
they considered nationalistic territorial attitude) and civilization605 (which
they considered universal because It is material and scientific) and advocated
strong cooperation among Arab states. 606 Aside from its support In cultural
areas, Arabic, the language of the Ouran, was being exalted in line with Islamic
tradition by all the politico-religious reformist parties and societies. 607 For
the Prophet 608 his successors, and puritan Muslim leaders all considered the
602Anwar 6. Chejne, Arabic : Its Significanc, and Place in Arab Muslim Society, THE
fiDDLE EAST JOURNAL. XIX. No.4, Autumn. 1965, p.459; Lii. Kenny, SaL( ii Husrrs
Views on Arab NationalIsm, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XVII, No.3, Summer, 1963,
pp.239, 254.
6O3 Kenny, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. XVII, No.3, p.239 refutes the territoriality f
Arabic literature.
604pluhammad Rifat, POlITICAL ORIENTATION OF MODERN ARABIC IDEAS (in Arabic)
Cairo : Dar .1 tlaaarit. 1964, pp.36-37.
605 1b1d.e pp .177 distInguishes between culture (which Is national, territorial and
spiritual) and civilizaLion (which is scientific, material and universal). Elie Salem.
Islam is a Basis of Arab Search for Ideology. STUDIES IN ISLAM, Ii. No.2, AprIl,
1965. pp.79-86.
'Chejne, ThE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. XIX. No.4. pp.451-55.
607 1bid., p.456.
tcE.A. Speisler, Cultural Factors in Social Factors in Social Dynamics in the Near
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use end protection of Arabic an act of faith end a prerequisite for learning
Islam.609 Such Indivisibility between Islam as a religion end Arabs as a people
proved the statement that Arab nationalism was a result of defending Islam.610
Even different Egyptian secular political groups end parties considered education
and teaching In Arabic as patriotic duties.61 1 Moreover. Egyptian governments
since the time of Orabi considered maintenance and protection of Arab antiquities
a national duty.
History has also become the inspiration of Arab nationalism.612 It has said that
[Arobs j live in their splendid past as an escape from the miserable present.613
Mohammed All's personal ambition to build an Imperial dynasty was the genesis of
the idea of establishing a modern Arab state;614 however, his attempt to
modernize Egypt resulted in the revival of Arabic for translation.6 15 In the same
vein, we can analyze Islam in the relationship between Arab and Egyptian
nationalism. Islam is the religion of most Arabs end Egyptians. And even the
non-Muslim Arabs are Influenced by Islamic culture. It has been the advocates of
a secular Egyptian nationalism (mostly the Copts) who wanted to discontinue
Arabic and to dissociate Egypt from the Arabs. The Copts were afraid of being
overwhelmed by a large Muslim majority. Inasmuch as the Arab people end their
language were predominant among the Muslims In early Islam, paradoxically
East, SOCIAL FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, edited by Sydney Nettleton Fisher, op.cit.,
p.19; Fabumni. op.clt., pp.215-16.
609 Fabumni. op.clt., p.2 17.
61O C. Ernest Dawn, Arab Islam in the Modern Age, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XIX,
No.4, Autumn, 1965, p.443.
611 Jacob, M. Landau. A1 Afghanis Pan Islamic Project, ISLAMIC CULTURE. XXVII.
No.3, July. 1952. pp.51.
612 Nasser, MAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part II, p.194, September 7. 1960. ...the region is
one, and Its conditions, Its problems, and Its future and even the enemy are the
e.me.... See Richard H. Dekmejlan. E6YPT UNDER NASSER : A Study In Political
Dynamics, Albany, N.Y. : State University of New York. p .103, ...thls circle Is as
much a pirL of us as we are a part. of It, that our history has mixed with It and that its
Interests are linked with ours...We have suffered the same hardships, lived the same
crlsls...
613Nab1h Amin Fans and Muhammad Tawfik, ThE CRESCENT IN CRISIS An
Interpretative Study of the Modern Arab World, Lawrence : University of Kansa!
Press, 1955. p.25.
6146eorge Antonlus. THE ARAB AWAKENING. op.clt., p.33.
6l5FanIs and Muhammad Husayn, THE CRESCENT, o p .clt., p.86.
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history reveals that the Muslims Arabs, 616 especially the Sunnls,617 became
predominant in the early stage of the Arab nationalist movement.
The awakening of the Arabs to the real danger of the Zionist movement In
Palestine end the universal trend toward regional and International community
encouraged the establishment of the Arab League. 618 Egypt's desire to seek the
support of the Arab states In her struggle for Independence was the greatest
determining factor In her role in establishing the Arab League. The Arab League
with regard to Its scope end activities was a compromise between various forces.
The designation of the organization as the League of Arab States and the selection
of Cairo as its headquarters and an Egyptian as Secretary-6eneral reflected
Egypt's leadership. 619 On the other hand, the Arab states, in the face of
Increasing Zionist danger In Palestine, were willing to accept and recognize
Egypt's leadership.620
With Nasser coming to power primarily as a consequence of the Egyptian defeat in
the Palestine War of 1948, he did not want to Involve himself in any external
problems of Arab or nun-Arab countries. The first application and manifestation
of the re-evaluation of Egypt's foreign policy was the replacement of Abd el
Rahman Azzam as Secretary-General of the Arab League.621 Nasser believed that
the Lea9ue was part of the great deception practised upon the people of the region;
It talked too much and did too little.622 Nasser paid lip service to Arab causes,
616 The fraternal sentiment of Islam takes the place of the national sentiment. In
fact, Arab masses In every Arab country look to the masses of the other Arab
countries as brothers unified by Islam in the first place and by Arabism in the second.
Quoted from Fans and Muhammad Husayn, THE CRESCENT. op.cit., p.27.
617 5ee Nassers position against the Shi'Ites: they might succeed temporarily by
relying an elements of sepanationists (Shublsts) which for centuries hated Arabs but
they will never succeed In putting out the spirit In the soul of real Arabs. Translated
from MAJtILJAT KHUTAB, Part ii, p.356; See also Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE
WORLD, op.ciL., p.76; Albert Hourani, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. XXIX. April, 1953.
p.177; BInder, THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION. op.cIL, p.206.
616Laqueur, THE MIDDLE EAST IN TRANSITION, op.clt., p.105.
619taqueur. THE MIDDLE EAST IN TRANSITION, op.cIt., p.102, the proposed federation
or loose confederation became a league among sovereign states. Even the name
League was initiated by Egyptian delegates.
620 A1berL Hourani, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. XXIX, April, 1953, p.179.
621 LIttle, EGYPT, op.cit., p.256.
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having lost any hope in the League's effectiveness. They [the Arab leaders]...do
nothing except talk. Arab unity Is Imaginary, not a real thing. 623 Thus Nasser
steered an Independent path for the achievement of Egypt's objectives. Nasser put
It squarely, We the Arab nations and our leaders are the main cause for the loss
of Palestine. 624 Nasser's Indifference toward Arab causes was not shown by a
lock of bombastic speeches and lavish support but was reflected In the
programmes of such government organizations as the Liberation Rally.625
Establishment of frlendly relations with all Arab states ond •e regional pact
were placed at the bottom of the objectives of the only popular governmental
organization just before the general friendly relations with all friendly
powers.626 On another occasion Nasser said in ridicule 627 •The Arab bond
(league) is nor real and up till now has been a mythical link. 626 His
indifference to the prospect of whether Syria unites with Iraq, Jordan or even
Turkey 629 and his designation of the Arab states as nations630 demonstrated lack
of sympathy for Arab feeling end lack of Arab nationalism and unity.
Nevertheless. despite this Indifference, Nasser would not tolerate any Arab
country pursuing any policy that would conflict with Its own. Nasser's opposition
came with the announcement of the Baghdad Pact. Then Egypt proposed a fully
unified Arab military command and co-operation in other fields.
The Egyptian Minister of National Guidance expressed annoyance stating, But, I
22 Quoted from Ibid.. p.256.
623 Quoted from Nasser In Wheelock, NASsER'S NEW E6YPL op.clt., p.216; See also El
Barawy, MILITARY COUP, op.cIL, p.209.
624 Translated from Nasser. KHUTUB AL PAlS. I, p.153.
625 While the Egyptian broadcasting station pledged Egyptian blood and treasure to the
Arab cause, Nasser himself showed a dangerous restraint In his references to Israel.
and there were reports from roreigners that he might be prepared to make peace.
Quoted from Little, E6YPT, op.cit, p.255.
626 Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY. op.clt.. p.164.
627Although the Egyptian and Arab nationalists considered Nasser's first three years
In power the low point in his popularity, others, mainly Westerners, considered this
period his finest. See Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.clt., pp.220-23. Nasser
had never been so unpopular. Quoted from Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT. op.cjf., pp.107,
110. See also Dayan. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XXXIII, No.2, p.225; Issawi, EGYPT IN
REVOLUTION, op.cit., p.54.




regret to say, we heard the opposite view from Iraq with regard to foreign policy
end defence, end we heard no views on the matter from the other Arab
countrles. 63 1 On the other hand, as settlement with the British appeared to be
forthcoming and as there were signs of a thaw In the Cold War between East and
West, Nasser valued the reactivation of Egypts leadership of Arab countries.632
Even before concluding the agreement with the British, Nasser tried to defend his
previous Indifference to Arab causes by saying he did not want to deceive or fool
the Arab citizens and Just say sweet words, but [we have] laid down a firm policy
In our relation with our brethen Arabs, whose results would be realized in the
coming j633
Salah Salem, the then Minister of National Guidance, echoed Nasser's view that
Egyptians must "look at our country and act In the light of our Interest, but at the
same time we feel that we are bound by a vital link, Arab nationhood, which was
not as Important to Egyptian statesmen In the past as It is now." Nasser
elaborated:
[We] believed that the problems of the Arabs are
problems of Egyptians too, end If the problem of
[British] occupation exhausted the largest part of the
energies of Egyptians, It never distracted us from
participation In any effort for the emancipation of
Arab countries. No doubt the future will witness new
pictures In this important area of the world.634
Increasingly Nasser began to Identify with Arab causes and to champion Arab
rights until on January 16, 1956, the preamble of the new Egyptian constitution
proclaimed Egypt an organic part of a greater Arab unity", and Article I stated
that the Egyptian people are an integral part of the Arab nation. 635 And on
June 23, 1956, the Egyptian people, as expected, approved the constitution
t31ha1il. THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.237.
2Whee1ock, NASSERS NEW E6YPT. op.cit., pp.218-9, 221-2.
633Nasser, KHLJTUB AL RAIS. I, p.141.
4 Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part. I, p.177. July 23, 1954.
5 Quoted from Chejne, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. XI, No.3, p.266. See also Curtis
F. Jones, "The New Egyptian Constitution, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, X. No.3,
Summer, 1956, pp.300-06.
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overwhelmingly.636 Other Arab countries made similar provisions in their
constltutlons.637 But none of these constitutional provisions and statements
stirred up 8flxlety and excitement among the Arabs as much as Egypt's, the most
Important Arab country.638
Nasser hid not describe the Egyptian constitution and the adoption of Arab
nationalism as major events In Egypt's history, Instead, he gave the Impression
that the idea of Arab nationalism had developed in him gradually, recalling that
the first glimmers of Arab awareness began to steal Into my consciousness when
I was a student in secondary school:
Then a kind of understanding began to develop when I
became a student In the Military Academy...Things
grew still clearer and the underlying realities became
apparent when (I was) in the General Staff
College.639
Nevertheless, a critical survey of Nasser's speeches made during his first
fourteen months In office reveals that he dealt with almost every important
subject except Arab nationallsm. At the same time, he took the liberty of
ridiculing other Arab states. The first time Nasser mentioned Arabism was In
en address to the Chiefs of Staff of the Arab armies on August 25. 1953 which
began: Chlefs of Staff : Brethen In Arabism end Islam.640 The most elaborate
detailed mention of Arab nationalism was in his PHiL 0.5 P//Y OF THE
REVOLUTION. 641 Even then Nasser continued to use the term Arab nation in
referring to the Arab people who Inhabit different Arab countries, while the
6 Jones, ThE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, X, No.3, Summer, 1956, p.304.
637 5ee Chejne, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. XI, No.3, pp .265-66, Egypt is the new
convert, the largest and the most important.
6 CecII Hourani. •The New Egyptian Constitution, MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XXXI, hay.
1956, pp.7-9, describes the Egyptian constitution as an Instrument or policy rather
than a set of fundamental principles of constitution.
639 From Nasser, EGYPTS LIBERATION. op.cIL, pp.89. 90. RepeaLed in an interview to
Desmond Stewart, YOUNG EGYPT, op.cIL, p.186.
40 Na,ser, KHUTUB AL RAIS, I. p.87.
641 Ibid.. pp.88-98, 102-09. According to St. John. ThE BOSS. op.clt.. pp.193-95.
even part of this book was actually written by Mohammed Hassanein Heikal.
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correct term is the Arab nntlon to which oil Arab people belong. 642 But, after
the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the term Arab nationalism was used In
Nasser's speeches as often as Egyptian natlonallsm and after the Tripartite
Invasion and the establishment of the United Arab Republic, Nasser's use of the
term surpassed his use of any other terms, Including Positive Neutrelity.643
Even after the establishment of the United Arab Republic and later federation with
Yemen end establishment of the United Arab States, which was Nasser's climax In
the achievement of Arab unity. Arab nationalism was not completely entrenched in
Egypt as the dissolution of the United Arab Republic and the discarding of Yemen
on the fall of 1961 showed. The Egyptians' reaction end embitterment was shown
through Nasser's spokesman. Mohammed Hassanein Heikal. who admitted that
there existed In fact no real and positive ties between the Arab peoples In Egypt
end Syria to establish the union - except for one thing, namely, Nasir, his
personality and popularity.644 However, once Nasser adopted Arab nationalism
end Egypt declared herself part of the Arab land, Arab nationalism and ideologies
became the monopolistic property of Nasser end the Egyptians.
Nasser's definition of en Arab as eny who speaks Arabic, as his mother tongue
end his definition of Arab nationalism approached the definition accepted by Pan-
Arcblsts. 645 According to Nasser, Arab nationalism Is Unity of conscience.
which Is represented In the unity of history. Unity of thought, which is
represented In unity of longuage. 646 On a later occasion Nasser concluded:
Hence if the Arabs have unity of conscience and unity of thought, then this
clearly means that the Arabs are one natlon..647
642Hasser, KHUTUB AL RAIS. I. p.153.
643 for a chronological development of Nassers use of the terms, Non Alignment.
PosiLive Neutraiism, and Arab National ism see Nasser MAJMUAT KHUTAB. Parts I
to VI.
b44 rranslated from AL AHRAM. October 6, 1961, and reproduced In A. toya. Ridio
Propaganda of the United Arab Republic - An Analysis. MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS. XIII
No.4, April1962. p.109.
45 Nasser, PIAJMUAT KHUTAB, Part II, p.194, July. 9, 1960.
64SQuoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. April-June. 1960. p.11.
64lNasser, MAJMUAT KHUTAB. Part III, p.194. July 9. 1960.
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Epistemologicaily speaking, Arab unity nationalism Is
traceable to four Interrelated powers - Intuition,
rationalism, experience, and tradition. Abd el Nasir
and other proponents or the Ideology repeatedly stated
that the tenets of Arab unity reside In Arab hearts. In
their efforts to ascertain the 'feeling' of nationalism.
most Arab theorists resort to the heart. While the
process of discovering the fundamental truth of the
Ideology Is a private endeavor for each Arab, the
collective will of the Arab people was to be articulated
by the leader of the nationalist movement, 6emal Abd
al Nasir, who himself relied on Intuition (In addition
to other means of gauging the popular will) as an
epistemological tool to 'reach' the hearts of the people
and Interpret their aspirations. The heavy reliance of
Nasir and Nasirite Ideologues upon the Intuition
approach should not be surprising considering that
nationalism Is the child of emotion and feeling. In
pursuing the broad elms of the Ideology, the Nasirites
are, at times, less concerned with the practical and
the rational and more with the desirable.648
Previously, in defining the objectives of Arab nationalism, Nasser had said they
center on Liberty, on sovereignty, on dignity, on Integrity, on unity - the unity
of the Arab Nation - so that we can strengthen and consolidate the pillars of Arab
Nationalism which unites the hearts of all Arabs in all parts of the Arab
World.649 Nasser's favourite theme equated Arab nationalism with complete
Independence from any foreign Influence and Its political content Is positive
neutrality between the two power blocs'. 650 In short, Nasser's definition of Arab
nationalism and Ideology651 came very close to the definitions of the
medieval,652 Inter war,653 and postwar654 periods. Finally, Nasser imbued
t4OSee Dekmejian, E6YPT UNDER NASSER. o p .cit., p.102.
9 Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. 1956. pp.25-29.
50 Quoted from IbId., 1959, p.532.
Nasser did not. like to enunciate any doctrine that might lead people to create
propaganda against It. Such a doctrine will, nevertheless, develop with the
development of Arab nationalism.' Quoted from Ibid., 1958. p.403.
652Accordtng to the medieval definition, an Arab Is one 1. Whose mother tongue Is
Arabic; 2. Who Is born to Arabs, and whose residence is the Arab Fatherland.
Translated from Muhammad Al Kittani, ARABISM OF IBN TAYMIYYAH, Cairo : Tlbaa ci
tiajils, 1963, pp.734-35.
653DurIng the inter war period the following definitions were used:
'TUE ARABS: AU who are Arab in their language, culture, and loyalty tdefined...as
nat1onal feelingi, those are the Arabs...
'The Arab Homeland: It Is the land which has been, or Is. inhabited by an Arab
majority.' Quoted from Khelid, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.clt., pp.34-54.
4 The following definition Is characteristic of the post war period: 'The present day
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Areb nationalism with his positive neutrality end Arab Socialism end gave it his
personal Impression, which altogether Is cafled Nasserism. 655 In adopting
Arab nationalism Nasser linked Egypt's fate with that of the Arab East.656
Nasser, wanting to eliminate eli slogans of the old regime's political parties
which lacked definite clear ideology657 end, in the meantime, to give the
appearance of a new and revolutionary regime 658 sought an Ideology.659
Positive neutrality, which was adopted as en Ideology for the new regime, was one
of the few points that could rally all the major political segments of Egyptian
society, and It became the pivot of Egyptian foreign policy. Nasser quickly
discerned that positive neutrality end nonalignment are terms that have appeared
in the Arab region which every Arab believes In and calls for.660 Thus shrewdly
defined, Arab nationalism means positive neutrality end non-alignment; It means
that our policy springs from our conscience 66 ' Then, during the spring and
summer of 1955 Nasser progressively developed the doctrine of neutralism,
fitting It into the frame of Arab nationalism.662 The crystallization of a clear
Arabs are all those who Inhabit the Arab world, speak the Arabic language, take pride
in Arab history, cherish the general Arab feeling, and share in the characteristics of
Arab mentality, Irrespective of their religious affiliation and their racial descent.
Quoted from Fans and Muhammad Husayn, THE CRESCENT. op.ciL, p.8.
5 Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD. op.ciL, pp.62-145. Nassers actions and
policies have Invariably either carried forward (perhaps more spectacularly than
before) trends already inaugurated in the Arab world, or translated Into action and
strong popular desires for new poiicies. Quoted from Fayez A. Sayegh, Nasser and
Arab Nationalism, MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XXIV. No.4. AprIl. 1959, p.16.
656J.W.D. 6ray. Arab Nationalism : Abdin Against the Wafd, MIDDLE EAST FORUM.
XXXVIII, No.2, February, 1962. pp.17-19; Albert Hourani, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL.
IX, No.3, p.251.
t575afran E6YPT IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY, op.clt., pp.245. 250. 255.
'It would be misleading to understand that evolution and to envisage the problems and
needs of present and future Ideological development only in intellectual terms.' p.250.
658 'lnstead the men who made the revolution have tried to combine some of the basic
elements of both Liberal Reformism Into a new indigenous nationalism to serve as the
foundation of a modern Egyptian communIty'. Ibid., p.255.
9 'The Ideology is the political myth functioning to preserve the social structure; the
UtODia to supplant It'. Quoted mom Lasswell and kaplan. POWER AND SOCIETY. op.cit.,
p.123.
°Nasser, MAJMUAT KHUTAB, Part I, p.743.
were always inspired in our action by Arab nationalism. Arab independence.
their attachment to positive neutrality and opposition to Zionism and Israel'. Nasser,
PIAJMUAT KHLJTAB, Part I. pp.649-SO.
2 Quoted from Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD, op.cit., p.145.
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and definite ideology 63 made it possible for Nasser to indoctrinate Egyptians664
with Arab nationalism. Further, the sphere of Arab nationalism was large enough
to serve as the foundation of Pan-Islam 665 end Pan-AIrlcanlsm.666 It was large
enough to remain In the Mediterranean zone, on the one hand, end, in the
meantime, to encompass the Sudan. The official adoption of Arab nationalization
was to Arablze the Egyptians and to legitimize Nasser s activities and
ambition:661
For some reason It seems to me that within the Arab
circle there is a role, wandering aimlessly in search
of a hero. And I do not know why it seems to me that
this role, exhausted by Its wanderings, has at last
settled down, tired and weary, near the borders of our
country and is beckoning to us to move, to take up Its
lines, to put on its costume, since no one else is
qualified to play it....We alone, by virtue of our place,
can perform the role.668
Nasser Spelled out the many facets, objectives, and purposes of the ideology:
Arab nationalism Is not merely a political movement; but it Is a social
philosophy as well; it is a sentimental call and a Joint Interest; it is a strategic
necesslty.669 An Egyptian writer outlined Egyptian foreign policy and the
pivotal role of positive neutrality:
Positive neutrality Is the Internal axis of our foreign
policy, the link of the Internal structure of our nation
and Arab nationalism and emanated from our history
tandi experience and dictated our Important
geographical and strategical position between East and
West and also connects us to Afro-Asian solidarity and
global peace.610
663 NissIm Rejwan, Arab Nationalism : In Search of an ldeology. THE MIDDLE EAST IN
TRANSITION, op.cIt. pp.147-65.
tb4Nasser argued that a social ideology takes root only when it expresses the hearts,
minds and souls of those who adopt it...The heart of the nation Is Its aspirations. Its
mind is Its present conditions and its soul is Its history. Quoted from MIDDLE EAST
NEWS DISPATCH. Translated In MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XXXVI. No.4. April, 1960. p.2 1.
665 Ibrahim Jumah, EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC NATIONALISM, tin Arabici, Cairo : Kosta
Tasomas Press, 1944, pp.3-4, 50-56.
t' 6 Anwar ZagI.mah, 6REATER EGYPT : Africa for the Africans tin Arabicl Cairo
tlaktabat at Anglo at Misrlyyah. 1955. pp.156.
667James Heyworth-Dunne, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL TRENDS IN MODERN EGYPT.
Washington. D.C.: Dunne Press, 1950. p.11.
66Hasser, E6YPTS LIBERATION. o p .clt.. pp.67-68, p.114.
669 Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. 1959, p.22.
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The elements of mystique end myth in both Egyptian67l and Arab672 nationalism
would Serve as en actual outline for Nasser. Admittedly, there are also elements
in both Islam end Arabism that conflict with each other. 673 Whatever Its
claims674 there Is no Ideology that could satisfy all human desires end
aspirations.675 At any rate, en extensive propaganda campaign676 was carried
Out to prove to the Arabs that Egypt was en Arab country. Nasser took the lead In
overcoming the longstanding Egyptian attitude of estrangement from Arab
nationalism: We firmly believe that we are part of the Arab nation. We cannot
regard it with the eyes of a stranger .677 In his zeal to extract proof that Egypt
Is an Arab country Nasser went so far as to claim that the Revolution of the 23rd
of July was an Arab and not an Egyptian revolution because It sprang from Arab
soil, blood, hearts.678
Since the establishment of the Arab League Egypt has been officially acknowledged
by the other Arab governments as the biggest Arab Slster. Egypt's adoption of
Arab nationalism after long hesitation was Jubilantly welcomed by the Pen-
670 AIbert Hourani, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. XXIX, APtiIe 1953, p.31.
611 *5 for the mystical element of Egyptian nationalism, nationalism is a
sentiment ..the reeling of the worth and dignity of man, of the bounty of 6od and his
care. of the meaning of existence itself. See Satran, EGYPT IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL
COMMUNITY. op.clt., p.87.
672 See the mystical element In Abd al Latit Shararahs definition of Arab nationalism
In Haim. ARAB NATIONALISM. op.clL, pp.225-26.
673Sharabl, NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION, op.cit., pp.4-5.
674 Ideologies have historIcally served to fill the needs of men, usually attempting to
bridge the gap between the prevailing limits of reason and the psychological needs of
man within society'. Quoted from Charles 0. Lerche, Jr.. and Abdul A. Said,
CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL POLiTICS, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice HaIl, 1963.
p.22 1.
675 'Probably no one Ideology embraces all life.. it follows, therefore, that a
particular Individual may. and ordinarily does, adhere to several ideologies. And he
may do so despite that tact that they contain elements and logical incompatibility'.
Schleicher. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. op.clt., p.74.
676 'In a society with a stable social structure, the ideology Is a matter of consensus.
not opinion'. Quoted from Lasswell and Kaplan. POWER AND SOCIETY. op.cIL, p.123.
NatIOnS which abruptly came Into being or which undergo a metamorphosis are
naturally In greater need of explicit Ideological guidance, and the Arab nation belongs
to this category.' Quoted from Hazem Zaki Nuselbeh, ThE IDEAS OF ARAB
NATIONALISM, Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1956. p.221.
b77Quoted from Nasser. SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. 1958. p.143.
678Nasser. MAJMUAT KHUTAB, Part IV, p.432.
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Arabists.679 Egypt's support was needed in the struggle for Palestine. 680 Egypt
was already a recognized leader In the Arab states,66 and Nasser's leadership as
spokesman of the Arab nationalists, whose aspirations fitted his ambition 682 was
acknowledged. 683 Therefore, most Arab governments who might have disagreed
with him feared to oppose him openly. Thus, Inasmuch as Nasser's Influence
teneflted from his position as the head of Egypt. Egypt Denefitted from NasserS
leadership. Nasser was able to raise his Image and enhance Egypt's interests in
the triangular Interplay of national, regional, and global Interests. His bold
policies and 'progressive' brand of Arab nationalism appealed to Arab nationalists
and rendered him the mouthpiece of the Arabs.684
In turn, his eminent position with the nonaligned group, Ilehru-Nasser-kkrumah,
made him attractive to the Communist bloc and won him an International stature
even in the West never before attained by any Middle Eastern leader. 685 Nasser's
international stature686 enhanced his prestige,687 consolidated his regime at
home, and gave him further freedom of action on the international scene. Nasser
In turn diverted most of his energy to more vigorously backing Arab causes of
liberation and Independence to keep Arab support end enthusiasm kindled.686
679 The Egyptians were always aware of the preponderance of their position. P. L.
Kendall, The Ambivalent Character or Nationalism Among Egyptian Professionals,
PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, XX, No.1, Spring, 1956. p.286; Nasser, E6YPS
LIBERATION, op.cit., pp.66, 89; Vatikiotis, NASSER AND HIS 6ENERATION, op.cit.,
p.200.
0 in the Arab world, her position as the center of Arab culture...and the tear that It
they do not follow her lead she will make a separate peace with Israel. have so far
secured her predominance. Quoted from Albert Hourani, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL.
XI, No.3. p.264;
'lbtd., p.250.
2 Chejne, ThE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. XI, No.3, p.265. According to Wheelock,
NASSERS NEW EGYPT. op.cIL, pp.232-33, Nassers call tor the liberation of the Arab
world from Morocco to Baghd.d...was not Incompatible with the broad aims of Arab
nationalism that Independent Arab countries, like Egypt, should help liberate those
areas still under foreign dominatlon.
fe3Fayez A. Sayegh, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, No.4, p .17; Cremeans, THE ARABS
AND THE WORLD, op.cit., pp.62, 145.
4Nasser. THE PHILOSOPHY, op.cIt. p.10 1.
5 CampeIl, THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE MUTED COLD WAR, op.clt.. p.19.
6LiLtle, EGYPT. op.clt., p.165. Lacouture, NASSER, op.clt., pp .223-24, 266;
Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD, op.clt., p.146; Wheelock, NASSERS NEW
EGYPT, op.cit., pp.225-26.
7 Lacouture, EGYPT IN TRANSITION, op.clt., p.221.
688 Fayez A. Sayegh, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, No.4. pp.16-17.
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Such Arab support of Nasser did not count much In a military showdown, but It
was effective In political and economic fields.689
However, Nasser's increased popularity and strengthened prestige were not
without losses. In as much as Nasser's support of Arab causes won him prestige
abroad and consolidated his position at home, his vigour In supporting the Arabs
in Algeria, Men, and Africa690 Invoked the wrath of the West end the Zionists.691
To maintain his Arab leadership Nasser hod to outbid his Arab rivals in the verbal
battle against Western Imperialism and Zionism. That led to the squabbles with
other Arab countries692 which climaxed in the Yemeni civil war, 1965 and led
ultimately to the defeat of June 1967. After this Nasser's ambitions in other
Arab countries were deterred temporarily, but until his death he remained the
uncontested leader of the Arabs. 693 In short, in adopting Arab nationalism,
Nasser, willingly or unwillingly, linked the destiny of Egypt with that of the Arab
countries but, in the meantime 1 guaranteed its leadership of these countries
regardless of the fact that Egypt was a new convert of Arabism:
Thus, If Damascus and Baghdad claim pre-eminence in
Arebism, it was and still is in Cairo that its advocates
can expound and nurture it. Although Mecca and
Jerusalem may represent all that is holy in Islam, it
was and still is in the AztLar University at Cairo that
religious thought, teaching, end orthodox tlus)im
pronouncements are molded and diffused694
6 9NASSER. THE PHILOSOPHY. op.cit.. p.100. See also tacouture, NASSER. op.cit..
pp.223-24.
b9OWheelock. NASSERS NEW EGYPT. op.cit.. p.225; Issawi, EGYPT IN REVOLUTION,
op.cIL. p.3 12.
69lLacouture, NASSER, op.cit., p.221; Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT, op.cit., p.154. For
Angl o-French complaints and futile effort to pacify Nasser to quit, see Wheelock,
NASSERS NEW EGYPT, op.ciL.. pp.233-35.
6921 RUe, MODERN EGYPT. op .cIL, pp.183-97.
693John S. Badeau, THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO THE ARAB WORLD. New York : Row,
1968. p.150.
6Q4Quoted from Vatikiotis, NASSER AND HIS GENERATION, op.clt., p.200.
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3.12 CONCLUSION
This conclusion attempts to evaluate the Impact of Nasser's leadership on Egypt's
power structure end International stature.
The capability or a state to achieve its objectives depenös on their feasibility and
clarity,695 on the state's powers, 696 Its ideology, type of leadership. end form
of government; and consequently, on the International setting. In general, its
capability of achieving Its objectives runs parallel with Its resources and means
of development of Its gross national product. 697 For economic power is a
determinant of the other forms of power - political, military, or cultural.698
The political power of a state or of en Individual Is very difficult to measure,699
for It Is relative and much more psychological than concrete. Further, a state's
capability varies from time to time depending on whether there is war or peace or
on the kind of leadership the state has. Egypt has been endowed with a vital
geographical, commercial, and strategical position. This position has
occasionally been used by a major power to control and influence countries to the
east and south. On the other hand, throughout most of her history Egypt has fallen
under the Influence of a major power because of her Inability either to use or to
protect these positions.
The tangible gains that accrued to Egypt under the leadership of Nasser might have
been impressive by Egyptian standards, but they do not explain the tremendous
Increase In the International stature, power, and Influence of Egypt. Therefore,
65Organski , WORLD POLITICS. op.clt., pp.76-77; Charles 0. Lerche, Jr., FOREI6N
POLICY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. Englewood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1961.
pp.11.13-14.
5 For a discussion of the various models and approaches to the study of power and
types of power, see Allan Kornberg and Simon D. Perry, Conceptuel Models of Power
and their Applicability to Em p irical Research in Politics. POLITICAL SCIENCE. No.1.
March. 1966. pp.52-54.
697 Dav1d 0. Wilkinson, COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS : Framework and Methods,
Belmont : Dlckenson, 1969, pp.42-43.
68sswelI and Kaplan, SOCIETY AND POWER, op.cit., pp.93-97.
699 See Kornberg and Perry. POLITICAL SCIENCE, XVIII. No.1. pp .65-68. for the
difficulties and shortcomings of applicability of major models and approaches of power.
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one must consider the political objectives of power,700 which requires taking
Into account geographical, historical, cultural, ethnic, and ideological factors
along with the character of leadership. The next factor to be considered is the
capability of the state - mainly, the change of government, type of leadership,
end Ideology. Indeed, the Intangible assets of Nasser's Egypt matched and even
surpassed her material strength. Egypt has been the center of Arabic culture and
Islamic religion. There Is a close Interrelation and interdependence among the
various material, political, personal, social, moral, and psychological forms of
power, end the Increase or decrease In one type of power might result In opposite
or similar changes in other types of power.101
The elimination of Naguib and other new rivals to Nasser, and the consequent
crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood (for which purpose Nasser did not hesitate to
use the negotiation with the British on the Evacuation Agreement as leverage)
resulted at the end of 1 954 in the concentration of political power - including
foreign policy - in the hands of Nasser.702 A relevant assertion declares, [The
more charismatic the leaderI the more power can be mobilized to support any
given policy, and consequently the more effective is policy; or...the more
charismatic the leadership, the more policy tends to be active, expansionist or
revolutlonary.703
6amal Abdel Nasser, In referring to the Army Movement, pressed his Egyptian
listeners to never forget that It was a revolution and not a coup.704 At the
outset, Nasser never mentioned the term 'revolution' with regard to the movement
In his proclamations, communiques, or official announcements ?05 nor was the
700 According to Lssswell and Kaplan, SOCIETY AND POWER, op.cit., p.92, all types of
power have political objectives and connotations.
70 For the Interdependence of powers, see IbId.. pp.93-94, and Organski, WORLD
POLITICS. op.cIL., pp.215-16.
7O2HIsham B. Sharabi. Power and Leadership in the Arab World, ORBIS, VII. No.3.
Fall. 1963. p.583. 1n the contemporary Arab world, personalized power is the basis
of all types of domination and control. p.593. See also p.590. for control of army
and administration.
7O3Quoted from Wilkinson, COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS. op.cIt., p.1 14.
704p4as,er, KIIIJ1IJB AL RAIS, III, p.505.
7O5Llt,Lle, WORLD TODAY. X, April, 1954, p.146.
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term 'revolution' common In official or non official usage. The term 'revolution'
was not used officially until September 7, 1952, in reference to the meeting of
the Command Council on the occasion of Mohammed Noguib's takeover as Prime
Minister.106 After February 1953. with the complete military takeover of
government, the terms 'revolution' end 'revolutionary' were ascribed to
everything related to the Army Movement or Its leader. Even if the motto and
programme of the Liberation Rally, 'unity, discipline, anti work', were
arbitrarily considered an ideology, end even If the agrarian reform end other
social welfare programmes were based on ideological principles, the number of
people affected by these measures would be too small to Justify calling the steps
revolutionary.?07 For the fundamental characteristic of a revolution:
Lies In the fact that It Is not merely a violent and
profound modification of the social organization but a
major shift In the relations between social
classes...the dominance of the upper class is destroyed
and the lower class emancipates itself from the
economic exploftatfon buttressed by p&.tic&
subordination.708
If according to these criteria the term 'revolution' Is difficult to apply to
Nasser's regime at that stage, then whlle they are still under way the word
'revolutionary' can only qualify methods, Intentions or asplrations.109 It Is
Important to find out what Nasser meant by describing the Army movement as 'a
revolution' end not a 'coup d'etat'. Nasser gave the answer himself by describing
the nature of the Army Movement as a revolution against imperialism and
reaction, a revolution expressing the hopes of the country. 71 O Even If the Army
706 1b1d., p.140.
707Dankwart A. Rustow. THE MILITARY IN MIDDLE EAST SOCIETY AND POLITICS,
Washington : The Brookings Institution, 1963. p.16 staLes The distinction between
military coups end military revolutions must properly rest not upon any differences In
the technique by which it is seized but rather upon the scope and success of the reform
program which is subsequently enacted.
706Quoted from Alfred Muesel, Revolution and Counter Revoiution, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCE. ed. Edwin R.A. Seligman. XXII. 1942. p.367.
709 E1 Serafy. THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XVII, No.3, p.215. Nasser later considered
the revolution...the end, the objective. SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1959,
p.567. Then he described the Army Movement In these words, Ours was a
Irevolutlonl undertaken or spearheaded by the army. Revolutions launched by armies
are the most difficult types of revolutlons, p.569. Armies are not political
organizations. The staging of revolutions Is not their Iine. p.569.
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Movement could be considered a revolution or a step toward revolution, one Is
Interested In discovering its Impact on the objectives of Egypt's stature. 71 1 For
In a revolution the relation of a government with foreign governments may be
affected, but not the necessities Imposed upon It by Its geographical position 1 its
history, Its need to live. Nasser echoed similar views:
This is our role as determined for us by the history of
our nation. There is no cholce....We cannot look at the
map of the world without seeing our own place upon it,
and that our role is dictated by that place.712
The lack7l3 of any policy objectives714 of the new regime was almost complete in
the matter of Egypt's foreign affairs. However, a review of the secret pamphlets
of the organization of Free Officers and the writings of the new regime's
supporters reveals that the objectives of Nasser and the Free Officers were:( 1)
independence, (2) clear neutrality which involves rejection of imperialistic
pacts, and (3) purifying the Inter-Arab Collective Security Pact. 715 Similarly1
the Liberation Rally's programme stressed the new regime's objectives 01
evacuation and friendly relations with Arab Asian countries. Likewise, In
Nasser's elaborate speech at the Bandung Conference in 1955 716 end in the
710 Nasser, KHUTIJB AL RAtS. III, p.505. See also Nasser, E6YPTS LIBERATION.
op.cit.. p.58.
7 1l However, later after the regime was well established Nasser had better
com prehension and description of the nature of the Army Movement. He described It as
a leap' or renaissance. See Nasser. SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1959. p.57 1,
July 2, 1959.
ll2Quoted from Nasser. EGYPT'S LIBERATION. op.cIL., pp.76. 85.
7l3p4asser admits that when the Free Officers took up arms against the existing
government their 'victory was not assured at all and, therefore, the Free Officers
were 50 preoccupied with their own rate that they did not have time to think of what
they 'were going to do after Itheirl victory. Translated from Nasser, KHUTUB AL
RA'IS. I, p.163.
7l4Llnllke most major conceptual models of power, Kornberg and Perry. POLITICAL
SCIENCE, XVIII, No.1, p.66, point to the necessity to Lake Into consideration of the
goals and objectives of a person In a sLudy and approach of power.
7l5El Barawy, MILITARY COUP. op.clt., pp.207-li.
76Nasser outlined Egyptian foreign policy as: (1) support of self-determination ror all
natIons. (2) support of United Nations principles for the maintenance of Inter-national
peace and security, and (3) extension of co-operation among the Afro-Asian bloc. Then
finally, he adopted the five conditions or prerequisites of the principles of peaceful
coexistence. See Nasser, KHUTUB Al. RAIS, III. pp.573-74.
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provisions of the National Charter of 1962,717 Egypt's foreign policy was laid
down in general and global terms rather than In specific and articulate
objectives. Common among all these general objectives was the desire, like that
of Nasser, for Egypt to be free, Independent and strong.
On the other bond, EOVPT'SL/DERA 1/ON delincated the spheres of Egypt's foreign
policy as centered around (1) the Arabic region, (2) the Black African continent,
and (3) the Islamic world.716 A more academic study reveals that the objectives
of Egypt's foreign policy, historically, geographically, and culturally, have been
directed toward the Nilotic and African, Islamic, Mediterranean, and Arabic
spheres in that order. 719 Nasser's adoption of positive neutrality first, followed
by adoption of Arab nationalism and finally Arab Socialism and Arab Unity,
reversed the priority of Egypt's foreign policy objectives. The Syrian Ba'ath
(Renaissance) party or, In fact, any political party may claim the initiative in
advocating neutrality and socialism, but positive neutrality Is associated with and
branded by Nasser who implemented it as en instrument of his government.720
The new element is that Nasser accepted the principles of positive neutrality a
symbol of his new regime with his personal imprint, end perhaps in a fit of
absentmindedness Nasser grabbed Arab leadership. What accounts for the
effectiveness of an ideology,721 at least In the short run, Is not its rationale or
717 War on Imperialism and domination...in all Its shapes and masks...
i.abouring to consolidate peace, since the atmosphere and possibIlities of peace are
the only favourable chance for the protection of national progress.
•Lsstty. International cooperation for the sake of prosperity, since the common
prosperity of all peoples Is no longer divisible and to achieve it, collective cooperation
has now become lmperative.
Quoted from United Arab Republic, THE CHARTER Cairo : IJ.A.R. information
Department, 1962. p.100 In Fsyez A. Sayegh. ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM.
op.cIL.. pp.223-24.
716 Nasser. E6YPS LIBERATION. op.cIt.. p.66.
1 19See Boutros Boutros Ghali. The Foreign Policy of Egypt (United Arab Republic).
FOREI6N POLICIES IN A WORLD OF CHANGE. ed.. Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W.
Thompson. New York : Harper & Row, 1963, pp.335.
720 0ne Irony is that Nasser who adopted the Baath trio of unity. freedom and
,ociallsm. unblushingly accused the Baath of being professional pinchers of slogans
and symbols from others. Nasser. IIAJtIUAT KHUTAB. Part IV. p.466, October 22.
1963. The Baath accused Nasser of stealing their slogans. Vatikiotis, NASSER AND
HIS 6ENERATION. op.cit., pp.168-69.
721 Even states like Russia with an official Ideology of Communism do not adhere to the
letters of Karl Marxs and Lenin's principles in the conduct of relations with non-
Communist states. See Henry B. Mayo, Theory, ideology, and Foreign PoIicy, WORLD
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the soundness and authenticity of Its foundation but rather the degree to which the
people believe In 11722 and Its function In preserving social structure end
political institutions.72 3 iIence It ties been said that almost nny practical
construction can be put on almost any theory'.724 In the case of Nasser, his
adoption of positive neutrality was because of the necessity of uniting all the
Important segments of the country so that they might win their political
Independence from British Imperialism. 725 Likewise, neutrality Is one objective
that all major segments of Arab nationalists would agree upon and would equate
with Independence. Thus Nasser's adoption of positive neutrality became a
rallying point. Other Arab governments claimed to have or promised to follow
such a policy, but Nasser adopted It, Implemented It, and propagendized for it.
Furthermore Egypt is the publication center of the Arabic world and Nasser was
aware of the Interdependence726 between other economic, cultural, and scientific
activities and the propaganda of words.721
Small nations resort to propaganda and diplomatic menoeuvres to compensate for
their lack in material resources and strength. Nasser Inherited from the old
regime a well established, articulate propaganda machine with a long tradition
traceable to the Fatimid and Al Azhar universities. 728 He also inherited the
largest number of newspapers and magazines extant in any Arab country. Radio
Cairo, the Voice of the Arabs, the Voice of Islam had a large audience in other Arab
PRESSURES OH AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. ed. Marlin D. Irish. Englewood Cliffs. N.J.:
Prentice HaIl, 1964, p.18. There is seldom, If ever, any close logical connection
between a political philosophy and its political application. p.25.
722 Sartori, THE AMERICAN POliTICAL SCIENCE REVIEW. LXIII. No.2. p.398.
723 Lasswell and Kaplan, SOCIETY AND POWER, op.cIL, p.123.
774Quoted from Mayo. WORLD PRESSURES, op.clt., p.26.
725 1b1d.. p.26.
726 Andrew H. Berding. Balance Sheet in the War of ldea, in Urban 6. WhiLaker. Jr.,
ed.. PROPAGANDA AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. San Francisco. Calif.: Chandler.
1962. pp.132-35.
727 Propaganda consists of the planned use of any form of public or mass produced
communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given group for a
specific public purpose, whether military, economic or polltical. Quoted from Paul.
tI.A. Linebarger, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press.
1948, p.39. in Whltaker, PROPAGANDA. op.clt., p.5.
728pj. Vatikiotis. THE MODERN HISTORY OF E6YPT, New York : Praeger. 1969. p.167.
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countries. 729 More Important, the Voice of the Arabs and Radio Cairo were so
successful that they competed with the propaganda of the major powers. 73O Egypt
supplied 3,000 volume libraries to 125 Islamic centers on five continents, and
her tireless printing presses flooded Africa with inexpensive copies ai the Quran
end pamphlets that shrewdly blended the word of Allah with the word of Nasser.
Nasser filled his propaganda with such simple slogans as posltive neutrallty,
which was becoming synonymous with Independence end which is considered
credible In light of local experience.73 ' Although every Afro-Asian, Arab, or
Muslim government has been advocating Arab nationalism, anti Zionism, other
Arab governments were unable to compete with Nasser's offensive. In the first
place good propaganda alone cannot put over unacceptable policies. Nasser
succeeded better than others because he told the Arab people what they felt for and
what they wanted to hear. 732 Admirers of Nasser attribute his success in the
Arab countries to the fact that he Implemented a policy according to the
aspirations of the Arabs.733 This still does not explain Nasser's success among
Africans, Asians, and Moslems In general:
In relations with Lebanon, Egyptian policy gives
priority to Arab policy because of the Lebanese
Christian majority. When Egypt was dealing with the
non-Muslim Chief of the south of the Sudan, emphasis
was placed on African and Nilotic solidarity. Emphasis
on Muslim solidarity Is essential in dealings with a
country like Afghanistan.134
in addition to this shrewd skill, Nasser's success In consolidating his regime and
729Loya, MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS. XIII, No.4. p.98 Lalks or the importance of the
radio as a vital piece of furniture in Arab homes.
730See Nadim Makdlsl, •Battle of Words Radio Broadcasting in the Arab WorId.
MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XXXV, No.5. May. 1959. p.30. for the reason for the success of
the Voice of the Arabs over all others.
731 Arthur Krock, Why we are losing the Psychological War. THE NEW YORK TIMES
MAGAZINE. December. 8, 1957, pp.12, 91, reproduced in Whltaker, PROPAGANDA.
op.cit. pp.123-24.
732 H.A.R. Philby. Nasser and the West, MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XXXIV. No.4.. April.
1959. p.41.
733 5ee Sharabi, ORBIS. Vol. VII, Fall, No.3. 1963. p.590, for the role of charismatic
leadership in the Arab world. Also refer to (lie Salem, Emerging Government in the
Arab WorId. ORBIS. Vol. Vi. SprIng. 1962. No.1. pp.102-118.
l34QuoLed from Boutros GhaII. FOREIGN POLICIES op.ciL, p.322.
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power, his ability to obtain the highest per capita aid from the Soviet Union and
almost the same generous aid from the West, and the rise of his own international
stature was the envy of the Afro-Asian countries end became a pattern to be
emulated. What made success more possible for Nasser was the fact that he was
the charismatic leader of Egypt and he utilized this position to enhance the
principles he adopted, mainly Arab nationalism. The other major element in the
components of Nasser's capability was the world setting with the stalemate of the
Cold War. What made It possible for Nasser to play en increasing role in regional
and world politics Is the balance of terror In the Cold war. Nasser believed that,
with the unwavering belief of both the East and the West in their superiority, and
ultimate victory of their own systems, he was able to manoeuvre around their
'peaceful competition' to win foreign aid 735 and use his propaganda. Nasser
demonstrated his extraordinary political acumen in this Cold War stalemate by
taking advantage of both East end West to a far greater extent than any other
nonaligned country was able to do end far beyond the limit Egypt's material and
political power alone would permit.736
The success of Nasser and the failure of his rivals may be attributed to the fact
that from the beginning he was the recognized leader of the Free Officers.737
This was due in part to his personalised leadership, experience, and the
similarity of his background with the founding members of the Free Officers -
735 Leo Tansty, U.S AND U.S.S.R. AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES A Comparative Study
of India, Turkey, and the U.A.R.. New York : Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,1967, pp.18-
19, Table No.3. Iraq received $16 million between July 1945 and June 20. 1958.
while the U.A.R. received $26 million. Pakistan received $424 million, while India
received $617 million. Israel received *513 mIllion, while ill Arab countries
including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya. Morocco. Sudan, and
Tunisian received $299.2 million in the same period. See also pp.11-13. Comparison
of U.S.and U.S.S.R. foreign aid between July 1954 and June 1965 shows that India
received from the U.S.S.R. $1,022 million or 20.3 per cent of Soviet foreign aid. The
nonaligned U.A.R. and India received from the U.S. $1,173 million and $5,901 million
respectively. U.S. allies, Pakistan and Turkey, received *2.891 mIllion and $ 1.873
million, respectively, from the U.S. during the same period.
736Albert Hourani, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. Summer, 1955. IX, No.3, p.255. But
reasonableness in politics takes the form of intelligent pursuit of national interests,
and the way in which a nation pursues Its interests will depend upon the means at its
disposal. p.240.
737 E1 Sadat, REVOLT ON THE NILE. op.clt., p.18.
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attributes which enabled him to mold them into a cohesive working group.738 To
be sure, most of the Free Offcers feB into disgrace with Nasser at one time or
another, but none was executed or banished altogether as happens in other
dictatorships such as Communist Russia, Iraq. or Syria. 739 Nasser buttressed
his position by formulating the Liberation Rally, the Arab Socialist Union end
regimenting the labour unions and other professional organizations to give his
regime popular bases. By strengthening his control of army and governmental
organizations his regime gained strength and power. This consolidation made it
possible for Nasser to be more active In foreign affairs.
It would be ludicrous to talk about measuring the power of a small state like
Egypt from 1952-1970 sInce Egypt started off by being a semi independent state
within the British sphere of influence and reached international stature in the
early 60's. However, It is precisely this change from semi-independence to
international stature and the fact that Nasser's Egypt increased so mud) in status
and prestige in such a short period that makes the study of Nasser more
attractive. lo measure the influence and prestige of any state is quite
difftcult.740 Nevertheless, In abstract terms, two prerequisites must be taken
Into Consideration: first, how other countries perceive the power, Influence, and
prestige of a state (which does not necessarily reflect the real and actual
strength), and second, how the performance of that state measures up to the
expectation of others. 741 in the first place, the British, French, and israeli
governments. in depicting Nasser as another Hitler to Justify getting rid of him,
l3eVatIkIotis. THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS. op.clt., pp.45-50.
7395ee El Sadat, REVOLT ON THE NILE. op.cIL, pp.VI-Vll. for the fate of these officers.
74OKornberg and Perry. POLITICAL SCIENCE. XVIII. No.1, pp.57-58, criticized James
6. March. Measurement Concepts in the Theory of Intluence, JOURNAL OF POLITICS.
xix. May. 1957. pp.202-26 and James 6. March. An Introduction to the Theory and
tieasurement of Intiuence, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR. ed. Heinz Eulau et aI, 6lencoe Illinois
The Free Press. 1956, pp.380-64. for omission of Internalized values or stored'
Influence.
741 One component of a nation's prestige Is the belief of others that the nation has the
will and the capability to bring about whatever It Indicates as Its serious Intentions...A
second component of prestige is the respect and agreement which the other nations and
peoples hold for what they understand to underlie a nation's poticy. Quoted from Paul
H. Nlt.ze, The Secretary and Foreign Policy, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, ed. Don K.
Price, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice Hall. 1960, pp.15-17. In Whitaker,
PROPAGANDA, op.clt.. p.20
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were first victims of their own false propaganda which led them to disagreement
on the methods of getting rid of Nasser end gave him the chance to survive the
Suez crisis of 1956.742 On the other hand, Inflation of Nasser by Western
propaganda gave him an Illusion of Importance beyond his capability. ?43 Thus.
Western propaganda Inflated Nasser's prestige In the eyes of world opinion and
generated belief in Nasser's claims, especially among the Arabs.
Public opinion Is elusive and difficult to measure even In democratic, advanced,
end stable societies.?44 And ft is more difficult to measure the prestige of Nasser
In terms of public opinion because there are publics and subpubiics of Arab
opinion In each Arab country. Yet public opinion is powerful, and all
governments, even non-democratic ones, have to reckon with It. In January
1955, Nasser's opposition to the Baghdad Pact and his adoption of positive
neutrality caused the Arabs to overlook his previous suppression of Egyptian
nationalists and his rapprochement with Israel. In terms of popularity, Nasser's
announcement of the Russian arms deal rallied the Arab nationalists behind him:
On the streets of Amman, vendors sold his picture for
a nickel apiece and never had a big enough supply to
meet the demand. In the shops of Damascus, Beirut,
and even Baghdad, Nasser's photo Invariably was
displayed. Mothers named their new-born babies
'3amol".715
742 Terrence Robertson, CRISIS The Inside Story or the Suez Conspiracy, New York
Atheneum. 1964. pp.136. 139.
743 For an account or how the West built up Nasser by their attack, see Lacouture,
NASSER. op.cit., p.221. People like to imagine that without the Egyptian 'big brother'
the Algerian rebels would lay down their arms. This is a striking Instance of the silly
attitude which for years consisted In 'building up' Nasser, making him Into a giant, a
terror, inflating him is such terms that he could not help thinking it was his due, so
that he used the same terms in talking with those Arabs, the Egyptians, who were least
taken in by his charm . p.221. Compare with the Wynn's analysis: The leader of a
poor and weak country, who knew In his heart that his army still was no match for
little Israel. was played up by the West as It he were a major power on a level wIth
Soviet Russla. NASSER OF EGYPT. op.cit.. p.154.
744For definitions of public opinion and subpublics of opinion, see James flac6regor
Burns and Jack WaiLer Peit.ason, GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE : The Dynamics of
American National State and Local 6overnment. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
1966, pp.226-28.
745 Quoted from Wynn. NASSER OF E6YPT, o p cit., p.120.
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After the arms deal, en American diplomat observed:
if Nasser ran for president In Lebanon, Syria, or
Jordan today, he would be elected unanimously.746
Even in the heat of the Tripartite 'military intervention' of E gypt in 1956 the
Syrians longed for more portraits of Nasser.747 Shortly after the fourteenth of
July the portrait of Nasser was placed above the portraits of the Iraqi leaders.
Qasim and Arof, who had overthrown the Hashemite government. When Nasser
announced his resignation in the June War of 1967 mess support for him in Cairo
and in other Arab capitals restored his tarnished power.748
However, through Nasser's harshness, his propaganda, end his embarrassment of
his rivals, lie was caught and pressed by his opponents. Hussein of Jordan and
Feisal of Saudi Arabia. to the brinkmanship of the 1967 war. 749 Furthermore,
many nationalists In other Arab countries (local or separetionist) resented
Egypt's meddling in their local affairs. However, it was Nasser's stand against
Israel. his Arms deal, and his stand against the West that made him the idol of the
Arab world. Some of Nasser's critics attribute his indulgence in foreign policy to
a desire to escape from dealing with domestic problems and to blame the
imperialistic powers for Egypt's seemingly insurmountable problems. 750 Hence,
it was easier to deal with foreign problems than with domestic ones. 751 True,
746WIIbur 1. Schramm, ed.. ONE DAY IN THE WORLDS PRESS : Fourteen Great
Newspapers on a Day or Crisis, Stanford, Calif Stanford University Press, 1959,
pp.82.
747 ib1d., p.64.
748Some authorities have claimed that it was a theatrical trick organized by Nasser's
close political supporters, but It does not explain how the simultaneous reaction
happened In other Arab capitals. See Leland Bowie, Charlsma, Weber and NasIr,
MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. Vol. 30. 1976, pp.141-157; John P. Entelis, Nasser's Egypt
The Failure of Charismatic Leadershlp, ORBIS, 18. No.2. Summer 1974, pp.451-464.
Compare with Dekmejlan. EGYPT UNDER NASSER, op.ciL, The central role of the
charismatic phenomenon and its constituent Ingredients was dramatically validated
with the reinstitution of Abd Al Nasir on 9th June...After ill, his activities as leader
were the concrete manifestation of the nationalist ideological message which most
Egyptian had shared and supported. EGYPT UNDER NASSER. op.cit., p.245.
749 See Laqueur, THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM, op.clt., p.63.
750 Robert C. Good. SLate Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New
States, NEUTRALISM AND NONALIGNMENT. op.clt.., p.5.
751 The climax of such charges were voiced by Liqueur, THE SOVIET UNION. op.cit.,
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some of Nasser's measures during the nationalization of the Suez Canal were
calculated risks undertaken to eradicate the vestiges of imperialism. However,
the events precipitated by Nasser's miscalculation and brinkmanship on June
1967 resulted in grave and Ignoble defeat.752 Nevertheless, Nasser's survival of
the 1967 war proved him to be the grand master of politics. The most valid
serious criticism of Nasser Is that his Inability to achieve collective solidarity
resulted In low collective action copacity, the deplorable condition during the
June War of l967.75 Nasser recognized and acknowledged its gravity but did
little more than oratory and draft charters.754
Whether Nasser would have been able to restore Egypt's freedom and independence
in relation to the two super powers would have depended on whether the West was
willing to settle its differences with him and offer him a face saving agreement.
Otherwise, he would have been left with the choice of Egypt's becoming a
Communist satellite or falling into a Western sphere.755
The measure of the power of a smau state Internationally is its ability to resist
Interference and maintain independence from major powers. Since 1952, Nasser
succeeded In resisting Western pressure. He declined to join a Western sponsored
regional military pact, rejected Western sponsored regional military pact,
rejected Western pressure to Impose a peace treaty with Israel, refused to
refrain from diplomatic relations with Red China, and refused to recognize and
p .2 15. Who would not take advantage of a favourable international situation to win his
Independence and assert himself In International politics.
752taqueur. THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM. ep.ciL., pp.104-OS. John Badecu maintained
that Nasser's amazing popularity made him more confident In leadership, more
calculating in his appeal to the crowd, and more ready to enforce internal control.
Nasser. THE PHILOSOPHY, op.ciL., p.20.
753WIlkinson. COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS. op.cIt.. p.52.
754Nasser, KHUTUB AL RAIS. Part III, p .667; Nasser tIAJMIJAT KHUTAB, Part Ill,
pp.Sil-72.
755 Few Western criLics would like to admit that the United States was lar rrom
willing to let new nations go their own way In choosing a form of government. No
nation, new or old, can be thoroughly respectable In American eyes unless it adopts the
Ideas and Institutions of constitutlonallsm democracy. Quoted from Frederick
Walkins, Colonialism, Dictatorship, and the American Political Tradition, WORLD
PRESSURES. o p .cit., p.100
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accept Western trusteeship of the Tripartite Declaration or the Eisenhower
Doctrine of 1957. Most Arab governments did reject all the above. What
distinguished Nasser from other Arab leaders was that he transferred his
successful resistance to western pressure Into an Independent path and freedom,
first by concluding the arms deal with Russia end establishing commercial and
diplomatic relations with Red Chine, consequently, by launching an offensive
against the Baghdad Pact by establishing the Arab Joint Commend with Syria,
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen thereby virtually Isolating Iraq and the Baghdad Pact,
and by nationalizing the Suez Canal to counteract Western withdrawal of the
Aswen Dam offer.756
The Tripartite 'military Intervention' of Egypt in 1956 signaled the failure of
Western political pressure.7 57 Nasser, withstanding the Tripartite onslaught,
turned his inevitable military defeat into political triumph. True, Nasser's
military machine was crippled, Egypt's economy was paralyzed, end the West
quarantined Egypt to bring Nasser down by economic and political pressure.
However, the outcome of the Tripartite fiasco was exactly opposite to Western
expectation. French interest In the Arab East was eliminated altogether. British
Interest received a fatal blow. Nasser's Arab rivals were discredited, and their
positions were weakened, eventually they were eliminated. Politically, Nasser
emerged more popular end his leadership and regime more secure than prior to
the Tripartite '56 War. Nasser's rejection of the Eisenhower Doctrine completed
Egypt's political and economic independence. The basis of Nasser's strength
Ewes] not Soviet arms nor economic aid, but his close identification with the main
stream of Arab national feelIng.758
Nasser's acceptance of the American peace proposal (the Rogers Plan) with Israel
756 For the statement of the Arab Joint Command en November 30. 1956, see Khahl,
THE ARAB STATES. II, op.clt., pp.254-55.
757 When violence becomes an actuality, it signifies the abdication of political power
In favor of military or pseudo-military power. Quoted from llorgenthau. POLITICS
AMONG NATIONS. op.cit., pp.28-29. See also Claude. SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES.
op.cIt., pp.40-43; Lasswell and Kaplan, SOCIETY AND POWER. op.clt.. pp.100-01.
750 PhIlby, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, No.4, p.41.
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in July 1970 tarnished his Image, caused disenchantment among Arab
nationalists, Palestinians, Algerians, Iraqis, and Syrians. and marked the decline
of his popularity to one of Its lowest ebbs.759 The eruption of fighting in Jordan
between Palestinian commandos end King Hussein's Arab Legion further alienated
Nasser from the Arabs. However, Nasser's success In summoning the Arab leaders
(Including King Hussein and the PLO) and getting them to agree on a truce to end
the fighting balanced the criticism that was leveled against Nasser during the
civil strife in Jordan. It proved to be tiis last political move.
Nasser's sudden death on September 29. 1970 resembled a meteorite that
brightens the whole sky as it burns while falling through airspace. His funeral
In Cairo was drowned in a tumultuous sea of human beings who came to say
farewell and was echoed simultaneously by funeral processions In Arab and
Islamic big cities and capitals.760 The mourning In most Black African
nonaligned countries, the communist bloc and even In the West marked the all
time high point of Nasser's popularity and career and possible of any leader in
modern times. Death elevated Nasser's status In the Arab countries to sainthood
with each Arab leader exhausting himself in emulating Nasser's policies and
principles. Since Nasser's leadership was highly personalised and dependent on
allegiance his death weakened any prospect of Arab Unity. Further, Nasser after
his death was recognized by the West and even the Israelis as a stabilizing factor
In the Arab East.
7591HE NEW YORK TIMES. July 29. 1970. pp.1,4.
76OIbId., September 29. 1970. pp.1,16; October 2. 1970, pp.1,16-17.
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CHAPTER FOUR
NASSER'S COGNITIVE PERCEPTIONS AND THE POLITICS OF ARAB NATIONALISM;
RELEVANCE. MEANING AND CONSTRUCTION IN THE CHARISMATIC SETTING
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the preceding Chapter, one saw the evolution of a charismatic reatlonsh1p
between Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Egyptian end Arab messes. In k11tion, one
saw that there were at least two perspectives - Egyptian and Arab - which had
been Irreconcilably competing for Nasser's role dynamics and leadership stature,
end, that each of these perspectives attempts to influence the Egyptian leader in
both domestic and foreign policy choices end decisions. The most pertinent
questions that need to be answered now are: What were Nasser's perceptions of
Arab Unity? Which of these perspectives hod the greatest impact on his foreign
policy towards Arab Unity? This Chapter Is an attempt to answer these two
questions.
4.2 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
Chapter Four Is divided in two sections. The first addresses itself to the meaning
and relevance of the cognitive perceptions to our study of charismatic leadership.
The second deals with the problem of constructing end tackling Nasser's
perceptions of Arab Unity.
Many writers have attempted to interpret the political Ideologies and beliefs of
Carnal Abdel Nasser. Several works have been written on Nasser's views on Egypt,
the Arabs and the world at large. 1 The methods used In most of these writings
1 Fawzy Abdul Razzak hu fleted, in an excellent annotated bIbliography, 107 ArabIc
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were not considered objectives end the Interpretations given were faulty, to say
the least. Not all of these writings attempted to address the Issue of Nasser's
Ideological beliefs end philosophical views. For these reasons, only a few of these
sources have been selected for review. It should be noted that the books that have
been selected did not tackle Nassers Ideological beliefs either with the same
'objectivity' or with the same enthusiasm or space allocation. For example, while
a writer like Yatlklotis2 allocates only a few pages to the Issue of Nasser's
beliefs, one sees other scholars like Davmal end Leroy3 writing mainly on the
Egyptian leader's beliefs arid Ideology. The lack of 'objectivity' end 'rigour' In
most of these writings Is quite clear. It is not Impossible for any Interested
observer to drew a correlation between the political attitude of the writer end the
method of analysis he followed in his work. This Is not surprising, as Rokeach
states:
A person with a particular attitude Is predisposed to
selectively perceive; recognize; recall; judge; learn;
Interpret; forget; and think In ways congruent with
his attitudes and such selective responses may be
directed towards an object or situation or the
maintenance of the belief Itself.4
Though one is not Interested In drawing that correlation, It does not seem too far
fetched as an Idea to classify these writings according to the attitudes of their
writers. Thus the major works that have been selected on Nasser can be
classified In terms of Leftist, Nesserite, Arab Nationalistic end Western
books on Nasser. Fawzy Abdul Razzak, Nasser : Documents and Sources In Arabic,
MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, Vol.30. No.4, Autumn, 1976. pp.545-550; Also in a
comprehensive survey or writings on the Middle East. the Harvard Library has
presented most of th. works on the same subject. ARABiC H1STORICM. WUTUIGS.
1973. Cambridge Mass : Harvard University Library, 1974. 147 pages; Also see
Amnon Toren (ed). A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF B001(S ON NASSEWS E6YPT, 1952-1970, Tel
Aviv : The Shlloah Center ror Middle Eastern and African Studies, University of Tel
Aviv. 1972, 93 pages.
2Panaylotls J. Vatikiotis, THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS : Pattern for New
Nations? Bloomington : Indiana University Press. 1961; and. NASSER AND HIS
GENERATION London : Croom Helm, 1978. especially Chapter 12 where the writer
addresses himself to Nasser's Ideology.
3Jack Davmal and Marie Leroy, GAPIAL ABDEL NASSER, Paris : Seghers, 1967.
4See MJ. Rokeach, 5tructural Theory •f Attitude Dynamics. PUBLIC OPINION
OUARTERLY. 24, 1960. pp.319-340, p.320.
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Interpretations.5 It has been observed that none of these writings tackled the
issue of Nasser's Ideology and beliefs with a detailed criteria of validity.
These Interpretations of Nasser can be classified in the final analysis Into two
categories. First: there are those writings which relied on Nasser's own words by
quoting directly from his speeches and major philosophical works. In this
category one can refer to the Nasserite end to some of the Western writings. The
problem with these writings lies 1 that the authors quoted ilasser whenever it
suited them. Other quotations which could hove disclaimed their arguments were
disregarded. One has seen an illustrative example In Silbermen's article referred
to earlier. Silberman has quoted only to prove his point . He has Ignored those
parts which could hove refuted his point completely, if properly quoted. Thus,
while Silberman chose to read one passage which listed the Arabs with the foreign
conquerors of Egypt, he chose not to refer to another passage In which Nasser
referred to the Arab circle as 'our circle'.
Secondly, there are those writings which shy away from the text and rely mainly
on the writer's own interpretations of the leader's words without referring to or
quoting from his speeches or major philosophical works. In this category, one
can list those Western oriented and Communist Interpretations of Nasser. The
problem with these writings is quite obvious. The writer's own views are
substituted for those of the leader.
if the Egyptian leader's Ideological beliefs and perceptions were thus
misinterpreted, It should not be at all surprising If his policies likewise were.
In fact, this is exactly the case.6 It Is clear that the above-mentioned methods
5For a Lertist Interpretation of the Egyptian Leaders beliefs, see T. Shaker.
NATIONAL LIBERATION AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN EGYPT. Beirut : Oar .1 Farabi.
1972; Ghall Shukrl, An Introduction to Nassers Thoughts, EL FIKRI ARABI, 4/5
Sept-OcL, 1978. pp.67-94. For a Western Interpretation, see Gad Silberman, flational
Identity In Nasserist Ideology, 1952-1970, ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES. Vol.8.
No.1, 1972; and for a Nasserite (Arab Nationalist) Interpretation, see S. Ahmed,
NASSER AND THE ARAB REVOLUTION. Beirut: Dar ci Wanda. 1973.
6A faulty analysis of Egyptian policy in the Arab world has been presented by
several writers. In the previous Chapter, the Western point of view of Egyptian Arab
Policy after the 1952 RevolutIon has been analysed.
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of interpreting the leaders ideological beliefs proved to be biased and unreliable.
The methods used In such writings (whether Communist with no reliance on the
text; or Western or Nasserite with their Inherently eclectic nature) Is not
acceptable. For this reason, one concludes that such writings are not suitable for
the purpose of constructing Nasser's perceptions of Egyptian Identity. A more
suitable, and consequently more 'objective', method for a wore accurate
Interpretation of the leader's Ideological beliefs Is, therefore, required.
1.3 THE NEED FOR A RIGOROUS METHOD
In order to have a more accurate reading of a leader's Ideology, a qualitative
analysts of content has been used. Serious consideration was given to the
possibility of using a quantitative mode of linguistic analysts. Since the content
analysis approach made Its appearance among American sociologists In the fifties,
who were fascinated with the Introduction of quantitative methods in the field,1
it has been used frequently In the social sciences Including Political Science.
From Its name, it Is clear that the approach analyses the 'content' of a message.
be it a speech, a written word or the like. It attempts to understand a 'text' by
first formulating certain questions about concepts that represent - In the mind of
the researcher - certain values. By accounting the frequency of a particular
concept in the 'text', the researcher draws a correlation between the rate of
frequency of that concept and the values he assigned It.8
A major problem of content analysis lies in the fact that it can predetermine the
questions to be answered. 9 Thus, this 'contextual' method of analysis reveals
only what the analyst wishes to reveal. In a sense this Is true of all research In
B. Berelson, CONTENT ANALYSIS IN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH, 6lencoe Hill : The
Free Press, 1952.
01n his study of Arab naUonalslt thought, El Sayyld Yassln has used this method of
content analysis. See El SayyId Yassin CONTENT ANALYSIS OF ARAB NATIONALIST
ThOIJ6HT : AN INTRODUCTION, Beirut : Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1960.
9, tioscovlci, & P. Henry. Problems de L'Analyse du Contenu, LAN6A6E, No.1 1,
1968.
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that the explanatory categories established by the analyst constrain what can be
concluded. However, with respect to content analysis, due to the nature of
language, this limitation appears far more damaging than In other areas of
research. The utility of a cetegorisatlon (classification) Is dependent on the
range of non-classified behaviours/concepts to which the classification Is also
relevant. Quantitative content analysis tends to restrict understanding through
extensive cetegorisation rather than extending understanding. This basic Inability
of quantitative content analysis arises from the attempt to encapsulate In
quantitative terms the extreme subtleties of language. Were It the case that
language was stable and uniform in all circumstances, then such methods could be
used, but context Is so important In meaning, and the use of signals in politics so
full of nuance, that it is difficult to see how this approach could usefully be used
In this work.
Given that the content analysis approach does not lend itself adequately to the
Interpretation of the leaders beliefs and Ideology, the approach used in this
chapter, Is more of a qualitative and interpretive one. With this qualitative
approach, the content of the loader's speeches are analysed in terms of the use of
vocabulary and Its Immediate context. 6lven that the selected speeches of the
loader Include a cognitive evaluative and affective component, the leader's self
Image and value Judgements have to be considered.
Since the analysis is limited to only one pert of Nasser's Ideological beliefs
(those beliefs end perceptions concerning Arab Unity). Semantics Analysis is a
more suitable method to use. The Semantics' argument Is simple and clear.
"Words have no meaning If they stand alone, only In a contexturel structure
Thus, a concept like 'national Identity' will have Its fullest meaningful substance
when examined In the light of a related vocabulary that gives It Its real content.
Thus, content Is still being analysed but In the context of the message. The
semantic method allows one to go beyond the immediate content end covers a wide
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range of vocabulary which qualifies the concepts end gives them their raison
d'at1ra, Take, for example, the concept of 'Arab Nationalism'. While content
analysis will focus mainly on this particular concept, with semantic and
contextual understanding it is possible to go beyond that level and tackle several
other related concepts such as 'Arab Unity', 'Arab Lend', 'Arab people', 'Arab
consclence'...etc, with the same attention, It Is with the aid of this approach that
one can construct Nasser's perceptions of the country's identity In the remaining
pages of this Chapter.
4.4 TWO OBJECTIONS AND A REBUTTAL
The first objection is raised by the Cognitive Process Model. Since this model
will be used in this Chapter, It is felt that this argument ought to be reconciled
with that of the Social Process. It has been argued that In the time of crisis -
where many factors have to be accounted for - leaders may not represent any of
the elite groups' perceptions or beliefs. They may act on their own relying
entirely on their own belief systems and Cognitive Perceptions. Though this
study does not involve decisions of the type that can be characterized as crisis
decisions, the model that has been opted for Is the Cognitive Process one with the
aim for testing It. Unity among the Arab peoples Is an issue of belief and
perceptions and, as such, the cognitive process model can still be used to uncover
the role of these beliefs and perceptions In leadership decisions. These decisions
do not have to be crisis decisions to be studied by the Cognitive Process Model.
The proponents of the model have made wide claims about its applicability. An
effort will be made to test the validity of the model and the claims of Its adherents
as weB.
The second objection comes from the Social Process model itself. It has been
argued that leader's own words cannot reveal his true beliefs. Thus, BroWn
argues:
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Official statements end public utterances of decision
makers do not necessarily reveal their real
perceptions end beliefs.10
A leader's belief system CBS) has the functions to 'simplify the perceptions of
reality and to provide him with 'diagnostic propensities' as well as 'choice
propensities'. 1 1 Beliefs serve as a 'prism' that Influences the leader's
perceptions of the flow of political events and his definitions or estimates of
particular situations. They also provide norms end standards that influence his
choice of strategy and tactics, and his structuring and weighing of alternative
courses of actions. 12 Thus, a leader's 6$ functions to orient him In the world:
to Interpret It, to evaluate it, to provide action rules for different situations, to
Indicate goals and means to achieve these goals. Such a function of the 68 is often
called the 'pragmatic function'. This means that the 68 Is policy relevant.
For this reason, some secondary sources have been used and the writer's
understanding of the language of the leader is intended to complement any lack of
soundness In the methed of reading the leader's writings and speeches. The prime
goal here is to understand the Images held by the Egyptian decision leader
concerning, among other forces, Arab Unity. Image is a complex structure and, as
such, needs a more sophisticated end complex approach to unveil it.
Images can be the direct and Indirect experiences that individuals cannot recall.
Therefore, in trying to understand an Image held by a certain leader about an
object - about what the object Is like (be it national sovereignty, internat)onal
organizations, a specific decision, or opinions on specific leadership issues) -
the analyst should not limit his field of Inquiry to the mere verbalizations of the
leader about that object, but also should concentrate on the conceptions of the
object that are Implicit In the ways he relates himself to ir.'3 Some indirect
10K. Brodlo, BelIer System. Doctrines and Perceptlons. COOPERATION AND
CONFLICT. 2, 1972: pp.97-i 12, p.103.




research devices should, therefore, be employed such as observation of, or
questions about, behrIlour. In this, the ondary sources find their usefulness.
The advantage the analyst would get from looking at held images is characterised
by Kelman as follows:
Imeoes in this sense make it easier to link behavior
towards objects directly and specifically to the
perceived characteristic of these objectives; and to
deal with the cognitive structures of people's
conceptions of these objects (which vary widely) and
with the mixed and often contradictory evaluations of
these objects.14
For these reasons, the sources that have been consulted In constructing Nasser's
perceptions of Egyptian national Identity are primary (leader's own writings,
speeches, and official documents) and secondary (other's writings on them).
However, before Indulging In the analysis of constructing Nasser's beliefs, a test
of validity should be mentioned in regard to:
1. Spontaneous (Press conferences, Interviews and Minutes
versus Premeditated documents (Books and Articles).
2. Monologic (Minutes, Press Interviews, and Private
communications) end Dialogic documents (Dialogue between
Nasser and Others).
3. Bhost-Written versus Authentic Documents.
Additionally, attention Is given to domestic versus foreign audiences and, masses
versus Intellectual audiences.
In regard to the first set of documents, the validity test Is based on the
assumption that the more carefully and deliberately planned the message, the
more remote the link between the subject's attitude and the message content. The
only significant variation was in the case of the belief about the role of the
13H.C. Kelman (ad.). IHTtRNATIOIIAL BEHAVIOR : A Social Psychological Analysis.
New York, Holt : Rhinehart & Winston, 1965. p.27.
14 1b1d., p.27.
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political leader In controlling historical developments. 	 in spontaneously
articulated documents. Nasser viawed his role as an active one. However, In
premeditated documents, he concepualized his role as passive.
in the second set of documents, the test Is predicated on the assumption that
Nasser is perhaps at his best In f to face discussions. Challenge seems to
bring out his deepest thoughts. 15 Documents such as Nasser's debates with
members of the National Congress In 1961 or his discussions with the leaders of
Syria and Iraq In 1963, 16 are seen as more accurate Indicators of Nasser's
beliefs than any other documents. Sayegh's expectations were found to be accurate
In the case of beliefs about risk acceptance. Nasser tended to express acceptance
of high risks In monologic documents whereas he tended to put an injunction
against the pursuit of high risks In dialogic documents.
In the third set of documents, one compared the content of the beliefs articulated
In THE PHIL OSOPHY OF THEREVOL UT/ON, a document that has been widely cited as
having been ghost written, with the content of documents authentically articulated
by Nasser in the same year. The result of the analysis reveals rio significant
pattern of variation. In other words, what was In THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
REVOLUTION falls within the mainstream of Nasser's beliefs and perceptions.
In the first set of audiences, the relationship between the distribution of beliefs
and the types of audiences was examined. Presumably the sincerity of Nasser
could be questioned if It was found that he presented one set of beliefs to one type
of audience and another set of beliefs to another type of audience. In other words,
If the data were valid, the distribution of Nasser's beliefs would remain basically
the same regardless of the the type of audience. An example Is the case of
military force. Nasser argued against resort to military force to domestic and
15See Fayez A Sayegh. The Theoretical Structure or Nasser's Arab SoctaIIsm in
Albert Heurani (ed). MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS. No.4. St. Anthony's Papers. No.17.
oxrord University Press. 1967. pp.9-55. p.34.
16For detailed texts or these discussions see Malcolm Kerr. THE ARAB COLD WAR :
Gamal Abdet Nasser and his Rivals. 1950-1970. Third EdlUon, 1981. London : Oxrord
University Press.
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foreign audiences, qualifying It with a belief In the utility of force as a deterrent
to the adversary In the domestic audience case. In the second set of audiences, If
It was demonstrated that Nasser articulated the same beliefs In addressing both
types of audience, then It can be concluded with some confidence that the data
truty reflect Nasser's beliefs. iie rationale ci the test is aseci on tne flypotnesis
which states that o small audience composed of people who can check the vereolty
of communication Is likely to elicit a sincere expression of the speaker's beliefs
rather than audiences composed of masses. 17 Across the board, the type of
audience did not have any discernible Impect on the articulation of any of Nasser's
beliefs. 18
17 5ee Robert Axelord, Schema Theory : An Information Processing Model of
Perception and Cogniuon, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1973, 67. P p .124-
166. p.153.
leA complementary test is based on the hypothesis argued by Yehoshafat ilarkaby in
ARAB ATTITUDES TO ISRAEL. Jerusalem : Israel University Press. 1972, p.390,
which states that. Arab public proclamations are more significant than the soft words
articulated in interviews with foreign observers. in other words, Harkaby contends
that Arab (including Nassers) articulations to domestic audiences vary significantly
from utterances to foreign audiences. Ilarkaby argues that his hypothesis app lies only
to Arab leaders, lie contends that. in the case of American leaders, private
conversations indicate their true beliefs, while their speeches to audiences of voters
are a matter of poliLIcs in the pejorative sense. Paradoxically. Hurkaby (1972.
p.414) refutes this distinction by arguing five pages later that - the pronouncements
of Arab leaders are often made for exhibitionist and tactical purposes and have no
profound signlficance. However, such arguments did not prompt him to question the
wisdom of his reliance upon such pronouncements to understand the Arab attitudes
toward Israel.
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SECTION ONE: THE RELFYANCY AND IIEANIN6 OF THE
LEADER'S COOHIT lYE PERCEP11OP4S.
It Is the contention of this Chapter that a political leader's policy Is determined
by the official perception of the situation end the nation's interest. A political
leader's perceptions of what advocates of Real Politik call 'Objective Reality' are
as Important as reality Itself. It is strongly argued in the leadership literature
that the 'individuals constitute the ultimate focus of action' end that Individual
decision-makers act and speak for the nation state. As Kelmon argues"to know
what is In the minds of men at the point of en Internationally relevant action is an
important input to the study of the behavior of the nation states. l9 This is the
main argument which sprang out of the various leadership approaches mentioned
In the first Chapter.
In the area of leadership efficacy, one sees that public speeches and statements of
such Individuals - In this case 6amal Abdel Nasser - must assume a vital
Importance In this respect. All major decisions concerning the demestic or
foreign policies of Egypt were made by certain individuals (and most often by the
President alone), end It Is toward the leader's perceptions end actions that one
must return In order to comprehend the relationship between our two variables
(Charismatic Leadership end Arab Unity). This means that when Egypt Is
mentioned, one really means the political leader who makes major leadership
decisions.20
Moreover, In the case of Egypt, cognitive perceptions of the leaders are also
relevant from another perspective. Iloisti states:
Moreover, perceptions are seen to be especially
Important In decisions made at the pinnacle of a
hierarchy by leaders who are relatively free from
19Kelman. C. Herbert. The Role of the Individual In International Relations : Some
Conceptual and Methodological Consideratlons, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
14.1970, pp.1-17.
20 This is of course a reminiscent of the celebrated French dictum of Lolus XIV
LEt.at. Cost PIoI.
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organizational and other constraints. 2 1
lithe observer closely examines the role of the Egyptian leader, one will almost
certainly be convinced that Nasser fits Hoisti's remark rather neatly. After all,
en Egyptian President commands a great deal of authority and Is relatively free
rrom organizational restraint. As a matter or fact this has been a constant
characteristic of the Egyptian political system since the days of the old. And It
has been suggested that, In Egypt. the executive branch of government will always
be strong and that the chief executive will always be in charge In every sense of
the word.
While one agrees with the Sprouts that 'no deterministic (i.e. causal)
relationship should be asserted between the environmental factors on the one
hand, and attributes or actions of political leaders, or a certain state of affairs on
the other,22 the fact remains that Egypt has always had a powerful central
government that subordinated all subnational units to Its authority which
sometimes bordered on despotism. From the time of Mohammed All until the
present, the central governments in Cairo has always controlled all subnational
units (localities, provinces, etc.) not only through the hiring and firing of local
executives, bureaucrats and even the 'so-called' popular councils. This highly
centralized character of the Egyptian system of government which dates back to
the Phareenic egos was noted by several observers of Egyptian society including
K. Wittfogel.23 In post-revolutionary Egypt. this character has been further
legitimized by the Egyptian constitution which is structured In a way that made
the President the most powerful man In the country and assured the supremacy of
the President vis-a-vis the Legislature and the Judiciary.
21 HolstI, O.R.. ForeIgn Policy Formulation Viewed Cognitively. in Robert Axelord
(ed). STRUCTURE OF DECISION, Princeton : Princeton University Press. 1976. pp.30-
31.
22j & H. Sprout, ThE ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE IN HUMAN AFFAIRS. London :
6reenwood Press. 1979. p.42.
Kari Wittiogel, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM : A Comparative Study in Total Power. New
Haven : Yale University Press. 1963. p.12 and passim. Consider WittfogeN thesis
that a direct and Immutable relation that links the water system to bureaucratic
despotism, the programme of land reclamation to the chief engfneers absolute rule
over rural society.
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As Chief Executive. the Egyptian President retains the constitutional right to
Initiate, ratify end block legislation; to drew major policies; to convoke end
dissolve the legislature; end to appoint end dismiss members of the cabinet as
well as members of the Supreme Court.21 All Egyptian Presidents utilize their
powers with a great degree of effectiveness especially in the area of foreign
policy to the extent that 'when one says Egyptian foreign policy, one always means
one thing: the President's leadership policy, Internal end external.' Carnal Abdel
Nasser could be rightly regarded as the sole end final arbiter, the main architect
end the only formulator of the country's leadership policy during his tenure.
Referring to his vast powers In decision-making, Nasser had once stated that:
No one In the country can make a decision or even
offer his viewpoint on any foreign policy issue or
matter before checking with me personally.25
The Egyptian President has become the pivotal point of the Egyptian political
system. This becomes understandable only when one takes into consideration the
concept of leadership. Leadership is the crux of the executive power. Generally
speaking, with the increasing demand for leadership, many theoretical attempts
have been made In the direction of 'discovering' the qualities and traits of the
leader. Yet, the fect of the matter Is that these qualities depend to a great extent
upon the conditions under which leadership operates.26 It Is possible, however,
to mention certain functional aspects of a leader. Such aspects, as Carl J.
Friedrich explains, are:
1 .The leader's representativeness;
2.The leader's capocity to offer solutions to commonly
recognized problems; end
3.The leaders capacity to foresee problems that are
not yet generally recognized, to bring them Into clear
view end to jmatize their urgencY. That Is to say,
the ability to generate and radiate emotlons(emphesis
added) 27
24See the permanent constitution of the Arab Republic .f Egypt especially articles
73-152 ror more details.
Hafez Munir, The Secret History .1 Nassers Reglme, ROSE EL YOUSSEF. 2 Play.
1976. pp.11.
26See for example Chester I. Barnard, ThE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE (1938); T.N.
Whitehead. LEADERSHIP IN A FREE SOCIETY (1936) and. Ordway Tead. THE ART OF
LEADERSHIP (1935).
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Charismatic movements in general, and particularly those of recent times, are
bound with leaders of this type. The person who well-anticipates (and offers
solutions to) future problems facing his group will naturally seem more qualified
to lead as he appears more superior to his fellows. As a leader, he will be In a
position to retein vest power. whereby eli other institutions will be reduced to a
mere subservient role to him. Carl J. Friedrich states:
...e government leadership always represents many
concrete problems; some are very smell and specific,
others vast end comprehensive. The man who suggests
a convincing solution acquires leadership as others
follow his lead...a successful leader commands a large
margin of freedom from communal restraint.28
Moreover, if a leader Is seen by his people as possessing certain qualities that
are not ordinarily accessible to ordinary men, he is said to be a charismatic
leader. Such a charismatic leader would normally have vast powers In steering
his nation towards the achievements of Its objectives. Thus, the key Issue of
Charismatic Political Leadership is how the people perceive the leader.
Many authorities have come to the conclusion that Nasser was one such a
charismatic leader.29 lie retained vast powers In his hands and reduced the
other Institutions to the mere subservient role of helpers' to the Executive. It
should not be surprising, therefore, that a man of Nasser's calibre did enjoy such
vast powers in a society like Egypt where all previous rulers were foreigners;
and where the people have traditionally been accustomed to allow their leaders
assume such vast powers.3° It has been clearly pointed out that constitutional
life In post revolutionary Egypt had evolved the person (and the powers of) the
27Carl J. Friedrich, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY : Theory and
Practice in Europe and America, boston : Gina and Company. 1950. p.352.
2 Ibid., p.352.
2 In an interview with the writer Sir Anthony Nutting said that if the words
'Political Charisma' were not, Invented before 6amal Abdel Nassers time, they would
have been created then. Abdel Nasser was seen by many of his followers as the true
embodiment or Political Charisma, October, 1986. London.
In the same Interview, Sir Anthony was quoted as saying The Egyptian people, as a
general rule are politically docile and hence Lend to allow their rulers supreme
powers, which Is not usual In the Third World setting, witness Nehrus IndIa.
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President who was the source of political end constitutional legitimacy. 31 Nor
should It be a surprise that Nasser - the engineer of the revolution and the main
architect of the Egyptian post-revolution political system - had rejected
tlontesquieu's theory of 'the Separation of Powers' as unrealistic. On July 2,
1962, before the National Congress of Popular Forces - which ratified the
National Charter - Nasser conten:
Some people would like to argue that the 'Executive'
branch of the government should be separate from the
leglslature'. This Is known as the theory of the
'Separation of Powers'. As a matter of fact, this
theory has never been applied In any country. Has
ever the Executive been totally separate from the
legislature anywhere In the world'r32
Moreover, Nasser hod repeatedly reaffirmed his views on the nature of the
relationship that should exist between branches of government In the Seventh
Meeting of the Trilateral Talks for the proposed unity between Syria, Iraq and
Egypt, Nasser said:
I believe that the principle of the 'Separation of
Powers' Is a greet deceit...Why? I will tell you why.
Because, in reality, there Is no such thing as
'Separation' between the branches of government.
Even In England, It has always been the case that the
party that commands a majority In the parliament
holds the reigns of government; Executive and
Legislative alike. Thus, the political leadership that
commands the majority will always have two things
under its control: the Executive and the Legislative
powers. 33
Being consistent with himself. Nasser hod appointed Mohammed Abu Nusseir - who
held the same views as Nasser himself on the principle of separation of powers -
to the post of Minister of Justice. This appointment was politically motivated, La.
to further Nasser's Influence end to tighten the screws around the members of the
Judiciary who started to voice their discontent with the regime and began to
31 See R. Hrair Dekmejlan, EGYPT UNDER NASSER : A Study in Political Dynamics.
Albany : State University of New York Press, 197$, pp.63-78.
Nass.rs Speech, AL AHRAM. July 3, 1962. pp.1-2.
Immam Abdullah, ThE MASSACRE OF THE JUDICIARY, 	 Cairo : Publishing
House, 1976. pp.24-46.
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Jockey for political power particularly following the 1967 defeat. With the
Nusseir appointment, Nasser engaged to stifle the opposition and to enhance his
own position.34
By rejecting the theory of the Separation of Powers, Nasser had established a
pattern of government based on FUSION OF POWERS Instead. In that pattern. all
other Institutions were reduced to a mere subservient role to that of the
President. Thus, the cabinet, the Assembly, the Military, the 'Wema' and all
other political Institutions were totally under the control of the head of state.35
1.5 M[ANING OF COGNITIVE PERCEPTIONS
Cognition Is an all-Inclusive concept which contains all other conceptual concepts
such as beliefs, Images, perceptions or values. For example, It is possible to
cognlze without believing or even forming a prior Image about an effect, but It Is
almost Impossible to believe without cognizing. The term Is derived from the
word Cogrta which means, to think about many things and bring them together In a
unified woy.36 This means to form an image about the effect. Image has been
defined as:
The organized representation of en object In an
individual cognitive system. The core of an Image Is
the perceived character of the object to which It
refers - the individual's conception of what this
object Is like. Image Is an Inferred construct,
however, rather than a mere description of the way
the object is phenomenally experienced.37
The Image of an object Is always associated with various specific memories
In an interview with the wrIter. Peter Planstleld said that The post 1967 wave or
political dissent within the country was as a direct result ot Nassers loss or influence
and hence the loosening of the executives power over the country. October. 1968.
London.
For more Information on Presidential Power see, Dekmejtan, EGYPT UNDER NASSER.
•p .clt., pp.196-8; Charles Cremeans, THE ARABS AND ThE WORLD : Nassers Arab
Nationalist Policy, London : Frederick A. Praeger. 1963, pp.32-4 1
6. Reed, ThE PSYCHOLOGY OF ANOIIALO(JS PERCEPTION. Cambridge : Cambridge
University Press, 1972, p.13.
31 lbid.. p.24.
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(pest); expectations (future); various generalized beliefs and opinions regarding
the object. The Image In a broader definition includes not only the individual's
conception of the object at present, but also his view of Its past, and (uture.38
If en Individual likes or dislikes, favours or opposes, approaches or avoids an
effect, one Is then talking about attitudes. When en Image is complex and
differentiated, it would then be appropriate to speak of a number of
attitudes.39 Images have some tendency to relate to different Impressions of
the object to each other so that thoy hang together In a unified whole. 40 In
other words, images are not Just an accumulation of discrete components, but
sorting out these components into a more coherent and efficient structure.41
Therefore, among the elements that constitute the image, there will always be a
tendency towards consistency so that the image can be coherent and organized,
even though It contains contradictions end ambiguities.42
Images play an Important role In the Individual's conception of the object (and
behaviour towards It) Therefore, understanding what Walter Llppman cells
plctures in our heeds,43 is crucial to understanding human behaviour. If that
behaviour is a political decision - where the stakes are normally high - probing
Into the Images held in the leader's mind seems to be a worthwhile undertaking.
After all, it Is these images that (sometimes) determines policy outcomes. In
this context, Boulding argues that docision makers do not respond to the
situation, but to their images of the situation and that behaviour is usually
directed to the fulfilment of images formed in the past for the future.44






4 WaILer Lippman, PUBLIC OPINION. New York : Free Press. 1965. pp.10-12.
44Kenneth F. Boulding, THE IMAGE : Knowledge in Lire and Society. London : Crescent
Press. 1961.
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a person says or does, end capable of being preceded by the phase 'I believe...or
the phrase 'my belief Is'. The content of a belief may describe an object or a
situation as true or false; evaluate It as good or bad; or advocate a certain course
of action as desirable or undesirable. Yet, all beliefs are predisposition to
action. Crutchfield and Kretch state:
Whether or not the content of a belief is to describe,
evaluate or advocate an action, or do all three, all
beliefs are predispositions to action; and they are part
of attitudes. An attitude Incorporates two or more
beliefs whereas a belief Is part and Darcel of an
attitude.
A belief system is on Inter-related set of affect-loden cogntttons concerning some
aspects of the psychological world of a single individual. 46 kretch and
Crutchfield assert that every belief (having a cognitive component) Is a
predisposition to action. The kind of action a belief leads to Is 'dictated' strictly
by the context of that belief. Beliefs are divided Into: central beliefs (a change In
which triggers a chain reaction of changes In other beliefs) end non-central
beliefs (a change In which does not necessarily result In a subsequent change In
other beliefs). Central beliefs usually remain relatively more stable than non-
central or secondary beliefs. Non-central beliefs are usually subject to change
end, therefore, are less stable, yet they do not affect the central ones.
All studies In the field share the common assumption that man strives to maintain
consistency between the cognitive, affective and behavioural components within a
single belief; between two or more related beliefs and attitudes entering Into a
total system of beliefs.
An attitude has, therefore, been defined as 'a relatively enduring organization of
beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond In some
preferential manner.47 Thus, beliefs, attitudes, and Images - all authorities
45DavId KreLch and Richard Crut.chtleld. ThEORY AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY. New York : Mc6raw HIll, 1948. p.153.
46 Ibid., p.154.
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agree - are dispositions to ection in a preferential way towards the object or
situation under investigation. Perception is a by-product of attitudes, beliefs
nd Images.
Social perception Is a difficult concept to define. It Is generally concerned with
the effects of social and cultural fectors on men's cognitive structuring of his
psychological and social environment. Since the 'social' has come to often mean,
In social-psychological parlance, 'motivational fectors' in perception 48 human
behaviour has been eccounted for by more than merely one attitude, I.e. by an
Image. According to Rokeach, Ballachey, Crutchfield end many others, behaviour
Is determined by a number of attitudes, wants, end situational conditions rather
than by a single attitude. Attitude test scores alone are usually not enough to
predict behavlour.49
From the distinction cited above between the various perceptual concepts -
beliefs, perceptions, ettitudes...etc - the cognitive perceptions that one will be
looking at are merely the images held in 6amal Abdel Nasser's head about the role
of Egypt's position in the Arab world and the politics of Arab Nationalism. Since
it Is our contention that the Image of 'Arab Unity' held by the Egyptian leader,
Nasser, constitute the most essential element in determining his leadership
decisions towards Arab Unity, the question arises is what those Images were.
In building Nasser's perceptions of national identity, one has used, as was said
previously, primary as well as secondary sources. Because the secondary sources
are lacking in methodological rigour, one has relied more heavily on the primary
sources (speeches and philosophical writings of Nasser, 1952-1970).
4 M.J. Rokeach, •Structural Theory of AtUtude Dynamics, PUBLIC OPINION
JARTERI.Y, 24. 1960, pp.319-340. p.320.
4 PercepLIon Involves the awareness and recognition of social objects present In
ones Immediate sensory field and Impressions experienced at an earlier time.
Structural Theory of Attitude Dynamlcs, op.cit.. p.154.
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4.6 NASSER'S PERCEPTIONS OF EOYPT IAN NATIONAL IDENTITY
Charismatic leaders do not necessarily cultivate stron g political institutions
during their life In office. Institutionalization has been noted by the Weberlans
as Incompatible with charismatic leadership. It has been observed that
Charismatic leaders always act alone In mobilizing the messes end personify
authority. They do not, in the majority of cases, rely on political Institutions.
Thus, the relationship between them end the masses Is always a direct one.
If Nasser Is to be taken as a truly charismatic leader, 50 then, as such, no
meaningful political Institutions existed besides him. Therefore, the heavy
burden of political communication with the Egyptian people rested solely with
ilasser who - due to the political circumstances of that era - relied mainly on the
spoken word, I.e., the political discourse. The political speech of the leader was
the main vehicle of interaction with the Egyptian and, regionally, the Arab
masses.51 Beside the political speech, there were some philosophical writings.
Such writings were mainly addressed to the learned stratum of the Egyptian and
Arab people. The examination of such speeches end writings give a fairly
comprehensive idea about Nasser's perceptions end beliefs concerning Arab Unity
and Nationalism.
Since It would be redundant and time-consuming to examine all of Nasser's
speeches, only some twenty four of them have been chosen for review. in
selecting this sample, a two-dimensional criterion has been applied: the political
See Jean Lacouture, ThE DEPII600S : Charismatic Leadership in the Third World;
Gamal Abdel Nasser : Leader and institution, New York : Alfred A. Knopt, 1970.
pp.81-138.
51 Conslder Nasser's utterances to an American Ambassador, John Badeau, In Egypt:
...the main weapon of the revolution is the masses. I have always been able to move
these masses to defend themselves against any danger. The weapon or the Arab
revolution Is the masses. So perhaps quiet diplomacy would suit the United states, but
quiet diplomacy would not suit sis because I would be cut off from the support of my
masses. It I am to be ready with my weapon I must always be ready to talk to the
Arab people...Otherwise I would be facing the battle without my weapon. Quoted in
Mohrez Mahmoud El ilussini, SOVIET-E6YPrIAN RELATiONS, 1945-85, London
tlacmilian Press 1988, p.171.
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cesion of the speech; and the kind of audience the speech was addressed to.
Having applied the Semantics Method - outlined earlier - to the selected sample of
speeches, one has come to the following definite conclusion about Nasser's
perceptions of Egyptian national Identity. Nasser did not consider Egypt as a
nation but, rather, as part and parcel of the Great Arab Ummah. This was a steady
belief In Nasser's mind and not merely a notion dictated by the circumstances of
the hour that the Egyptian leader entertained for a while and had to give up at a
later time. It was a deep rooted belief of the kind religions require of their
adherents. The observer notes that Nasser's speeches reflected his belief that
Egypt was pert of the Arab world. Against all odds, Nasser's firm belief In the
Arabness of Egypt never wavered. He continued to maintain that belief even when
almost all the Arab world were adamantly against him and unquestionably opposed
to his policies.
To qualify this general conclusion, the analysis of the selected sample of the
leader's words has revealed the following:
4.7 OAWMI (NATIONAliSM) VERSUS WATANI (PATRIOTISM)
There are two different sets of vocabulary relevant to Egyptian and Arab
Nationalism. These two sets of vocabulary have sometimes caused a great deal of
confusion for those who attempted to analyze Nasser's perceptions of Arab Unity.
Silberman Is a very good example to cite In this regard. The confusion - whether
In Silbermen's exemple 2 or In others like it - occurs due to the writers' lack
of knowledge - or at least lack of command - of the Arabic language. Nasser spoke
in Arabic. Any scholar who attempts to Interpret Nasser's views must do so with
a sufficient ability to understand that language. For example. Nasser chose his
vocabulary In a careful manner. His Qawmi vocabulary set differed completely
See Gad Sliberman, PlatIonaI Identity In NaerIst Ideology. ASIAN AND AFRICAN
STUDIES, Vol.8. No.1. 1972.
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from his Wetani vocabulary set. A thorough review or the sample of speeches
Indicates that Nasser never Intermingled the two sets together. Thus, for Arab
Nationalism, Nasser used the word Oawmlyah (meaning natlonaHsm); end for
Egyptian Nationalism, he used the words Watantyah (mooning patriotism). The
adjectives OewmI' end 'Watani' mean 'National' end 'patriotic' respectively.
Apparently, Nasser never on any occasion used -not even once - the former when
referring to Egypt or to the Egyptians.
4.8 THE CONCEPT OF THE WIMAH
Since Nasser's Arab Policies aiming to unite the Arab World did not appear before
the mid-fifties, it was a natural thing for the local (the Watani) vocabulary In
Nasser's speeches and writings to emerge before the regional (the Qewmi) one.
This was another source of confusion for any Western observers and analysts who
Inferred from this fact that a change In the Ideological beliefs of the leader did
occur. Consequently, they set out to find reasons for that perceived change and
were guided by their faulty readings of the leaders' beliefs to the external
environment. The fact of the matter Is quite contrary.
Nasser used the Wateni vocabulary from the beginning of his coup d'etat, this
means that he hod hod a good chance to use the Oawmi vocabulary from the start.
He could have, for example, described Egypt as en Ummah before he embarked on
his regional policies which were geared to achieve a degree of 'Arab unity'. Yet,
Nasser had not done so. The Egyptian state was never referred to as en Ummah.
Moreover, from Its first appearances In 1956 in Nasser's writings and speeches,
the word Ummah was used to describe the Arabs. Since then, the word was never
- as It was never before - used to describe Egypt. This concept, Ummah was
systematically used by Nasser to describe only the Arab world. Egypt was seen as
en Integral part of the Arab world and never as an Ummah by itself. Such a
meticulous usage of the Arabic language suggests that Nasser did In fact
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distinguish between Oawmi end the Weteni vocabulary. And that he did so on
purpose end out of a philosophical belief about the identity of Egypt end Its role
in achieving Arab Unity.
Before 1954, Nasser used terms like the 'Arab Circle' end the 'Arab Region' when
referring to the Arab world. But even then, Nasser used to refer to the entire
area as one region being laden with the same problems, heading for the same
future and bound for the same destiny. It was only In 1954 that Nasser revealed
the real regional goal of the 1952 Revolution. According to Nasser, the goal of
the Egyptian revolution of 1952 was that the Arabs become a united Ummeh. It
Is apparent that the Arabs, In Nasser's language, become an Ummeh (for he never
deubted the existence of the Arab Ummah), but, he said to become a united
Ummah (for it was obvious that the Ummeh was divided).
This revelation by Nasser of the regional goals of the Free Officers was repeated
quite often afterwards. Thus. In 1954 and 1955 the goal was stressed in Nassers
major speeches. In 1955 he affirmed that 'our Arab policy elms .t making the
Arab Ummah united.53 And, on January 16, 1956, the Egyptian constitution
legitimized Nasser's perceptions that The Egyptian people constitute an integral
part of the Arab Ummeh. From that date on, Egypt was referred to as Al Watan
and the Arab World as Al Ummah in all of Nasser's speeches and writing.54
It should be noted that this disclosure by Nasser of the regional goals of the
Egyptian revolution came In 1954. It Is not a coincidence that In that year the
British had to leave Egypt. After the British had been ousted from Egypt, It
should not be surprising that the leaders of the revolutionary regime were a
53Nasser, A Speech on July 22nd 1955. NASSERS DOCUMENTS. op.cIL. p.63.
Befor. 1956. Nasser was in the habit of using terms like UNITED UTIIIAH and one
UMPIAH whenever he referred to the Arab World. These two concepts became the Arab
Ummah from 1956 on. However, sometimes the Watani vocabulary was carefully
borrowed by Nasser to be used in the Qawmi (Arab) sense. Thus on March 30th,
1968. Nasser used the term At Watanylh Al Arablyih. But such borrowing remained
limIted. it was an e,iception which should confirm • rather than negate, the general
rule Nasser followed in using these terms. See NASsER'S DOCUMENTS. op.cit.. p.398.
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little bit encouraged to disclose their real policy goals vis-e-vis the Arab world.
Nasser himself referred to this point In 1954 when he said:
Egypt has begun a new phase with the Arabs...The Goal
of our revolution has always been to make the Arabs a
united Ummah. It is true that the problem of the
existence of the British on Egyptian soil had occupied
most of our time and efforts exerted for the liberation
of the Arab lends.55
That perception of Egypt as an Arab country continued to exist as pert of Nasser's
belief system - and a guide to his regional end Arab policies - until his death In
September, 1970. Here, once again, one finds oneself in sharp contradiction with
Silberman's Interpretation of Nasser's ideological beliefs. Silberman argues that
following the 1967 defeat, Nasser's concept of the Arab Ummah waned as the
leader's perception of national Identity took a turn toward Egyptian nationalism.
Silberman misread the Egyptian leader In this respect as well. For, while It Is
true that Nasser de-escalated his cell on the Arabs to unite In that particular
period in Egypt's history, nothing Indicated that the Egyptian leader gave up his
Ideal of Arab unity. A careful examination of our selected sample of his speeches
revealed that Nasser's main emphasis in that period was on 'a united Arab stand
against Israel.' Nasser's call on all Arabs to 'close the ranks' and 'fight until the
last man' in order to regain the Arab land lost to Israel in the War, should not be
seen as a sign of giving up the ideal of Arab Unity or for turning towards Egyptian
nationalism. As a matter of feet, In that particular period of Egypt's history,
Nasser's usage of the word Ummeh - end its related vocabulary - was more
visible than ever before in Nasser's speeches end writings. For example, the
term was repeated by Nasser over 200 tImes in the period between 1967 and his
death in 1970
6amal Abdel Nasser, A Speech en July 22nd, 1954 •, NASSERS DOCUMENTS. op
cit,1 p.117.
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4.9 THE POLITICAL EXPRESSION OF THE UMMAH
Nasser saw an ephemeral phase In the multitude of the Arab states. The Ummah
has always had one logical expression In Nasser's mind. That expression was to
take the form of an Arab state which will encompass all present Arab mini states.
Thus, for Nasser Egypt was only a pert of the Ummah. In tact, he had affirmed the
Arabness of Egypt from the moment he ousted the British and emerged triumphant
over Naguib In the March 1954 crIsis within the RcC. In THE PHiLOSOPHY OF
THE REVOL UT/ON (written In 1953). he referred to the Arab circle as a Sense of
Belonging (1t Is from us end we are from 1t). Likewise, in all of his official
writings and documents, Nasser had repeatedly confirmed the Arabness of Egypt.
Thus, the Constitution of 1956, the National Charter of 1962, and the March
30th DeclaratIon of 1968. eli went the way to represent Nasser's perceptions of
Arebness of Egypt. In the March 30th declaration, for example and contrary to
whet Silberman likes to believe. Nasser said:
It is Important that the constitution emphasize the
Egyptians belonging to the Arab Ummah; a belonging of
history of struggle and of destiny. An organic unity
above all Individuals end phases of struggle.56
All this leads us to the conclusion that Nasser's perception of Egypt was simply
Arab. He saw Egypt as part of en Ummah; the Arab Ummeh end In no way en
Ummah by Itself. According to Nasser. Egypt's role was to struggle for the Arab
Unity; Egypt's army was to fight for the entire Ummah; end Egypt's revolution
was to help all Arab revolutions for the achievement of Arab Unity.
6amaI Abdel Nasser. •A Speech to the Intellectuals .1 Cairo University ror
presenting the March DeclaratIon, 1968, NASSERS DOCUMENTS. op.clt., p.250.
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SECTION TWO: THE ROLE OF NASSER'S PERCEPTION IN LEADERSHIP ROLE
AND POLICY TOWARDSARAB ISM: OPERATIONALISATION AND CONSTRUCTION
In order to render the Cognitive Process Model amenable to the analysis of the
role of Nasser's perception of national Identity In his leadership role towards
Arab Unity, the following operationalisatlon seems appropriate.51
The leader's perceptions of Arab Unity (PAU) represent only one part of his
belief systems. For a leader's belief system (or part of It) to be used In
connection with some sort of explanation. It can be seen In three possible WOYS: It
can be used as dependent, Intervening or Independent variable. And as such It
poses Its own logical questions which require logical answers. The following
abbreviations will be used to facilitate the task of operationalising the model:
(BS) Belief System.
(PAU) Perceptions of Arab Unity;
(AC) action; a.b.c......n (any independent variable) end
(DM) the decision making process.
(a) (PAU) AS AN INTERVENING VARIABLE
Two scenarios are possible In this case: One, en autocratic leader:
a---PAU--AC
Where (a) stands for any Independent factor(s) -- such as Incoming Information
for example -- that may affect a leader's actions after being 'filtered' through
tils BS.
Two, a democratic leader: a PAU --DM -- AC
Where decisions are made collectively (by a group), one Is faced with a process of
action and Interaction.
57 The version of the cognitive model chosen In this work Is drawn mainly from one
source. Christler Johnson, (ed), COGNITIVE DYNAMICS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,
New York : Martin, 1982, PP.2 10.
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(b) PAU AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE
In this case, the relevant questions include: How are beliefs formed and changed?
How does a leader draw anologles and learn historical lessons'? What factors




(c) 65 (PAU) AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:
As an Independent variable. PAU can be represented as follows:
PAU-------AC
Where PAU causes AC. But, since no one can assert that actions are determined by
the (BS) alone, the following relationship is both appropriate and inevitable:
PAU-a-b-c-----n----------AC
Needless to say that one Is Interested In the last scenario; i.e. In PAU as an
Independent variable which can be represented in this simple form:
PAU---------------AC
The problem then becomes how to separate a leader's (BS) (or PAU) from other
independent variables (a,b.....n) In order to assess what effect each of such
variables has on the action(s).
Since a leader's (BS) Is a disposition to action, it Is by definition policy-
relevant. However, an actor's CBS) Is a latent structure which cannot be directly
observed but only be constructed by inference. The question that arises then is
what are the valid indicators that clearly reveal to a leader's beliefs and at the
same time avoid circularitles? A leader's CBS) can be inferred from his verbal
statements and/or from his actions (with the understanding that such actions may
0.R. Hoisti and J.N. Rosensu, VIetnam Consensus and the Belief Systems of
American teaders, WORLD POLITICS. 32. January, 1979. pp.1-56. p.20.
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well be Influenced by several other factors other than the leader's 85.) The
lunction of explicit statements is called 'expressive': I.e. to Justify actions, to
persuade other actors. ...etc.59
This leads to the following question. Do leader's express what they perceive; and
do they perceive what they express? It Is true that oH leaders verbal statements
may or may not represent his BS. And, It Is equally true that, In politics - for
obvious reasons - a leader's verbal statements do not often represent his BS. But
how often and when? Thus, three dimensions are considered: a leader's 83; his
Verbal Statements (YS); and his Actions (AC). These dimensions can be
represented as follows:
BS=YS---------AC
The question is whether or not VS represent 65, end whether or not (63) Is
expressed by (YS). Fortunately, the main concern here Is only with a fraction of
the leader's (63); with cognitive beliefs (beliefs which are neither true nor
false). The answer to this question Is straightforward. If a leader's statements
are supported or followed by actions that are consistent with his statements, they
must then be taken to express the leader's (BS. Ttus, tf (AC) Is cotsts(ent wIth
his (VS) 1 It Is highly plausible that they represent his (BS).
That Is exactly what one will be doing In the remaining part of this Chapter. An
effort Is mode to capture those beliefs of Nasser which relates to the Issue of Arab
Nationalism and Pan-Arabism.
H.E. Himmelstrand. Depollticlzation and Political Involvement in E. Atlardt. and S.
Rokkan, CeO.), IIASS POLITICS, New York : Free Pres5, 1970, p.20.
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4.10 THE ROLE OF NASSER'S (PAU) IN HIS LEADERSHIP
ROLE TOWARDS ARAB NATIONALISM (LRTAN)
In this section, en attempt will be made to relate Nasser's leadership role -
decisions end ections - towards Arab Nationalism to his perceptions of Arab
Unity. Based on this, Nasser's PAU can be rendered amenable to this analysis
through the following operatlonalisation:
PerceptionJ:
The Arabs form an Ummah.
It comprises all Arabic speaking
peoples from the Atlantic Ocean
in the West to the Arabian 6ulf In the East.






Egypt belongs to the Arab Ummah.
It Is en Integral part of the Ummah.
Egypt Is not an Ummeh by Itself,
though It Is a sovereign state.
(lie). Egypt belongs organically to the Arab Ummah.
(lIb). Egypt belongs geographically to the Arab Iimmah.
(lIc). Egypt belongs historically to the Arab Ummah.
(lid). Egypt belongs spiritually to the Arab Ummah.
PerceDtlon Ill:
The Ummah Is In a divided state.
(file). This state Is en ephemeral one.
(tub). Only In this stage of dividedness,
would the Ummeh allow the existence of
local or Subregional units (Egypt, Syria, lreq...etc.)
Perception IV:
The cause of this dividedness of the Ummah Is Imperialism.
(lYe). Israel (Zionism) Is the spearhead of Imperialism.
(lYb). It precludes Arab Unity.
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Percention Y:
Unity WIll be achieved if imperialism
ceases to Interfere In Arab affairs or!
end If Isreel as a nation - ceases to exist.
PerceDtion VI:
Arab Unity should be achieved through stages
(Functional Approach).
PerceDtlon VII:
The enemies of the Arab Ummah are:
(Vile). Imperialism;
(Ylib). Israel (Zionism); and
(Ylic). Reactionary Arab rulers.
(Tables 1 , 2, end 3 at the end of this Chapter
provide a summary of these categorizations.)
The Nasserite era will be divided Into five phases. This periodizotion Is taken
from Nasser. In a major speech celebrating the Day of the Union with Syria nine
years later - exactly on Feb. 22nd, 1967 - Nasser divided the period from 1952
to 1967 Into four stages end assigned each stage a title of Its own. These titles
reflect clearly Nasser's own thinking of the Arab World. All the titles were used
with reference to the Arab World; and particularly to Arab Unity. Thus, he gave
the following periodization: From 1953 to 1957 was celled 'closing the ranks'
stage; from 1957-1963, was called •uniting goals before united ranks' stage;
from 1963 to 1966, was called 'united efforts for Palestine' stage; and from
February 1966 to June 1967. was called 'unity of the revolutionary forces'
stage. The period from June 1967 until Nasser's death In September 1970 one
may call • 'the call for a united Arab stand' stage.6° It Is clear that Nasser's
main concern In this final stage was to regain the Arab land lost by the warring
Arab states of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the 1967 war.
0 6amal Abdel Nasser A Speech on the Occasion of the Day .t Arab UnIty, Feb 22nd.
1967, NASSERS DOCUMENTS: Speeches, Declarations and SLsLements, Cairo : Center
for Political & Strategic Studies t AL AHRAPI IP 1973, 27 pages.
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One will examine the role of Nasser's PAIJ - as obtained from the primary
sources61 - in his IRTAN as E,lstory recounts It. The five phases will be
reduced to four only as each of the periods from 196 1-67 and the period from
1967-70 will be considered as one phase.
4.11 PHASE ONE : CLOSING THE RANKS. 1952 - 1957:
Insofar as Nasser's leadership role was concerned, this phase was characterized
by the struggle for Egyptian Independence 1952-1954; the struggle for Arab
Independence and the rejection of the Baghdad Pact 1955-56 and the struggle for
Egyptian natural right of self determination (the nationalization of the Suez Canal
company (1956)); and the failure of the Tri-Partite military intervention
against Egypt (1956).
4.11.1 .NASSER'S EARLY YEAR'S: 1952-1954.
The first two years of Nasser's regime witnessed an almost total absence of
mentioning the Arab world; much less Arab unity. Jockeying for political power
61 The chosen sample of the speeches Is evenly distributed ever the eighteen years of
Nasser's rule'. The speeches are also evenly distributed ever the above menuoned
stages. These stages are as follows:
1. The February 22nd speech. It became Nasser's tradition to deliver a speech on that
day celebrating the union with Syria in 1958. From 1959 on this s peech Is included.
2. The May 1st speech. Since Nasser's socialist programmes got oft the ground In
1961, this speech became a routine speech.
3. The June 5th commemorating the Egyptian defeat began in June 1968.
4. The July 23rd speech began In 1953 and is being delivered until the present. This is
th. day of the Revolution of 1952.
5. One has also chosen several other speeches with dealt with a particular political
circumstance, such as the 1956 speech on the .ccasIon of the iiaUonalization of the
Suez Company; th. speech of September 30th. 1961 on the occasion or the Syrian
secession from the union...st.c.
Nassers major philosophical writings were consulted as well. These are: 6amal Abdel
Nasser THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION. Cairo : Ministry of Information, 1953.
56 pages.; THE NATIONAL CHARTER. Cairo : Ministry of Information. 1962. 124 pages;
and THE DECLARATION OF MARCH 30TH. Cairo : Ministry of Information, 1968, 9
pages.
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among the coup's leaders coupled with their eagerness to consolidate their power
base and protecting and legitimizing their ru'e, was the apparent reason for such
total disregard to the Arab world. For It was not until the power struggle was
settled end security for the new regime was felt assured - especially after the
ousting of British forces from Egypt - that the Arab world began to dominate
Nasser's vocabulary end policy. Indeed, It was not until after Nasser had emerged
victorious from the Internal power struggle within the Revolutionary Command
Council end a relative degree of legitimacy was achieved that the Arab world
started to gradually appear In Nasser's vocabulary and leadership policy.
4.11.2. THE YEARS: 1954-1957:
From 1954 onwards, Nasser began to reveal his Ideological views regarding
Egyptian relationship with Arab world. And by the end of 1955, Egypt had moved
firmly from the 'periphery' to the 'core' of Arab politics. It was during these
years that Nasser's Image was tremendously enhanced that he became the chief
protagonist of the Arab Nationalist Movement. This new role for Egypt was
legitimized by Nasser when, for the first time in Egypt's history, the first
article of the 1956 constitutIon declared that:
Egypt Is a sovereign Independent Arab state and the
Egyptian people are en Integral part of the Arab
Ummah.
This radical change effected by Nasser was due In most part to his deep
convictions of Egypt being an Arab country. To be sure, there were several
pressures on Nasser - emanating from the Internal as well as the external
environment - to pursue en active Arab policy. But Nasser did not need any
pressure from outside to convince him of the necessity for change In Egypt's
leadership status. And, It was his PAU that actually made the difference. To have
en assessment of the role of his PAIl one must examine the pressures of the
external and the Internal environments and the alternative courses of actions that
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were available to the leader at the time.
4.1 1.3 THE EXTERNAL. ENVIRONMENT
Perhaps one of the main foundations of strength of Nasser's Ideas concerning
Egypt's Arab role was the fact that the Arab World, end more specifically the Arab
masses, were prepared to welcome such a leading revolutionary role to be
assumed by Nasser. One must bear In mind that at that time the Arab World was
still frustrated by the first defeat In the conflict over Palestine, generally
dominated by British and French colonialism, and mostly overwhelmed by
conservative ruling elites. As Professor All Hillel Dessouki stated:
The situation in the Arab World was so conducive to
the establishment of Nasser's credibility among the
Arab peoples that his charisma captured the
Imagination of the peoples early and before any
concrete plans towards this area were put Into
effect.62
Through his policies were geared at eliminating the power-base of the 'encien
regime' in Egypt, coupled with his management of Egyptian relations with the
West, Nasser's prestige as a new leader of the hero-seeking Arab World soared
high. As far as the pressures from the external environment are concerned,
Nasser's active Arab policy could rightly be seen as a response to the outpouring
of emotions by the Arab masses. It could also be seen as a strategic or tactical
move on Nasser's part in his efforts to curb the hegemonical Influence of colonial
powers In the area: What the Arab masses were aspiring to achieve. The issue
can be simply stated as follows: The Arab masses 'demanded' that Nasser play an
Arab - rather then merely an Egyptian role:
Arab responses was strong and spontaneous. General
strikes took place in Iraq, Syria, Jordan. Lebanon, the
Sudan, Libya, the Persian Gulf Shelkdoms and even
Morocco...Nasser was amazed and almost overwhelmed
by this response. Reciprocating, he set out to create
the Arab Nationalist Ideology.63
In an Interview with the wrIter, June, 1988, London.
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The explanation of Nasser's charismatic leadership in terms of the external
imperatives alone tends to ignore hell the picture end obscures the other half.
Nasser's Arab Ideology was not a by-product of this 'conducive' Arab situation.
Nasser's Ideological beliefs owes much to his PAU.
4.11.4 NASSER'S PAU
It Is most probable that what really encouraged the Egyptian leader the most in
his perception of this new Egyptian role, beside the positive Arab stance
following the Suez Crisis, was his apparent deep rooted-convictions that Egypt
was an 'Arab country' and that he personally was the expression of the Arebness
of Egypt. In his THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOL UT/ON, (written some time In
1953-54 almost two years before the Suez Canal crisis) Nasser had decisive
thoughts on the Identity of Egypt vis-e-vls Arab Unity. While the Islamic and
African dimensions of this Identity were not overlooked, 64 the Arab aspect of it
was given clear and full prominence end was dealt with In a different way from a
political perspective. Nasser affirmed Egypt's belonging to the Arab circle (PAU)
which led him to conclude that Egypt not only belonged to - but was also qualified
to play a leading revolutionary role in - the Arab world which. Nasser said, was
In search of a hero. Of that role, he wrote:
We cannot look stupidly at a map of the world not
realizing our place In it end the role destined for us
by that place.65
Truthful to this belief. Nasser perceived In the Baghdad Pact an attempt to
• lsolate Egypt from the rest of its sisterly Arab states. 66 Perhaps the most
WIllard Range. An Interpretation of Nasserlsm, WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY,
XII, 1959. p.1008.
The Islamic world, and the African continent were thought of in terms of an Islamic
conference to be held during the MusIIms yearly pilgrimage t.o Plecca. and an African
Institute to be established In Cairo to contribute to Liberation struggle in Sub-Saharan
Africa. See Gamal Abdel Nasser, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION. Cairo :The
National Publication House, 1954. pp.49-70.
65Nas,er. THE PHILOSOPHY Of THE REVOLUTION. op.clt.. p.59.
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significant change in Nasser's statements was the fact that while In 1953 he used
to refer to the Arabs as the Arabs or as the 'Arab area', he began from 1954 on
to refer to them as a 'nation' or as 'a unified nation'. As a matter of fact, as early
as August 1st, 1954 Nasser told THE SUNDAY TIMES in en interview that, Our
people will have to think strategically after this Treaty (meaning the Evacuation
Treaty). Until now we have only been able to think of Egypt.' 1 Moreover, a
month earlier, and exactly on July 23rd, Nasser rave ad for The first time, what
others believed the 'hidden goal' of the Egyptian Revolution. Speaking on behalf of
the RCC, on the 2nd annIversary of the revolution, Nasser said, '...the real goal of
our movement was to make the Arabs a united Ummoh.'8
Thus, one can clearly see that Nasser's PAU was quite salient during this stage
which was merely a preparatory one. A stage that would soon lead to more
Involvement In the area on the part of Egypt In the name of Arab Unity. No
serious active policy toward Arab Unity was pursued in this phase.
4.12 PHASE TWO: UNITING THE RANKS (1958-1961)
This phase witnessed the process In which concept of Arab nationalism reached its
peak; the golden years of Nasser's Image as an Arab leader; and the beginning of
real commitments by Egypt to the Arabs, commitments that - with the passage of
time - proved to be quite costly, not only to Nasser, but also to Egypt and Its
image In the Arab World. All unification attempts In this stage (either initiated
by Egypt or by other Arab states) ended In failure. The most Important factor In
this process was Nasser's perception of Egypt being an Arab country. This phase
was characterized by the Union with Syria In February 1958; and the dissolution
of the Union in September 1961.
66 Nasser, SPEECHES. DOCUMENTS AND DECLARATIONS. op.cit.. p.222.
67 THE SUNDAY TIMES, August, 1st. 1954. p.1.
68Na,ser, SPEECHES. DOCUMENTS AND DECLARATIONS. op.clt., p.177.
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This phase began as early as 1956, when Nasser elevated the Idea and, thus, the
strategic blueprint of Pan-Arabism to that of Arab Nationalism. It was In 1956
that Nasser began to use the term the 'Arab Ummah' when describing what hod
hitherto been called the Arabs. Anwar Abdel Malek has pointed out that, many
young writers, Journalists and nationalists began to theorize for the new regime
as early as 1953. And it was then that these nationalist theorists established
their connections with the Syrian Ba'athlst group.69 To Nasser, Arab
Nationalism was to take the form of the Integral unity of the sovereign Arab
states. Thus, the United Arab Republic - which Joined Egypt with Syria in 1958
- was formed as a nucleus for total Arab Unity.
Nasser's Arab policy was - to a great extent - a response to various stimuli from
the internal (Egyptian), the regional (Arab and Israeli) and the international
(Oreat Powers) environments. And it was Nasser's perception of these stimuli
that made the difference. Among these stimuli was his PALl. A close look at these
factors Is, therefore, In place.
4.12.1 THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
The external (regional and international) environment played a significant role
In directing Egyptian foreign policy; particularly towards the Arab world. In the
mid-fifties, the external pressure came mostly from the West; particularly from
the U.S.A. When the Eisenhower administration succumbed to the pressure
mounted by a great number of interest groups, such as the Baghdad Pact members,
U.S. Senators for cotton producing states, the Jewish Lobby and Israel, Secretary
of state Dulles withdrew his offer of aid for the construction of the High Dam.
Nasser's response to this cancellation was the nationalization of the Suez Canal
Company. It was during this crisis and the tripartite military intervention that
Anwar Abdel Ilalek, EGYPT : MILITARY SOCIETY. The Army Regime, the t.rt. and
Social Change Under Nasser, translated by Charles Lam Markmann, New York : Vintage
Books, 1968, p.256.
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followed it, that Nasser had to stress end intensify Egypt's identification with
Arab Nationalism. In a major speech on June 1 1956 Nasser repeated his
discourse on the need for a strong national army to 'better resist the forces of the
Baghdad Pact'.70
America's response to those events In the Middle East. especially to the British
end French loss of position, power, end prestige (as a result of the Suez fiasco)
was the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine In June 1957. The doctrine was
meant to fill what Dulles saw as the 'vacuum of Power' that the West's retreat has
created. In response to what Dulles perceived as the growing Soviet Influence in
the Arab World, the Doctrine reveals much of how American decision makers
viewed the situation In the region. Eisenhower stated that, "eli this instability
had been heightened end, at times, manipulated by the Soviet Union or (to use
Dunes' own words) by 'international Communism' 71 The Soviets were seen as
attempting to dominate the Middle East for reasons of "power politics". 72 The
U.S. in order to demonstrate their support for the independence of the 'freedom-
loving nations of the area', pledged economic and military aid to them and the
possible use of US armed forces 'to secure and protect the territorial integrity
end political Independence of such nations facing the threat of internal
communism.73 Thus, In this statement of policy, it is clear that the Middle
East was perceived as en essentially homogeneous region whose major threat was
the spectre of 'International Communism'. The possibility that some Arab nations
might view the U.S., Europe, Israel, or other Arab states as greater threats was
discarded. By this declaration of policy, the U.S. had decided to play en active
role within the Arab World that would prevent the rise and expansion of
governments which were considered to be unfriendly to the U.S. (Egypt for
example). end, therefore, by the Implication that "those who were not with us,
were against us", were In fact perceived as part of 'World CommunIsm".
70Nasser. SPEECHES, DOCUMENTS AND DECLARATIcNS. op cIt. Vol.6, pp.122.
71 SLate Department Bulletin, November 21. 1955. p.845.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, A SELECTED CHRONOLOGY AND BACKGROUND
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE MIDDLE EAST. Washington : Government Printing Office.
90th Congress. 1st sessIon, Committees Print, June 6. 1967. p.109.
73 lbid., pp.78-81.
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As Syria joined Egypt, and Qasim took power in Iraq, the U.S. perceived an erosion
of its Influence In the region. Therefore, a day after Qasim took power in Iraq,
the U.S. landed marines In Lebanon end the British sent paratroopers Into Jordan
In order to support the Pro-Western regimes In those states.74
By now, Nessers leadership In the Arab World could be considered In the final
analysis as pursuing three major goals:
1 .the struggle for the Independence of the Arab World
from colonialism, Imperialism or any foreign power
seeking to dominate the area (It Is clear that Nasser
perceived the US as such a power).
2.The quest for unifying the Arab countries; and
3.The support for revolutionary regimes In the
area.75
Egyptian policy towards Algeria in the fifties, and towards South Yemen In the
sixties are clear cases In the context of the first element. On the other hand, the
merger with Syria (1958- 1961) and the various successive attempts to have a
federal union with Syria, Iraq, end later on with Libya throughout the sixties and
until Nasser's death In 1970, are testimonials of the second element.
Undoubtedly, the Egyptian military Intervention In Yemen (1962-67) is most
representative of the third element.
In toto, Nasser's leadership •t this stage could be viewed as expressing a
revolutionary leading role In the Arab World. Indeed, this Is the key for any
proper understanding of the response to this policy. These responses served as
feedback to Nasser's policy and led to responses by the Egyptian leader as well.
Egypt's revolutionary policy made it almost Inevitable for the conservative Arab
regimes not to look at Nasser with deep suspicions even in times of Inter-Arab
detente. On the other hand, the leading character of such a begemonial role
induced an endemic crisis with other Arab revolutionary regimes. Reasons are
74 This marked the climax of American policy of Active Intervention in the Middle
East. While the Military action achieved its short-run goals, over the long-run It
served to deepen the suspicion of the U.S. I the Arab World.
75Professor All Hillal Dessouki In an interview with the wrIter, June, 1988, London.
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clear on both sides. Conservative Arab regimes feared to be overthrown either
from Inside by Nasser's sympathizers among the members of alienated elites
supported by the masses, or from outside by Nasser's outright plots end
machinations. As early as 1956, Nasser himself pointed to the fear expressed in
foreign newspapers as follows:
Arab Nationalism began to show its existence and Its
truth. I read an article on Arab nationalism In a
foreign newspaper, and it said Arcb Nationalism
became a danger after 1952 and after the writing of
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOL UT/ON. •16
This might suggest that Nasser's Arab policy was a function of the external
environment. The fact or the matter is that Nasser's image of Egypt as an Arab
country destined to play a leading role in the forefront of Arab solidarity and
Unity, was not merely a response to these outside (regional and/or international)
factors. Nasser's PAU played a major part in shaping Egypt's role towards this
end. Thus, the external environment can then be seen in terms of mounting
pressure from the West (particularly the U.S.A), a deep rooted suspicion and fear
of Nasser In the Arab world and the Israeli sector. This external environment
was not, however, the only cause of active Arab Involvement. His PAU played a
signthcent role as well.
4.12.2 NASSER'S PAU
Perhaps It Is Interesting to know that Nasser's Increasing involvement In the
Arab World was neither truly initiated nor fully controlled by him. Nasser
himself used to say, I do not act, I react. 77 For example, Nasser's most
76Nasser, SPEECHES. DOCUMENTS AND DECLARATIONS. op.clt., Vol.7. p.1393. A
major source of embarrassment In Nasser's relations with Arab revolutionary regimes
was the extent to which these regimes were willing to commit themselves to what by
now became known as the Nasserlte Line'. This explains why Nasser's relations with
the conservative Saudi regime under Saud and Feisal were similar in many respects to
his relations with the revolutionary regime In Iraq under Kassem.
77 Th1s was often recognized by many observers or Egyptian politics. For example.
Miles Copeland, an ox-CIA agent stationed In the Middle East staLes: lie (Nasser) had
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dramatic decision to accept full unity with Syria, in February 1958, constItuting
the most crucial step towards Involving Egypt more and more In Arab politics,
was reluctantly mode. Nasser rejected several Syrian overtures for union with
Egypt arguing that the time was not rlght end that any union should at least
take five or six years to prepare. 78 However, this should not be taken to mean
that he was responding to the external environment without beliefs and
convictions of his own.
A distinction should be mode between Nasser's PAU - which calls for Arab Unity
on the one hand - and his reluctance to accept the 1958 merger with Syria on the
other. For Nasser hod always believed that such unity would have to come about
(by Itself) as a result of a long functional precess in which political unity would
be the final step.
4.13 PHASE THREE: THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUOGLE 1961-67;
This phase was characterized by the dissolution of the union in 1961; and the
failure of the Tri-Partite agreement with Iraq and Syria In December 1963. The
collapse of the union with Syria In September 1961, was enough a 'setback' for
Nasser to abandon such an activist Arab policy. Arab solidarity became no more a
goal of Egypt's foreign policy. According to the National Charter, declared by
Nasser In 1962, Arab reactionary rulers hod allied themselves with colonialism
and it became inevitable that he attacked both.79
no wish to rule the Arab world, or the World or Islam or Africa or any other World...be
only wanted to decide their Arab foreign policy vis-a-vis great powers. Miles
Copeland, ThE 6APIE OF NATIONS : The Amorality of Power Politics. New York : Simon
and Schuster, 1969. p.196. Compare with Sir Anthony Nuttings remarks to the writer
In an Interview, where he stoted that The one thing Nasser misunderstood was In
seeing that the Arab masses wanted him to rule them. It was quite the contrary.
Those Arab masses who were enthusiastically waving the banner or Nasserism and
Arab Nationalism were searching ror their own Nasserites who would follow Nassers
policies, instead of being ruled by Nasser hlmselr. October, 1988, London.
78Robert Stephens, NASSER : A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. London : Alien Lane, 1971.
p.273.
7 6amal Abdel Nasser, THE NATIONAL CHARTER. Cairo : The National Publication
295
On the other hand, the Syrian secession as a major setback to Nasser was more
than en encouragement to the conservative Arab regimes. As a matter of fact, one
of the most conflictual periods In Inter-Arab regimes ensued. The secession
Itself, as was later revealed, was in part encouraged end financed by the
conservative Arab states.
The Yemen emerged after the September 1962 revolution as the most decisive
arena of conflict between revolutionary end conservative Arabs. With the failure
of the Yemeni revolution to extend Its influence to many of the tribes, Egypt came
to the help of the revolution with Increasing military Involvement, while Saudi
Arabia was providing the tribes with financial and military aid.8° The border
clashes between Algeria end Morocco were another example characteristic of this
period. In this case tee, there was a direct Egyptian Intervention In support of
Algeria.
On March 8. 1963, Damascus was the scene of a coup d'etat against the
secessionist party. A coalition of civilian and military Be'ethlsts seized power In
Syria. One month earlier Baghdad witnessed the Coup that put Abdel Salem Arif In
power and ended Qasim's rule. With revolutionary regimes in both Syria and
Iraq, talks about a merger of the two states with Egypt seemed plausible to all
parties concerned. Therefore, Cairo witnessed protracted negotiations or Unity
Talks (March 14 - April 14, 1963) between the Egyptian leader and the National
Revolutionary Command Councils of the two regimes of Syria and Iraq. The talks
ended in an agreement to unite - In the future - following a 25 months transition
period.
The agreement was, In fact, nothing more than a 'Declaration of Intent' due to Its
general and vague nature. The leaders did not agree on any political Institutions
such as the constitution; or the National Assembly; or even the formation of any
House, 1962, p.40.
For more details about the Yarned episode, see THE EGYPTIAN INTERVENTION IN
YEMEN (62-67) : A published Ph.D. dissertation. By Ahmed Yousset, Cairo : University
of Cairo Press, Egypt.
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political parties for mobilizing the revolution in Ir and Syria. As a matter of
fact, the agreement was influenced by Nasser's belief that economic unity should
precede any political unity. The Syrian experience was also still vivid in the
mind of the Egyptian leader who Insisted on a transitional period. Such a period
was to allow for the formation of acceptable coalitions in Syria and Iraq.
However, as referred to earlier, arrests, purges, accusations, and mutual
recriminations In both Syria and Iraq spilled over and ended with Nasser's
denunciation of the Trilateral Cairo Talks and Agreements.
Another attempt between Syria end Iraq was made In the same year. The two
countries wanted to form a military and economic union, but when Arif -via a
Coup d'Etat on Nov. 18, 1963 - came to power this attempt ended In failure. An
attempt to unite had also began between Iraq and Egypt In December 1963, when
Arif - by now the President of Iraq - became on good terms with Nasser. A
merger agreement was signed In Cairo in 1965. As the 1967 war broke out, all
such attempts ended without achieving the dream of unity between any two Arab
countries.
From the preceding chronology of events, one can conclude that at this stage of
Pan-Arablsm (1954-1967), Egypt's Nasser had a clear vision of Egypt's Arab
Identity and what was needed to achieve Arab Unity. It Is true that the Ideology
was a rationale for en Arab cooperation but mainly by virtue of being a rationale
for Arab unity among Arab states. The external environment was not the dominant
catalyst that prodded Nasser Into a merger nor was It the major reason for his
entry into both the Arab League and the Palestinian conflict. The external
environment was mainly a constraint on Nasser's endeavours to achieve a Unity
that was In harmony with his beliefs and verbal statements. Wynn was able to
succinctly sum up Nasser's era as follows:
Stung by the secession of Syria In 1961, bogged down
by the tribal/feudal war In Yemen, blocked by the
Conservative Arab States almost at every turn and
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spurned by other fellow Arab nationalists end
'revolutionaries', Nasser stumbled Into the war of
June 1967 with Israel which marked the end of this
phase of Pan-Arebism end brought Nasser's Arab
Policy to a rather tragic close.81
4.14 PHASE FOUR : ARAB SOLIDARITY (1967-1970):
This phase was characterized by Arab solidarity for the restoration of Arab lands
lost to Israel In the 1967 war. The new atmosphere created by the war lasted
more or less until Nasser's death In September 1970. However, It should not be
surprising to say that the new developments In Ept's two adjacent neighbours,
the Sudan and Libya, in flay and September 1969 respectively, when pro-Nasser
revolutionary regimes were established in both countries, would have led Nasser
to change his mind, had It not been for his death In 1970.
4.14.1 A Case Study: The Meroer with S yria: 1958:
In this section, the role played by Nasser's PAU in his decision to accept Syrian
offer to form a merger between the two countries in February 1958 will be
examined. One will introduce the environment of the decision; the leader's PAU;
the alternative policy choices available and the decision process.
4.14.2 THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
It has already pointed that by the end of 1955. Egypt hod moved firmly from the
'Periphery' to the 'core' of Arab affairs and as such had become the focus not only
of the Arab Political situation, but also, and perhaps most relevant, of its
ideological manifestation, The Arab Nationalist Movement. It has also been noted
81 WIIn Wynn. NASSER OF EGYPT : The Search ror Dignity, Cambridge, Mass :
Arlington Book. 1959. p.125.
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that this new role for Egypt was legitimized by the 1956 'temporary' constitution
which declared Egypt as a sovereign Independent Arab state and the Egyptian
people as en Integral part of the Arab nation. As Egypt Joined Syria In 1958 end
formed the United Arab Republic, this legitimacy was further consolidated; and
Arab Unity seemed attainable. As Nasser emerged as the only Arab personality
capable of expressing the hopes and ambitions of the Arab masses, he was almost
'Idolated In the region'.82 His political tactics during the Suez Crisis, his arms
deal with Czechoslovakia and his political victory In the Anglo-french-Israeli
1956 milItary Intervention made him the epitome of all the Arabs. In a word, he
became almost a 'saviour' of the entire region.83 At this point In time, the
entire environment became highly charged with the feelings of Arab Nationalism.
Yatikiotis describes the atmosphere:
Exactly by 1958, a radical change was sweeping the
area as every Arab revolutionary leader saw himself
as a Nasserite Irrespective of his willingness to
relinquish his sovereign status In favour of CgypUea
domination.84
6iven this state of affairs In the region, It was natural, for Arab masses to look
up to Nasser for the fulfilment of their political aspirations, hence the Syrian's
overtures to the Egyptian leader. Late In 1957. there was much controversy and
political uncertainty in Damascus as not one single political party was able to
command a substantial majority. A problem of orientation reigned In the country.
The Syrian President, Al Kuwatly, was seeking closer ties with Saudi Arabia on
the one hand. On the other band, Leftists (Particularly the Ba'athist Party) were
cefling for Arab unity and socialism and were backed by the U.S.S.R. and the
Rightists (particularly the People's Party) were tilting towards unity with Iraq
end were backed by the West.
Anthony Nutting, NASSER. New York : Dutton, 1972. p.196.
63NutUng, NASSER. op.cIt.. p.198.
Mp J Vatikiotis, •The Foreign Policy •f Egypt. In R.C. Placridis (ed). FOREIGN
POLICY IN WORLD POLITICS. London : Prentice Hall Inc. 1962. p.336.
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By the nature of thinus. the Ba'athlsts were the ideal candidates for e p Droachlno -
and thereby putting pressure on - Nasser for en Immediate merger. They did and
were rebuffed many times by Nasser who judged the time was not right for an
Immediate merger. It is now known that their attempts to merge with Egypt began
In 1955. Yet. In February, 1958, some twenty high ranking Syrian Army
officers flew to Cairo - without governmental sanction - to tell the Egyptian
leader that merger was the only viable way to end the state of chaos end confusion
reigning in their country.85 Nasser reluctantly accepted but stipulated that the
Syrian Army be de-pollticized and that all political parties be banned. To
Nasser's satisfaction the Syrians agreed. Hence the birth of the United Arab
Republic comprising Egypt and Syria and opening the door to any other Arab state
that wishes to join in the near future.
In sum, the external environment of the decision can be seen In terms of (a) the
psychological euphoria prevailing In the area and calling for Arab unity; (b) the
mounting pressure emanating from the West on both Egypt and Syria; and (c) the
existence of Israel. The external environment was indeed conducive to the
conclusion of the merger.
4.14.3 THE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
Each of the two countries had Its own circumstances which constituted the
Internal environment conducive to the merger. The Syrian political situation
earlier has been examined. A look at the Internal Egyptian situation before the
merger merits mention. As Helkal In his weekly editorial of AL AHRAtI once
wrote: •Egypt benefits from its foreign policy rather than being burdened with
It. 86 This utilitarian principle Is applicable to Egyptian foreign policy In the
Arab world. Nasser did not always act out of ideological considerations alone. It
Is true that his beliefs played a role but it Is equally true that 'rational' leaders
PatrIck Scale. THE STRUGGLE FOR SYRIA. Baltimore : John Hopkins Press. 1944.
pp.94-103.
06 A1 ANRAM, Dec.31. 1965, P.1.
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always calculate the benefits and In the case of Nasser such calculation was
always subservient to his beliefs. The case of the merger with Syria Is a good
example. Nasser came to believe that In order for him to achieve his goals of
independence, development and Arab Unity - end above all to stay in power -
adequate funds for social and economic development must be available. Voluntary
domestic and foreign Investment was very slim end could not be relied upon.87
Foreign grants were, therefore, required. Nasser's active Arab policy precluded
the possibility of receiving any funds from the West. Thus, the Internal situation
was conducive to an active Nasserite Arab policy. However, the utilitarian
economic factor should be discounted in the case of the Syrian merger. Syria had
very few material assets to offer Egypt. What was the key reason that macSe
Nasser reverse himself and agree to unite with the Syrians? The answer lies
partly In Nasser's PAU.
4.14.4 NASSER'S PAU
Two aspects of Nasser's PAU were salient during this episode. First, there was
his unshakeable belief that Egypt is, first and foremost an Arab nation: PAU-A.
And, secondly, there was his belief that gradua tunct'son 	 tatSvr '* V
only viable way to achieve Arab Unity: PAU-VI. On February 3, 1958, Nasser
stated that:
the Arabs enjoy basic harmony of interests which
clearly manifested In the unity of the language,
culture and hlstory....They also enjoy a basic harmony
of mind and consciousness which transcends and
supercedes all other differences and divisions.88
As to his PAU-A, In a newspaper Interview In March 1957, Nasser confirmed
57AmIn has shown that less Investment was att.racLed during the years 1952-1954
than during the years 1949-1951. See Amin 6alal. The Egyptian Economy and the
Revolutlon In P.J. Vatikiotis, (ed.), E6YPT SINCE THE REVOLUTION. London : George
Allen & Unwin, 1968, p.45.
88Nasser, AL AHRAPI, p.1-2.
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that:
I em not thinking in terms of any federation or
confederation for the present...l should prefer
organizations like the Arab League, for Instance, to
became strong and formidable links between Arab
states.89
And when the Syrian officers flew to Cairo to press for unity, he told them:
We should wait for five years. We should first try an
economic union, a military union and a cultural union.
Then we can head towards the constitutional union.90
4.14.4 ALTERNATIVE POLICY CHOICES
When Nasser was presented with the Syrian offer to merge, he was In fact faced
with three alternatives; to accept, postpone or reject the Syrian offer. Since
delaying the decision would have been taI)fb7)DUflt it) b rejection of the Syrian
oiler, Nasser's choices were In fact reduced to two: to accept or to reject as
represented below:




Nasser opted to accept the merger despite his reluctance because It was quite In
harmony with his PAU-AC. Rejecting the offer would have been Inconsistent wiTh
Nasser's beliefs and perceptions. Therefore, this option was discarded. Thus, the
decision to merge with Syria correlates with Nasser's PAU. Of course there were
other reasons behind Nasser's decisions, such as economic end political gains and
strategic depth which are vital to Egypt's own security.




Arab States and the Shlekdoms which remained In the hands of conservative elites
end (as well as Jordan. Lebanon end Iraq) were more determined than ever to
preserve their sovereignty end resources. In an almost Immediate defensive
response, Iraq and Jordan Joined to form the Arab Federated Union. Soon after
that, Yemen came out of Its self-imposed Isolation to Join the U.A.R.
The formation of the U.A.R. lad to an Intensification In Pan-Arab activities. It
proved, however, to be a catalyst In the configuration of power and forces In the
area. On the one hand, conservative Arab regimes, fearing Nasser and Nesserism,
started to rally themselves In a serIes of defensive unions and treaties In order to
preserve their own sovereignties. They, however, continued to pay lip service to
the concept of Pan-Arabism. On the other hand, a series of agreements between
the revolutionary regimes took place but, even here, Arab Unity remained more of
a dream than reality.
As for the Arab Federated Union. the U.A.R. spared no effort to attack It and label
It as the 'product of imperialistic stooges.' When the referendum was held In Iraq
and Jordan to confirm the Union, Nasser, Via Radio Cairo, Instigated the Jordanian
and Iraqi populace to boycott the voting. Nasser's propaganda campaign against
the union was so powerful that most of the voters stayed home and boycotted the
ballots. On the other side of the equation, the Incorporation of the Yemen into the
liAR, was In harmony with the constitution which stressed that all Arab states
may Join. Besides, the Yemen could be a strategic spot for exporting the Arab
nationalist Ideology Into adjacent Saudi Arabia. The Involvement with Yemen later
proved to be Nasser's 'Vietnam.'
The secession of 1961 was a fatal blow to Arab Unity, but it did not mark the end
of Pan-Arab endeavours, for Nasser refused to view the collapse of the union as a
failure of Arab Nationalism. Thus, while one may be willing to agree to Nutting's
argument that Nasser feared that if he did not accept the repeated advances of the
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Syrlens for unity with Egypt. Syria might have fallen In the hands of the Iraqis
or the Saudis, one adds a qualifier to It. Nasser's PAU played a role In the Syrian
merger.91 It then becomes apparent that Nasser had a regional (I.e. Arab)
policy of his own and that his Arab policy did Indeed originate primarily for his
own beliefs as well as from his perception of the situation end his PAU.
91 NutLIng NASSER. •p.clt., p.211.
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Watani Vs. Qewml Terms In Nasser's Vocabulary
Watani (local)	 Oawmi (Arab National)




THE CHARISMATIC RESPONSE AND LEADERSHIP EFFECT OF
6AMAL ABDEL NASSER
CHAPTER FIVE
NASSER'S IMPACT ON THE ARABS: THE CASE OF THE 1967 WAR1
The men is at once feline and massive. His square
build speaks of a peasant ancestry, the long
remembrance of stubborn, fleshy gestures, the
recompense of a heavy, miserable diet over many
generations. But this son of the Middle Valley also
carries Arab descent in his blood: a Bedouin strain hod
pursued for several centuries in Bani Murr District
the synthesis of Ishmoel and Pharaoh. Perhaps this
gives his physique that deliberate alertness, his face
that sharp breadth, his eyes that brooding nostalgia
behind their hard, almost green, gaze. The Arab has
risen ponderously, one might say, from his long
submergence in the soil of Egypt.2
5.1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
The objective of Chapter Five is to provide an Inquiry into the impact of Carnal
Abdel Nasser on the Arab world during his leadership. A case study, which is the
focus of the thesis, makes special reference to the events leading up to the 1967
War, the defeat of the Arab armies by Israel, Nasser's resignation and his
subsequent reinstatement to the presidency.3 The questions addressed are
basically: What were the events that led up to the June 1967 War? What of the
defeat? What were the presumed reasons for Nasser's resignation? And, what
were the supposed reasons for his reinstatement?
'For an Arab perspective of the 1967 War see ibrahim Abu-Lughod, (ed.) THE ARAB
ISRAELI CONFRONTATION OF JUNE. 1967 An Arab Perspective, Evanston, Illinois
Northwestern University Press 1 1970. For an Israeli view of the conflict and the War,
see Abba Eban, MY COUNTRY. London : Clarendon Press. 1971 and THE VOICE OF
ISRAEL. New York Albany. New York Press, 1973. For a Western perspective see
Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, THE SIX DAY WAR. London : Heinemann,
1967; Walter Liqueur, THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM. New York : Macmillan. 1966.
2Jacques Berque. CULTURAL EXPRESSION IN ARAB SOCIETY TODAY. Trans. Robert W.
Stookey, Austin. Texas The University of Texas Press. 1978. pp.15-16.
3The objectives of this case study is to attempt and specify the trend of events In
May and June 1967 and to examine the response of the Egyptian and Arab masses in the
artermath of the June 1967 defeat. In other words, one aims to make an objective and
qualitative assessment of the charismatic component of Nassers leadership that
enabled him to retain office.
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5.2 METHODOLOGY
An inquiry into the role of personalities in politics necessarily raises questions
of scope and method. For Instance, can one consider political leaders as 'authors'
of political movements or merely as 'instruments' who somehow appear on the
political scene to achieve social demands? 4 Considerable disagreement
surrounds this question among writers: at one end of the spectrum are those who
endorse the 'great man' theory (Carlyle's hero), and at the other end are those
who consider leaders as mere 'puppets' (Herbert Spencer) who derive their
power from a public desirous of changing social conditions. 5 II either of these
views is regarded as valid, the outstanding interest would be the motivations of
the leader6 : whether he was motivated by sheer political ambition or by a set
of ideas and ideals (ultimate goals). 7 Even if it was assumed, for the sake of
analysis, that political ambition dominates the minds of most leaders, for such
ambition to be pursued, It would appear necessary for the leader to be Identified
with some overriding goals in order to justify publicly his political
involvement.6
Apart from goals and methods, the role of personalities may be examined from
another perspective. For example, one should examine who the leaders are. Do
they come from a privileged small group within society, or are they the
acknowledged leaders of a much larger circle of people, among whom there may be
4tlorroe Berger, Social and Political Change in the Moslem-Arab, WORLD POLITICS.
X, July, 1950. p.342.
5Peter Amann, Revolution : A Redefinition, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY,
LXXVII, March. 1962.
66ordon W. Aliport. Motivation in Personality : Reply to Mr. Bertocci,
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XLVII. November, 1940. p.162.
7For an interesting comment on the correlation between Ideas and reality, consider
Fouad AjamIs The End of Pan-Arabism, in FOREI6N AFFAIRS. WInter 1976/1979,
pp.355-373, PolltIcal Ideas make their own realities. Often In defiance of logic, they
hold men and are In turn held by them, creating a world In their own Image, only to
play themselves out In the end, shackled by routine problems not foreseen by those
who spun the myth, or living past their prime and ceasing to move people sufficiently.
Or, political ideas torn to ashes and leave behind them a trail of errors, suffering and
devastatlon. p.355.
8Ann Gifford adopts this position in examining charismatic appea'. See An
Application of Weber's Concept of Charisma,, BERKELEY PUBLICATION IN SOCIETY AND
INSTITUTIONS, 1, Spring. 1955. pp.40-49.
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others who fill important political roles? Here, again, there Is considerable
disagreement among writers.9 Some contend, for example, that in the less
advanced societies, It Is the paramount leader who is most likely to ploy a
decisive role in politics; 10 others maintain that It is not so much the qualities
of the individual leader as It is the political system which determines who the
leader will be and the nature of his political role. 1 For example, in a
democracy, a political leader may be a spokesman either for the group In power,
or for any one of a number of groups contesting for power; In authoritarian
systems, political power and political leadership are the monopoly of the few at
the top.'2
If one assumes that the most decisive political roles are performed by the few at
the top, the question arises whether It Is better to study them collectively or
separately, assuming in the latter case that each leader has his own goals and
methods. 13 The former oproac(, wM	 s cçt(c	 etzçc( &
behavioural sciences, seems to presuppose that leaders ordinarily react similarly
to stimuli and in accordance with a recognizable pattern of political behaviour. If
this were to be the approach, the function of the investigator would be to study
the outward conduct of the political leaders of a given society and to formulate
from their conduct a generalized behaviour pattern of leadership in that society.
While this method might well prove illuminating, It tends to ignore other
variables, such as social morality and cultural values, which In certain societies,
9For a good discussion of these conflicting positions refer to Richard Neustadt,
PRESIDENTIAL POWER : The Politics of Leadership, New York John Wiley & Sons.
1960.
10 This position Is advocated by Ruth Gunther. Personal Rulership, Pat.rimolism, and
Empire-Building in the New States, WORLD POLITICS. 20. Jan, 1968. p.196.
11 This argument can be found In Orrin E. Klapps, SYMBOLIC LEADERS. Chicago : Aldine
Press, 1964.
' 2Karl W. Deutsch, POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT : How People Decide Their Fate,
Boston, Mass: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970. p.28.
13Robert C. Tucker In Thc Theory of Charismatic Leadershlp, DAEDALUS. 97.
Summer. 1908. p.754, discusses the virtues of both approaches coming to the
conclusions that each single leader is unique and thence generaliiations can only be
issue specific and not across the board. For a criticism of Tuckers position, see
Stanley Stark, Toward a Psychology of Charisma : The Innovation Viewpoint of Robert
Tucker, PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORT. 23. 1968, pp.1 163-1166.
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govern the minds and actions of leaders to a larger extent than In others.14
In this Chapter, which seeks to Investigate the role and impact of Gamal Abdel
Nasser on the Arab World, one's approach will be to describe and analyze the
Individual skills and the general level of sophistication of a leader who, In the
eyes of many observers, played a significant role In the Arab world. In addition,
one is to determine the relevance of Nasser's values and goals to the conditions
existing In the Arab countries. 15 While particular attention will be given to
these variables, the general patterns of political behaviour will not be ignored,
since they are likely to sharpen ones insight Into the leadership role that Gamal
Abdel Nasser played. This method may strike the reader as idealistic, since It
seeks to explore the relationship of such intangible variables as values, skills,
and sophistication to the role of charismatic leadership in politics. However,
these variables will not be studied in the abstract but rather in relation to the
particular event in which Nasser was involved, namely the June 1967 War and
its aftermath - a viable test of political charisma. Consequently, ones method
might well be what Eulau called 'empirical idealism', since it views ideas and
ideals not as abstract principles but as guidelines for political action, and
because it endeavours to investigate the extent to which such guidelines have
relevance to reality.16
t46abriel A. Almond. Democracy and the New Nationf. STANFORD TODAY. IV.
Autumn, 1964.
15 Manfred lialpern, THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA, Princeton Princeton University Press, 1963.
' 6For more elaboration on this point see Heinz Eulau, et ii., POLITICAL BEHAVIOR.
Glencoe, Illinois : The Free Press. 1956. pp.76-92.
310
5.3 NASSER : THE POLITICAL LEADER17
Gamal Abdel Nasser once stated that he was a revolutionary and not a politician.
He wrote:
Every people on earth goes through two revolutions: a
political revolution by which It wrests the right to
govern itself from the hand of tyranny, or from the
army stationed upon Its soil against its will; and a
social revolution, Involving the conflict of classes
which settles down when justice is secured for the
citizens of the united nation.15
In analyzing the political history of post-1952 Egypt, tiaxime Rodinson concludes
that the two main goals of Nasserism were national independence and
modernization. 19 Among the important political achievements of Nasser's
revolution were (1) the expulsion of foreign influence, and (2) the strengthening
of the pride and dignity of the Egyptian people. 20 The successes and failures of
Nasser's political programmes rested to a great degree upon his ability to guide
Egypt through the stormy seas of international politics. It was In this broader
area that the Egyptian president expended most of his political energy, and It was
here that he witnessed his greatest triumphs and his greatest defeats. His tenure
as leader of Egypt was clouded by deep problems directly associated with the
Arab-Israeli confrontation, the American-Soviet cold war, the general drive for
Arab unity, and the differing Arab stances concerning the entire Issue of social
and political change. Events such as the Czech Arms deal, the destruction of the
Baghdad Pact, The Nationalization of the Suez Canal, Egypt's liberation from
France and Britain, and the failure of the Eisenhower Doctrine to constrain
Nasser brought together the masses of Egyptians and Arabs behind Nasser, who had
proved to them that Egypt was an Independent nation whose dignity could no longer
li lt is recognized that to the Egyptian audience, Nasser was first and foremost their
head of state. However, to the majority of the Arabs, Nasser stood for the realization
of the Pan-Arab vision. A distinction in types of audiences is worth noting. Jean and
Simmone Lacouture, E6YPT IN TRANSITION. London : Methuen, 1979, p.33.
186ama1 Abdel Nasser, E6YPTS LIBERATION : The Philosophy of the Revolution,
Washington, D.C. : Public Affairs Press, 1955. pp.39-40.
19See Maxime Rodinson, The Political System in EGYPT SINCE THE REVOLUTION, ed.
by P.J. Vatikiotis, Hew York : Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, pp.57-113.
20 lnterview with Sir Anthony Nutting, November. 1985, London.
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be trampled upon.2 ' The significance of the Suez crisis reached far beyond the
event Itself, causing a revolutionary transformation of the technocratic,
reformist government. 22 It was a charlsmatic sltuatioir23 that helped
invest Nasser with extraordinary powers as a political leader.
These early successes were of sufficient magnitude to enable both Nasser and
Egypt to ride out later disasters. The most serious of these was the June War of
1967, in which Israel (in an impressive and swift military campaign) left Egypt
battered and demoralized. Nasser, who must bear much of the blame for
occasioning the conflict, resigned his position, to be called back only hours later
by the Egyptian people, who seemingly genuinely wanted and demanded his
leadership24 (to be examined in detail later on in this Chpter). It Is 1Drgely
held that Nasser's reinstatement was the product of a popular mandate. And, it is
in this spirit that Nasser began to describe the 1 967 defeat as a 'setback'. Using
the example ol Churchill after Dunkirk, Nasser was to claim that Egypt had lost
not a war but a battle. However, the existence of Israel haunted Nasser's rule,
and he was never able to confront this situation with the same style and success
with which he addressed other thorny problems.25
2lj.p Entails, 'Nationalism, Nasserism and the Arab World : Contemporary Arab
Nationalism under Nasser and Its Effect on EgypLs Approach Loward Inter-Arab
Affairs', ARAB JOURNALS. IV, No.1, 1966-67. pp.35-42.
22Jean Lacouture, THE DEMI6ODS : Charismatic Leadership in the Third World, Trans.
by Patricia Wolf, New York Alfred A. Knopf, 1970. p.110.
23lbid p.110.
24Sir Anthony Nutting In an interview with the author, November, 1958, London. Dr.
Henry Kissinger was later to write with professional puzzlement about Nassers
attitude after the June defeat. ...Nasser insisted on israel's unconditional withdrawal
from all the occupied territories, but he never explained what Incentive israel had for
withdrawal in the face of his ambiguous non-belligerency...Nasser counted on us to
extricate himself from the consequences of his recklessness in 1967. But he was
unwilling to relinquish his role as champion of radical Arab Nationalism which forced
him into a strident anti-American posture on almost all International Issues'. Henry
Kissinger. THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS, London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael
Joseph, 1979. p.312.
25Charles Douglas. THE ARABS AND ISRAEL. London : Beadley Head. 1965. pp.52-54.
Israeli politicians and leaders saw Nasser as one of their greatest enemies. At the
onset of the 1956 War, Ben Gurion, Israeis first Prime Minister Is quoted as saying:
6amai Abdel Nasser is the enemy number one of Israel who...has sullied Israel's name
in the entire world by defining it as the spearhead of international imperialism in the
region
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Oomal Abdel Nasser's leadership broke with many of the patterns of traditional
patrimonial rule. Although strongly authoritarian, Nasser's techniques did not
include the promotion of self-deification. 26 1ho RAIS always thought that if a
leader portrayed himself a some sort of a god, the populace would leer rather than
respect hlm.27 It Is true that his Image was protected and polished by his
governmental and security forces, but he resisted pressures to Invest huge
resources In the glorification of his person. 28 Hasser's entourage and the
public to a certain extent noted his simplicity in dress and to his last days,
'maintained class loyolty'. 29 There were no statues of Nasser, for example,
dotting the Egyptian landscape. Nor did his face adorn postage stamps and
currency.3° The Egyptian President consciously sought to transcend the
temptation to permit and promote personal exaltation and hero worship.31 One
keen Western observer of Egyptian affairs wrote that nothing irritates Nasser
more than being treated like a modern Phnrooh.32
It may be said that a truly charismatic personality need not build monuments to
himself and myths for his people. The leader's charisma is based on his
extraordinary actions. In Nasser's case, the leader also eschewed any special
connection with the Divine, whether it be in terms of common ancestry or private
visions.33 The secular nature of Nasser's reforms and political programmes
put him in certain ways on the same footage with Kemal Atuturk.34 Although he
never attacked the Islamic clerics in Egypt, at the same time he did not attempt to
build any particular intimate political relations with them.35 The fact that
AlI Sabri, reply to questionnaire, July. 1989, Cairo.
ibid.
lbld.
Tawfiq Al Ilakim, THE RETURN OF CONSCIOUSNESS. Translated by Bayly Winder.
London : The MacMillan Press, 1955. p.58.
31 Mohammed Hassanejn Heikal, Political Documentary on British Television, Channel
Four Programme, NASSER. 14th November1956. Recorded footage.
32Jean Lacouture. NASSER : A Political Biography, London Constable. 1973. p.213.
ln an interview with Fathy ci Goully, January 1989. London.
IbId.
For an investigation of Nasser's relationship to Islam, see Josef Muzikar, Arab
Nationalism and IsIam, ARCHIV ORIENTALI, 43, 1975, pp .193-323. In an interview,
Fouad Ajami, May 28th, 1989, New York, contends that Islam did not have a significant
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Nasser's leadership is traceable neither to manufactured mythology nor to
religious connections Indicates how divorced his leadership was from the
traditional mold. 36 The Islamic religion did not have a significant influence on
Nasser's diplomacy or foreign pollcy. 37 It Is precisely this kind of charisma
that Invested Nasser with the special strength necessary to maintain power and to
promote deep change In the face of formidable problems, both Internal and
external 38
5.4 NASSER IN THE EYES OF THE OBSERVER: A Recapitulation
Gamal Abdel Nasser appeared to Western writers as the Arab leader whose
ambition conflicted with essential Western interests; therefore his policies and
methods were looked upon by the West with suspicion and dislavour. 39 He was
not unaware of misrepresentations, but he took no serious steps to correct them.
Some of his actions and angry public statements40 weighed against him and led
influence on Nassers diplomacy or foreign policy. A reply In effect refuting P4.
Vatikiotis essay. 'Islam and the Foreign Policy', in Pit. Holt (ed.) ISLAM AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. London : School of Oriental and African Studies. 1965.
pp.120-137.
Dunkwart Rustow, reply to questionnaire, New York. April. 1989.
37Ibid.
3 For elaboration on this see Morroe Berger, THE ARAB WORLD TODAY. 6arden City.
N.Y. : Doubleday & Co.. 1962. p.78. And, in his monograph, MILITARY ELITE AND
SOCIAL CHANGE Egypt since Napoleon, Research Monograph. No.6. Princeton. N.J.:
Princeton University Center for International Studies. Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, 1960.
39Consider Robert Stephens statement on how the Western World viewed Nasser:
Nasser left his mark on nearly twenty years of Egyptian. Arab and world history. An
anti-colonist who extended his concern to the newly liberated countries of the Third
World, he has been acclaimed as a nationalist liberator - and condemned as a
warmonger'. See 'Nasser: A Reassessment'. ARAB PAPERS. No.8. Arab Research
Center, London. p.9. For an Interesting account of how the Western World generally
views the Arabs and their political thoughts, see Michael Adams, Good and Bad
Arabs'. MIDDLE EAST FORUM. XXXIV. January. 1959. pp.13-15.
40For an example of one of the harsh public statements made by Nasser to President
Johnson, on the subject of food aid, Nasser was reported to have said: 'The American
Ambassador says that our behavior is not acceptable. Well, let us tell them that those
who do not accept our behavior can go and drink from the sea....We will cut the tongues
of anybody who talk badly about us....We dont mind troubles. But we are not going to
accept pressure. We are not going to accept gangsterism by cowboys'. Quoted In
William J. Burns, ECONOMIC AID AND AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD EGYPT 1955-1981,
Albany : State University of New York Press, 1985. pp.159-160.
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many Westerners to confuse his goals with his rhetorical statements. 41 Thence.
an examination of his goals is vital in order to delineate his leadership role.
Nasser possessed a practical turn of mind and tried to solve problems by tackling
them one after the other in order of their urgency. 42 Yet he felt he was
committed to certain national goals which were considered almost sacrosanct and
therefore not subject to compromises. 43 As a native Egyptian who grew up In a
social environment sensitive to deprivation, Nasser sought to voice his
countrymen's grievances against social letters 44 on the one hand, and to seek
national freedom from foreign rule on the other. 45 Influenced by emotional as
well as socioeconomic forces, Nasser may well be regarded as essentially
belonging to what one might stipulate as an 'ideological' 46 rather than to a
'realistic'47 school of leaders. Yet it would be wrong to depict him as merely a
doctrinaire unwilling to modify his actions in the light of experience. 48 After
he seized power by force, he tried to achieve his objectives by peaceful and
practical methods,49 or as he said, by trial and error.50 What were those
41 Mohammed Naguib. KUNTU RAISAN LI MISR (In Arabic). Cairo Al Maktab al Plasri
al Hadith. 1981. p.33.
Abdel Latif Al Boghdadi, MEMOIRS. (In Arabic) Vol.2. Cairo : Al Maktab al Masri ii
Hadith, p.3 10.
43 6ama1 Abdel Nasser, Where I Stand and Why, LIFE. XLVII. No.3, July 20. 1959.
pp.96-i 10. Compare with Wilton Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT The Search for Dignity.
Cambridge. Mass Arlington Books. 1959, p.121.
AI Boghdadi. MEMOIRS. op.cit.. p.312.
Nasser, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION. o p .cit. pp.32-38.
The criteria used here to denote an ideological leadership Is where leaders regard
goals as overriding. They are also prepared to use revolutionary means to achieve
their goals. The fact that the regimes established by revolutions often fail to pursue
their declared goals Is often overlooked, though such leaders frequently continue to
assert that their goals will be achieved ultimately. Such leaders are usually the
spokesmen for a particular ideology: in Nassers case Pan Arabism and Arab
Nationalism.
47 A realistic leadership is used here to denote leaders who occupy an intermediate
positlon In that they realize that the goals they pursue, while embodying their
countrymens hopes and expectations, must be modified by reality if they are ever to
be realized. Men in this group are usually prepared to limit themselves to goals that
they believe can be achieved, and to disregard or to modify others. In short, they are
leaders who are prepared to subordinate Ideals to realities. These leaders often seem
to possess greater flexibility and, therefore, a greater capacity for political survival
than those who are less Inclined to compromise with realIty.
48 Al Boghdadi, MEMOIRS. op.cit., p.313.
49 Naguib, KUNTU RAISAN LI MISR. o p .cIL pp.143-144.
5014asser, TIlE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION, op.cit., p.28.
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'objectives or ultimate goals?
First and foremost was the achievement of Egypt's full Independence, which meant
In practice the elimination of all encroachments on the country's sovereignty.
whether resulting from military occupation, treaty stipulations, or political
pressures. Nasser also sought to Insure Egypt's national security from foreign
dangers. The Insistence that Egyptians should be free to manage their own affairs
was the product of a strong and compelling emotional force and not merely the
cherished desire of Intellectuals.51
As on ideological objective, Nasser was demanding recognition not only of Egypt's
own sovereign rights and of other dependent countries that desired full
independence, especially the Arab countries that had not yet achieved any form of
Independence, but also the countries and peoples of Africa and Asia who were still
struggling to achieve freedom from colonial rule. 52 In the pursuit of ideological
goals, Nasser went so far as to antagonize some Western powers - France and
Britain in particular - by extending help to some countries struggling for
independence; but he was not prepared to go to war with them unless they
deliberately sought to encroach on his country. In the Summer of 1967, Nasser
felt that deliberate encroachment on Syria and Jordan was, rightly or wrongly,
instigated by Israel with the blessing of the United States. 53 And Nasser. in
51 Gamai Abdel Nasser, The Egyptian Revolution, FOREIGN AFFAIRS. XXXIU. No.2.
January. 1955. pp.199-211.
52Nasser, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION. op.cit., p.56.
One must remember that Nasser officially accused the United States of
participating in the destruction of the Egyptian air fields during the Six Day War. See
AL AHRAM. June 10. 1967. Moreover, during the October 1973 War, the Egyptian
Press reminded the Egyptian public again that the U.S. government and Israel had
worked actively to remove Nasser from the scene in 1967. See AKHBAR EL YOM.
October 11. 1973. Peter Mansfield In THE ARABS postulated that Neither Nasser nor
king Hussein were able to sustain the charge of direct Anglo-US military intervention
and soon abandoned it. Yet the vaguer, but scarcely less damaging, accusation of
collusion remained and was accepted by most of the Arabs. One reason was the simple
fact that there had been collusion in 1956, which Britain had still not admitted.
Another was the subsequent failure of Britain and the US, especially the latter, in the
United Nations and elsewhere in the international field. The US government gave the
impression of being unwilling to do anything that might offend the Israeli state. If in
1967 the US government had done no more than give the green light to the Israelis to
go it alone, with a promise to intervene if things went badly for them, did this not
amount to collusion? London : Pelican Books, 1985, p.284.
316
turn, had to resort to some sort of action if he was to maintain his leadership role
in the Arab world. However, to explain the breakout of the June 1967 hostilities
and their aftermath, It Is imperative to examine the events that preceded It.
5.5 PRELUDE TO THE JUNE 1967 WAR : A Conventional View54
Ever since the days of the Suez War, Nasser's policy towards Israel could be
regarded as being very conservative.55 Nasser was concentrating on Egyptian
domestic change and on developments within the Arab states together with the rest
of the Third World. Israel's Minister of Labour, Yigal Allon, was quoted as
stating that:
While Egypt contributes most of the money for
Shukairys Organization (The Palestinian Liberation
Army) and permits him to recruit his membership in
the Gaza strip and to have his main offices in Egypt
itself, It has not permitted any hostile activities
across the 6aza border Into Israel since the Sinai
campaign.56
Thus, out of the 121 IncIdents of 'sabotage' by Arab countries against Israel
54A •deflnitive analysis of the immediate causes of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War can
only be made possible if hitherto secret documents are published. Too many
unanswered questions lie in the way of the researchers inquiry into the roles and
intentions of the two superpowers as well as the combatants themselves. However,
one visible factor that had a direct bearing on the conflict were the activities of the
Palestinian Fedayyin groups. Prof. Ali Hillal Dessouki, in an interview with the
writer, contends that one of the primary catalysts of the Six Day War were the
Palestinian Fedayyin units operating against Israel. He recalls that the guerilla
activities of the displaced Palestinians had played a similar role with respect to the
1956 war. However 1 this should not be taken as a single factor explanation given that
a multitude of other factors were also at work in both wars. London. June, 1985.
In his attempts to make peace with Israel, Nassers Ideological aim bad always been
the restoration of Palestinian territorial rights. A full analysis of these attempts are
discussed In Elmore Jackson, MIDDLE EAST MISSION : The Story of the Major Bid for
Peace in the Time of Nasser and Ben 6urlon, London : W.W. Norton, 1983; See David
Ben-Gun on, MY TALKS WITH ARAB LEADERS, Translated from the Hebrew by Angela
Rubinstein and flisha Luvish, New York : Third Press, 1975. p .145. Also, Saadia
Touval, THE PEACE BROKERS: Mediators in the Arab Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979,
Princeton : Princeton University Press. 1952. PP.134-164.
56QuoLed In Michael E. Fander, 'Commentary Dr. Ralph Bunche, Mythical Knight in
Jerusalem', MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XIII, No.1, Winter, 1966. pp.56-70.
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between January 3, 1965 and June 3, 1 967, only five were attributod to Egypt as
compared to 63 for Jordan and 34 for Syria. There was not a single Incident of
'sabotage' from the Egyptian border between February 1965 and May 27, 1967, a
few days before the War, when an Israeli halftruck was damaged by a mine In the
Kerim Shalom area.57 The Palestinians, Syrians and Jordanians put great
pressure on Egypt during this period to permit Fedayyin type raids, but Nasser
steadfastly refused.56
On the Israeli side, prospects for peace were much better since the pre-Suez
period. This time, Levi Eshkol, a moderate remained In power and was not deposed
by a Hard-Liner, In the fashion Ben Gurion deposed Moshe Sharett in the pre
1956 era.59 With Abba [ban's appointment as Foreign Minister, Eshkol
Initiated a more independent foreign policy, less reliant on the United States and,
pursued a policy of ending the restriction on the Israeli Arab population . In
addition, the majority of Israelis, including most of the 'herds', desired a period
of 'no-war' with the Arab states. There was, by all account, a widespread and
almost paralyzing fear in Israel at the prospects of another war. Israel, despite
American support, felt more isolated than before, and the massive Arab
armaments made even a victory look very costly.61
If it is true, for argument's sake, that neither the Israelis nor the Egyptians
wanted war, how did it come to pass? One contributory reason is certainly
superpower rivalry In the Middle East between the Soviet Union and the U.S.62
57See Robert Burrowes and Douglas Muzzles, The Road to the Six Day War Aspects
of an Enumerative History of Four Arab SLates and Israel 1965-196T, JOURNAL OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION. Vol.16, No.2, 1972. pp.211-226.
Anthony Nutting, NASSER. London : Constable, 1972, p.263.
595ee Moshe Sharett, MAKING OF POLICY : The Diaries of Moshe Sharett, Tel Aviv
Am Oved Publishers, 1968.
60Eban, MY COUNTRY. op.cit., p.155.
61 See Nadav Safran, FROM WAR TO WAR The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1948-1967,
New York : Pegasus, 1969. pp.212-221. For details of the arms purchases by the
local actors see THE NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE issues March 2 1st, 27th and 29th,
1967. Also In THE WASHINGTON POST. April 1st, 2nd. and 6th. 1967; THE LONDON
TIMES. May 12th, 13th. and 18th, 1967.
62Jacob Coleman Hurewitz, SOVIET-AMERICAN RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. New
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It had Its own momentum, Independent of the locals, and led during the period
immethately preceding the war to a spiraling arms race.63
Local Inter-Arab political tensions also played a major role. The leftist Ba'ath
regime took a militant rhetorical position in favour of en all-out guerille war
against Israel, based on what It claimed was the Vietnamese model. 64 The
Ba'athists were to blame the Egyptians for the lack of momentum between this
drive, and accused the Egyptians of peaceful coexistence with Israel. 65 It is
true that the Ahmed Shukairy led Liberation Front which the Egyptians funded was
restricted by the government to frantic radio broadcasts. 66 The raids
themselves were conducted by Yasser Arafat's AL FATAH movement which the
Syrians controlled.67
The Soviet Union was forced to support the Syrians, even though they were
pursuing what the Russians elsewhere would have considered a policy of
adventurism. The 5mb-Soviet dispute had boxed the Soviets In. 68 They were
under pressure to demonstrate their revolutionary sincerity and the Syrians
played on this. In addition, the Soviets had been continuously kept off balance by
Nasser's Independent and unpredictable style, and preferred the politics of the
Syrian Ba'athists who had at least a revolutionary vocabulary and a doctrinaire
York : Praeger, 1969, p.201.
Hisham Sharabi, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL : The Lethal Dilemma. New York : Pegasus.
1969. p.141. Burrowes and Muzzles express a similar position: Conceivably a fine
grained analysis of the three week escalation to war could meaningfully be limited to
local actors. However, any attempt to relate what happened after May 14 to the
events of early 1967. late 1966, or earlier will have to look beyond the Arab-Israeli
dyad. The basis of a plausible explanation does not seem to be contained therein.
The Road to the Six day War:..., op.clL, pp.224-225.
Walter Z. Laqueur, THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM : The Origins of the Arab-Israeli
Conflict. 1967, New York : The Macmillan Co.. 1968.
Safran, FROM WAR TO WAR. op.cit.. p.289. Malcolm H. Kerr. THE ARAB COLD WAR
Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Rivals. 1958-1970. 3rd Edition. London : Heinemann,
1987, p.127.
BBC 5WB12473/AI 1-20.
67 Sharabi, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL : The Lethal Dilemna. op.cit., p.162.
The Sino-Soviet split made It clear to Nasser that he could no longer use West
against East since the East no longer represented a bloc. Nassers Cold War card which
he had so successfully used In previous years was thus weakening.
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party.69 Nasser's non-alignment distressed the Russians who then welcomed the
existence of a regime to the 'left' of him in the Middle East. The frequent use of
the words 'Imperialists' and 'Zionist' by the Syrian regime may have impressed
the Soviets but, its crude anti-Zionism was little different from that of its
'reactionary' Arab neighbours.70
On Nasser's part, he had by the beginning of 1966, in political rhetoric, declared
war on the United States and Britain - a course which inexorably drove him
towards disaster, augmented by what Sir Anthony Nutting described as:
...e chain reaction of sickness and suspicion, over
reaction and misjudgement. Desperately striving to
retain the Initiative in the Middle East, he committed
Egypt to a series of adventures and undertakings far
beyond what her capacities could sustain, so that,
instead of moulding events to his design, he found
himself reacting ever more Impetuously to the actions
of others who, whether by their own or his choosing,
had become his enemies.71
Thus, what were those adventures and misperceptions that undermined Nasser's
often prudent and cautious outlook? One was the Yemen War. In his
determination to evict the British from Aden, Nasser reinforced his troops in
Yemen until a large proportion his army was engaged in Southern Arabia.72 And,
in attempting to thwart the Anglo-American conspiracies which he believed were
being hatched for him, Nasser proclaimed that the Egyptian army would remain in
the Yemen until the British were forced to leave the area. 73 Nasser, in effect
had assumed the 'defensive offensive' In his struggle to maintain the political
Initiative in the South Arabian peninsula. 74 Meanwhile, Radio Cairo.
characteristically continued to spread Invective on Imperialism and the CIA who
See Patrick Seale, ASAD : The Struggle for the Middle East, London : lB Taurus.
1989. pp.62-81.
70 Ibid., pp.90-91.
71 Anthony Nutting, NASSER : A Political Biography, London : Constable, 1971. p.383.
Mc6eorge Brudy, THE PATTERN OF RESPONSIBILITY. New York : Augustus M. Kelly.
1972. p.125.
73 1n an interview with Peter Mansfield, October, 1988, London; AL AHRAM, 15th flay
1964. THE TIMES. 23rd July. 1964
7.4 bid.
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were accused In the most vile terms of helping the Yemeni Royalists on behalf of
their British and Saudi allies.75
In order to understand the Yemeni War from the then Egyptian view, one has to
put It In the context of a supposedly American-Saudi Axis in the Middle East. This
Axis, according to Robert Stephens, aimed at toppling Nasser's regime, and
Implementing Eisenhower's political theory of filling the vacuum left by the
Anglo-French powers and transferring Arab Leadership to the House of Saud.76
It was against this background of regional and international events that the
Yemeni war broke out. The war in the Yemen baffled all parties concerned and
King Saud had to turn his attention from attacking Nasser in Cairo to facing the
danger on his borders instead.17
The 'revolution' In Yemen was by no means instigated by Nasser's Egypt and it is
difficult to estimate the Influence of Nasser's brand of Arab Nationalism on those
who aimed to abolish the parochial Immamate. whose leader, the Imam, made a
name for himself in brutally repressing any form of dissent. 78 When the
Yemeni 'revolution' finally succeeded and the Republic was proclaimed, Saudi
Arabia regarded the event as a direct threat to its own security and thus sought to
nip it In the bud. 79 The Yemeni Republic called on Egypt for help and, Nasser
responded - on the grounds of both Ideological commitment and self-interest.60
Thence, special Egyptian forces were sent to Yemen with the aim of bolstering the
Republic. Following this. Saudi and Jordanian support for the Royalist forces
steadily expanded making the Egyptian army increasingly beleaguered in a hostile
and unfamiliar environment.6'
75 MWDLE EAST FORUM, 21st September. Vol.17. No.46, 1966; BBC SWB
ME/3064/A/3.
76 1n an interview with the writer, November, 1986. London. A similar point of view
Is aired by Mohammed Auda In Nasser : The Revolution Continues, ARAB PAPERS.
No.8, Arab Research Center : August. 1981, p.28.
77Kerr, THE ARAB COLD WAR, op.cit., pp.89-94.
78Dana Adam Schmidt, YEMEN The Unknown War, London : Bodiey Head, 1968, p.89.
79SchmIdL, YEMEN :The Unknown War, op.cit.. pp.121-123.
80President Gamal Abdel Nassers SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, Cairo,
Information Bureau, VoL.5. 1964, p.531.
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In February 1966, the British Government Indicated that on reconsideration they
would not after all require a military base in Men after independence. Nasser
was suspicious of this end any proposals for ceasefire mediation in the Yemen
were one end all summarily rejected In Cairo. "In private he was reported to
hove sarcastically remarked that 'as the noose tightens around the beast, it
cultivates benevolence"'.62 Nasser, who obviously was asking too much, placed
on Egypt's dwindling resources extensive undertakings that could prove
economically unfeasible and politically severely constraining. Not withstanding
these commitments, Nasser was about to take upon himself the further, and, as it
was shortly to prove, fatal obligation to defend Syria against attack from any one
of her neighbouring states.83
This additional undertaking was moulded by events which had begun in June, 1965
when Ben Belle was overthrown In Algeria in a 'Palace coup" staged by Colonel
Houarl Boumedlene, the then Defence Minister. Nasser was reported to have seen
this event as one that could prove chaotic. Firstly, The suspected that the
Imperialist powers were behind this, since Algeria's uncompromising nationalism
had been a constant threat to their regional Interests."64 Secondly, any shift by
Algeria In inter-Arab relations would adversely change the balance of power in
the Arab World.85 So, when Boumedienne quickly aligned himself with his
Moroccan and Tunisian neighbours, both of whom were among Egypt's staunchest
opponents, Nasser began to woo the Hafiz regime in Syria with suggestion ol
support on the Palestine question. Eight months later, however, in February
81 Ahmad Kamal Al Turbji. THE ARAB ARMED FORCES IN YEMEN (in Arabic). Cairo : Al
Dir ii Qawmiyyah lii Nashr. 1966.
a2Sir Anthony Nutting, In an interview with the writer, November. 1988. London
Kerr, THE ARAB COLD WAR. op.ciL, p.101.
MAli Sabri, reply to questionnaire, July. 1989. Cairo.
85 Ibid. At this self-same Juncture, Cairo heard that Nkrumah had been overthrown.
To Nassers incurable suspicion, this development only served to reconfirm his theory
that the Imperialist powers were engaged In a major counter offensive to destabilize
progresslve' Third World countries. Thus, It was time to close ranks and sink
differences. No less worrying was the news that his best, If not only, friend Abdel
Salem Arif of Iraq had been killed In a helicopter crash near Basra. Added to all this.
lraqs stability was further threatened by a fresh outbreak of heavy fighting with the
fractious Kurds only a few days before Arifs untimely death. Richard Hofstander,
EGYPT AND NASSER : A Fact on File Publication Series. Vol. 2. U.S.A. : Fact on File.
mc, 1973, p.30 1
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1966, the Secretory-General of the Syrian Ba'ath Party. General Solah Jadid
staged another Coup in Damascus and Hurl el Din al Attassi was proclaimed
President of Syria. This change of leadership produced a more leitward trend In
Syria's foreign policy, which, from the point of Nasser's mixed fortunes, made It
crucial br egypt to •contror 5yrla vls-a-vls Israel anu the Palestine
question.86
As the new relationship between Syria and Egypt warmed, Nasser launched into a
series of violent denunciations of the pro-Western Arab rulers with whom, he
claimed, cooperation against israel had become futile and impossible.57
Contending that he had been deceived by their protestations of solidarity, he
declared that these 'reactionaries' had proved quite useless in the conflict with
the Israeli Invader and, in Nasser's words, hod shown that their hatred for Egypt
was greater than for tsrael. 88 He even indulged in the fanciful threat to wage a
preventive war or develop atomic weapons should Israel acquire such arms from
her Western backers.59
As Nasser's renewed assault on the 'reactionaries' gained momentum, 90 Egypt's
frontiers remained relatively secure, thanks to the protection of the IJNEF forces.
However, those of Israel's other Arab neighbours were not. On the contrary, they
were as vulnerable as ever to the Ben Gurion kind of reprisal' raids that
constituted the pillar of Israel's policy of 'swift retaliation'. 9 ' Nasser knew
well that Palestinian national ambitions could all too easily run away with them
and any fiery utterances or the smallest of Fedayyin raids could cause
SeaIe, ASAD The Struggle for the Middle East, op.cit.. pp .10 1. William B. Quandt,
THE POLITICS Of PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM. Santa Monica The Rand Corporation.
1971. p.139.
87 Kerr, THE ARAB COLD WAR. op.cit., p.12 1.
Burrowes and Muzzles, The Road to the Six Day War..., op.clt., p.228.
Eban, THE VOICE OF ISRAEL. op.cit., p.48.
Hussein of Jordan and Feisal of Saudi Arabia were singled out for verbal
indictments in his public utterances. Referring to Hussein as a CIA agent and Feisal as
'the bearded one', the rift between Nasser and the 'reactionaries' became Intensely
personified.
91 Robert St. John, BEN GURION. London : Jarrods, 1964. p.199.
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incalculable trouble. Nasser was also well aware that, while the Fedayyin were
prevented from engaging the Israelis from Egyptian territory by the presence of
UNEF. and from Jordan and Lebanon by order of Amman and Beirut. the Syrians
were allowing the Fedayyin to train and operate from Syrian territory.92
All these considerations made it essential for Cairo to gain some degree of control
over the action and policies of the Attasi regime. For, if Nasser had learned
anything from the days of the Union, It was the difficulty of quarantining the
rashness of the Syrians especially when It came to the Palestinian issue.93
With Ben Bella and Arof gone, and with the conservative Arab States alienated,
Nasser had become dangerously Isolated. No longer could he manipulate his fellow
leaders with the tact and success that he had been able to previously.94
Therefore, the bitter fact for Nasser was that whatever lines he took on Israel, he
was surely to be attacked by his fellow Arabs.95 Within such a constraint,
Nasser came to the conclusion that the only way to keep the initiative in Egypt's
hands was to impose a restraining Influence on the Syrian army and hence on the
Palestinian guerrillas operating from Syrian territory. This could only be
achieved by a defence agreement with the regime in Damascus, which he was able
to get.96
Nasser In those days, contrary to widely held opinions, had not changed his mind
about the futility of the Arabs in trying to restore the Palestinians to their lost
lands by force of arms. 97 If he had to prevent the Arab world from being
dragged into a third round with Israel, provoked by Syria, Nasser felt that
Egypt's security required the control of Syrian military planning at the earliest
opportunity. 95 Therefore, quite apart from any question of leadership in the
See Liqueur, THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM, op.cit., p.231.
93 Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, YEARS OF UPHEAVAL (In Arabic), Cairo : Markhaz el
Ahram lii Targama wal Nashr, 1969, pp.261-301
945ir Anthony Nutting in an interview, November. 1966. London.
lnterview with Peter Mansfield, October, 1956, London.
96 Richard Hofstander (ed.). EGYPT AND NASSER, Vol Ii, A Fact on File Publication,
op.clt., p.103.
97 lnterview with Peter Mansfield, October. 1966. London.
98 lnterview with Prof. MI Hillal Dessouki, June, 1968. London.
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Arab world, Nasser believed that If the Western powers were gunning for him
again, nothing could better help their plans than for Egypt to be embroiled In a
war with Israel in which the weight of world opinion would be against the
Arabs.99
If there was ever any doubt In Nasser's mind about the logic of these conclusions,
events were soon to dispel them. For one, Israel hod started to administer the
most punishing retaliatory raids for any minor Fedayyin action. lOO The Syrians,
on their part, resisted and called. In vain, for the Egyptians to come to their
rescue. Since the deployment of Egyptian troops on Syrian soil was not Included
In the defence treaty, Nasser could do little but engage in more rhetorical threats
against Israel, further aggravating the political climate of the region. 101 At
various press conferences, he was reported to have reiterated that: We will not
accept any possibility of co-existence with Israel".102
At this point in time, Nasser began to act on some highly disturbing intelligence
about American strategy in relation to the Middle East. From his Ambassador to
Brussels, Nasser was to learn that Washington was now working on a new policy
for the defence of American interests In the Middle East, based on an active
Israeli role. t03 With the announcement that American military aircraft were on
their way to Israel, Nasser, more than ever convinced that the clock was being
put back ten years, now decided that the recent attacks on Syria were, like the
Gaza raid in 1955, the prelude to Western and Israeli action to stamp out Arab
Nationalism. 104 The rift between Egypt and the United States was beyond repair
since the days when Nasser and Johnson collided on the issue of wheat sales to
Interview with Abdel Majid Find, April. 1988. London.
lOOAbu-Lughod , THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFRONTATION OF JUNE 1967. op.cIL. pp.122-
123.
bun an Interview with Fathy ci Ohoully. January, 1969. London.
lO2Quoted In Abba Ebans speech it. the Special Assembly of the United Nations, 19
J0 e. 1967. Walter Liqueur, ThE ROAD To JERUSALEM. op.cit, Appendix 10, p.336;
pp 328-346.
ioAiI Sabni, reply to questionnaire, July, 1989, Cairo
iO4IntervIew with Sir Anthony Nutting, November, 1988, London.
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Egypt. Thus no Egyptian-u.s dialogue would have achieved any reduction in
tensions. 105
As Jordan suffered a heavy retaliation raid by Israel, King Hussein had found the
answer to the vilifications of Nasser and Radio Cairo. 106 From then on the
Jordanian press and radio maintained attacks on Nasser that were designed to
challenge his de facto hands off policy on Israel. 107 And 1 indeed, because of its
domestic economic problems and military involvement in the Yemen 1 needless to
add, the leading Arab state had done little to provoke Israel, except
rhetorically. 108 Radio Amman was to portray Nasser's role as betraying the Arab
cause and declared in one its many statements that:
Since 1 956 Abd an Nasir has been the only leader of an
Arab state having common borders with the usurped
part of Palestine who lives in peace and tranquility
with tsrael...His treason has reached the point of
disregarding violation of Egyptian airspace by the
Israeli airforce, and by not resisting them..Jn his
attitude towards Damascus, Gaza and the Tiran straits,
Abd an Nasir is no longer a party to anything remotely
related to Palestine or the Palestine question.109
With the war of words between Egypt and Jordan, Nasser was forced to counter
these allegations and by doing so, mode three moves that sealed the fate of the
Arab armies. Firstly, he requested the UNEF to withdraw from Sharm el Sheik and
border posts. 1 10 Secondly, he closed the Gulf of Aqaba, an international
105 A11 Sabri, reply to questionnaire, July. 1989, Cairo.
106 This action by the 1DF, the Sammu Raid on November 1966, considerably added to
the existing tension and became one of the landmarks In the road to the 1967 June War.
101 RadIo Amman maintained that, firstly. Nasser was hiding behind UNEF's skirts and
avoiding combat with the enemy. Secondly, were the shipments to Israel via the Gulf
of Aqaba which the Egyptians had open since the withdrawal of the tripartite troops
from the Sinai after the Suez debacle. Thirdly, and most heinous of all, Cairo was
IntendIng to negotiate a separate peace settlement with Israel by selling out the West
Bank. in an interview with Sir Anthony Nutting. November. 1988. London.
106Laqueur, THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM. op.cIL. p.63.
1O9THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. May 23. 1967. pp.2-3; quoted In Laqueur, THE
ROAD TO JERUSALEM. op.cit., p.232.
110 The United Nations Official Chronology states that Egypt requested a partial
withdrawal of UNEF forces and, in fact, Egyptian troops did not physically occupy
Sharm ci Sheik until three days after U Thant had ordered U.N. forces to pull out. At
the same time, it seems somewhat strange that, with so much at stake, U Thant
suggested that he would meet Nasser in Cairo only after he had received a formal
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waterway, which caused on outcry in the West. 11 ' Finally. Nasser ordered his
army to take up positions in the Sinai.' 12
Overnight Nasser became once more the hero of the Arab world. Even the Arab
radio stations that had been lambasting him earlier cheered this singular act of
defiance. The jeerings end taunts of yesterday evaporated. What remained after
the prolonged and bitter fray was the euphoric chorus of jubilation. But unknown
to the teeming Arab nationalists who come out onto the streets to praise and
acclaim Nasser. no-one, save the ever watchful Israelis, seemed to realize that
now their military preparedness would prove its worth. The Israelis, who hod
for all the ten years after the Suez War worked and perfected plans to recover all
and more than they had been obliged to abandon In 1 956, would soon achieve part
of their political strategy - the destruction of Nasser, or at least humiliating
him beyond hope of recovering his prestige as on Arab leeder. 113 Ben Gurion's
fears that Nasser was the man who would roise the spirits of the Arabs, cAange
their character and turn them into a fighting nation would be alleviated for the
time being. 114 Nasser who was aware of his reputation and seeking a political
request for the total withdrawal of UNEF. As Nasser welcomed the idea of a visit, It Is
the fact that. the Secretary 6eneral did not set forth for yet another four days, by
which time the President had finally decided to close the 6ulf of Aqaba to Israeli
shipping. In addition, the majority of contributing nations to the U.N. Force agreed
that Egypt was acting within her rights and that it was not for them to oppose her
request for UNEF's withdrawal. British and American protests about the Egyptian
action gave Nasser the impression that UNEF was thought of as some kind of occupation
army placed in the Middle East to perform Anglo-American bidding. With the
Americans pre-emptorily telling Nasser to comply with whatever the Secretary-
6enerai suggested, any hope for negotiation with Cairo was thus removed. See the
UNITED NATIONS OFFICIAL CHRONOLOGY, flay 1st to June 30th. 1967, New York
United Nations Publications, 1968, pp.311-347. Also see The TIMES, May 18th. 1967,
U Thant Warning over Middle East Crisis : Egypt Demands Withdrawal of United
Nations Force, p.1. For a detailed analysis of the role of the U.N. troops in the Sinai,
see Major General Rikhye. THE SINAI BLUNDER : Withdrawal of the United Nations
Emergency Force leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967. U.S.A Frank Cass, 1980
11 1 See The TIMES, May 22nd, 1967, Danger of Clash in Tiran Straits, flay 23rd,
1967. Egypt Closes 6ulf of Aqaba to Israel's Ships : Defiant flove by Nasser Raises
Middle East Tension. Compare with coverage in The OBSERVER and The 6UARDIAN of
the same dates.
I I2ec report In the LONDON TIMES, May 24th, 1967, Tive Arab Nations Now
Mobil ized : Cairo Says Its Own Troops Are On Border. pp.1, 3-5; AL AHRAM. 25th
MaYI 1967; AL NAHAR, Beirut, 26th May 1967.
11351r Anthony Nutting, November, 1988, London.
1 l4Ben Gurlon, MY TALKS WITH ARAB LEADERS. op.cjt., p.294; Interview with Peter
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victory without war, found himself taking a set of Irreversible decisions that
pushed the situation towards the brInk.' 15
The prime questions to be addressed in the light of the multitude of factors that
are essential in understanding the June 1967 War are: Firstly, what are the
possible explanations for Egyptian and Israeli over-reaction? Secondly, what
were the probable Intentions of the local actors in the conflict? And, lastly,
where does all this fit into the study of charismatic political leadership?
Soviet supplied intelligence about the vulnerability of Syria and Israel's armed
concentration on the Syrian border is one much repeated explanation for Egypt's
over-reaction. l 16 Thus, the subsequent Egyptian moves were designed to thwart
the Israeli threat. However, if these moves were to culminate in an attack on
Israel, which serves as a justification for the subsequent Israeli pre-emptive air
strikes on 5 June, it hardly represents an objective assessment of Nasser's
intentions. Considering the Egyptian situation soberly in the pre-wor period,
which presumably Nasser did, on immediate war with Israel was not feasible,
even if Egypt was to make the first strike. With the deployment of his best units
in Yemen and his reputed misgivings about the efficiency of his army, it is
difficult to see how Nasser's Egypt would manage 'the ultimate bottle with the
Zionist state.' Being in a position where he alone controlled the decision making
process, one must assume that Nasser was rational, In that he did not
overestimate the strengths of the Syrian and Jordanian armed forces.117
If the foregoing hypothesis Is correct then It is conceivable that Nasser's
Intention was to engineer another political victory, as In the years past, by
Mansfield. October, 1988, London.
115MiIes Copeland, THE GAME OF NATIONS. London : Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1969.
p .238.
1 l 6See Mohammed Heikal, SPHINX AND COMMISSAR : The Rise and Fall of Soviet
Influence In the Middle East, London : Collins, 1978, p.182; Mohammed Heikal. NASSER
The Cairo Documents, New York : Doubleday. 1973. p.121.
lllSir Anthony Nutting, November, 1988, London.
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brinkmanship. Dispatching messages to the Indian and Chinese leaders on his
Intentions and sending his Prime Minister to Washington just prior to the Israel
attack may have been an attempt to withdraw from the brink. The resort to high
level diplomacy tends to strengthen the thesis that it was not Nasser's intention to
start an armed conflict.'' 8 it appears that all Nasser seemed to be looking for
was a limited political victory that would strengthen the regime at home and
particularly in the Arab sphere. I 19
On the other side of the coin, the Israeli decision making process that culminated
in the 5th June surprise attack has been a subject of inquiry. What compelled
Israel to choose the most extreme of the four basic options - a preemptive strike
- remains unclear to hlstorians. i20 Another option, diplomacy, was discarded
after a brief two week trial. 121 A third option, would have been the testing of
Egypt's resolve by dispatching one Israeli ship through the Tiran Straits. This
would have shifted the onus of armed aggression onto the U.A.R, had she chosen to
enforce the blockade. Finally, a limited armed action to force open the straits
could have been attempted by Israel.122
What apparently escaped the attention of Egyptian policy-makers was the deeply
hold Israeli fear of encirclement and extermination. 123 The massing of Arab
armies On Israel's borders hit at the central aspect of contemporary Israeli
national character that springs from the ghetto experience of Jewish history. The
resort to total war was ultimately triggered off by the Israeli population's fear
ll8Copeland, THE 6AME OF NATIONS. op.ciL p.236.
ll9Kerr comes to a similar conclusion when he states Nassers...objective went
beyond simply deterring Israel: it was to score a political victory over her, and then
to receive thaL acclaim and reap the rewards in the Arab political arena that would
surely follow. In short, Nassers concern began not with Israel but with Syria, and
pointed eventually not to Sharm al-Shaikh, still less to Tel Aviv. but to the chanceries
and the streets of the Arab world. Malcolm Kerr, THE ARAB COLD WAR. op.cit. p.127.
l2OBernard Kuiholm. THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR IN THE NEAR EAST, Princeton
Princeton University Press, 1980, p.30 1.
l2lFleikai , SPHINX AND COIIMISSAR. op.cit., p.172.
l22The last two options were suggested to the Israeli coalition cabinet by 6eneral
Dayafl between May 22nd and 23rd. in Moshe Doyan. THE STORY OF MY LIFE. London
Sphere Books. 1970, pp.481-483.
l23Eban, MY COUNTRY. op.cit., p.205.
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with the political ambitions of certain hawkish Israeli leaders playing a part in
the final decision. Israel temporarily solved its security problem by defeating
the Arab armies. But, likewise, the Six Day War set In motion a constellation of
powerful forces, whose impact was felt In the 1973 Ramadan War and Is
constantly felt to this very day.124
Hence, to recapitulate all that has been said, Nasser's gambles and political bluffs
of May 1967 brought him to the morning of June 5, when he waited for over six
hours to learn that his air force had been wiped out on the ground in less than
fifty minutes. What happened after this is described by Jean Locouture:
The RAIS was too experienced a strategist to nurse any
further hopes. For four days running he tried to
manoeuvre, to get help from the USSR and the United
Nations, even the USA. Towards midday on the 9th, he
saw defeat staring at him. And his instinctive reaction
was to personalize it as one of his responsibilities.
Convening the staff of the Arab Socialist Unions, he
announced his decision to resign in favour of Zakaria
Moheiddin. He incarnated defeat as completely as he
had incarnated the nation. He was disaster
personified.
At about seven o'clock on the evening of June 9, this is
what he told the country very matter of factly on
television, his voice, like Egypt, anguished, his
expression, like his army, bewildered. Beginning
with on account of the disaster, he went on painting
details with dismal realism, then suddenly announced
just before concluding: "I am retiring from public
life...
The reaction was fascinating, perhaps unprecedented,
and cast a strange light on this extreme case of the
mythical Incarnation of a nation.
Authority remained on the side of the defeated and
resigning man...rescued despite incontrovertible
evidence that he was doomed. Therein lie the power
and significance of Nasser's leadership.
It is not really Important to know whether he was
sincere that day or was feigning an exit in order to
woo public support. In any event, he was taking a
chance with a people that had been dealt with a
124tlIchaoI Adams, The Foundation of Peace, THE GUARDIAN. 15th June. 1967.
professor Adams postulated that If the Israelis want a peace as savage as war, what
freedom of choice does this leave the Arabs' ......, p.6.
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crushing blow. What nation would not have sanctioned
the fallen leader's decision?125
Egypt's defeat in the June War is not the most significant contemporary
development for one's study of Nasser's politics, since few experts expected an
Egyptian victory over Israel. Rather it is the presistenCe 01 Nasser's image to
endure despite the enormity of defeat. 126 The 1967 war, as Robert Stephens put
it:
....seemed to destroy much of Nasser's earlier
achievements. Having at last freed Egyptian territory
from foreign military occupation with the departure
of the British In 1956, Nasser, little more than ten
years later, saw Israeli forces occupying the Sinai
peninsula and its oilfields. Having gained full control
of the Suez Canal, he now saw it closed and useless and
with one bank occupied by the Israelis. Having
rejected a Western alliance and protection in the
pursuit of complete independence and non-alignment,
he found himself relying heavily on Soviet military
and diplomatic support. Having sought financial and
economic aid without political strings, he was faced
with foreign indebtedness of £1000 million and
dependence on subsidies from Arab governments,
including his chief Arab opponent, King Feisal of Saudi
Arabia. But events since Nasser's death have
confirmed that these setbacks were mostly of a
transitory character and had not fundamentally
reversed the changes that established Egyptian
Independence.127
Thus the ability of Nasser's political system to adjust itself to the conditions of
severe stress after June 1 967 testIfies to its great absorptive capacity.
However, to make a fundamental connection with the analysis of charismatic
political leadership a few general points need clarification.
In the first part of the study it was mentioned that a primary element of strength
l2SJean Lacouture. THE DEMI6ODS, op.cit., pp.129-130.
l26Nassers long time confidant, Mohammed HeRal wrote: it has to be admitted that
in 1967 Nasser failed in one of the fundamental duties of any ruler - he tailed to
defend the borders of his country. By that failure the legitimacy of his regime was
fjawed... AUTUMN OF FURY. London : Andre Deutsch, 1983. p.114.
1275ee Robert Stephens, Nasser, A Reassessment, ARAB PAPERS. Number 8, London
Arab Research Centre. p.12.
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in personal rule In the Third World was charismatic leadership. The central
role of the charismatic phenomenon and its various Ingredients was dramatically
validated with the reinstitution of Abdel Nasser on 9th June. 1967. The
charismatic component came Into clear view when one considers how widespread
and deep were the feelings shown by the demonstrations In urging Nasser to
withdraw his resignation. Although the demonstration may have been guided by
some governmental organization, the popular support for Nasser in as crucial
time as this surpassed that of a staged affair.' 28 Fouad Ajami, in describing
these moments, articulates that:
Nasser's genius and the popular need for belief in
someone, in anything - enabled him to rise above the
defeat. The leader was dissociated from the defeat and
Invited to go beyond his political apparatus to purge
the elements that had supposedly captured and
undermined his revolution...
Part of Nasser no doubt died on June 5, 1967, but
another part of him somehow survived for another
three years at the helm, assumed the role of resister,
and went on to preside over the redefinitions and
transformation of Nasserism. The charismatic
relationship between him and the masses formed
during the bright youthful days of Suez and the non-
aligned movement was shattered with the 1967 defeat;
another variant, born out of despair and a sense of
loss, sustained him until his death. He would stay in
power not as a confident, vibrant hero, but as a tragic
figure. a symbol of better days, a sign of the will to
resist. 129
l2OEric Rouleau, a long time observer of Nasser, wrote after that fateful event, ...in
the morning, having learned of their defeat, they Warned Nasser alone and were ready
to send him picking; that evening, the news of his retirement made them cling to him
as their sole refuge, their teacher and breath of life: 6arnal, 6ama dont desert us. we
need you. Quoted In Jean Lacout.ure. THE DEMI6ODS. op.clL, p.130. For other
Interpretations of the June events, see Mahmoud Hussein, CLASS CONFLICT IN EGYPT.
1945-1970. New York : Oxford University Press. 1970. pp.261-69; Isaac Deutscher,
0n the Israeli-Arab War, NEW LEFT REVIEW. No.44, July-August. 1967. pp.30-45;
Anwar Abdel Malek, Crisis In Nassers [gypt, NEW LEFT REVIEW. September-October.
1967; No.45. pp.67-82. Clement Moore suggest that the demonstrations are to be seen
as support for the nation Nasser symbolized rather than for Nasser himself who was
responsible for the disastrous defeat. See Moore, Authoritarian Politics in
Uncorporated Society : The Case of Nasser's Egypt. COMPARATIVE POLITICS. January
1974. p.200.
1295ee Fouad Ajami, The Struggle for Egypt's Soul, FOREIGN POLICY. Vol. 35,
Summer. 1979, p.6.
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As earlier emphasized, a basic rule is that defeats do not bode well for
charismatic leaders. However, the reinstatement of Nasser to power defied the
established pattern for charismatic leaders for a number of reasons. Dekmejian
details them as:
...the high degree or residual legitimacy that Nasser
possessed by virtue of his leadership performance
during the fifties - a legitimacy too great to be erased
overnight by a defeat. After all, his activities as
leader were the concrete manifestations of the
nationalist ideological message which most Egyptians
had shared and supported....
...The fact...that....when popular beliefs and
aspirations coincided with the politics of the
leadership, there is little that external pressures can
do to erase the resulting legitimacy...
...The public reaction to the openly expressed Israeli
and Western desire to witness his downfall. As in
1956, many Egyptians supported Nasser ii only to
deny the enemy the satisfaction of success. In a deeper
sense, however, by re-instating the President, the
Egyptians underlined their reluctance to accept
defeat....
...Charlsma and the charismatic compulsion to search
for new victories that led Nasser to the disastrous
brink in early June was also the force that helped him
retain office after the defeat.130
5.6 THE EVENTS OF JUNE 9th. 1967: A Qualitative Analysis:13'
For the great majority of Egyptians, June 9th, 1967 was a black day. After
rejoicing on the faked reports which Radio Cairo put out hourly the masses were
bewildered as they listened to a communique issued by the General Command which
said that the Israelis had crossed to the West Bank of the Canal and appealed to the
130p . Hralr Dekmejian. EGYPT UNDER NASSER : A Study in Political Dynamics. New
York. Albany : New York State University Press, 1971. p.245.
131 Since the aim of this case study is to make an assessment of the response of the
Egyptian and Arab masses In the aftermath of the June 1967 defeat, one attempts to
capture the magnitude of events that Illustrate the charismatic component of Nassers
leadership that enabled him to retain office.
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world to Judge this move. The communique Implied such disgraceful
helplessness, submissiveness, and humiliation It made the blood of the Egyptian
citizen boil. l32 TawfiqAl Hakim, a celebrated Egyptian writer, in capturing the
general mood commented:
I did not know the truth until FrIday, 9th June, and as
the truth dawned consternation seized me. It appeared
that we had lost the war in the first hours of 5th
June...and when we saw the face of the President on the
television screen announcing the defeat and
minimizing It by using the word reversal, we could
not believe that we were In a such a contemptible
position and that Israel was in such a strong one...133
The defeat of June 1 967 had been a complete surprise to everybody, it may be
that Egyptians had not expected quick victory, but nobody had been prepared for
defeat on such a shattering scale. 134 It would be difficult to overstate the
traumatic effect which the June War had on Egypt and the whole Arab world. For
a time everyone was In a state of shock, unable to appreciate the magnitude of the
disaster or to face its implications. lhere was a tendency to see things In terms
of the past - a tendency which to begin with, even Nasser shared. 135 Thus,
when Podgorny was In Cairo at the end of June 1967, and a question was asked
about the Gulf of Aqaba, Nasser answered that whatever it was could be decided
after the withdrawal". 136 He was assuming that the aftermath of 1967 would
follow the pattern of Suez.
But just as Suez was an act of national self determination for Egyptians, the
outcome of the June War was a cause for unity among the populace. Most
Egyptians might have overlooked the catalogue of Nasser's misfortune since 1959.
but they could hardly disregard the latest and most grievous of his Real Pobtik
miscalculations. They had cared little about Saudi or Iraqi rebuffs or about
l32inLervIew with Fathy ci Ghoully, January. 1989, London.
l33Tawfiq At Hakim, THE RETURN OF CONSCIOUSNESS. Translated from the Arabic by
BaylY Winder, London : Macmillan Press Ltd. 1988, p.42.
134A11 Sabri. reply to questionnaire, July, 1989, Cairo.
l35lnterview with Sir Anthony Nutting, November. 1988, London.
l36Ali Sabri, reply to questionnaire. July, 1989. Cairo.
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Syria's secession from the union and, save for those with relatives involved in
the fighting, even the war in Yemen had not greatly concerned them. 137 But they
cared deeply about the occupation of Egyptian territory by the Israeli enemy and
about the degrading defeat Inflicted on their army. The debacle destroyed the
army's morale and aroused Its resentment. They grew to believe that they had
been used by Nasser to ploy a game which hod foiled and they were abused by
taking the blame for It. 0n top of the appalling loss of life In Sinai, the army
was now suffering the added humiliation of being the butt of every satirist in
Egypt and outslde. 138 Egyptians were shocked at the events which were even
more traumatic than the Invasion of 1956 hod been.
After Suez, Egyptians believed that they had emerged victorious from that war,
or at least if they did not believe they had won the war, they knew they had won
the peoce. 139 They had stood up to the might of three states and hod not been
completely defeated by them. The regime had weathered the storm and had not
fallen. 1 4O However, the situation on June 9th, 1967 was drastically different.
Three quarters of the Egyptian air force was destroyed, while 12,000 men were
killed. The army resisted fiercely, but it was not up to par, especially since it
lacked a'r cover. The gap between the soldiers, who were peasants with little
training or technical knowledge, and their officers, showed In the field. 141 To
make matters worse, the best units of the Egyptian Army were still engaged in the
Yemen fighting fellow Arabs. Thus, militarily, the June War totally devastated
Egypt's armed power. 0n June 9, 1967, when Egypt agreed to cease fire, the
entire Egyptian army and air force hod been completely destroyed as fighting
bodies. 142 Nasser was to say later that on that day there was not a single
Egyptian soldier on the West Bank of the Canal to resist an Israeli crossing and
137 Ibid.
13Interview with Sir Anthony Nutting. November, 1988, London.
l39lnterview with Professor Au Hillal Dessouki, June. 1968, London.
140 Ibid.
141 Yehoshafat Harkaby. The Causes of Arab Defeat in June 196T, ORBIS. Fall, 1967.
230-243.
l42lntervjew with Peter Mansfield, October, 1968. London.
march on Calro. 143 The statement certainly contained a good deal of hyperbole,
since reports from Cairo for that day spoke of movements of troops in the capital
and flights of air force units over the skies In connection with internal pohticai
manoeuvres; 144 nevertheless, It was essentially true that Egypt lay practically
defenceless before the Israeli troops, who, however, had no intention of venturing
beyond the Canal. This particular consequence of the war proved to be the least
enduring.
Politically speaking, the war was bound to affect Egypt's role as leader of the
drive for Arab unity through the crashing blow It dealt to Nassers charisma.
AIter all, Egypt's commitment to the cause of integral Arab Unity was not
something It had thought out and sought in advance, but was rather an objective
that was thrust upon It by the logic of Nasser's manoeuvres and the spectacular
successes he had achieved. J45 Furthermore, since Egypt did commit itself to tile
cause of Integral Arab unity, the striving for the realization of that ideal did not
take the form of wide ranging, systematic endeavours nor did It assume any
institutionalized form. Rather, it continued to depend primarily on Nasser's
personal charisma and his capacity to manoeuvre in the fluid political conditions
of the Arab world. Since Nasser's charisma itself had arisen out of real or
Imagined spectacular successes, and since it depended on continued success for Its
maintenance, the spectacular defeat he suffered in the war was bound to explode it
and thus deprive Egypt's drive for Arab unity of Its major propellant".146
On the level of the Egyptian people, the feeling had grown In the years that they
were capable of defeating Israel and regaining part of Palestine. Nasser's earlier
declaration that closed the straits of Tiran to Israel-bound ships brought the
realization that this might precipitate the long awaited war to defeat Israel.
1 43A11 Sabri, reply to questionnaire. July. 1989. Cairo.
l44Hofstander , E6YPT AND NASSER. A Fact on File Publication, New York : A fact on
File Publication, 1973, Vol. III, op.cit., pp.231-234. See The 6UARDIAN, 10th June,
i gbl . pp.2-3.
145 Interview with Robert Stephens. November, 1988. London.
14b Ibid.
336
Excitement became intense147 Egyptians argued that their nA/S would not
have risked the military challenge of Israel unless he was convinced that this
time he could wth.148
The objectives of the Arabs were described differently in different countries,
varying from the destruction of Israel as a state to simply holding the straits of
Tiran. Perhaps Nasser put the position most clearly to members of his National
Assembly when he said that he had gone back to the position in 1956 (by closing
the strait) and, '6od Willing', would go back to the position of 1948. 149 One
must conclude that he intended to return if possible to the partition plan by
military action if the Israelis attacked. it was certainly a widely held view in
the Arab world that he would at least regain the land bridge across the Negev to
Jordan, and Palestinians of 'revolutionary persuasion' held that he would then
make a Palestine state consisting of the West Bank of the Jordan and the
Negev.15°
None of these objectives were In mind when Nasser closed the strait of Tiran, but
grew with the widening conviction that victory could be achieved. lhis was an
enterprise Into which the Arab people followed Nasser with bright-eyed
hope.' 5 ' There had been deepening pessimism among most Intelligent Arabs,
including many Palestinians, who had come to believe that there was no hope of
regaining even part of Palestine, and neither in governments nor people was there
any thought that a new war for Palestine was about to begin. Objectives were
engendered by emotions fired by hope.152
The lightning and comprehensive defeat that came on June 9th, 1967 blew away
all these Illusions, shook the Egyptian and Arab peoples out of their blinding
l4llnterview with Sir Anthony Nutting. November. 1988. London.
146A11 Sabrl, reply to questionnaIre. July. 1989. CaIro.
l49lnterview with Robert Stephens. November, 1988. London.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
l52lnterview with Sir Anthony Nutting. November. 1988. London.
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euphoria. The mood beforehand had been supreme confidence - afterwards
astonished disbelief. 'How had a small state managed to defeat the combined Arab
armies end wipe their air forces' In a matter of minutes' was one of the many
questions on the mind of every Arab youth. 153 The answers to the self
questioning were to be found later but for now, • the Egyptian masses come to the
conclusion that they would hove to rethink their entire strategy and rebuild on a
basis of realism. 154 They [the Egyptiansi were to soldier on, rebuild their
army In the hope that one day they would be strong enough to fight again and
regain their lost territories and most of all, their honour and dignity. The
determination of the Egyptian people to reinstate Nasser that provided him with a
fresh mandate to carry on the fight can be viewed as a Churchillian refusal to
contemplate defeat. The Egyptians. like other Arab peoples, insisted on calling
their defeat merely a 'setback' - although some were more realistic and celled it a
'national calamity' - and carried on with their defiant attitude. 155 The massive
demonstrations following Nasser's resignation on Jwie 9, /96? wkia/, /rn/uced
him to reconsider and stay in power, seem to contradict the suggestion that his
charisma was destroyed. Actually, these demonstrations took place under
exceptional circumstances in which masses of people were gripped by a hysterical
fear of disaster and an obsessive desire to hold on to the only certainty they knew
in the form of Nasser's continued presence i56 The defeat intensified the
bitterness and disillusionment of Egyptians and they tended to blame Israel's
supposed international backers, Britain and the United States. The canard that
they provided air cover for Israeli forces did not die easily 157 Anwar El Sadat
in his SEARCh FOR IDENTITY was later to write:
...All at once, the wheel of time had been turned back
and the days of occupation by a big power were back
again - only it would be the United States this time,
not Britain. This was the clear implication of
Nasser's address, which moved the people deeply,
arousing their patriotic ardour, and restoring to them
l53lnterview with Peter Ilansfield, July. 1969, London.
154Aii Sabri, reply to questionnaire, July, 1989. Cairo.
l55lnterview wIth Prof. All Hillal Dessouki, June, 1968, London.
1 5' Ibid.
l5llnterview with Peter Mansfield, July. 1969. London.
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their capacity for rejection - their sharpest weapon
down the centuries. The people were out to defy defeat,
to declare their unwillingness to submit to any foreign
power, however mighty; their armed forces had been
defeated, but their will had not and could not ever be
conquered. For seventeen hours the people wouldn't
leave the streets of Cairo. The had forgotten
everything - even food and drink and sleep and would
think of nothing except to adhere to their unity and
defy the will of the foreign power that hod attempted
to control them...158
This was the outward manifestation of a nation's desperation at the moment of
shattering defeat. The masses demanded that Nasser withdraw his resignation and
remain in power. The general feeling motivating the demonstrators was as much
a sense of loyalty to the person of the RA/S as it was to the feeling of national
unity in the face of uncertainty which hung over the political future of the
country". 159 The vast majority of Egyptians would not countenance the RAIS
relinquishing office and their massive demonstrations, only surpassed in size and
intensity by those at Nasser's funeral three years later, demanded that he remain
at the helm. Though numbed and dazed by the war, and its immediate aftermath.
the public insisted that the RAIS assume the role of 'resister'. 160 In effect, the
popular demonstrations of June 9 and 10 gave Nasser a new mandate of sorts161
and with it, he went on to preside over the 'eradication of the traces of
aggression'. The charismatic relationship between him and the masses formed
during the triumphant days of 1956 and 1959 could not be shattered
overnight.' 162 For the ordinary Egyptian, Egypt's defeat could be explained in
these terms. There were really two states In Egypt before June 1 967 : One was
the state founded by Nasser (Revolutionary Nasserism) with all its
accomplishments; the other was the state of bourgeois bureaucracy - the centers
of power - which no doubt presented obstacles in the way of greater
accomplishments by Nasserism. Thus, in restoring Nasser to the Presidency, the
l56Anwar El Sadat. SEARCH OF IDENTITY. Great Britain : William Collins. 1978.
pp.217-218.
l59lnterview with Peter Mansfield. July. 1989. London.
l6Qjnterview with Sir Anthony Nutting. November. 1988. London.
161 IbId.
l62lntervlew with Fathy el Goully. January. 1989. London.
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masses Invited the R..4/3 to seek and purge all those that had undermined Egypt's
military performance in the 1967 War.
In analysing the events of June 9th, 1967 one Inevitably has to inquire into the
extent to which Nasserist values became an accepted part of Egyptian political
culture. It is regarded that various aspects of Nasserist thought and practice
greatly Influenced Egyptian reaction on that fateful day. One very crucial notion
that Egyptians bore in mind while demonstrating for Nasser's continued
leadership was that the RAe'S has always made the themes of 'social Justice,
equality and the development of the Individuals humanity' the core of his
Ideological message and activity. 163 This was something that Egyptians had
always felt for and supported persistently. Small wonder that, when an Egyptian
is asked to single out the most important accomplishment of the Nasserist
revolution, he usually points to the sense of dignity and the human and physical
well-being which, he maintains, the revolution has enabled him and his
countrymen to experience and enjoy." 164 These basic Nasserite values: Karamah
(dignity) end Isrer (persistence) Influenced the public deeply and helped sustain
Egypt through the difficult days of June 1 967.
Sadik Abdul Ham Id, a character in Najib MahIuz's AL MARAYA • conveys the way In
which on average Egyptian viewed the June 1 967 War and how the leader and the
nation managed to survive: Sadik Abdul Hamid was a man of some education who
believed In the 'July 23 RevolutIon' and was willing to overlook Its errors. When
the 'catastrophe' happened on June 5, he was overcome with Intense grief and
despair; he wondered how everybody else managed to retain their sanity and not
commit suicide. But then he recovered his composure and came to believe that the
continuity of the revolution was the central issue: The more he heard of the
enemies' wish to liquidate the revolution the more firmly he became committed to
it until he sincerely believed that the continuity of the revolution was more
important than the recovery of the occupied Arab land, for what good is It to
163 Ibid.
164A11 Sabrl, reply to questionnaire. July. 1989. Cairo.
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recover the land and lose ourselves? 165
Beyond that level of belief, the public in the Arab world demonstrated their
allegiance to Nasser and refused to consider his resignation. jhey viewed him as
a creature of historical forces who believed In Arab Nationalism based on Arab
solidarity end on the idea that the Arabs form a single nation. 166 To the Arab
masses, Nasser was the first Arab leader to succeed in transforming prior Arab
ideas, longings and dreams into tangible reality. lie it was who bridged the
chasm separating many Arab hopes from their fulfillment; he It was who took the
decisions end supervised their implementation end, in so doing, selected the
means and devised the actual plans of enforcement. 167 By playing the
historically decisive role of realizing earlier Arab hopes, he had in effect
translated disembodied ideas into concrete realities, giving them in the process
distinctive shape and specific form. 166 For, thanks to an Arab propensity to
focus on objectives as abstractions to the neglect of their contents, the form of
their ultimate embodiments, and the means of their attainment, most Arab
nationalist ideas had remained amorphous until Nasser arrived on the scene. By
providing the leadership required for the achievement of these objectives, he had
also provided shape and content to the institutions and systems through which
they were achieved. To Nasser as midwife, then, Arab Nationalism owes not only
the bringing into being, but also the conceptual contents and distinguishing
structural features of its principal ideas 69 •To see Nasser as an expression of
the Arab nation and a symbol of its hopes is to understand not only the delirious
welcomes with which the Syrian people greeted him in the days of the Union, but
the hero welcome, after a recent military defeat, accorded him by the Sudanese
people when he came to Khartoum in August 1967, end the nationwide outpouring
of sorrow at his death seldom paralleled anywhere170
l65Najlb tlahfuz, AL MARAYA. Cairo : The American University of Cairo Press, 1972.
p.196.
l6Slnterview with Fathy el Goully, January. 1989. London.
l6llnterview with Robert Stephens. November, 1988. London.
16All Sabri. reply to questIonnaire. July. 1959. Cairo.
169 IntervIew with Fathy el Goully, January, 1989. London.
l7Ointervlew with Sir Anthony Nutting. November. 1988, London.
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5.7 CONCEUSION
Thus, the picture, as one has described it, proposes that the Arab defeat in the
1 967 War was Nasser's darkest hour. But, In some ways It was also to prove his
finest. From the beginning of the war Nasser had mode no public utterances. But
when he announced the ceesefire after his long silence, It came as a shock. 171 It
aroused anger and criticism of Nasser. bewilderment that the Egyptian army had
been defeated so quickly. 172 For Nasser, defeat was far worse an In 195t. His
work of fifteen years, the liberation of Egypt from foreign troops, the
establishment of Egyptian control of the Suez Canal, the rebuilding of national
self confidence among the Egyptians and the Arabs, all seemed to have been
brought to ruin in three disastrous days. In the prospects of a humiliating
capitulation what he feared most was not the material loss but the breaking of the
morale of the Arab national movement, the enforced submission of a people who
had dared to raise their heads In pride and independence and to seek a better
llfe. 173 He had risked war above all because he believed that sooner or later the
Arabs, and particularly Egypt, must turn and face the power of Israel or live
forever at the mercy of Israel's political will and her supposed international
backers. 174 He had run the risk and failed. Nor was there the hope as in 1956
of snatching diplomatic victory from military defeat. 175 He believed that the
United States had colluded with the enemy and actively assisting 11 176 while the
171 A1 AHRAM. 8 June, 1967. pp.1-2; AL NAHAR. Beirut, 9 June. 1967. pp.1-2.
l72 AIi Sabri, reply to questionnaire. July. 1989. Cairo.
l73lntervlew with Fathy ci Goully. January. 1989. London.
l74 lnterview with Sir Anthony Nutting. November. 1988. London.
175 Ibid.
l 7óWritlng of May 1967. the Zionist writer Jon Kimche gives a sophisticated but
plausible version of what actually happened. He says there were two American policies
operating on two distinct levels: Offlclally. Americans were correct in every way.
They went along with the United Nations, with the British and the French, and
endeavoured to find an International solution. But they were convinced that the United
Nations would remain ineffective, and that all the British might succeed in doing was to
get the Americans involved in a conflict in the Middle East...In secret talks which they
had with Yariv and Amit, Israel's military and secret intelligence chiefs, the Pentagon
and the CIA were satisfied that Israel could well take care of the situation as long as
the great powers did not intervene. The Israelis were, therefore, informed on two
distinct levels of the American position. Johnson and Rust played their version of the
Middle East charade with [ban, but they did not realize that [ban was taking it all
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Soviet Union did nothing materially to stop them) 77 World opinion was no longer
overwhelmingly on Egypt's side as it was in 1956
Faced with this situation, It Is not surprising that, as the bad news came pouring
In to Nasser. he declared that he was ready to assume the entire responsibility
for the setback. He announced that ho had decided to give up all his official
posts and every political role and became an ordinary citizen. 176 Even before he
had finished speaking, there had begun another of those dramatic reversals of
fortune that marked his career. As soon as they heard him announce his
resignation, people in Cairo began to pour out into the streets and to appear at the
windows of their houses shouting for Nasser to stay. The noise was like a rising
storm. A whole people seemed to be in mournlng. 179 Tens of thousands gathered
round the National Assembly chanting his name. it was estimated that
opproximately half a million people massed along the five miles from Nasser's
home to the centre of Cairo to watch over Nasser during the night and make sure
he would go to the National Assembly the next day to withdrew his resignation.180
Millions more were reported to have poured in Cairo from all over Egypt to make
sure that Nasser stayed.lBl
seriously and was aware of the other half of the American proposal. Helms (head of
the CIA) told his Israeli colleagues that Israel would have to conjure up all of her inner
strength to withstand pressures from outside. Even the Americans might find It
necessary to join in these pressures, for they had to protect themselves at all costs
against the suspicion of collusion - and they could do so only by ensuring that there
was no collusion. But- and this was conveyed to Vin y rather than spelled out in as
many words - If Israel wanted to have tangible results this time, she would have to be
solid as a rock and not weaken before, during, or after the actual military encounter.
Jon kimche, PALESTINE OR ISRAEL : The Untold Story of Why we Failed, London
Constable. 1973. pp.257-258.
177 Heikal, SPHINKS AND THE COMIIISSAR. op.cit.. pp.196-199.
175 For full text of Nassers resignation Broadcast. June 9. 1967 see Appendix I.
Source: Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin. editors. THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER : A
Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict, U.S.A: Viking books. 1984. pp.189-
194.
179 Heikal, NASSER : Channel Four Political Documentary. op.ciL. Part 3.
160 lnterview with Robert Stephens. November, 1988. London; THE OBSERVER. 10th
June. 1967 for his commentary and compare with the coverage of this story in the
DAILY TELE6RAPH. London, pp.6-8.
151 Ibid.
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Many people outside Egypt, especially In the West, found this support for Nasser
strange, ar.d explicable only In terms of a stage-managed performance. Nasser
had led the Egyptians to a national military disaster, yet they were not demanding
his head but clamouring for him to stay. Moreover, If they had wanted to get rid
of a dictator here was their chance - he was himself offering to go, but they would
not let him. How could this be?
This puzzlement reflected partly the continuing failure of many foreigners to
understand the nature of Nasser's relationship with the Egyptian people, the
decisive element of consent mixed with the authoritarianism of his regime and the
significance of what he had achieved inside Egypt itself, compared with his
international activities which had chiefly attracted foreign attention. Egyptians
did not judge Nasser simply by his success or failure as a military leader,
however great his failure then was - and perhaps also the public was even then
not fully aware of the extent of the defeat. 182 He was rather the man who had
overthrown the King, ended the British occupation, given Egypt full control of the
Suez Canal, begun to build the High Dam, carried through the land reform and
tried to control rents, build more factories and schools, brought clean water and
electricity to many more villages, begun social insurance for workers and, within
limits, given many more Egyptians a say in the running of their own affairs.
However, this did not mean that Nasser and his regime were immune from
criticism or even opposition.
To the less sophisticated majority, used to centuries of authoritarian or
paternalistic rule, Nasser had became established as the father of the
natlon.' 83 Now, at a moment of calamity, the father figure was about to leave
them to their fate. This emotional reaction was strengthened because people,
Including the more educated and politically conscious, saw Nasser as the symbol of
resistance.' 84 The Egyptian army had been defeated but not the nation as a whole.
lB2Heikal, NASSER. Channel Four Political Documentary. op.cit.. Part 3.
l53lnterylew with Robert Stephens. November. 1958. London.
lO4lbid.
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The enemy was occupying a large tract of Egyptian territory, but the main part of
the country was still Intact and needed somehow to be defended. It was the
situation of the Soviet Union and Stalin when the Germans reached the gates of
Moscow, of Britain and Churchill after Dunkirk, though Egypt's military position
was for the moment even more helpless. Egypt and the Arabs had lost a campaign
but were not yet ready to surrender.
This was also the reaction all over the Arab world. For Nasser hail became the
symbol not only of Egyptian resistance but of Arab nationalism. His fall would
seem the final proof of Arab defeat and humiliation, the ultimate satisfaction for
those who wanted to break the spirit of Arab national revival. Even those who had
opposed Nasser's policies were swept along on a wave of deep, spontaneous emotion
in urging him not to resign. Perhaps there was also a conviction in this
movement that, despite his mistakes and failings, Nasser was the only Arab leader
of sufficient stature to deal with the situation in which Egypt and the Arab states
now found themselves 185
l85 lnterview with Peter Mansfield, October, 1968. London; and, with Sir Anthony
Nutting, November. 1988, London.
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CHAPTER SIX
A OEHERAI liED MODEL. ON CHARISMATIC POlITICAL LEADERSHIP
6.1 INTRODUCTION
An attempt to formulate a generalized model to clarify the concept and explain the
phenomenon of charismatic political leadership has been long In the making.
While working on a study of Nasser as a charismatic political leader, one utilized
the concept of charisma in was the analysis of a particular case of political
leadership. 1 Although the term 'charismatic leader' certainly seemed to have
become common and even debased currency, scholarly and systematic scrutiny of
the phenomenon as such seemed scarce.2 These conditions tempted one to a
lengthy exploratory detour Into the terrain originally, but sketchily, mapped by
Max Weber.3 However, since this thesis sought to examine some components of
political leadership in general and charismatic political leadership In particular,
its goal is to discover some generalizations pertaining to the emergence,
consolidation and termination of charismatic leadership. The leadership of
President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic (1918-1970) served
as a case study. The initial hypothesis that underlay this Investigation were:
A- Firstly, charismatic political leadership emerges
out of a situation ol protracted societal stress or
crisis of one kind or another - economic, political.
'Perhaps the most prominent approach to leadership revolves around the concept of
charisma. Th. charismatic leader Is distinguished from other leaders by his capacity
to inspire loyalty towards himself as the source of authority, apart from an
established status. See Chapter I, Section One, pp . 64-73.
2Fouad Ajami, in an interview with the author, points out that crltical analysis of
'charismatic relationships' which he labels as being of the 'domain of legitimate
political partisanship and activism' has been largely absent from political literature.
An analysis of bow leaders achieve such an effect, of the means by which and the
conditions under which this kind of loyalty Is generated and maintained, might give us a
better intellectual grasp of charismatic leadership. New York, Play, 1989.
3Chapter Two. pp. 74-77. seeks to examine the concept 'Charismatic leader' in
Western Political Philosophy. The emphasis here is on the contemporary meaning of
the concept.
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ro11g1ou, pyoho1ogiool. oto. - froquontly In
combination. These circumstances and the failure of
the existing structure to solve societal problems
ultimately leads to the erosion of their legitimacy. A
condition of institutional vacuum thus paves the way
for the charismatic leader to assert his power. In
other words, the Impact of the charismatic leaders is
always In the context of the circumstances of the
country's history.
B- A political leader with charismatic ability (as
perceived by his followers) can accomplish certain
aims and objectives embedded in the cultural, political
and Ideological milieu of a nation.
C- A charismatic leader affects a value transformation
on the basis of the legitimacy flowing from the nascent
charismatic relationship; Increasingly, he exercises a
diffuse and intense influence over the normative
orientations of the masses. As the new values,
perspectives and policies of the leader find acceptance
among the masses, they can be said to become subject
to him and he becomes their charismatic leader. in
view of the reciprocal relationship, the notion that
the charismatic ... is always the creation of his
followers 4 Is a half truth in the Nasser context. It
is necessary to add: to the extent that the leader has
succeeded in Imparting his values to his followers:
They are his creation.
D- Two Independent variables perceived as extremely
important In understanding charismatic political
leadership are personal traits and situational
performance.
[- Charismatic potential develops In a leader by a
certain merger of his personal traits and his
performance style. This merger produces a state of
dormant charisma. Dormant charisma flowers when It
receives favourable popular support and becomes
activated charisma.
F- The effectiveness of charismatic leadership depends
on the leader's ability to maintain the charismatic
bond between himself and the masses.
Since the objective of this thesis was to develop an understanding of the nature,
function, and scopo of political leadership, it is imperative to outline what is
meant by the phenomenon of political leadership. By this, one has to provide an
xbx definition and comment on the elusive nature of the subject. 5 Following
4Richard Fagen Charismatic Authority and the Leadershi p of Fidel Castro, ThE
WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Vol.10, 1965, pp.275-264.
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this, one elms to revise the concept of charismatic political leadership in the
light of the case study. Secondly, the Identification of charismatic political
leaders merits some mention. And finally, and most important of all.
generalizations ore drawn on the charismatic personality.
6.2 WHAT IS POUTICAL LEADERSHIP?
Leadership has en elusive, mysterious quality about It. It is easy to recognize,
hard to describe, difficult to practice, and almost Impossible to create in others
on demand. Perhaps no other topic has attracted as much attention from
observers, participants, and philosophers - with so little agreement as to the
basic facts.6 It cannot even be adequately defined. Leadership, like happiness,
success, or failure, means different things to different people. Frequently, the
leader's themselves are not even aware that they are leading. One of the constant
issues In leadership discussion is whether leaders are born or made. Some
individuals would have almost certainly left their stamp on history, no matter
whet their circumstances. Napoleon's influence on war, law, and society;
Churchill's impact on the Second World War and British society; Nasser's legacy
on Arab Nationalism, Pan-Arabism and Middle East political geography - It Is
herd to imagine that these men would have lived unnoticed lives, no matter what
their situations. In contrast, many leaders seem captive to their time and
situation. Perhaps competitive or charismatic leadership is merely an accidental
collision between an appropriate person and a precipitating environment.7
5$L Is recognized that the manirest aspects or political leadership and the relevance
or numerous and complex latent facts, hive made it difficult to agree on what the
concept is and does. As such, political leadership, like other concepts in social
science, is an essentially contestable one.
6See Chapter One, pp . 8-10, for a discussion on the Intellectual need for a
comprehensive perspective on political leadership.
7The Marxist school on authority, with its emphasis on social determinism, proposes
that great men are a necessary response to a social need, and that they would always
be present. In Engers own words: That a particular man, and no other, emerges at. a
definIte time in a given country Is naturally a pure chance. But even if we eliminate
him there Is always a need for a substitute, and the substitute Is found hut b/en QUC
ml!. in the long run he is sure to be found. That Napoleon - this particular Corsican -
should hive been the military dictator made necessary by the exhausting wars of the
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But only the most cynical observer can accept that analysis. The rest of us can see
leadership happening routinely all around us or. equally perversely can see the
Impact of Its absence. In pervasive and all too common contrasts, people In
positions of power who do not provide the necessary guidance prove just as
vividly, by the destructive nature of their passivity, the relevance of the concept
of leadership: i.e. 'any action that focuses resources toward a beneficial end'.
Leadership Is as old as mankind. It is universal, and Inescapable. It exists
everywhere; In formal organization and informal bodies such as mess
demonstrations. Leadership is, for all Intents and purposes, a salient feature of
organization. For leodarslL(9 to exEst. of course. there &e.c ta be e qraiiq bet
wherever a group exists, there Is always a form of leadership.8 Among the
various aspects of leadership, political leadership, In particular In the nation
state, occupies a special position. It Is not that It is intrinsically different In
kind or character from leadership in other organizations, but it is rather more
visible and, ostensibly at least, vastly more important since It encompasses and
Incorporates many functions. Within each nation, political leadership can
command and reach out widely and extensively; and the rulers of the most
important nations have a resonance that carries an International level, some in
areas and in a limited number of fields, continue to depend on the leadership of
the most important states, while at the regional framework of public life. If one
reduces political leaders, both at home and abroad, what remains once everything
else has been erased; they are the most universal • the most recognized, the most
talked about elements of political life.
Given this recognized importance of political leadership, it is pr/n,., 1w/a
surprising that a general analysis of the phenomenon should be so little
advanced.9 There has been change In, and indeed a marked awakening to, the
French Republic - that was a matter of chance... Quoted In Sidney Hook, THE HERO IN
HISTORY, Boston : Boston Press. 1943, pp.78-79.
86iven that this thesis attempts to show that leadership is a behavioural concept,
the definition of leadership must therefore be behavioural i.e. defining leadership
within the context of organized groups. See Chapter One, Section One, pp. 19-2 1.
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importance to the subject from the mid 1970's. In addition to this, there is no
generally accepted definition of the concept, a characteristic that seems to apply
also to leadership In general. 10 There Is an effort to survey the field, to map
out the directions in which the study of political leadership needs to be
undertaken; but there is limited concentration on what might be the core element
of the concept. Perhaps this is because there is concern not to lose sight of the
many ways In which leadership should be examined.
Yet It is not permissible to undertake brood, indeed general, studies of a subject
without attempting to delineate as precisely as possible, the boundaries of that
subject. Thus, a definition of leadership must be sought even If. because It has to
be general, It is of necessity rather vague and may demand further elaboration
over time. However, a definition needs to be given in order to clarify the
distinction between what should be described as the core, the central aspect of
leadership, and elements that are tributaries of or dependent on this core. 1 1
Therefore, what is political leadership? It is manifestly and essentially a
phenomenon of power: it is power because It consists of the ability of the one or
few who are the top to make others do a number of things (positively or
negatively) that they would not or at least might not have done. But, it is not, of
course, just any kind of power. It appears to be power exercised from the top
down, so to speak: the leader is, in various ways, 'above' the notion (in the case
of national political leadership) and can 'guide' the rest of the citizens. However,
leaders often guide as well as follow their masses. It might also be added that this
ability of the leader Is also durable and indeed, in some cases, can be exercised
for a long period. Thus It seems possible to define political leadership, and
specifically national political leadership, as the power exercised by one or a few
9See Chapter One, Section One, pp. 8-9 ror a discussion on this aspect.
10James MacGregor Burns in his analysis reflects on the lack or a general theory on
political leadership and the temptations to resort to the hypothesizing of a limitless
assortment of psychological, social, and political variables In the shaping of political
leadership and the making of history.
11 See Chapter One, Section One, p. 23 for a contingency model and a set of
typologles on the multidisciplinary perspectives of leadership.
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individuals to direct members of the nation towards action.
The potential immensity of such a power of leaders Is, of course, immediately
apparent: this imleed already provides an insight into what might be one of the
reasons why national political leadership poses fundamental questions about Its
origins, its mode of operation and its effect. Indeed, the potential, and on
occasion the actual immensity of the power, also reveals in part why, at first
sight surprisingly, political theorists have not studied leadership directly and
systematically. Instead, the study of leadership, especially within 18th and 19th
Century political theory has tended to be viewed in terms of an examination of the
mechanisms by which the actions of leaders would be sufficiently constrained so
as not to encroach unduly upon the lives of citizens.
Yet, after a lot of time and effort has been devoted to studying leadership, the
time may have come to consider all aspects of leadership 1 not merely In order to
ensure that the lives of citizens are more secure but In order to see how the
power of leaders can be positively harnessed for the good of mankind. For If the
power of loaders can be exercised to control, dominate and subjugate, It can
surely be exercised to uplift, Improve and develop. As It Is manifest that the
condition of mankind deserves amelioration, and as leadership happens to be a
power that can affect mankind, It Is clearly valuable - indeed, imperative - to
see how this power can help to bring about a 'better' state of affairs in our
societies. This is particularly so since political leadership appears to be one of
the clearest ways in which men and women can be induced to work Jointly for the
improvement of their lot; leadership seems able, by virtue of what It is, both to
bring citizens together in a concerted effort and to do so over time by gradual
achievements aimed at a common goal. Thus, while leadership may be a negative
tool, it con also be one of the most powerful means of leading to collective action.
not Just severally and in a direct manner, but in a common endeavour over
substantial periods: it con thus result in development for the whole society.
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In the course of the last few decades, views about political leadership hove begun
to change. They are changing In part because the role of leadership itself has
altered as a result of the major emphasis given. In the contemporary world, to
social and economic development; they are changing also because, as a result,
leadership has come to be viewed more positively, more constructively, than in
the past; and they are changing, though more slowly, because a close examination
of the impact of leaders has made the traditional ideological dichotomy between
'good' and 'bad' leaders seem increasingly unrealistic, as increasingly realistic as
the thesis that is held by those who feel that 'leaders do not matters since they are
only agents of history.
Perhaps the most Important changes result from the fact that In democratic
societies, leadership has come to be concerned principally with the improvement
of social and economic conditions. Of course, this role of leadership Is neither
entirely new nor wholly exclusive. In the past, too, rulers have had to be
concerned, to some extent, with the economy and with social life. This economic
and social role was not viewed as a primary, let alone principal function of
leaders, however; more Important, It was not viewed In the context of a dynamic
process of development of society. 12 By and large, up to and Including the
nineteenth century, the most Important problems for leaders was to consolidate
their authority and power, to maintain peace at home and to ensure that the
country was protected externally. For some • the maintenance of internal order
hod to be the main preoccupation; for others - probably the majority - the main
task was to defend their country against the ambitions of other rulers - or else to
attempt to Increase the size of their territory.13
Of course, neither of these functions have disappeared In the Twentieth Century.
International relations, peaceful or not, continue to be a major preoccupation for
many leaders, and not merely those of the largest nations. As a matter of fact, the
12This is especially true with the penetration or the state into society and the
assertion of functions and responsibility of political leaders.
135ce Cha pter One, Section Two, pp. 37-45 for a discussion on some of the functions
and preoccupations of political leaders.
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feeling remains that Involvement In world affairs Is in some sense more 'exalted'
than the 'mere' preoccupation of the whole area covered by the social and
economic affairs. 14 Moreover, the 'flight Into foreign affairs' is not merely the
result of a feeling that to become a leader is to be able to deal with world
problems, or Indeed that it Is necessary to fight colonialism, Imperialism or even
communism on a world front, as Nasser did. The concern with foreign affairs is
also an opportunity, consciously realized or not, systematically or not, to achieve
results on the home front by providing a diversion from the daily preoccupations
of citizens and by fostering a sense of national Identity and pride In the country's
achievements.15
The reason why external and internal purposes have often been mixed is in large
part from the fact that loaders have been unable as ever to ensure internal order
and maintain themselves In office. 16 The prospects of military coups and other
disturbances have affected large numbers of Third World countries during the
recent period. Thus, many a leader In these countries has been displaced by a
coup or faced some sort of violent disturbance.
Yet, while foreign affairs and Internal order continue to be subjects of major
preoccupation among contemporary rulers, the main focus of attention has been on
universal social and economic problems. These problems are not merely at the
centre of the preoccupations of leaders; nor Is the lack of concern with
development widely Interpreted as the main reason why leaders fall. The most
crucial point Is that social and economic development Is vIewed as a process which
has to take place at a sustained rate If It Is to achieve results, a process that, at
14For a discussion of this In the case of Nasser, see Chapter III, Section one pp 157-
170.
155ir Anthony Nutting, In an interview with the author emphasized that for all his
foreign involvements, Nasser helped to give Egypt and the Arabs that sense of dignity
which for him was the hallmark of independent, nationhood. For despite every reverse
that he and the people suffered, Egypt and the whole Arab world would have been the
poorer, on spirit as well as material progress, without. the dynamic inspiration of his
leadership. November, 1955, London.
16 it is recognized that these two factors need to be separated in democratic
countries, in contrast to the majority of Third World countries.
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the same time, creates tensions while development Is taking place. Modern
political loaders do not choose to be concerned with the continuous improvement
of their societies; they have to take this concern on board or they may not stay in
office unless they hold power In a coercive way 11 . The population often demands
that their lot be improved and, even If they do not, the leaders themselves believe
that It is their duty to achieve social and economic progress. This view of
leadership as a latent force, to be called or summoned Into being by a collective
Impulse only appears when a collective desire has reached an overwhelming
strength. At those times, the desire Is not only keenly felt but also personified.
it stands before the eyes of the masses In a concrete, plastic and Individual shape.
The Intensity of the collective wish Is embodied In the leader.18
Almost certainly, this change in the principal role of leaders provoked the
transformation of attitudes towards leadership that has been noticeable in the
course of the last few decades. For if leaders are to be essentially concerned with
the 'cure' of social and economic Ills, and if this role entails the continuance,
guidance and direction of the population, It Is simply not possible to dismiss
leaders as unimportant. On the contrary: leadership has to be viewed as
continuously playing a positive part in developing society. Efforts have therefore
to be made to ensure that loaders do fulfil this positive role. This entails, in the
first instance, a precise determination of the personal qualities and Institutional
support that are appropriate.19
It is understandable that Judgements on leaders and on leadership should have so
often been negative in the past and even to the present day. So many rulers have
been tyrants and despots that the natural reaction has been to try to reduce their
power by setting up institutions that acted as many hurdles against encroachments
11For the motivations of leadership, see Chapter One, Section One, pp . 31-34.
18 E. Gonzales. CUBA UNDER CASTRO : The Limits of Charisma. Boston : Houghton.
1977. pp.23-27; Orrin [. Klapps. SYMBOLIC LEADERS. Chicago : Aldine Press, 1964.
p.23.
19This thesis is developed by 1.1. Greenst.ein, The Impact of Personality on Politics
An Attempt to Clear Away Leadership, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW,
September, 1967, Vol.6 1, pp.629-47; Also see Chapter One, Section One. pp.
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by the 'executive' power. Consistent with this view, the prevailing effort was
directed towards discovering how people could ensure their protection against
leadership, not towards determining how leaders could be made best use 01.20
Max Weber's model of authority and Its analysis helped to change this approach.
In the special case of societies in crisis, the German sociologist showed that
loaders could be the central point of a new legitimacy. In this he went further
than even those who recognized that some exceptional leaders could play a crucial
part In helping to bring about the new institutions of the state. For Rousseau's
legislator was merely a catalyst; he embodied the views of the people, was better
than the people, perhaps his function was to make the population see the light.
Weber's charismatic leader genuinely constructed the polity.21 He brought
together what was divided into many fragments and what, without him, would have
remained in fragments. However, Webers standpoint of the national saviour was
partial, because it was concerned only with the extraordinary periods of crisis
during which legitimacy had broken down.22
It may seem unrealistic to claim that the vision of the Ideal rulers emerges from
the 'ugly mistakes' that occurred in the Twentieth Century with respect to some
leaders. Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin are names associated with excesses only; so
are the names of the dictators who emerged in the Third World. But other leaders
have more than compensated for these mistakes; In addition to Roosevelt,
Churchill and Nehru, even some of the more ruthless leaders such as Mao. and
some of the more humane 'populists' such as Nasser and Tito. have contributed to
the build-up of a composite image, Indeed of an 'Ideal-type, an ideal type which
the reality of contemporary leaders only approximates, but whose characteristics
con be identified. 23 This identification is essential because it makes it possible
See D.D. Searing, Models and Images of Man and Society in Leadership Theory.
JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Feb. 1969. Vol.30, pp.30-i.
21 See Chapter Two, ror details on how the charismatic leader constructs his polity.
22See Chapter Three, Section One, pp. 12i-126; Also Hans H. loch, Crisis
Situations and Ideological Revolution, PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY. Spring 1956.
pp.53-67.
23Joef S. Iligdal. Vision and Practice : The Leader. The State. and the
Transformation of Society, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW. January.
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to see what personal qualities and Institutional types of support are needed if
leadership is to fulfil the continuous and positive role that social and economic
development - Indeed, the survival of the world - manifestly require.24
Lenin once said that the energy of the working class hod to be harnessed for the
revolution 1 and that the party, like the pistons of a steam engine, was the means
by which this energy could be stored and provide maximum power. A similar
remark could be made about leadership. What Is required Is the discovery of the
mechanisms by which the energy of leaders can best be used to the advantage of
mankind - not so much by building girders or other protective arrangements, but
by finding on outlet and a direction In which the mind, and also the emotions -
Indeed, the whole personality of leaders - can most profitably be used.25
6.3 THE CONCEPT OF CHAR!SIIATIC POLITICAL LEADERS
A scholar who proposes to Identify his research with a concept that has been
attacked as ambiguous, that has been seriously questioned as an analytic tool, and
that has boon considerably debased In popular usage must somehow come to terms
with the controversy that has surrounded it. Of the many concepts contemporary
social science owes to Max Weber, that 01 charisma may well be one of the most
controversial. Since I am more Interested In analyzing a particular type of
political leadership than In adding to the elaborate exegesis already surrounding
the work of Weber, the question arises as to why I should have chosen the route of
rashness rather than of discretion. To analyze the phenomenon that interests me
-which I have called charismatic political leadership - I might alternatively hove
minted a new term, If not necessarily a new concept, as yet untainted by prior
1988, Vol.9. 1, pp.33-36.
245ee Jerzy J. Waiti, introduction : Political Leadership from a Comparative
Perspective, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW April. 1988. Vol.9 1 2,
pp.91-94.
25Sec Yehezkel Dror	 Visionary Political Leadership : On Improving a Risky
Requisite, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol.9, No.1, January, 1988.
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associations. The reason for this choice is fairly simple. I happen to feel that
the discipline of political science Is already overburdened with overlapping
concepts and terms and that restraint rather than inventiveness is In order. Of
the conceptual artillery, 'charismatic leadership' most closely approximates the
particular political process with which I proposed to deal.
We associate the notion of charismatic leadership with Weber's now classic
classification of authority into three ideal types on the basis of their claims to
legitimacy. The first type, traditional authority, is derived from 'an established
belief In the sanctity of immemorial traditions'. Legal or rational authority is
based upon the belief In the legality of rules and on the right of those who occupy
posts by virtue of those rules to issue commands. Charismatic authority differs
from the other types In two fundamental respects. Traditional and legal rational
authority are institutionalized in belief systems and are therefore vested in the
role rather than in the person. In contrast, the locus of charismatic authority is
In the capacity of a particular person to rouse and maintain belief In himself and
his mission as the source of authority.26
Charismatic authority Is therefore highly personal. It follows that traditional
and legal-rational authority are relatively enduring, whereas charismatic
authority is transitory and unstable, being contingent upon the particular person
and his continued ability to Inspire faith in himself as the fount of authority.
While the belief systems underlying the former types provide the legitimate
bases for the enactment of leadership roles within them, It is the exercise of
charismatic leadership that legitimizes and sustains charismatic authority in this
sense, charismatic leadership can be considered the 'purest' form of leadership,
for It serves to create the very authoritative component of the belief system upon
which it rests.21




A close reading of Weber makes it clear that he, no less than contemporary
students of leadership, recognized that leadership Is a relational phenomenon.
Involving the interaction of leader and followers towards goals and within the
context of situations. As Weber emphasizes repeatedly, it Is not necessarily what
the leader is hut how he Is perceived hy his followers. That is decisive for the
validity of charisma. What Is alone Important Is how the Individual is actually
regarded by those subjects to charismatic authority. Many may feel called to
leadership but few, after all, are chosen. What a leader Is and does - his
personality and actions - may help to shape follower reactions. But crucial to
their responses to his call Is that which they see In and feel about him. Between
an aspiring leader's claim and its acceptance by potential followers are two
Important mediating factors. One is what he projects and they perceive as
desirable In him - his 'image' In the current jargon. Insofar as charisma can be
seen as a quality of an Individual, it lies In his capacity to project successfully.
an image of himself as an extraordinary leader.28
Not mentioned by Weber but essential in understanding the charismatic
relationship and especially its projective-perceptual dimension Is a second
mediating factor. This Is the conceptions of the desirable and the extraordinary
in a leader shared by members of the group or the society for which leadership is
claimed. Since groups and societies can differ In their dominant cultural
definitions of preferred leadership qualities, it Is not surprising that the
attributes of charismatic leaders have varied among societies and among groups
within societies.29
It cnn be argued that what has been asserted so for does not yet adequately
The culUvation of Nasser's image In terms of the appeal or Arab Nationalism Is
discussed in Chapter Three. Section rwo. pp. 228-24i.
Dennis Kavanagh. CrlsIs, Charisma and British Political Leadership : Winston
Churchill, Paper delivered at Ninth World Congress of Political Science. Montreal,
Aug. 1973; Dankwart A. Rustow, Ataturk as Founder of a Stat.e. in PHILOSOPHERS
AND KINGS Studies In Leadership. ed., Dankwart A. Rustow, Hew York : 6eorge
Brazlllon, 1970, p.209.
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diacrimineto between loodorahip in general and Ito oharlemotlo variant. Mi
leadership is relational and is similarly mediated through projections and
perceptions of on aspirant leader's claims, attributes, actions, and potential for
action and through cultural values relevant to leadership. What then
distinguishes these projective-perceptuol and cultural aspects of the followers'
acceptance of a leader in the charismatic relationship from those same aspects of
followers acceptance in any leadership relationship?
What is taken to be the core of Weber's concept Implicitly distinguishes
charismatic leadership from other leadership In both the affoctual or emotional
dimension and the cognitive dimension. Mmittedly, It can be argued that any
emotion or affect is a matter of Intensity or degree. Nonetheless, a consideration
of some of the emotional responses called forth by or directed toward loaders
suggests that there is a qualitative distinction between what might superficially
be considered merely different degrees or Intensities of the same type of
affect.3°
Leaders tend to elicit the emotions symbolized by affection and popular leaders
can arouse them to a high degree. I would argue that the affect denoted by awe and
reverence is not merely an extension of affection and admiration but is also
different in kind. Such emotions - devotions, awe, reverence, and, above all,
blind faith - are what the charismatic leader generates in his followers. Thus,
while the charismatic relationship Is far from unique In the fact of an emotional
bond between leader and followers, the components of this emotional bond are
peculiar to It.31
An examination of the cognitive dimension, I.e. the terms in which the leader Is
perceived, suggests that here also there is a marked distinction between
305ee James V. Downton, Jr. Charisma as a Psychological Exchange. In REBEL
LEADERSHIP : Commitment and Charisma In the Revolutionary Process, New York : The
Free Press, 1973. pp.222-226.
31 Dorothy Emmet, FUNCTION, PURPOSE AND POWERS. New York MacmIllan, 1958.
p.242; Ann Ruth Whiner and Dorothy Whiner. The Rise and Role or CharismatIc
Leaders, ANNALS, 355, 1965, pp.77-88.
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charismatic leadership end other leadership relationships. Even a highly popular
leader can afford rather few errors of judgement In the eyes of his followers
(unless he holds power In a coercive system) If popularity and support ore not to
fall away. In the charismatic relationship, once It has been achieved, the leader
Is relatively Immune from such constraints as long as the relationship prevails.
In the cognitive dimension, this relationship Involves abdication of choice and of
judgement by followers and the surrender of the mandate to choose and Judge the
leader.32
In these terms, the leader is perceived as somehow more than human, possessing
seemingly supernatural gifts of heroism. He Is seen as endowed with magical
powers, emotionally he is tendered responses appropriate to a demigod,
cognitively he Is perceived as a demigod. It is not difficult to delineate in
contemporary terms the elements entering Into this perception and to indicate the
basic attributes the leader has for his following. This cognitive dimension can be
broken down into its descriptive, normative, and prescriptive components (I.e.
what is, what should be, what should be done). By his followers, the charismatic
leader is held to be uniquely capable of cognitively structuring or restructuring
the world. His orientations are their orientations. For them, it Is his existential
definitions of pest and present, his normative visions of the future, and his
prescriptions for action they accept. It therefore can be inferred that they
perceive him as outstanding In wisdom, outstanding in presence, and possessing
the power to bring into being the goals they share.33
Here can be brought in other elements of the interaction process in leadership:
goal, and situation, as they impinge on the leader-follower relationship. The
charismatic leader's proclamation of his goal or mission may play no small part
Alexander Mitscherllch. Changlng Patterns of Authority : A Psychiatric
Interpretatlon In Lewis J. Edinger (ed.) POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN INDUSTRIALIZED
SOCIETIES, New York John Wiley & Sons, 1967. pp.26-58.
3 See Edward A. Shils, Charlsma, Order, and Status, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW. Vol.30. No.2, AprIl, 1965, pp.201-203; Also Leo Lowenthal and Norbert
6uterman, Self Portrait of the Fascist Agltator, In Alvin Gouldner (ed.) STUDIES IN
LEADERSHIP. New York : Harper & Brothers, 1959, p.99.
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In Initially generating the charismatic relationship. insofar as specification of
goals can be soon as Instrumental In the development of any leadership
relationship, In this respect it is not a discriminating factor. However, once the
relationship Is attained, there Is a difference. Then it Is undeniable that It Is the
leader who sets the goals and selects the means. He can change them at will, even
Into quite opposite ones than those Initially specified, without necessarily losing
support, as long as the relationship holds. It might be noted in passing that the
goals of charismatic leaders are generally expressed In universalistic and
transcendental terms and In such fashion as to seem to incorporate the more
limited and particularistic goals of various groups of followers.34
Situation also play a major role In the generation of the charismatic relationship,
as they do for leader-follower relationships In general. Charismatic affect in
followers may Initially arise in part because the loader can Identify their
situations in ways that best satisfy their emotional needs. 35 Here again.
however, once the charismatic relationship comes into existence, the leader's
definitions of subsequent situations becomes article of faith for the followers. As
long as the relationship holds, reality for the followers is what the leader
declares is to be because it is he who declares it so.36
The maintenance of the charismatic relationship may well depend upon the
continued ability to provide 'proofs' or 'miracles'. 37 U may be argued,
however, that the strongest proof for the existence of such a relationship is the
acceptance by a following of the leader's definition of an empirical situation that
Is manifestly at variance with the definition that would be provided by a non
follower or by the hypothetical omniscient, Impartial observer. The discrepancy
34Hadiey Cantril. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, New York : John Wiley &
Sons, 1963, p.64.
35For a discussion on the situational approach to Political Leadership. see Chapter
One, Section Two, pp . 47-49.
ibld.. p. 48.
37PIax Weber, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION. Translated by
All. Henderson and Talcott Parsons: New York : Oxford University Press, 1947.
p.355.
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between a given 'reality' and what the leader can make it appear to be for his
followers Is the ultimate test of his specifically charismatic hold on them.38
A charismatic relationship can exist between a leader and his followers without
the loader's attaining formal political power or office, as might be exemplified by
6andhl. A charismatic relationship may arise between a leader already in public
office and sizable segments of his political public only in the course of his career
In office. The 'signs' of charismatic appeal may not even precede a leader's
accession to office; in fact, his behaviour in office may serve as one of the means
of generating charismatic affect. A contemporary example of this is Ronald
Reagan who was initially Oovernor of California and later President of the United
States of America. A charismatic leader may come to power by plebiscitary
moans, but does not necessarily have to do so. A charismatic leader may, and
frequently does, have a revolutionary Impact upon the beliefs and behaviour of a
small group of followers Initially and subsequently upon a larger following.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that a charismatic leader is necessarily a
revolutionary leader in the sense of attaining office or formal power by
revolutionary means; although he may do so. Nor, conversely, does entry Into
office through revolutionary or other nonpiebiscitary means signify the existence
of a charismatic relationship extending beyond the circle of the loader and his
immediate followers.39
The distinctions made above may be illustrated from an example among national
loaders of this century. The case of Nasser exemplifies respectively pro-
accession and post-accession generation of charisma by so called revolutionary
loaders. Nasser rose to public office through a military career and did not
initially gain office through genuine plebiscites. Nasser was initially known
merely as one of a group of officers who toppled the Egyptian monarchy. Only
later did it became apparent that he had been the mainspring of the coup.
38SLenley Clark. loward a Psychology of Charisma : The Innovation Viewpoint of
Robert Tucker. PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS. 23. 1968. pp.1 163-1166.
Judith M. Brown 6ANDHIS ROAD TO POWER Indian Politics. 1915-1922. London
Cambridge University Press, 1972. p.346.
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Meanwhile, General Mohammed Naguib, because of his seniority and prestige, had
been co-opted to serve as the apparent leader of the new regime. It was he who
garnered support for It and seemed to have captured the popular Imagination. Yet
in the course of time. Nasser in his own right would appear to have generated
charismatic support from significant sectors of the Egyptian population,
particularly after the takeover of the Suez Cnnal.
The example of Nasser and the development of charisma in the course of office
bring up the problem of mass communications and 'managed' charisma, especially
In regard to single party regimes. In the case of Nasser in which a political
loader obtained power through a coup and proceeded to control mass media whose
resources wore then exploited for widespread glorification of the loader, It might
be argued that even though charismatic appeal or its appearance results
therefore, this is 'spurious' or 'manufactured' charisma.41
Such a distinction is Important mainly for examining the strategies of
charismatic legitimation, i.e. the methods by which a leader gains and sustains
charismatic support from a large following. It Is not relevant for Identifying the
existence of such a relationship. Just as leaders can attain formal office in
different ways, the phenomenon of charismatic leadership can arise in many ways
under different sets of circumstances. Whether its genesis is fortuitous or
contrived Is irrelevant to the fact of its existence, although relevant to the
methodological problems that would be involved in determining that fact. Mass
communication media can serve as a powerful means for promoting charismatic
appeal, but it is doubtful whether they can create it where there is no basis for
its generation. 42 Thus, to assert that charisma or the charismatic relationship
Mohammed Hassanein HeIkal, NASSER, Political Documentary on British Television,
Channel Four Programme. 14th November. 1986. Recorded Footage.
41 For a discussion on this aspect see Joseph Bensman and Michael Givant. Charisma
and Modern : The Use and Abuse of a Concept, SOCIAL RESEARCH. 57, Winter. 1975.
pp.571-GO; Also Ronald Glassman, Legitimacy and Manufactured Charlsma, SOCIAL
RESEARCH. 69. Winter, 1975, pp.615-636.
426iassman. Legitimacy and Manufactured Charisma, op.clt.. p.621; John Waite
Bowers and Michael M. Osborn, Attitudinal Effects of Metaphors in Persuasive
Speeches, SPEECH MONOGRAPHS. 33, June 1966. pp. 127-55.
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cannot exist in a modern society because it is created by or becomes the victim of
modern technology Is to commit the logical fallacy of confusing a phenomenon with
the means of its genesis. One finds similarly specious reasoning In arguments to
the effect that charismatic leadership Is to a greater extent a phenomenon of the
pre-Industrial world, of the pro-Cartesian West, or of parts of Asia and Africa
today, because it has been peculiar to political milieu conditioned exclusively or
to a large extent by magical, ritualistic, or mystically religious elements.
Certainly there have been close linkages, if not identities, in much of the past
world and in parts of the contemporary world between the realm of politics and
that of religion or magic. It does not necessarily follow, however, that a divorce
between politics on the one hand and religion or magic on the other automatically
confers on religion exclusive custody of mysticism, ritual and emotion.43
Another logical fallacy is Involved In the over-identification of the phenomenon
with Its possible consequences and the subsequent reasoning from the latter to the
former. We are accustomed to thinking of the charismatic leader as typically
mobilizing a following In opposition to a given order and in assertion and pursuit
of the possibility of a new order. Yet there are leaders who generate a
charismatic relationship and seek to preserve a prevailing order from
dissolution. In other words, there can also be charismatic leaders of nativistic
movements, as exemplified by the Mandi of the Sudan.44
6.4 THE IDENTIFICATION OF CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
By defining and clarifying the concept of charismatic political leadership one has
attempted to provide the foundation of the conceptualized phenomenon. In order to
make the concept operational for the purpose of comparative empirical research,
43 Thomas Dow Jr., The Role of Charisma in Modern African Development. SOCIAL
FORCES. 46. March. 1969, p.337.
44See Richard H. Dekmejian and Margaret J. Wyszomiskl, Charismatic Leadership in
Islam : The Mandi of the Sudan in COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY.
14, No.2, 1972. pp.193-214.
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further guidelines are needed. This section is therefore devoted to the problem of
providing guidelines or indicators that can be used to recognize the phenomenon of
charismatic political leadership and to identify charismatic political leaders.
The most direct evidence of political charisma might be obtained by survey
research directed toward ascertainin g the responses of a public to a political
leader. One of the many advantages of survey research Is the opportunity it
affords to discriminate among types of perceptions and their content. Another,
depending upon the sample of respondents selected, Is the possibility of eliciting
the distribution of responses, charismatic or otherwise, among various segments
of a public by correlating them with other Items of data obtained from the
respondents.
I am not aware of surveys specifically designed to test the presence or absence of
charismatic political appeal. Flowever, surveys that generally test public
attitudes towards political leaders can serve as a useful source of what might be
called 'charismatic responses', especially If they Include open ended questions
whose answers can be coded in accordance with criteria designating charismatic
content. It is often difficult or, in some instances, impossible to undertake
research of this type on contemporary leaders, not to mention those who have
passed Into history. Nonetheless other kinds of material gathered for other
purposes or stored in government or historical archives can also be a fruitful
source of empirical data on charismatic responses.
Less direct evidence, but also useful, are those items found in accounts of
scholars, reliable journalists, and others who have had opportunities to observe
directly.the responses of particular public statements recorded in such accounts
and can testify to the Incidence, If not the extent, of charismatic perceptions of a
political leader. This Is particularly true of statements whose content suggests
Imputations of powers or qualities not found in most leaders. Retroactive
evidence of the existence of charismatic appeal of a leader can be obtained in many
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ways from former followers. Their convictions seem relatively unshaken by
Interpretations to the contrary by individuals whose knowledge they respect.
The disinclination of sometime charismatic followers to recognize flaws in the
Judgement of their leaders Is Illustrated by the opinion held by such people who
claim that Nasser's mistakes could be attributed to the fact that he was misled by
his political asslstants45
Secondary evidence on the presence of charisma includes the responses of large
audiences gathered to hear a speech of a political leader or evidence of
demonstrations. One is particularly dependent upon the acuteness, eye for detail,
and discriminatory powers of the observer and recorder. It Is important, even
though difficult in some contexts, to discriminate between spontaneous responses
and directed or semi-coerced responses and between enthusiastic reactions of
approval to statements on the 'Issue' and charismatic acclamation of the person of
the leader.
In attempting to discriminate between enthusiastic responses on issues and
frenzied acclamation of a leader, such acclamation from audiences, many of whose
members understand the 'language' in which a political leader addresses them,
might seem significant. However, It Is necessary to distinguish between societies
and situations In which enthusiasms for, acclamation of, or signs of deference
toward a leader are the traditional response to the appearance of any leader and
those in which they ore not. More reliable Indicators of a lenders charismatic
hold on a following are examples of actions they have performed at his bidding or
on his behalf which run counter to some of their most cherished values.47
Reactions to the possibility of the death of a leader con serve as indicators of
beliefs In his Indispensability. The emotional Intensity of responses to the death
45 lntervlew with Peter Mansfield, July. 1989. London.
46Leland Bowie and R. Hrair Dekmejian, Nasirs Rote and Legacy I and Ii ., THE
MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, Vol.30, No.2, Spring 1976. pp.142-172.
47Wilton Wynn. NASSER OF EGYPT 	 The Search for Dignity. Cambridge. Mass
Arlington Beaks, 1969. pp.134-149.
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of a leader, especially when succession Is institutionally provided for, might
suggest the degree to which his person has been seen as transcending his
occupancy of office. There are admittedly problems of isolating the cIarismatic
content of responses to the death of a leader brought about by accident or
assassination. The complex emotions generated in many societies by violent death
or deliberate murder, Including those of shock and horror, can complicate the
analysis of emotional responses such as grief, loss, and a sense of abandonment.
Martyrdom is not equivalent to charisma, although It may serve to generate
postmortem retroactive attribution of charismatic leadership.48
To detect the radius of a charismatic relationship, La. the size of a charismatic
following and its duration would necessitate the search for such Indicators over a
cross section or sample of followers and over time. Empirical research of this
type not only would tell us how far, among whom, and for how long the
charismatic appeal of a particular political leader extended, but also would enable
us to assess in any particular case the relative weights of the strategies employed
In gaining and maintaining a charismatic following. Such empirical research
might also help to clarify the relationships between charismatic political
leadership and formal political leadership, which can exist in conjunction with
each other as well as separately and each of which can serve as one of the means
for gaining the other.49 Ideally, we should study charismatic leaders who have
not gained office as well as those political leaders who have developed a
charismatic following either before or only after gaining public office.
Similarly, charismatic leadership arising with established political
organizations, I.e. charismatic factional leadership, should be studied as well as
that commonly associated with the founding of a new political movement.50
4aFor a discussIon on John F. Kennedys legacy and how the death of a leader can
elevate him/her to sainthood see. Dorothy Wiliner, RituaI. Myth and the Murdered
President, in THE REALISM OF THE EXTRA HUMAN. ed., A. Bharat. The Hague : Mouton,
pp.401-420.
M.A. Toth, THE THEORY OF TWO CHARISMAS, Washington DC University Press of
America, 1966. pp.67-69.
Mohammed Naguib, E6YPS DESTINY. New York : Doubleday. 1955. pp.215-216.
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Another pattern I that of the leader who I one of cvcrol original foundcr of or
who emerges from a political clique that later becomes a charismatic movement.
He may have few or no charismatic followers before the accession of his group to
formal power and of himself to chief public office. Prior to or soon after the
acquiring of power, there may be an Internal struggle for leadership In which he
emerges triumphant over his rivals end thus becomes In the public eye the
personification of the movement. Indeed, the movement itself may have no
existence and ideology as such until he develops them. Nasser exemplifies this
pattern.51
6.5 GENERALIZATIONS ON THE CHARISMATIC PERSONALITY
An examination of the conditions for the emergence of the charismatic political
phenomenon would be far from complete without consideration for shared personal
characteristics of charismatic leaders.
The generation of the charismatic political phenomenon can undoubtedly be
explained in part by a convergence of social conditions culminating in a crisis
that involves institutional failures to meet a society's needs and of Its members'
subjective perceptions of and psychological responses to such a crisis. Such an
explanation, however, should not neglect the role of the leader as catalyst.52
Aspirants for national political leadership frequently face the necessity to
mobilize support from diverse groups with traditions and interests somewhat
different from their own and from those of that group In their societies which
originally supported them. The successful national political loader must often be
a man of many faces, capable of arousing and convincing many audiences. If its
true for political leaders in general, It Is even more so for those who elicit from
diverse groups the quality and intensity of support that Is charismatic.53
51 Enver M. Koury. ThE PATTERNS OF MASS MOVEMENTS IN ARAB REVOLUTIONARY -
PRO6RESSIVE STATES, The Hague : Mouton. 1970. pp.150-155.
See Chapter Three, Section One. pp. 127-135 on Nassers role as leader and
catalyst.
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What makes for political ambitions and political success is a subject that has long
fascinated and will undoubtedly continue to Interest students or political
leadership. Some hove advanced and developed the concept of a particular
political personality a character type in pursuit of power over other values. In
the effort to find the common denominators or common determinants of such a
type, considerable attention has been devoted to the family backgrounds and early
histories of successful political leaders, particularly by scholars concerned with
the motivational and personality factors underlying the ambitions and behaviour
of political leaders.
Other scholars who are interested in accounting for the success of outstanding
political figures examine their social origins and early environments from the
point of view. The modern charismatic leader has been characterized as 'a
marginal man of a marginal group' In the society that he claims to represent and
comes to rule.54 These charismatic leaders, It is suggested, were motivated by
the frustration of their marginality, both social and psychological, and appealed
to frustrated and marginal people in their societies. This theme is in accord with
the well known hypothesis concerning the displacement of private affect or
frustration upon public objects.55
The marginality and displacement hypothesis may account in part, or perhaps
sufficiently, for those favouring psychoanalytically oriented actions, for the
inner drive or motivation toward political leadership by some individuals. Their
utility in explaining the success of these men would appear somewhat limited.
Evidence or this factor Is evident In the organizational structure of Nasser's Free
Officers where there .were perhaps as many shades of political belief as there were
numbers of Free Officer executives. Views ranged from extreme rightists, Islamic
Fundamentalists, and Fascists, to left-wing radical socialists and Communists. Any
contention, therefore, that the society embraced a group of officers with a common
Ideological or political persuasion is erroneous. P.J. Vatikiotis, THE E6YPTIAN ARMY
IN POLITICS : Pattern for New Nations?, Bloomington : Indiana University Press, p.68.
See Chapter One, Section Two, pp. 67-65 for a discussion on the marginality of the
charismatic leader.
The displacement hypothesis forms part of the Psychoanalytic Approach to
leadership theory. See Chapter One, Section Two, pp. 54-57
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Ilotivatlon, however strong and endurin g , can be only one com ponent of success.
The Implicit corollary of such theses is the vulnerability of the public to
displacement of private frustration. The public may well be frustrated but the
different Individuals and different groups that constitute any single national
political public may also have different bases for frustration and may perceive
remedies In different terms. Moreover, although many members of a society may
be marginal in some respects to whatever may be considered the society's
dominant group, the dimensions of marginality may differ among them and may
differ from those of the marginal aspirant leader.56
The research In Nasser's background suggests an alternative hypothesis with
somewhat greater potential for explaining his success as national leaders in
terms of personal environmental factors. This Is the thesis of olural Dossible
identifications by virtue of social origins and early exposure to varied
environments. Although Nasser may be seen as socially and/or psychologically
marginal to any dominant group of his society, by and large he could be identified
with or being capable of identifying with several different groups or segments
within them.51
Social and/or psychological marginality can result in social and/or psychological
flexibility. The individual who Is neither securely rooted nor stably placed
within one social group is less likely to accept, internalize, and express
exclusively the values and characteristic behaviour patterns of any single group
that one who Is. He has the advantages as well as the strains, of multiple
perspectives on the world. He is potentially able to communicate with members
of different strata or segments of his society In terms that are meaningful to
them. He can appear to display a more convincing empathy towards a broader
spectrum of his society than can the Individual whose exposure to more than one
group and Its norms has been limited. This plural set of possible identifications
can be attributed to one or some combination of three factors that have been
Ibid., p. 55
57Enver M. Koury, THE PATTERNS OF MASS MOVEMENTS IN ARAB REVOLUTIONARY-
PRO6RESSIVE STATES, op.clt., pp.147-160.
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Identified in Plasser's case. The first factor is heterogeneity rather than
homogeneity of family. The second factor is mobility and/or Instability of family
during childhood and/or youth of leader. Thirdly, the mobility of the leader and
consequent exposure to varied environments during childhood and/or youth.58
Nasser was descended, In the paternal line, from a family of Fellahin or peasants
from a village on the Nile. His family, however, possessed more land than most
fellow village families. His father had been upwardly mobile, had obtained a
secondary education, and had became a postmaster. His mother was a relatively
cultured urbanite, the daughter of a prosperous building contractor in
Alexandria. The period of Nassers childhood and/or youth was characterized by
residential mobility and consequent exposure to and participation In a variety of
social milieus. Nasser was only six months old when his family made the first of
several moves as his father was transferred from the post to post. He attended
school in a village, was sent to Cairo to live with an uncle, then to Alexandria
where he lived with his maternal grandparents, then back to Cairo and his uncle,
subsequently to a boarding school In Heiwan, and again to Cairo and Alexandria. in
the course of twelve years, he seems to have attended eight schools in four
communities.59
In researching the case of Gamal Abdel Nasser as a charismatic leader, certain
elements were discovered which enter into the capacity to project the Image of an
Individual endowed with extraordinary powers. It has been suggested that the
heterogeneity of background and exposure to a variety of social environments can
serve to develop or enhance the ability to communicate with and appeal to various
groups in a society in such a fashion as to strengthen the potentially charismatic
leader's claim upon each one of them.60
For details on this see Peter Mansfield. NASSER. London : Metheun Educational Ltd.
1969, pp.61-50.
59See Chapter Three, Section One, pp . 129-131. for Nasser's background and
education.
Abdel Latif Al Boghdadi, MEMOIRS. Part II, Cairo, Alexandria : Al Maktab ci MIri
al Hadith, 1977. pp.87-93.
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Most crucial to the arousal of charismatic perceptions of a leader in a following
are the qualities that he projects and that are attributed to him. However, there
are considerable variations In cultural definitions of esteemed and extraordinary
leadership qualities. It Is for this reason that it would seem difficult to discern a
set of attributes common to all or most charismatic leaders which can be designed
as a 'charismatic cluster'. Moreover, It may well be argued that the existence of
cultural difference does not preclude the existence of cultural similarities and
that some qualities or the appearance of them may be viewed as extraordinary in
all or most societies.
The first characteristic to be noted is that of a high energy level or an
extraordinary degree of vitality. Admittedly, this a quality about which available
data provide few precise or easily comparable indicators. Energy or vitality can
be expressed in many kinds of behaviour. Some individuals are capable of
dramatic bursts of energetic or frantic activity followed by periods of lassitude,
whereas others maintain a more even but nonetheless heavy output of energy.
Observers can be misled into mistaking magnetism or volubility or vigorous and
forceful gestures and mannerisms for vitality. The ability to maintain late hours
and exist on very little sleep while keeping a heavy schedule of activities seems
to be one Indicators of high energy. Capacity to work long hours without signs of
exhaustion would seem to be another indicator frequently mentioned in references
to the 'inexhaustible vitality' or 'prodigious energy' of a charismatic leader.
Nasser was reported frequently to maintain a working schedule from early in the
morning until early the following morning. Also offered as testimony of untiring
energy on the part of the leader has been the exhaustion of those who worked with
him or accompanied him on trips.61
It might be noted that statements about energy and vitality ought to be accepted
with some reservations. However, seemingly inexhaustible energy may well be
61 A1 Boghdadi, MEMOIRS. op.cit., pp.101-104.
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one of the modern functional equivalents of superhuman powers. It is often to the
advantage of a leader and his followers to exaggerate his capacities and to develop
a myth about his untiring dedication to work and unflagging vitality.
A second characteristic that seems to stand out Is presence of mind or composure
under conditions of stress and challenge. Many of these leaders hove been
portrayed as men who have not been easily frightened, disconcerted, or thrown off
balance. They hove exhibited coolness. Imperturobility, and even humour in the
face of danger or crisis. Being unmoved, obdurate or stubborn hove been
characteristic of many of the charismatic leaders. They seem to have carried
with them a 'demon' of determination that would not permit them to lose sight of
their goals or swerve from a particular tactic they hod decided upon, no matter
how remote from achievement the goals may have appeared to others or how
unwise the tactic. Moved by some Intuition or 'inner voice' and not discouraged
by the obstacles that seemed insuperable to those around them, they pursued the
courses they had set themselves.62
Another characteristic might be described as the capacity to project the image of
unusual mental attainments. One is not referring to leaders who can be
considered genuine Intellectuals who devoted some part of their lives to serious
study. It appears, however, that some of the others, primarily men of action and
not of scholarly bent, have bean able to seize upon information and ideas from
many sources and, often by dint of an excellent memory, conveying the Impression
of possessing a powerful mind and a wide range of knowledge. In addition.
charismatic leaders seem to hove exhibited a flair for originality and a capacity
for Innovation In their behaviour as politicians. Either they impinged standard
techniques In ways that wore novel or unprecedented in their societies or they
were sufficiently Imaginative to perceive the political potential of new
technological development and to utilize it.63
62 Koury, TIlE PATTERNS OF MASS MOVEMENTS IN ARAB REVOLLJTIONARY-PRO6RESSIVE
STATES. op.cit., p.141.
LucIan 1. Pye. The Non-Western Political Process, JOURNAL OF POLITICS. XX,
August, 1968. pp.469-486.
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It might also be noted, in empirical verification of Weber's thesis that charisma
rejects rational economic conduct, that a number of these charismatic leaders
have displayed a striking lack of interest in or a lack of understanding of
economic and financial affairs or both. Even when charismatic leaders publicly
and repeatedly proclaimed their concern with economic reform and betterment
they seemed somewhat naive in their approach to problems and programmes in
this orea.64
Finally, and perhaps not unrelated to this element in the leaders magnetism, is a
physical attribute common to a number of them - extraordinary eyes.
Charismatic leaders have differed so considerably In their physical appearance
that one cannot help but note and speculate about the significance of the single
physical feature attributed to a number of them. Nasser's eyes were described as
having latent hypnotic powers. It would certainly be interesting to ascertain
whether eyes, more than other features, tend to be perceived by people as
external Indicators of personal qualities of on individual. We tend to associate
hypnotic ability with eyes. Noses, cheeks, foreheads, and ears that are unusual
may be commented upon but rarely in conjunction with qualities of personality or
character. Mouths and chins may be associated with strength and weakness in the
possessor, but rarely with the implication of exerting force outwardly. The
statement that someone can kill with a look suggests the importance attached to
eyes. Perhaps some of the charm, magnetism, irresistible persuasiveness, or
power attributed to charismatic leaders by those who have had personal
encounters with them is related to the effect of their eyes and how they have used
them upon others.
6.6 CONCLUSION: THE LEOACY OF CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
As this thesis Is been devoted to the study of political leadership in general and
64Sir Anthony Nutting, interview with author. November, 1988. London.
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charismatic leadership in particular, to conclude by dealing in depth with the
legacy of charismatic political leadership would be premature and presumptuous.
Even to assess what has been wrought by the charisma of a single leader would be
a formidable enterprise and one to yield controversial results. Charismatic
leaders and their works have not only been controversial In their lifetime but
have remained subject to controversy for decades and even generations after their
deaths.65
Some journalists seem to have little trouble crediting some leader's
accomplishments to their political charisma. Students find this a hazardous task,
for there can be considerable difficulty In discerning whether or how much a
particular process can be attributed to a leader's charisma rather than other
factors. There is admittedly an easy way out of this difficulty in the cases of
leaders for whom charisma was salient in gaining power. It can be argued that
since their power was derived from their charisma, all that they have done with
that power can also be treated as derived from charisma.
Apart from the fact that this approach might be begging the question, it cannot
encompass the cases of leaders whose charisma was gained after they obtained
power. For when a charismatic political leader achieves the power and authority
of public office or when en incumbent of such office achieves charisma, It
becomes difficult to disentangle the results that can be attributed to the formal
powers of his office. Even when one is able to pinpoint charisma as the prime
cause of the success of an act or event, there is still an obstacle . How can one
measure the range of the impact at any time or over a period of time? The
immediate effects of a charismatic leader are often observable: ultimate impacts
may be difficult to detect and measure. Finally, there Is a problem of evaluating
the impact of charismatic leadership. Here controversy Is likely to be endemic.
There might be relative consensus, at either end of a spectrum, concerning what
followed from the charisma of Gandhi. Agreement about what was wrought by
Al Boghdadi, MEMOIRS. op.clt., p.19.
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Nasser's charisma Is hlohlv unlikel y. Nasser. who is oositivelv oerceived by
some people as having built an egalitarian society, is negatively seen by others as
having wrecked the once prosperous Egyptian economy and substituted a 'liberal'
monarchy with a dictatorship. That is why legacies of charismatic leaders have to
be rescued from true believers and harsh critics and why we need a basic
reconstruction of what the 'great men' left behind them.
Different basic value premises and different subjective preferences yield
different assessments of the results of charismatically Induced happenings and
consequences. And time may change perspectives and assessments. Given these
caveats, what can be be sold about the impact and legacy of charismatic political
leadership? Obviously, those who undertake minute historical reconstructions of
individual cases of political charisma will emerge with many and varied
conclusions. The few observations offered here are all derived from one such case
study.
During the stage of a leader's ascent to formal power, political charisma can
undoubtedly be a major asset. A charismatically oriented following can be
ordered to the polls or onto the streets at will. Its members vociferously
demonstrate their leader's popularity, swell audiences, and campaign for him
with extraordinary vigour and often at sacrfice to themselves. A leader can use
such followers as a means of subtle or overt Intimidation, provoking them to
demonstrations or boycotts and encouraging violence with the threat of further
violence to come. He can restrain them from action or violence if it seems
advantageous. He has, in short, a most malleable instrument to use at will. 66 A
charismatic hold on some part of his following permits a leader greater
flexibility than leaders without charisma are likely to have. Charismatic leaders
are often less constrained. It Is true that they may lose some of their supporters
If they zig-zag sharply or seem to act contrary to their earlier proclaimed
principles. But those who are charismatically oriented to them stay with them
and can be counted upon to do so. The almost automatic obedience a leader can
Dankwart A. Rustow, reply to questionnaire, New York, May. 1989.
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commend from a charismatically oriented following gives him substantial
leverage In his manoeuvres with either leaders and groups. Should he wish to
dissimulate, a sometimes useful strategy In manoeuvering for power, he can
manipulate followers to increase his credibility.
A political leader in power may proclaim and proselytize a measure, policy, a
programme. To carry one out, however, requires the efforts of others, no matter
how much persuasion, patronage, bargaining, threat, or other tactic he may
employ to stimulate them to marshal that effort. A leader's charisma can also
play a role In the implementation of his goals. One cannot send back in time
survey researchers and pollsters to ascertain how much of the efforts of aides,
civil servants, and others was due to their charismatic devotion to the leaders and
how much to a sense of duty, agreement, opportunism, fear, or other motives.
One's study of Nasser as a charismatic leader yields the Impressions of the
contributions of political charisma. The charismatic Interplay between leader
and followers seems to release considerable energy, at least for a period of time,
in support of the major goals of that leader. Accounts of the early periods of
Nasser's rule In Egypt stress the energy and enthusiasm of those members of the
state who were not opponents or treated as such. Their zeal to forward the new
order apparently existed despite the increasing curbs on civil rights and the
Increasing regimentation. Such observed enthusiasm and energy, however, may
not In all Instances be correctly credited to charismatic leadership.67 If a
leader has tapped the latent desires of people and their goals and his desires and
goals coincide or overlap, his charisma was not the major catalyst for their zeal.
Fairly unambiguous cases of charisma affecting the accomplishment of leadership
goals are those in which people implement them at a cost to themselves. When
they voluntarily sacrifice something, materially or otherwise, or undergo
hardships at the bidding of a loader to further policies that are his rather than
theirs, the stimulus would seem to be his charisma.66
6lPeter Mansfield, NASSER'S E6YPT. London Penguin Books Ltd. 1965. p.109.
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The implementation of a leaders foreign policy may also be facilitated by his
charisma, especially if the policy is one perceived as risky. Those who might
oppose the policy within his own country might be hesitant to do so openly, not
wanting a confrontation with his charismatically oriented supporters. More
important, however, can be the credibility he can gain externally because of his
known charismatic constituency.
Reflections on the contributions of political charisma to power and policy can lead
to some questions about what charisma has failed to accomplish in these areas. If
a charismatic leader can count on almost automatic obedience to his commands
from followers, why have some explicit goals of charismatic leaders failed to be
realized? One of the obvious factors affecting what a charismatic leader can do is
how far his charisma extends. The radius of a public figures charisma has
rarely, if ever, extended to include all or most of those under the official bounds
of his authority. Even systems of authority with a strong charismatic component
tend to be mixed. A charismatic leader cannot count on constant compliance from
followers who are not part of his charismatic constituency and can count on little
from his opponents but opposition.
In an open or even partially open political system, the status and resources of
those who oppose the charismatic political executive or his policies can limit the
extent of charismatic contribution. The uses of political charisma can thus be
constrained by the type and rules of the political system within which the
charismatic leader operates and by whether and how he chooses to circumvent or
change them. Political charisma in and of itself has rarely, if ever, been
sufficient to accomplish a complete reordering of a system or a revolution.
Nasser, as Egypt's ruler, was willing to persuade the Egyptian masses of his ideas
but could not contemplate using force to keep them in that persuasion. Hence, the
MansfIeId, NASSERS EGYPT, op.cIt. p.119.
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magnitude of change accomplished In Egypt was limited to a few areas of the
socio-economic sphere. Thus, the limits of what a charismatic leader can do are
not only influenced by the size and status of the charismatic constituency and the
system within which a leader works. They are also partly determined by what a
given charismatic loader may or may not choose to do and by the means he may
employ or reject in exploiting his charisma. Apart from the goals a charismatic
leader may set himself or his priorities, there Is the further limitation of the
means or measures that might be employed.
Finally, it Is likely that charisma Is limited by how far and how often It can be
personally projected. The heroic feats by charismatic leaders are infrequent. A
charismatic leader who holds office cannot spend the greater part of his day
touring the country or communicating through radio or television. in addition,
the leader's directives that are communicated to people through various layers of
the bureaucratic pyramid may attenuate charismatic effectiveness. Perhaps the
ultimate limitation on the effectiveness or polItical cIarfsmo Is ifs fnIIfIp' Iii
prevent a leader from being the object of military coups by army officers if they
ore both united and determined to do so. It is true that a leader's charisma can
help to deter or modify attempts to oust him. However, its effectiveness in such
instances may depend upon divisions within the military and the leaders control
on the masses. After Nasser's humiliating defeat in 1967, subsequent to his
failure to raise significantly the standard of living of the Egyptian masses, there
were rumours of impending attempts to oust him. His demonstration of a
charismatic hold on the volatile Cairo populace may well have been a major factor
in discouraging such attempts.69
Whether or not a given leader's charisma has lasted through his tenure of office
or his lifetime, some of Its effects have often endured much beyond either. It
appears that their charisma stimulated political activism on the part of many
people who had been apolitical or politically apathetic. As a result of their
Ferdlnand Hurni, Nassers Domestic PoIItIcs, SWISS REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS.
June, 1968, Vo.18, PP.13-14.
379
influincc, political participation ccm to havr Incrracd considerably In th1r
countries. Admittedly, arousal to political awareness and activity through
charismatic followership does not necessarily lead to autonomous and educated
political Judgement. But habits of participation may remain long after their
original stimulus is gone and may be rechanneled In various directions. Another
consequence of charismatic leadership, although not Inevitably a direct one, one
has been the lessening of social and status Inequalities. A country led by a
charismatic leader has often been marked by relatively rigid class and status
distinctions and a strong bias In favour of aristocratic elites. But such a leader
seems to have selected their own aides and lieutenants from a range of social
backgrounds. Posts of power and prestige were not restricted to those of the
upper classes. In Nasser's regime, more of these positions appear to have been
occupied by those of the middle class origin than In the preceding regime.70
Apart from the example in allocation of posts and favours, charismatic leaders,
especially in the Third World, usually employ rhetoric and slogans that
emphasize social equality and community and that often gave positive
reinforcement to their lower strata of their societies. Although it would be
difficult to trace the influence of such emphasis on subsequent attitudes and
behaviour, there probably were subtle but desirable effects, if only on how the
'lower orders' learned to view themselves. Other action, policies, and
programmes that flowed in part from the exercise of charismatic appeal, directly
or indirectly, helped to modify social structures and social attitudes. It thus can
be argued that by and large increased circulation of elites and increased mobility
characterized the rule and legacy of charismatic political leaders. In some
Instances, certain segments of their societies gained appreciably or social
distance among some segments diminished. Such changes continue past the period
of the leader. Particularly in the Third World countries, charismatic leadership
seems to have contributed to the growth of a sense of national Identity and to the
development of national unity among their peoples. These two processes, which
70 See Fouad Ajami, 0n Nasser and his Legacy, JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. XI.
1974, PP.41-49.
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ore often referred to Interchangeably, have somewhat different relerrents,
although they are related. National Identity refers to people's identification with
and beyond local and other parochial Identification with their region or class.
National unity refers to a basic consensus among disparate groups In a state and a
subsequent modicum of shared values for the state to survive. Charismatic
leadership seems to have aided the growth of nationhood in several ways. The
very presence of charismatic leaders, especially when they travelled, helped to
promote it. For those people who had little or no knowledge of the abstract entity
of the state, much less loyalty to it, the charismatic leader became the concrete
embodiment of an authority higher than those they were accustomed to. For those
who saw the state and its national capital as remote, alien, and possibly hostile,
the presence of the charismatic leader was an electrifying sign that the 'country'
cared about them and their welfare.11
Charismatic political leaders by and large seem to be strenuous travellers. As a
result of this, their messages relating to national identity and unity were likely
to have been received and internalized with greater conviction than similar
messages from others. Or their messages may have been transmitted and heard
more widely than others. Some charismatic leaders have used their charisma to
create or help popularize national symbols. Even the use of traditional symbols
as an aid to charisma could have a feedback effect so that charisma in turn
reinforced the resonance of these symbols.
Perhaps the most lasting legacy of charismatic political leadership is the
postmortem charismatic myth in which it becomes clothed. The charismatic
leader gains his charisma in part through tapping the traditional myths and
71 For details on the contribution of charisma to nation-building. see Ann R. Wiliner
and Dorothy Whiner, Charismatic Political Leadership as Conservator and Cataiyst.
In A.R. Davis, ed., TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES AND MODERN STYLES IN POLITICAL
LEADERSHIP, London and Sydney : Angus and Robertson. 1973. pp .17-28; Thomas Dow,
Jr. The Role of Charisma In Modern African Deveiopment. SOCIAL FORCES. 46,
March, 1969, p.339; Edward Shils, The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma
Their Bearing and Economic Policy In Underdeveloped Countries, WORLD POLITICS.
1958-59, Vol.11, pp.1-19.
381
symbols of his society. Subsequently. he and his works take on in turn a mythic
quohty and become part of the reservoir of myths and symbols for that society
and perhaps even for others. He and his deeds are then drawn upon by the leaders
and generations that follow. Even those for whom he was not charismatic and those
from whom he ceased being so did share In the drama he enacted. And they too
transmit its awe and aura to their descendants. Myths of some charismatic
leaders seem able to surmount and survive efforts to destroy them by those who
succeed these leaders. It is, after all, the unbelievable that helps give rise to
charisma, to the awe that sustains it and the myth that succeeds it. The
charismatic leader is in a sense the Prometheus of politics who also steals from
the gods by stretching political reality beyond the bounds of belief and prediction.
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I. A Note on Documentary Sources and Translation.
This study is based largely on published literature in English and Arabic. A note
on the translation at the onset of Chapter Three, indicates that as the Arabic
language has Its own alphabet, there is no standard English language spelling for
Arabic words. Common nouns are spelled as they are most usually reproduced in
English. An attempt has been made to spell all book titles and names as their
writers spell them in translation.
II. Interviews and Correspondence.
Personal interviews and correspondence provided a valuable supplement to
documentary evidence. Listed below are the names of those persons who
graciously consented to Interviews or who responded to my questions by letter,
brief descriptions of their professional backgrounds, and the places and dates of
interviews or dotes of correspondence.
Foued Ajomi,
Director of Middle East Studies at the School for Advanced International Studies,
John Hopkins University,
Personal interview, New York, 14 May, 1989.
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Deputy Director of the Arab Research Center,
Personal interview, London, 23Apr11, 1988.
All Hillel Dessouki,
Professor of Economics and Political Science, University of Cairo and
International Institute of Strategic Studies,
Personal Interview, London, 24 April, 15 June, 1988.
Abdel Majid Fond,
Director of the Arab Research Center,
Personal Interview, London, 21 April, 1988.
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Political Correspondent, AL AHRAII,
Personal Interview. London, 16 January. 1989.
Albert Hourani,
Director of the Middle Eastern Center and Fellow of St. Anthony's College at
Oxford.
Personal interview, London, 13 March, 1968.
Peter Mansfield,
Middle East Journalist,
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Sir Anthony Nutting,
Secretary of Foreign Affairs In the Anthony Eden Cabinet prior to the Suez Crisis,
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Dankwart Rustow,
Professor at City University of New York, Department of Political Science,
Letter, 25 August, 1989.
All Sabri,
Political Assistant to Gamal Abdel Nasser, 1954-1970,
Letter, 11 July, 1989.
Robert Stephens,
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Michael Wall,
Editor, Middle East International,
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